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Abstract
Service-oriented computing, an emerging paradigm for distributed computing based on
the use of services, is calling for the development of tools and techniques to build safe
and trustworthy systems, and to analyse their behaviour. Therefore, many researchers
have proposed to use process calculi, a cornerstone of current foundational research on
specification and analysis of concurrent, reactive, and distributed systems. In this the-
sis we illustrate this approach by focussing on COWS, a process calculus expressly de-
signed for specifying and combining service-oriented applications, while modelling their
dynamic behaviour. We show that COWS can model all the phases of the life cycle of
service-oriented applications, such as publication, discovery, negotiation, orchestration,
deployment, reconfiguration and execution. We present the calculus and a number of
methods and tools that have been devised to analyse COWS terms: a type system to
check confidentiality properties, a bisimulation-based observational semantics to check
interchangeability of services and conformance against service specifications, a temporal
logic and a model checker to express and check functional properties of services. We also
show COWS’s expressiveness both for modelling imperative and orchestration constructs,
and for encoding other process and orchestration languages. We illustrate our approach
through many specific examples and two large case studies, from automotive and financial
domains.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years, the increasing success of e-business, e-learning, e-government, and other
similar emerging models, has led the World Wide Web, initially thought of as a system
for human use, to evolve towards an architecture for Service-Oriented Computing (SOC)
supporting automated use. This emerging paradigm finds its origin in object-oriented and
component-based software development, and aims at enabling developers to build net-
works of interoperable and collaborative applications, regardless of the platform where
the applications run and of the programming language used to develop them, through the
use of independent computational units, called services. Services are loosely coupled
reusable components, that are built with little or no knowledge about clients and other
services involved in their operating environment. In the end, SOC systems deliver appli-
cation functionalities as services to either end-user applications or other services.
There are by now some successful and well-developed instantiations of the general
SOC paradigm, like e.g. Web Services and Grid Computing, that exploit the pervasiveness
of Internet and related standards. However, current software engineering technologies for
SOC remain at the descriptive level and lack rigorous formal foundations. In the design
of SOC systems we are still experiencing a gap between practice (programming) and the-
ory (formal methods and analysis techniques). The challenges come from the necessity
of dealing at once with such issues as asynchronous interactions, concurrent activities,
workflow coordination, business transactions, failures, resource usage, and security, in a
setting where demands and guarantees can be very different for the many different com-
ponents. Many researchers have hence put forward the idea of using process calculi, a
cornerstone of current foundational research on specification and analysis of concurrent,
reactive and distributed systems through mathematical — mainly algebraic and logical —
tools. Indeed, due to their algebraic nature, process calculi convey in a distilled form the
compositional programming style of SOC.
A major benefit of using process calculi, however, is that they enjoy a rich repertoire
of elegant meta-theories, proof techniques and analytical tools that can be likely tailored
to the needs of SOC. In fact, it has been already argued that type systems, modal and
temporal logics, and observational equivalences provide adequate tools to address topics
1
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relevant to SOC (see e.g. [146, 195]). This ‘proof technology’ can eventually pave the
way for the development of automatic property validation tools. Therefore, process calculi
might play a central role in laying rigorous methodological foundations for specification
and validation of SOC applications. Many process calculi for SOC have hence been pro-
posed either by enriching well-established process calculi with specific constructs (e.g.
the variants of pi-calculus with transactions [32, 127, 128] and of CSP with compensation
[52]) or by designing completely new formalisms (e.g. [131, 172, 50, 125, 104, 34, 35]).
This thesis focusses on one of these proposals, namely the process calculus COWS
(Calculus for Orchestration of Web Services, [131]). The design of the calculus has been
influenced by the principles underlying the OASIS standard for orchestration of web ser-
vices WS-BPEL [166], and in fact COWS supports service instances with shared states,
allows a process to play more than one partner role, permits programming stateful sessions
by correlating different service interactions, and enables management of long-running
transactions. COWS has also taken advantage of previous work on process calculi. In-
deed, it combines in an original way constructs and features borrowed from well-known
process calculi, e.g. non-binding input activities, asynchronous communication, polyadic
synchronization, pattern matching, protection, delimited receiving and killing activities,
while however resulting different from any of them.
We put forward to use COWS as a linguistic formalism for specifying and combining
service-oriented applications, while modelling their dynamic behaviour. We present the
calculus and a number of methods and tools that we have devised to analyse COWS terms:
a type system to check confidentiality properties, a bisimulation-based observational se-
mantics to check interchangeability of services and conformance against service specifi-
cations, a temporal logic and a model checker to express and check functional properties
of services, and a symbolic characterisation of the operational semantics. We illustrate
our approach and COWS’s expressiveness through many specific examples and two large
case studies, from automotive and financial domains.
1.1 About this thesis
In Chapter 2, we give an overview of SOC, by focussing on the standard language for
orchestration of web services WS-BPEL [166]. Then, we point out major ambiguous fea-
tures of the WS-BPEL specification by means of many examples, some of which are also
exploited to test and compare the behaviour of three of the most known freely available
WS-BPEL engines. We show that these ambiguities have led to engines implementing
different semantics and, hence, complicate the task of developing WS-BPEL applications
and undermine their portability across different platforms. To face these difficulties, we
put forward using formal methods as a means to build up a framework to precisely de-
scribe the most significant aspects of a SOC application (e.g. a WS-BPEL program), to
state and prove its properties, and to direct attention towards issues that might otherwise
be overlooked. A formal approach also enables tailoring proof techniques and analytical
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tools typical of process calculi to the needs of SOC applications. We briefly review some
of these techniques and tools, and end the chapter with an informal presentation of the
two case studies that will be used throughout the thesis for illustration purposes.
In Chapter 3, we introduce the formal language COWS used for specifying and
analysing SOC applications. To gradually introduce the technicalities and distinctive fea-
tures of COWS, we present its syntax and operational semantics in three steps. More
specifically, firstly we consider the fragment of COWS without priority in parallel com-
position and linguistic constructs dealing with termination, then we enrich it with priority
in parallel composition and, finally, we extend again the calculus by adding primitives
for termination. For each of the three calculi we show many simple clarifying examples.
After a discussion on the correspondence between WS-BPEL activities and COWS terms,
we conclude with the specification in COWS of the two case studies informally described
in the previous chapter.
In Chapter 4, we present some methods and tools to analyse COWS terms. Firstly,
we introduce a type system for checking confidentiality properties, that uses types to ex-
press and enforce policies for regulating the exchange of data among services. Secondly,
we describe a logical verification methodology for checking functional properties of SOC
systems. The properties are described by means of SocL, a logic specifically designed
to express in a convenient way peculiar aspects of services, such as, e.g., acceptance of
a request, provision of a response, and correlation among service requests and responses.
Service behaviours, of course, are specified using COWS. The verification of SocL for-
mulae over COWS specifications relies on an abstraction phase and is assisted by the
on-the-fly model checker CMC. Thirdly, we study a bisimulation-based observational se-
mantics for COWS, that is directly usable to check interchangeability of services and
conformance against service specifications. We define natural notions of strong and weak
open barbed bisimilarities and prove their coincidence with more manageable characteri-
sations in terms of labelled bisimilarities. Finally, we define a symbolic characterisation of
the operational semantics of COWS that avoids infinite representations of COWS terms
due to the value-passing nature of communication in COWS and is more amenable for
automatic manipulation by analytical tools, such as e.g. model and equivalence checkers.
In Chapter 5, we demonstrate COWS’s expressiveness by showing some encodings
of other formal languages for SOC: the three orchestration languages Orc, SCC and ws-
calculus, the process calculus Lpi, and the modelling language SRML. Moreover, we
present two COWS variants that permit modelling timed activities and dynamic service
publication, discovery and negotiation. This way, the obtained linguistic formalism is
capable of modelling all the phases of the life cycle of SOC applications.
In Chapter 6, we conclude with some final remarks and touch upon directions for
future work.
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This thesis is mainly the result of a collaboration with Dott. Alessandro Lapadula and
Prof. Rosario Pugliese of Dipartimento di Sistemi e Informatica at Universita` degli Studi
di Firenze. Besides them, other people that have contributed with their work to this the-
sis are Federico Banti, Laura Bocchi, Alessandro Fantechi, Jose´ Luiz Fiadeiro, Stefania
Gnesi, Franco Mazzanti, and Nobuko Yoshida. Thus, part of the chapters has appeared in
joint papers with them. In particular:
• Chapter 2 is based on [135, 137, 11];
• Chapter 3 is based on [131, 134, 174, 137, 11];
• Chapter 4 is based on [132, 174, 83, 175];
• Chapter 5 is based on [131, 134, 130, 31, 133, 136].
Some of the above papers have provided basis for the PhD thesis of Dott. Alessandro
Lapadula that, besides COWS, presents other different approaches to model languages
for web services orchestration: Blite, a lightweight language designed around some of
WS-BPEL specific features, and ws-calculus, a calculus equipped with a typing disci-
pline aiming at formalizing the relationship existing between WS-BPEL processes and
the associated WSDL documents. This thesis, instead, focusses on COWS as specifica-
tion language for SOC and introduces more techniques for analysing COWS terms.
Some of the work presented in this thesis has also been exploited by other researchers
in [172, 173, 16, 205, 202].
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Chapter 2
Background and motivations
In this introductory chapter, we set the scene of the whole thesis, by providing background
notions from SOC and formal methods theory, and by outlining the main motivations
behind this thesis.
After a general overview of the SOC paradigm, we introduce WS-BPEL, the standard
language for orchestration of web services. We show many examples to point out major
ambiguous features of the WS-BPEL specification and to test and compare the behaviour
of three of the most known freely available WS-BPEL engines. Such ambiguities have led
to engines implementing different semantics and, hence, complicate the task of developing
WS-BPEL applications and undermine their portability across different platforms.
We then present an approach based on formal methods to face the above difficulties,
which permits to build up a framework to precisely describe the most significant aspects
of a SOC application (e.g. a WS-BPEL program), to state and prove its properties, and
to direct attention towards issues that might otherwise be overlooked. A benefit of this
approach is that it enables tailoring proof techniques and analytical tools typical of process
calculi to the needs of SOC applications. Therefore, we outline some of the relevant tools
for analysing process calculi terms, and give a glimpse of pi-calculus, a cornerstone of
current foundational research on specification and analysis of concurrent, reactive, and
distributed systems.
We end the chapter with an informal presentation of the two case studies that will be
used throughout the thesis for illustration purposes.
Structure of the chapter. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1
presents basic elements of service-oriented architecture and computing. Section 2.2 pro-
vides an overview of WS-BPEL and shows many peculiar examples and the results of our
experimentation with some WS-BPEL engines. Section 2.3 introduces formal methods
as a mean to specify and analyse SOC application, with special concern on process cal-
culi and the related theory. Section 2.4 presents two case studies, from automotive and
financial domains.
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Figure 2.1: Service-Oriented Architecture
2.1 Service-Oriented Computing
Service-oriented computing (SOC) is emerging as an evolutionary paradigm for dis-
tributed and e-business computing that finds its origin in object-oriented and component-
based software development. Early examples of technologies that are at least partly
service-oriented are CORBA, DCOM, J2EE or .NET. Also, early adopters of the SOC
approach have created their own service-oriented enterprise architectures based on mes-
saging systems, such as IBM WebSphere.
A more recent successful instantiation of the SOC paradigm are web services. These
are sets of operations (i.e. functionalities) that can be published, located and invoked
through the Web via XML messages complying with given standard formats. To support
the web service approach, several new languages and technologies have been designed
and many international companies have invested a lot of efforts.
There is a common way to view the web service architecture. It focuses on three major
roles:
• Service provider: The software entity that implements a service specification and
makes it available on the Internet. Providers publish machine-readable service de-
scriptions on registries to enable automated discovery and invocation.
• Service requestor (or client): The software entity that invokes a service provider. A
service requestor can be an end-user application or another service.
• Service broker: A specific kind of service provider that allows automated publica-
tion and discovery of services by relying on a registry.
Figure 2.1 shows the three service roles and how they interact with each other. This
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architecture, and the context of services use, imposes a series of constraints. Here are
some key characteristics for effective use of services (see, e.g., [43]):
• Coarse-grained: Operations on services are frequently implemented to encompass
more functionalities and operate on larger data sets, compared to those of fine-
grained components as well as object-oriented interfaces.
• Interface-based design: Services implement separately defined interfaces. The ben-
efit of this is that multiple services can implement a common interface and a service
can implement multiple interfaces. The set of interfaces implemented by a service
is called service description. In addition to the functions that the service performs,
service descriptions should also include non-functional properties, such as e.g., re-
sponse time, availability, reliability, security, and performance, that jointly represent
the quality of the service. In this case, they are also called service contracts.
• Discoverable: Services need to be found at both design time and run time by service
requestors.
• Loosely coupled: Services are connected to other services and clients using stan-
dard, dependency-reducing, decoupled message-based methods such as XML doc-
ument exchanges.
• Asynchronous: In general, services use an asynchronous message passing approach.
However, this is not required; in fact, some services may use synchronous message
passing too.
Some of these criteria, such as interface-based design and discoverability, are also used in
component-based development; however, it is the sum of these attributes that differentiates
a service-based application from a component-based one. It is beneficial, for example, to
make web services asynchronous to reduce the time a requestor spends waiting for re-
sponses. By making a service call asynchronous, with a separate return message, the
requestor will be able to continue execution while the provider has a chance to respond.
This is not to say that synchronous service behavior is wrong, just that experience has
demonstrated that asynchronous service behavior is desirable, especially where commu-
nication costs are high or network latency is unpredictable, and provides the developer
with a simpler scalability model [43].
To support the web service approach, many new languages, most of which based on
XML, have been designed. The technologies that form the foundations of web services
are SOAP, WSDL, and UDDI. Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP, [38]) is responsible
for encoding messages in a common XML format so that they can be understood at either
end by all communicating services. Currently, SOAP is the principal XML-based standard
for exchanging information between applications within a distributed environment. Web
Service Description Language (WSDL, [66]) is responsible for describing the public in-
terface of a specific web service. Through a WSDL description, that is an XML document,
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a client application can determine the location of the remote web service, the functions
it implements, as well as how to access and use each function. After parsing a WSDL
description, a client application can appropriately format a SOAP request and dispatch it
to the location of the web service. In this setting, Universal Description, Discovery, and
Integration (UDDI [194]) is responsible for centralizing services into a common registry
and providing easy publish and find functionalities. The relationships between SOAP,
WSDL, and UDDI are depicted in Figure 2.1.
To move beyond the basic framework describe-publish-interact and to better appre-
ciate the real value of web services, mechanisms for service composition and quality of
service protocols are required. Several specifications have been proposed in these areas,
most notably service composition languages such as Web Services Business Process Ex-
ecution Language (WS-BPEL, [166]) and Web Services Choreography Description Lan-
guage (WS-CDL, [118]), and standards for other important aspects of services such as
WS-Transaction [165], WS-Security [164], and WS-Reliable Messaging [163].
In the web services literature [170], terms orchestration and choreography are both
used to describe composition of web services. Orchestration describes how web services
can interact with each other at the message level, including the business logic and the ex-
ecution order of the interactions. These interactions may span applications and/or organi-
zations, and result in a long-lived, transactional, multi-step process model. Choreography
tracks the sequence of messages that may involve multiple parties. For orchestration, the
process is always controlled from the perspective of one of the business parties. Chore-
ography is more collaborative in nature: it is defined according to a global perspective,
where each party involved in the process describes the part that plays in the choreography.
A service orchestration combines services following a certain composition pattern to
achieve a business goal or provide new service functions in general. For example, han-
dling a purchase order is the summation of processes that calculate the final price for
the order, select a shipper, and schedule the production and shipment for the order. It
is worth emphasizing that service orchestrations may themselves become services, mak-
ing composition a recursive operation. In the example above, handling a purchase order
may become a service that is instantiated to serve each received purchase order separately
from other similar requests. This is necessary because a client might be carrying on many
simultaneous purchase order interactions with the same service.
Service descriptions are thus used as templates for creating service instances that de-
liver application functionality to either end-user applications or other instances. The tech-
nology supporting tightly coupled communication frameworks typically establishes an
active connection between interacting entities that persists for the duration of a given
business activity (or even longer). Because the connection remains active, context is in-
herently present, and correlation between individual transmissions of data is intrinsically
managed by the technology protocol itself. Instead, the loosely coupled nature of SOC
implies that a same service should be identifiable by means of different logic names and
the connection between communicating instances cannot be assumed to persist for the du-
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ration of a whole business activity. Therefore, there is no intrinsic mechanism for associ-
ating messages exchanged under a common context or as part of a common activity. Even
the execution of a simple request-response message exchange pattern provides no built-in
means of automatically associating the response message with the original request. It is
up to each single message to provide a form of context thus enabling services to associate
the message with others. This is achieved by embedding values in the message which,
once located, can be used to correlate the message with others logically forming a same
stateful interaction ‘session’. A key observation is that message correlation is an essential
part of messaging within SOC as it enables the persistence of activities’ context and state
across multiple message exchanges while preserving service statelessness and autonomy,
and the loosely coupled nature of service-oriented systems.
A further key feature of languages for service composition is the recovery mechanism
for long-running business transactions. In SOC environments, the ordinary assumptions
about primitive operations in traditional databases (Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation and
Durability, ACID) are not applicable in general because local locks and isolation cannot
be maintained for the long periods (see [166], Section 12.3). Therefore, many languages
for service composition rely on the concept of compensation, i.e. activities that attempt
to reverse the effects of a previous activity that was carried out as part of a larger unit of
work that is being abandoned.
In the next section we will focus our attention on WS-BPEL, an OASIS standard lan-
guage for web service orchestration.
2.2 Overview of WS-BPEL and experimentation
We provide an overview of WS-BPEL and present some illustrative examples of WS-
BPEL programs used to test and compare the behaviour of three of the most known freely
available WS-BPEL engines. The section ends with an evaluation of the results of our
experimentation.
2.2.1 A glimpse of WS-BPEL
WS-BPEL is essentially a linguistic layer on top of WSDL for describing the structural
aspects of web service orchestration. In practice, and briefly, WSDL is a W3C standard
that permits to express the functionalities offered and required by web services by defin-
ing, akin object interfaces in Object-Oriented Programming, the signatures of operations
and the structure of messages for invoking them and returned by them. The WSDL docu-
ment associated with a WS-BPEL program can then be exploited to verify the possibility
of connecting different services.
In WS-BPEL, the logic of interaction between a service and its environment is de-
scribed in terms of structured patterns of communication actions composed by means of
control flow constructs that enable the representation of complex structures. Orchestra-
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tion exploits state information that is maintained through shared variables and managed
through message correlation. For the specification of orchestration, WS-BPEL provides
many different activities that are distinguished between basic activities and structured
activities.
The following basic activities are provided: <receive> and <reply>, to enable
web service one-way and request-response operations; <invoke>, to invoke web ser-
vice operations; <wait>, to delay execution for some amount of time; <assign>, to
update the values of variables with new data; <throw>, to signal internal faults; <exit>,
to immediately end the service instance; <empty>, to do nothing; <compensate> and
<compensateScope>, to invoke compensation handlers; <rethrow>, to propagate faults;
<validate>, to validate variables; and <extensionActivity>, to add new activity
types.
The structured activities describe the control flow logic of a business process by com-
posing basic and/or structured activities recursively. The following structured activities
are provided: <sequence>, to process activities sequentially; <if>, to process activities
conditionally; <while> and <repeatUntil>, to repetitively execute activities; <flow>,
to process activities in parallel; <pick>, to perform activities selectively; <forEach>, to
(sequentially or in parallel) perform multiple activities; and <scope>, to associate han-
dlers for exceptional events to a primary activity.
Notably, synchronization dependencies among activities, other than by means of con-
trol flow constructs, can also be specified through flow links to form directed acyclic
graphs. A flow link is a conditional transition that connects a ‘source’ activity to a ‘target’
activity. When a source activity completes, the associated transition condition is evalu-
ated to determine the status of the join condition that acts on the flow link of the target
activity. A target activity may only start when all its source activities complete and its join
condition evaluates to true.
The handlers within a <scope> can be of four different kinds: <faultHandler>,
to provide the activities in response to faults occurring during execution of the primary
activity; <compensationHandler>, to provide the activities to compensate the success-
fully executed primary activity; <terminationHandler>, to control the forced termi-
nation of the primary activity; and <eventHandler>, to process message or timeout
events occurring during execution of the primary activity. If a fault occurs during exe-
cution of a primary activity, the control is transferred to the corresponding fault handler
and all currently running activities inside the scope are interrupted immediately without
involving any fault/compensation handling behaviour. If another fault occurs during a
fault/compensation handling, then it is re-thrown, possibly, to the immediately enclosing
scope. Compensation handlers attempt to reverse the effects of previously successfully
completed primary activities (scopes) and have been introduced to support Long-Running
(Business) Transactions (LRTs). Compensation can only be invoked from within fault or
compensation handlers starting the compensation either of a specific inner (completed)
scope, or of all inner completed scopes in the reverse order of completion. Invoking a
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compensation handler that is unavailable is equivalent to perform an empty activity.
A WS-BPEL program, also called (business) process, is a <process>, that is a sort of
<scope> without compensation and termination handlers.
WS-BPEL uses the basic notion of partner link to directly model peer-to-peer relation-
ships between services. This relationship is expressed at the WSDL level by specifying
the roles played by each of the services in the interaction. However, the information pro-
vided by partner links is not enough to deliver messages to a business process. Indeed,
since multiple instances of a same service can be simultaneously active because service
operations can be independently invoked by several clients, messages need to be deliv-
ered not only to the correct partner, but also to the correct instance of the service that the
partner provides. To achieve this, WS-BPEL relies on the business data exchanged rather
than on specific mechanisms, such as WS-Addressing [103] or low-level methods based
on SOAP headers. In fact, WS-BPEL exploits correlation sets, namely sets of correlation
variables (called properties in WS-BPEL jargon), to declare the parts of a message that
can be used to identify an instance. This way, a message can be delivered to the correct
instance on the basis of the values associated to the correlation variables, independently
of any routing mechanism.
2.2.2 An assessment of three WS-BPEL engines
We now present some illustrative examples of WS-BPEL programs and use them to test
and compare the behaviour of three of the most known freely available WS-BPEL engines,
namely ActiveBPEL [4], Apache ODE [9] and Oracle BPEL Process Manager [167] (the
former two are open source projects, whereas the latter is distributed under the Oracle
Technology Network Developer License)1. For our evaluation, we have taken into account
fundamental features of WS-BPEL that remained unchanged since its initial version.
For the sake of readability, in this section WS-BPEL programs are presented by ex-
ploiting the graphical notations introduced in Figure 2.2, rather than the usual verbose
textual form. We additionally use the following symbols:
• i© to label an activity that initializes correlated variables;
• u© to label a receive activity that does not use correlated variables;
• c© to label an activity that checks correlated variables;
• ic© to label an activity that initializes or checks correlated variables;
• to label an activity waiting for a message from a partner;
• 4 to label a completed activity;
1ActiveBPEL and Oracle BPEL Process Manager are also part of (commercial) tool suites, namely Ac-
tiveVOS and Oracle SOA Suite, for designing, developing, testing, deploying and maintaining WS-BPEL
applications.
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Figure 2.2: Basic/structured activities and service components
• to label a completed start activity that initiates a new instance of the service;
• 8 to label a terminated activity due to the execution of <exit> or <throw> activi-
ties.
Example 2.2.1 (Message correlation) A client can request a log-on operation via Lo-
gOn, and can request some logging information via RequestLogInfo; this information
can be asynchronously obtained by implementing the callback operation SendLogInfo
(on the use of asynchronous request-response patterns in service-oriented applications see
also Example 2.2.2). Correlation variables can be exploited to correlate, by means of
their same contents, different service interactions logically forming a same ‘session’. For
example, consider the simple service LogOnService in Figure 2.3(a) providing ‘log-on’
and ‘request-log-info’ operations. Initially, to request a log-on a client must send its logID
with some other data. Then, the service waits for a request from the client to provide
some logging information2. After that, the service can reply (and terminate) by sending
the requested information to the client. Notably, the WS-BPEL process in Figure 2.3(a)
cannot ensure that the service does provide logging information properly. In fact, since
the messages for operations LogOn and RequestLogInfo are uncorrelated, if concurrent
instances are running then, e.g., successive invocations for the same instance can be mixed
up and delivered to a wrong instance. This behavior can be prevented by simply correlat-
ing consecutive messages by means of some correlation data, e.g. logID, as in the modified
service LogOnService of Figure 2.3(b).
2For the sake of simplicity, we assume here that the logging information are simply the data sent by the
client through invocation of operation LogOn. In a more realistic scenario, of course, logging information
could be internally computed by LogOnService or retrieved from a (possibly external) service.
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Figure 2.3: Message correlation
A special case is when the two initial receives are on the same partner and operation,
as in Figure 2.3(c) where LogOnService requires some extra-information from the client,
so that it waits for two consecutive log-on requests to let the client logging on the service.
This is allowed by the WS-BPEL specification [166, Section 10.4] that, however, does
not mention that possible conflicting receives could arise. This situation is illustrated in
Figure 2.4(a), where it is assumed that a client process has performed two log-on requests
with data info1 and info2 that, accordingly to the intended semantics of WS-BPEL, should
trigger only one instantiation of the service. This is indeed the behaviour of ActiveBPEL
and Apache ODE, that exploit the received data to correlate the two consecutive receives
and, thus, to prevent creation of a wrong new instance. On the contrary, when executing
this example, Oracle BPEL creates two instances, one for each received request as shown
in Figure 2.4(b). An important consequence, and indeed an unexpected side effect, is that
the created instances are in conflict and, then, will soon get stuck.
Example 2.2.2 (Asynchronous message delivering) In service-oriented systems com-
munication paradigms are usually asynchronous (mainly for scalability reasons [43]), in
the sense that there may be an arbitrary delay between the sending and the receiving of a
message, the ordering in which messages are received may differ from that in which they
were sent, and a sender cannot determine if and when a sent message will be received.
We can guess from [166, Section 10.4], that this is also the case of WS-BPEL. To illus-
trate, consider the WS-BPEL process in Figure 2.5(a) representing a client logging on the
previous service depicted in Figure 2.3(b). After the request for some user information
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Figure 2.6: Multiple start activities
is performed by the first invoke activity, a service instance is created as a result of con-
sumption of the request for logging on the service produced by the second invoke activity
as depicted in Figure 2.5(b). Now, the first produced message is not considered expired
and, thus, can be consumed by the newly created service instance. All the examined WS-
BPEL engines tacitly agree with this communication paradigm, although no requirement
is explicitly reported in the WS-BPEL specification.
Example 2.2.3 (Multiple start and conflicting receive activities) When defining ser-
vices, the WS-BPEL specification allows for using multiple start activities [166, Section
10.4]. However, it is not clear how conflicting receive activities enabled at instantiation of
such a service must be handled. To explain this point, consider a simple variant of service
LogOnService, called MultiLogOnService, that allows two clients to log on the same ser-
vice instance. Figure 2.6 illustrates two alternative definitions of MultiLogOnService with
the same semantics: the one on the left hand side makes use of activity <flow>, while the
one on the right hand side uses activity <pick>. In both definitions, the service waits for
two log-on requests from clients and then, on demand by one of the two clients, provides
logging information. After a message from a client, say client1, has been processed, an
instance of the service is initiated as illustrated in Figure 2.7(a) (we only consider the case
of the definition in Figure 2.6(a)). Now, the definition and the instance of the service com-
pete for receiving the same message sent by another client that is correlated to that sent by
client1 through the datum logID. In cases like this, the WS-BPEL specification requires
the second message to be delivered to the existing instance, thus preventing creation of a
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Figure 2.7: Multiple start activities: service instantiation
new instance. In fact, the instance in Figure 2.7(a) can only reduce to that of Figure 2.7(b).
In case of conflicting receives, the WS-BPEL specification document prescribes to
raise the standard fault bpel:conflictingReceive, which seems to be somehow in
contrast with what we have illustrated before. In fact, this situation readily occurs when a
service exploits multiple start activities, because of race conditions on incoming messages
among the service definition and the created instances. However, in such cases, it does
not seem fair to raise a fault because the correlation data contained within each incoming
message should be sufficient to decide if the message has to be delivered to a specific
instance or to the service definition. This is indeed a tricky question that leads the three
engines we have considered to behave differently. Indeed, Oracle BPEL always raises the
fault bpel:conflictingReceive, ActiveBPEL exploits correlation to enforce creation
of only one service instance (just like the example in Figure 2.7), whereas Apache ODE
does not currently support multiple start activities.
Example 2.2.4 (Scheduling of parallel activities) While using the WS-BPEL engines,
we have also experimented that they implement the flow activity in a different manner.
For example, the expected behaviour of the WS-BPEL process in Figure 2.8(a) is that
the three assignments are executed in an unpredictable order that may change in different
executions. In fact, only Apache ODE implements this semantics, while the other two
engines execute the assignments in an order fixed in advance, that is sequentially from
left to right in case of ActiveBPEL (Figure 2.8(b)) and from right to left in case of Oracle
BPEL (Figure 2.8(c)).
Example 2.2.5 (Forced termination) The WS-BPEL specification [166, Section 12.6]
states: “The <sequence> and <flow> constructs must be terminated by terminating their
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Figure 2.8: Scheduling of parallel activities
behavior and applying termination to all nested activities currently active within them”.
This sentence is ambiguous because it is not clear what “nested activities currently ac-
tive” means in case of termination due to <exit> or <throw> activities. For example,
consider a sequence of two assign activities. In Oracle BPEL, termination prompted by a
parallel <exit> activity has no effect on the sequence (Figure 2.9(a)), while termination
prompted by a parallel <throw> activity causes execution of only the first assign activ-
ity (Figure 2.9(b)). ActiveBPEL is more compliant to WS-BPEL for which all currently
running activities must be terminated as soon as possible (Figure 2.9(c)) without any fault
handling or compensation [166, Section 10.10]. However, differently from what the WS-
BPEL specification seems to suggests, ActiveBPEL does not distinguish short-lived activ-
ities (i.e. sufficiently brief activities that may be allowed to complete) from basic activities
and makes them terminate in the same way. Finally, Apache ODE is fully compliant with
WS-BPEL, since a termination activity function is applied to the continuation that only
retains short-lived activities.
Example 2.2.6 (Eager execution of activities causing termination) As shown in Ex-
ample 2.2.5, to be compliant with the WS-BPEL requirement stating that termination ac-
tivities must end immediately all currently running activities [166, Section 10.10], when
defining the semantics of WS-BPEL, execution of activities <throw> and <exit> must
have higher priority than execution of the remaining ones. Thus, for example, consider
again a sequence of two assign activities. By executing a parallel <throw> activity, since
assigns are not considered short-lived activities, the whole process can only reduce as
shown in Figure 2.10(a). While ActiveBPEL agrees with this requirement, Oracle BPEL
and Apache ODE do not implement any prioritized behavior for activities forcing termi-
nation. Thus, the above process can also evolve by firstly performing the first <assign>
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Figure 2.9: Forced termination
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Figure 2.10: Eager execution of activities causing termination
activity and then the activity <throw>, as shown in Figure 2.10(b); this way, the first
assign activity is not forced to terminate.
Example 2.2.7 (Handlers protection) The structured activity in Figure 2.11 consists of
a process with two inner parallel activities, one of which being a scope whose primary
activity is a sequence of a scope and a <throw> activity (Throw1), while the other parallel
activity is a basic <throw> activity (Throw2). Suppose that the innermost scope performs
its assignment Assign1 and completes. Then, the associated compensation handler CH
(i.e. the activity Assign2) is installed. When execution of Throw1 rises a fault, then it is
caught by the corresponding fault handler (that here is the default one and, hence, is not
depicted in Figure 2.11) that simply activates the compensation consisting of execution
of Assign2. This activity can be effectively executed since it is appropriately protected
from the effect of execution of the parallel activity Throw2 (which has been enabled by
completion of the scope enclosing Assign1).
We end by remarking two aspects of the compensation mechanism prescribed by the
WS-BPEL specification [166, Sections 12.5 and 10.10]. First, compensation handlers
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Figure 2.11: Handlers protection
of faultily terminated scopes should not be installed. Second, fault and compensation
handlers should not be affected by the activities causing termination. Both aspects are not
faithfully implemented in Oracle BPEL, while ActiveBPEL and Apache ODE meet these
specific requirements and adhere to the intended WS-BPEL semantics.
2.2.3 Evaluation
The results of our experiments, summarized in Table 2.1, point out that the engines we
have experimented with are not fully compliant with the intended semantics of WS-BPEL.
This is also a consequence of the lack of a formal semantics for WS-BPEL, that would
have disambiguated the intricate and complex features of the language. Therefore the
work carried out in this thesis, and works with similar goals, other than as a guide for
developing compliant implementations since the early stages, can be also used for making
future versions of existing implementations more compatible.
We end our evaluation with some observations on the procedure to deploy WS-BPEL
programs, although the description of the deployment is out of scope of the WS-BPEL
specification document [166]. A WS-BPEL process is designed to be a reusable defini-
tion that can be deployed in different ways within different scenarios. In these respects the
three tested engines pose different requirements. ActiveBPEL provides deployment infor-
mation (i.e. partner link bindings and address information) in terms of abstract WS-BPEL
elements (i.e. partner links and partner roles), while Apache ODE and Oracle BPEL Pro-
cess Manager use proprietary defined elements to describe a deployment, regardless of
whether the same elements are declared at WS-BPEL level. The integration of different
deployment documents is then impossible to obtain, which is another factor that reduces
the level of portability a programmer might expect.
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Oracle BPEL ActiveBPEL Apache ODE
Message correlation (Ex. 2.2.1) + + +
Consecutive conflicting receives (Ex. 2.2.1) − + +
Asynchronous message delivering (Ex. 2.2.2) + + +
Multiple start (Ex. 2.2.3) − + −
Scheduling of parallel activities (Ex. 2.2.4) − − +
Short-lived activities (Ex. 2.2.5) + − +
Forced Termination (Ex. 2.2.5) − + +
Eager execution (Ex. 2.2.6) − + −
Handlers protection and installation (Ex. 2.2.7) − + +
Table 2.1: WS-BPEL compliance of the tested engines
2.3 Formal methods for Service-Oriented Computing
We have seen in the previous section that current software engineering technologies for
development and composition of services, like WS-BPEL, remain at the descriptive level
and do not integrate such techniques as, e.g., those developed for component-based soft-
ware development. Formal reasoning mechanisms and analytical tools are still lacking for
checking that the web services resulting from a composition meet desirable correctness
properties and do not manifest unexpected behaviors.
To this aim, in the last few years, many researchers have exploited the studies on pro-
cess calculi as a starting point to define a clean semantic model and lay rigorous method-
ological foundations for service-based applications and their composition. Process cal-
culi, being defined algebraically, are inherently compositional and, therefore, convey in
a distilled form the paradigm at the heart of SOC. This trend is witnessed by the many
process calculi-like formalisms for orchestration and choreography. Most of these for-
malisms, however, do not suit for the analysis of currently available SOC technologies
in their completeness because they only consider a few specific features separately, pos-
sibly by embedding ad hoc constructs within some well-established process calculi (see,
e.g., the variants of pi-calculus with transactions [32, 127, 128] and of CSP with com-
pensation [52]). Besides these works, among the several proposals for orchestration and
choreography languages based on formal frameworks inspired to process calculi, we want
to mention [131, 47, 172, 50, 125, 104, 34, 57, 35]. Rather than as ordinary specification
or programming languages, process calculi should be seen as experimental prototypes,
whose primitives can inspire new computing paradigms.
A major benefit of using process calculi is that they enjoy a rich repertoire of elegant
meta-theories, proof techniques and analytical tools that can be likely tailored to the needs
of SOC applications. For example, it has been shown that type systems, model checking
and (bi)simulation analysis provide adequate tools to address topics relevant to the web
services technology (see e.g. [146, 195]). In the end, this ‘proof technology’ can pave the
way for the development of automatic property validation tools.
In the rest of the section, we outline some of the most relevant tools for analysing
process calculi terms, and conclude with a glimpse of pi-calculus, a cornerstone of current
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foundational research on specification and analysis of concurrent, reactive, and distributed
systems.
Type systems. Type systems have been shown to provide an important ingredient to stat-
ically detect (and prevent) execution errors of programs written in modern programming
languages. Many of the SOC features (e.g. loose coupling, distributed and heteroge-
neous components) raise the need for the introduction of flexible and compositional type
systems, capable of specifying the compositional behaviour of components in service-
oriented applications and ensuring that the resulting compositions behave as intended
across service composition in an open-ended way. While the sequential behaviour of ser-
vices may be successfully approached using more traditional notions of types, the require-
ment of compositionality and service awareness raises additional challenges and seem to
require fundamental changes in the underlying conceptual framework of type systems.
However, to address topics relevant to the web services technology, type systems for pro-
cess calculi might be a practical and scalable way to provide evidence that a large number
of applications enjoy some given properties. Technically, one can prove the type sound-
ness of a language as a whole, from which it follows that all well-typed applications do
comply with the properties stated by their types.
Among the proposals appeared in literature, we want to mention two orthogonal re-
search directions for developing typing systems for service compositionality. The first one
concerns the way behavioural types can support and enforce high level properties of the
global service interactions. The second one tackles the problem of formally representing
the internal conversation rules between services, i.e. service sessions. A static approach
to ensure global properties of service interactions has been introduced in [13, 14, 15]
for λreq, an extension of λ-calculus with primitive constructs for call-by-contract invoca-
tion. In particular, an automatic machinery, based on a type system and a model-checking
technique, constructs a viable plan for the execution of services belonging to a given or-
chestration. Non-functional aspects are also included and enforced by means of a runtime
security monitor. Service sessions are explored in [112, 207, 57, 3, 124, 114, 65] in terms
of session types, an emerging powerful tool for taking into account behavioural and non-
functional properties of conversational interactions. Session types permit to express and
enforce many relevant policies for, e.g., constraining the sequences of messages accepted
by services, ensuring service interoperability and compositionality, and guaranteeing ab-
sence of deadlock in service composition.
Logics. As for type systems, modal and temporal logics have long been used to repre-
sent properties of concurrent and distributed systems owing to their ability of expressing
notions of necessity, possibility, eventuality, etc. (see e.g. [116, 107, 151, 54, 53]). These
logics have proved suitable to reason about complex software systems because they only
provide abstract specifications of these systems and can thus be used for describing system
properties rather than system behaviours.
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Logical verification frameworks can support means for checking functional properties
of services by abstracting away from the computational contexts in which they are operat-
ing. As an example, services can be abstractly considered as entities capable of accepting
requests, delivering corresponding responses and, on-demand, cancelling requests. Some
interesting abstract properties can be availability (if a service is always capable to accept a
request), reliability (if when a request is accepted by a service, a final successful response
is guaranteed), responsiveness (if a service always guarantees a response to each received
request), etc. Many other interesting properties can express desirable attributes of services
and SOC applications (see, e.g., [6]).
An important advantage is that the application of temporal logics to the analysis of
systems is often supported by software tools (see e.g. [67, 68, 110]).
Behavioural equivalences. Process calculi can be used to describe both implementa-
tions of services and specifications of their expected behaviours. An important ingredient
of these languages is therefore a notion of behavioural equivalence between processes.
Behavioural equivalences [148, 77, 182] can be used in several ways: for example, to
prove the soundness of a protocol implemented in the language, to prove some form of
correspondence between a service written in a language and its encoding in another lan-
guage, to optimize the semantic model representing a given service, or to provide a means
to establish formal correspondences between different views (abstraction levels) of a ser-
vice, e.g., the contract it has to honour and its true implementation. Ideally, equivalences
should be congruences, i.e. should be preserved by all the contexts of the language. This
is often obtained by closing the equivalences w.r.t. all the possible language contexts,
which makes direct equivalence proofs particularly difficult. A standard device to avoid
such a quantification consists in defining a labelled operational model so that, when a sys-
tem evolves, the action performed is made apparent. In this way, the interaction with an
external context is recorded in the labels and the universal quantification over language
contexts can be dropped: equivalence proving is made more feasible.
Developing equivalences for SOC is a non trivial task. Indeed, it requires handling un-
expected behaviours and (typically) asynchronous communication paradigms which com-
plicates the observational theory (see, e.g., [143]). The behavioural theories introduced in
[50] provide a means to establish formal correspondences between different views (chore-
ography and orchestration) of service compositions. A notion of compliance among ser-
vices instead is formalized in [39, 40, 126], where a special case of equivalence, called
subcontract preorder, characterizes the possibility to replace services with subservices
without breaking the correctness of the composition.
pi-calculus by examples. COWS and several several process calculi for SOC have drawn
their inspiration from the pi-calculus [150], therefore we present here its syntax and infor-
mal semantics by examples. In fact, the design of many orchestration languages, such as
e.g. XLANG [193], Microsoft BizTalk Server [70] and WS-BPEL, is admittedly inspired
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Figure 2.12: A remote procedure call interaction in pi-calculus
to the programming metaphor offered by the pi-calculus, based on message exchange in a
distributed setting. Two books provide a complete account of pi-calculus: Communicating
and Mobile Systems by Milner [149] and The pi-calculus: A Theory of Mobile Processes
by Sangiorgi and Walker [182].
The basic computational step of pi-calculus is the transmission of a communication
channel between two processes; the receiver can then use the channel for further interac-
tions with other parties. For example, Figure 2.12 depicts the process interfaces for an
interaction based on the Remote Procedure Call (RPC) paradigm. An RPC interaction
involves a client and a server, where after the first communication has taken place, the
client waits for the server to elaborate a response. The communication channel at which
the client waits for the server’s response is c (abbreviation of ‘callback’) that, in the first
communication along the channel r (abbreviation of ‘request’), has been sent to the server.
The pi-calculus term representing the client is r¯〈d, c〉 . c(x) .C. The output prefix oper-
ator r¯〈d, c〉 .C′ expresses that the request data d and the callback channel c are sent along
the channel r and thereafter the process continues as C′. Similarly, the input prefix oper-
ator c(x) .C means that a datum is received along the channel c and x is a placeholder for
the received datum. After the input, the process will continue as C but with the received
datum replacing x.
The server is rendered in pi-calculus as r(y, z) . z¯〈n〉. It performs an input action r(y, z)
to receive an RPC request and replies by delivering the result of the call (i.e. the datum n)
along the received channel (stored in z).
In the end, the whole system is
r¯〈d, c〉 . c(x) .C | r(y, z) . z¯〈n〉
where the parallel composition operator | allows the two processes to run concurrently
and to interact with each other. Thus, the output and input actions along r can synchronise
and communication can take place, leading to
c(x) .C | c¯〈n〉
where z is replaced by c in the server process. Now, by performing a second communica-
tion, this way along channel c, the system evolves to C{n/x}, that is the term obtained by
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applying the substitution {n/x} to the client continuation C.
A different kind of binding occurs in presence of the restriction operator: in (νc) P
the name c is local to P. Coming back to the example above, suppose that initially c is a
channel local to the client. The system now takes the form
(νc)( r¯〈d, c〉 . c(x) .C ) | r(y, z) . z¯〈n〉
Thus, once a communication along r has taken place, c becomes a private channel shared
between the two processes:
(νc)( c(x) .C | c¯〈n〉 )
To express infinite behaviours, a process may be replicated: a replicated term !P rep-
resents an unbounded numbers of copies of P and it is (recursively) defined as P | !P.
Re-consider our example
(νc)( r¯〈d, c〉 . c(x) .C ) | !r(y, z) . z¯〈n〉
Here the server can receive an arbitrary number of procedure calls from clients. The above
system can evolve as follows
(νc)( c(x) .C | c¯〈n〉 ) | !r(y, z) . z¯〈n〉
Finally, another operator for defining pi-calculus processes is the choice: P + Q repre-
sents a process that can enact either P or Q. We see here an RPC client sending a second
private communication channel e along which the server can deliver a message if some
error occurs.
(νc)(νe)( r¯〈d, c, e〉 . (c(x) .C + e(t) . E) ) | !r(y, z, h) . (τ . z¯〈n〉 + τ . h¯〈m〉)
In this case the RPC interaction produces the following system:
(νc)(νe)( (c(x) .C + e(t) . E) | (τ . c¯〈n〉 + τ . e¯〈m〉) ) | !r(y, z, h) . (τ . z¯〈n〉 + τ . h¯〈m〉)
where the client can play two different behaviours depending on the response from the
server, while the created server instance can proceed by performing one of the two silent
actions τ, which can evolve without interaction with the environment. Suppose an error
occurs (i.e. the τ on the right hand side of + is executed), then the system evolves to
(νc)(νe)( (c(x) .C + e(t) . E) | e¯〈m〉 ) | !r(y, z, h) . (τ . z¯〈n〉 + τ . h¯〈m〉)
Now, the error can be communicated to the client by obtaining the following term
(νc)(νe)( E{m/t} ) | !r(y, z, h) . (τ . z¯〈n〉 + τ . h¯〈m〉)
Besides the standard pi-calculus, roughly introduced above, in Chapter 3 we will refer
also to some of its variants:
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• asynchronous pi-calculus (Api [111, 37, 7]): output actions cannot be used as pre-
fixes and choice can only be guarded by receive activities; this way, communication
is asynchronous in the sense that it is not possible for a sender to determine when
its output is consumed by a synchronizing input;
• localised pi-calculus (Lpi [147]): in each input prefix a(b).P the name b may not
occur free in P in input position; this way, only the output capability of names may
be transmitted (see Remark 3.2.1 at page 43 for more details);
• pi-calculus with polyadic synchronisation (epi [60]): channel names can be compos-
ite, i.e. they are vectors of names and interaction can take place only when such
vectors match element-wise.
There is an ongoing debate, originating from the workflow community, about the rela-
tive merits of pi-calculus, and more generally of process calculi, for modeling the service-
oriented computing paradigm. For example, [179] has recently presented some challenges
to model workflow in pi-calculus. On the other hand, not trivial examples of applications
of pi-calculus as a formal foundation for modeling workflow have been investigated in
[177, 176].
However, we are not completely convinced that all the features of pi-calculus are well
suited for expressing in a ‘natural’ way a number of workflow patterns like, e.g., the
cancelation patterns [179]. In other words, exploiting directly pi-calculus without intro-
ducing other orchestration primitives could be not-trivial and confusing, and could make
it difficult to reason on the resulting modelled process. Thus, to fit with the specific re-
quirements of the SOC paradigm, we should extend pi-calculus with features borrowed
from other process calculi such as, e.g., global scoping and non-binding input (from up-
date calculus [168] and fusion calculus [169]), distinction between variables and values
(from value-passing CCS [148], Applied pi-calculus [1], Distributed pi-calculus [108]),
pattern-matching (from KLAIM [74]), prioritised activities (see, e.g., [69, 55, 171]), de-
limited forced termination (see [131]) and protection (inspired by [51]). In fact, COWS,
the process calculus for SOC presented in details in the next chapter, results from a proper
combination of all these features whose usefulness will be illustrated by means of several
examples.
2.4 Case studies
In this section, we introduce two significant case studies defined within the EU project
Sensoria [185] that will be used throughout this thesis to illustrate our approach. The
former [123] is a scenario in the area of automotive systems and describes some func-
tionalities that will be likely available in the near future, while the latter [5] is from the
financial domain.
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2.4.1 An automotive case study
This case study involves a number of services that are discovered and bound at run-time
according to levels of service specified at design time, so as to deliver the best available
functionalities at agreed levels of quality.
We consider a scenario where vehicles are equipped with a multitude of sensors and
actuators that provide the driver with services that assist in conducting the vehicle more
safely. Driver assistance systems kick in automatically when the vehicle context renders
it necessary. Due to the advances in mobile technology, automotive software installed in
the vehicles can contact relevant specific services to deal with driver necessities.
Specifically, let us consider the case in which, while a driver is on the road with her/his
car, the vehicle’s sensors monitor reports a severe failure, which results in the car being
no longer driveable. The car’s discovery system then identifies garages, car rentals and
towing truck services in the car’s vicinity. At this point, the car’s reasoner system chooses
a set of adequate services taking into account personalised policies and preferences of the
driver, e.g. balancing cost and delay, and tries to order them. Before being enable to order
services, the owner of the car has to deposit a security payment, that will be given back if
ordering the services fails. Other components of the in-vehicle service platform involved
in this assistance activity are a GPS system, providing the car’s current location, and an
orchestrator, coordinating all the described services.
An UML-like activity diagram of the orchestration of services using UML4SOA, an
UML Profile for service-oriented systems [141, 203, 142], is shown in Figure 2.13. The
orchestrator is triggered by a signal from the sensors monitor (concerning, e.g., an en-
gine failure) and consequently contacts the other components to locate and compose the
various services to reach its goal. The process starts with a request from the orchestrator
to the bank to charge the driver’s credit card with the security deposit payment. This is
modelled by the UML action CardCharge for charging the credit card whose number is
provided as an output parameter of the action call. In parallel to the interaction with the
bank, the orchestrator requests the current location of the car from the car’s internal GPS
system. The current location is modelled as an input to the RequestLocation action and
subsequently used by the FindServices interaction which retrieves a list of services. If no
service can be found, an action to compensate the credit card charge will be launched. For
the selection of services, the orchestrator synchronises with the reasoner service to obtain
the most appropriate services.
Service ordering is modelled by the UML actions OrderGarage, OrderTowTruck and
RentCar. When the orchestrator makes an appointment with the garage, the diagnostic
data are automatically transferred to the garage, which could then be able, e.g., to identify
the spare parts needed to perform the repair. Then, the orchestrator makes an appointment
with the towing service, providing the GPS data of the stranded vehicle and of the garage,
to tow the vehicle to the garage. Concurrently, the orchestrator makes an appointment
with the rental service, by indicating the location (i.e. the GPS coordinates either of the
stranded vehicle or of the garage) where the car will be handed over to the driver.
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Figure 2.13: Orchestration in the automotive scenario
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The workflow described in Figure 2.13 models the overall behaviour of the system.
Besides interactions among services, it also includes activities using concepts developed
for long running business transactions (in e.g. [98, 166]). These activities entail fault
and compensation handling, kind of specific activities attempting to reverse the effects of
previously committed activities, that are an important aspect of SOC applications. Ac-
cording to UML4SOA Profile, the installation of a compensation handler is modelled by
an edge stereotypedcompensationEdge, and its activation by an activity stereotyped
compensate. Since each compensation handler is associated to a single UML activ-
ity, we omit drawing the enclosing scope construct. Moreover, we use dashed boxes to
represent compensation handlers. Specifically, in the considered scenario:
• the security deposit payment charged to the driver’s credit card must be revoked if
either the discovery phase does not succeed or ordering the services fails, i.e. both
garage/tow truck and car rental services reject the requests;
• if ordering a tow truck fails, the garage appointment has to be cancelled;
• if ordering a garage fails or a garage order cancellation is requested, the rental car
delivery has to be redirected to the stranded car’s actual location;
• instead, if ordering the car rental fails, it should not affect the tow truck and garage
orders.
These requirements motivate the fact that ordering garage/tow truck and renting a car are
modelled as activities running in parallel.
2.4.2 A finance case study
As in the previous section, we provide first an informal specification of the scenario, then
a more detailed UML-based one.
The considered service is a credit (web) portal that provides the customer companies
with the possibility to ask for a loan to a bank, and then orchestrates the necessary steps
for processing the credit request, involving a preliminary evaluation by an employee, and
subsequent evaluation by a supervisor before a contract proposal is sent to the customer.
Initially, the customer logins to the portal by providing his username and password,
then he selects service Credit Request. In the next step, the customer uploads the necessary
data for his request. More specifically, he firstly provides the desired credit amount, then
the securities of the loan and his balance. The service checks the balance by resorting on
a validation service and, in case the balance is not validated, it asks the user to provide it
again.
When the request is completely filled by the customer, the service puts it in the list
of tasks that the bank employees must accomplish. Then, an employee withdraws the
request from the task list and fills his evaluation about it. The evaluation has a private part
(only available for the bank purposes) and a public one which is available to the customer.
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The private evaluation consists of the rating of the customer company and some additional
information. The public evaluation consists of the decision about the request and, in case,
the bank offer or the motivation for the rejection. The decision can be to reject the request,
to accept it or to ask the customer for updating the request. According to the decision, the
request processing may proceed in three different ways.
• If the request is rejected, the customer receives a message containing the response
and its motivations, and then the process terminates.
• If an update is asked, a message is sent to the customer with the update request and
its motivations. The customer may then decide to update the securities and/or the
credit amount or refuse to update. In the latter case, the process terminates, while
in the former one the updated request is processed again as from above.
• If the request is accepted, the service queues the contract (i.e. the request and the
evaluation) in the list of tasks that the bank supervisors must accomplish. Then,
a supervisor withdraws the contract from the task list and may update the public
evaluation with its own decision. Again, the decision may be to ask for an update,
to reject the request, or to accept it. The first two cases are processed as above,
regarding the last one, the customer receives the offer and may answer positively
or negatively. In both cases the process terminates. If the answer is positive, the
process terminates positively and the contract is sent to an external service dealing
with contracts for which customer and the bank have found an agreement.
At any moment the customer may require to abort the process. If this happens, the
process terminates and, in case, the request is removed from task lists. As we will see
later on, this last property requires execution of compensation activities to semantically
rollback the action of queueing the request in the task list. This prevents an employee or
a supervisor from examining an already aborted request.
We present now the UML specification of the scenario and its workflow. We rely
again, for what regards the activity diagrams, on UML4SOA, a service-oriented profile of
UML. However, due to the larger dimension of this scenario, to improve the understand-
ability this time we follow all prescriptions of UML4SOA profile for the UML specifi-
cation. In fact, within UML4SOA, the specific actions for service interaction are: send
a message, receive a message and send&receive (a synchronous communication where
a message is sent and then the service awaits for a reply). Actions have associated pins:
the link pin specifies which is the partner of the interaction, the input and output pins
specify the exchanged messages for send (only output pins), receive (only input pins),
and send&receive (both input and output pins) actions. For instance, in Figure 2.14, a
send&receive action is represented. The link pin, labelled by  link, specifies that
service Authentication is the partner of the communication, the output pin, labelled by
snd, specifies that a message ID is sent and the input pin, labelled byrcv, specifies
that a message valid is received as an answer. The most important novelty in UML4SOA
29
CHAPTER 2 Background and motivations
Figure 2.14: An example of (detailed) action in the profile UML4SOA
is the possibility to install compensations of executed activities that are executed in case
of failure as discussed in the following.
Firstly, we illustrate the various services of the scenario, their orchestration and the
kind of exchanged message. The customer initially logins to the Portal by sending
his ID, i.e. his username and password. The customer identity is confirmed by an
Authentication. For each successful login, Portal generates a sessionID, i.e. a datum
univocally identifying a session. The value sessionID is used by the various actors for ex-
changing messages after the customer logins. Each message has, in fact, a body argument
containing the exchanged data, and the sessionID as further argument identifying the cor-
responding session. This guarantees that messages referring to different requests are not
erroneously mixed together. Portal then sends the requestID, i.e. the couple of sessionID
and customer username, to service Information Upload, that starts a conversation with
the customer in order to fill the request. The customer balance is validated by a Validation
service. The filled request is then sent to Request Processing. Request Processing
relies on employee and supervisor Task List services (shortened into empTaskList and
supTaskList, respectively) for storing the request that is successively retrieved by, respec-
tively, an employee and a supervisor, each of whom fills an Evaluation and forwards it to
Request Processing. An Evaluation has two parts, i.e. Public Evaluation and Private
Evaluation. The former is a tuple containing the strings Offer (the offer made to the cus-
tomer), Motivation (the motivations of the rejection or of the request for an update) and
Decision, which is equal to one of the values Accept, Reject or AskToUpdate. The latter
is a tuple containing the strings rating and AdditionalInfo. Together, a Request and its
Evaluation form a Contract. If either the employee or the supervisor asks to update the
request, the related Contract is sent to service Information Update, that asks to the cus-
tomer whether he wants to update the request and, in case, sends the updated request back
to Request Processing . Finally, when an agreement between the bank and the customer
is established, the related Contract is forwarded to a Contract Processing service.
We now specify the behavior of the involved services, i.e. Portal, Information Upload,
Information Update and Request Processing, whose internal behavior is fundamental
for a correct specification and implementation of the whole workflow.
The diagram of Figure 2.15 relates to the interaction between the customer and service
Portal. The customer ID is sent to the portal that starts a login scope. Portal synchronously
exchanges messages with service Authentication, sending the customer ID and receiving
back the boolean valid. If valid=No, the service sends back to the customer a message
signaling the failure of the login and then raises the exception failedLogin that termi-
nates the process. If valid=Yes, the service generates (by means of action create)
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a new sessionID and sends it back to the customer. Portal receives the customer choice
about the desired service (here we only consider service Credit Request) and invokes
service Information Upload (shortened into InfoUpload) sending to it a message with the
requestID. From then on, the customer communicates with InfoUpload.
After the login, service InfoUpload (see Figure 2.16) starts a conversation with the
customer whose purpose is to produce a Request. The service workflow immediately
forks in two parallel branches, one responsible for collecting the data of the Request,
while the other one awaits for a message cancel from the customer, meaning that the
customer wants to abort the process. In the last case, an exception abort is raised and
the process terminates. The branch responsible of collecting the data of the Request first
receives the desired amount from the customer. After that, the customer may choose to
send first either his balance or the securities (shortened sec), hence the workflow forks in
two parallel branches awaiting to receive the messages with this two data. Moreover, the
branch responsible of receiving the balance, sends it to service Validation, that replies with
a message containing the boolean valid. If valid=Yes, the workflow proceeds, otherwise, it
sends a message to the customer, asking to resend the balance, and then cycles and awaits
to receive a new message. After both the branches are completed, service InfoUpload
terminates by invoking Request Processing (shortened into reqProcessing) and sending
the Request to it.
Service Information Update (shortened into InfoUpdate) is similar to the previous
service (see Figure 2.17) but, unlike InfoUpload, it starts already receiving a Contract
containing the existing Request and the Motivation for the request of an update. The
Motivation and the request of an update are sent to the customer and the service awaits
to receive an Answer. If Answer=No the process terminates, otherwise the workflow
forks in two parallel branches. In one branch, the service asks the customer if he wants
to update the securities: if the answer is positive, the service awaits to receive the new
securities and then reaches a join point with the other branch, otherwise it immediately
reaches the join point. The other branch does the same activities but with the amount in
place of the securities. After both the branches have reached the join point, the service
terminates by sending the updated Request back to service reqProcessing. In parallel
with the described branch, the service starts another branch awaiting for a cancel request
from the customer, exactly as in the case of InfoUpload described above.
As above specified, both InfoUpload and InfoUpdate send a request to reqProcessing
(see Figure 2.18). As for InfoUpload and InfoUpdate, the workflow initially forks in two
branches, one responsible of the main interactions, while the other awaits to receive a
cancel message from the customer and, in case, triggers an abort exception. Regarding
the main branch, the received request is sent to service empTaskList that queues it. It is
possible that the customer decides to cancel the request after this step has been performed.
In this case, the request must be deleted from the task list, in order to prevent an employee
to examine an already aborted request. Hence, the action of sending the request must be
compensated with a delete action removing it from the task list. For this purpose, the ser-
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Figure 2.15: Service Portal activity diagram
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Figure 2.16: Service Information Upload activity diagram
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Figure 2.17: Service Information Update activity diagram
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vice installs a ‘compensation handler’ consisting of an action sending the message Delete
to service empTaskList. This message asks empTaskList to delete Request. Note that
reqProcessing may not directly delete a request from a task list, since task lists are man-
aged by services empTaskList and supTasklist that are autonomous from reqProcessing.
After sending the Request, reqProcessing awaits for the related Evaluation from
an employee. The workflow then follows three alternative lines, according to the value
of the argument Decision of Evaluation. If Decision=Reject, the service sends the
Public Evaluation (shortened pubEvaluation), containing the decision and its motiva-
tion, to the customer and then terminates. If Decision=AskToUpdate, the service ter-
minates by sending the Contract, containing the decision, its motivation and the re-
quest to InfoUpdate illustrated above. Finally, if Decision=Accept the second step of
evaluation, similar to the described one, starts. The Contract is sent to supTaskList
and the related compensation, asking for the deletion of the Contract from the super-
visor task list, is installed. The service then awaits for the pubEvaluation by a super-
visor. If Decision=Reject or Decision=AskToUpdate the service performs the same
actions described above. If Decision=Accept, the service sends the pubEvaluation
with the Decision and the bank Offer to the customer and awaits for his Answer. If
Answer=No the process terminates, if Answer=Yes the service sends the Contract to a
Contract Processing service and the process successfully terminates.
It still remains to examine the case when a customer asks to cancel the request while
reqProcessing is running. As for services InfoUpload and InfoUpdate, the cancel mes-
sage is received by a secondary branch of the process running in parallel with the main
branch described above; then an exception abort is raised that eventually leads to process
termination. However, before ending the process, some compensation activities may be
required. The action Compensate All is executed; the meaning of this action is to
execute all the installed compensations. Hence, if no compensation has yet been installed,
the compensation activity is empty. If a request of deletion for the employee task list (and,
possibly, for the supervisor task list) was installed, that compensation is executed.
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Figure 2.18: Service Request Processing activity diagram
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A Calculus for Orchestration of Web
Services
In the previous chapter, we have discussed the motivations behind the necessity of rigorous
formal foundations for current software engineering technologies for SOC, with special
concern on the OASIS standard for orchestration of web services WS-BPEL.
Therefore, in this chapter, we introduce COWS as a formalism for specifying and or-
chestrating services while modelling their dynamic behaviour. COWS, in fact, falls within
a main line of research (see e.g. [47, 50, 125, 130, 104, 34, 35, 52, 57, 127]) that aims
at developing process calculi capable of capturing the basic aspects of service-oriented
systems and, possibly, of supporting the analysis of qualitative and quantitative properties
of services. The design of the calculus has been influenced by the principles underly-
ing WS-BPEL, and in fact COWS supports service instances with shared states, allows
a process to play more than one partner role, permits programming stateful sessions by
correlating different service interactions, and enables management of long-running trans-
actions. However, COWS intends to be a foundational model not specifically tight to web
services’ current technology. Thus, some WS-BPEL constructs, such as flow graphs and
fault and compensation handlers, do not have a precise counterpart in COWS, rather they
are expressed in terms of more primitive operators (see Sections 3.2.1.3 and 3.2.3.3). Of
course, COWS has also taken advantage of previous work on process calculi. Indeed,
it combines in an original way constructs and features borrowed from well-known pro-
cess calculi, e.g. non-binding input activities, asynchronous communication, polyadic
synchronization, pattern matching, protection, delimited receiving and killing activities,
while however resulting different from any of them.
We illustrate COWS’s suitability for modelling SOC applications through many spe-
cific examples and the specification of the two case studies informally introduced at the
end of the previous chapter.
Structure of the chapter. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1
provides some insights into COWS’s main features by means of an example. Section 3.2
37
CHAPTER 3 A Calculus for Orchestration of Web Services
presents COWS’s syntax and operational semantics. Section 3.3 discusses the correspon-
dence between WS-BPEL and COWS. Section 3.4 describes the more relevant parts of
the COWS specifications of the two case studies. Section 3.5 touches upon more closely
related work.
3.1 A ‘Morra game’ scenario
Before formally defining COWS, we provide some insights into its main features in a
step-by-step fashion by means of an example. This is a service inspired by the well-known
game Morra1 and described at two different levels of abstraction.
Let us consider a service that allows its clients to play the Morra game. We consider
the variation of Morra where two players, named “odds” and “evens”, throw out a single
hand, each showing zero to five fingers. If the sum of fingers shown by both players is
an even number then the “evens” player wins; otherwise the “odds” player is the winner.
The service collects the two throws (i.e. two integers), calculates the winner and sends the
result back to the two players. A high-level specification of the service in COWS is:
∗ [xid, xp, xnum, yp, ynum]
( odds • throw?〈xid, xp, xnum〉 | evens • throw?〈xid, yp, ynum〉
| xp • res!〈xid,win(xnum, ynum, 1)〉 | yp • res!〈xid,win(xnum, ynum, 0)〉 )
(3.1)
The service receives throws from the players via two distinct endpoints, i.e. pairs
odds • throw and evens • throw, which can be interpreted as specific implementations
of the operation name throw provided by partner names odds and evens. The players
are required to provide the partner names, stored in variables xp and yp, that they will
use to receive the result. The replication operator ∗ , that spawns in parallel as many
copies of its argument term as necessary, permits supporting creation of multiple in-
stances to serve several matches simultaneously. A match is identified by a match-id,
stored in xid, that the partners need to provide when sending their throws. To avoid in-
terferences between matches played simultaneously, match-ids should be unique (clients
can use the delimitation operator [ ] to guarantee uniqueness). Partner throws arrive ran-
domly, thus any interaction with the service starts with one of the two receive activities
odds • throw?〈xid, xp, xnum〉 or evens • throw?〈xid, yp, ynum〉, corresponding to reception
of throws of the match identified by xid, and terminates with the two invoke activities
xp • res!〈xid,win(xnum, ynum, 1)〉 and yp • res!〈xid,win(xnum, ynum, 0)〉, used to reply with the
result. We assume that win(x, y, z) is a total function which, if x and y are integers between
0 and 5, returns the string w (abbreviation of ‘winner’) in case (x + y) mod 2 is equal to z,
and the string l (abbreviation of ‘loser’) if (x + y) mod 2 is different from z; otherwise, the
string err is returned.
1For further information about the Morra game visit the web site http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Morra_(game).
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Service (3.1) uses the delimitation operator to declare the scope of variables xid, xp,
yp, xnum and ynum. An inter-service communication takes place when the arguments of a
receive and of a concurrent invoke along the same endpoint match and causes replacement
of the variables arguments of the receive with the corresponding values arguments of the
invoke (within the scope of variables declarations). Notably, the two receive activities are
correlated by means of the shared variable xid.
When an invocation for operation throw is processed, it must be checked if a service
instance with the same match-id already exists, in which case the invocation is received
by the instance, or if the service must produce a new instance. This is done through the
dynamic prioritised mechanism of COWS, i.e. assigning the receives by instances (having
a more defined pattern) a greater priority than the receives by the service definition.
Thus, for example, after an interaction with the following client
[z] ( evens • throw!〈first, cbB, 1〉 | cbB • res?〈first, z〉 . 〈rest of client B〉 )
service definition (3.1) runs in parallel with the instance identified by the match-id first
(the instance is highlighted by a gray background)
∗ [xid, xp, xnum, yp, ynum]
( odds • throw?〈xid, xp, xnum〉 | evens • throw?〈xid, yp, ynum〉
| xp • res!〈xid,win(xnum, ynum, 1)〉 | yp • res!〈xid,win(xnum, ynum, 0)〉 )
| [xp, xnum] ( odds • throw?〈first, xp, xnum〉
| xp • res!〈first,win(xnum, 1, 1)〉 | cbB • res!〈first,win(xnum, 1, 0)〉 )
Now, if another client performs the invocation odds • throw!〈first, cbA, 2〉, it will be pro-
cessed by the already existing instance because, w.r.t. this invocation, the receive odds •
throw?〈first, xp, xnum〉 has greater priority than the receive odds • throw?〈xid, xp, xnum〉 (that
has a less defined argument pattern). The long-running interaction between the Morra ser-
vice definition (3.1) and the above clients is graphically represented in Figure 3.1, where
each node represents a state, while each edge describes a communication action (e.g. la-
bel evens • throw〈first, cbB, 1〉 denotes taking place of a communication along endpoint
evens • throw with matching values 〈first, cbB, 1〉).
For a lower level implementation, we wish to maximise the abilities of different ser-
vices, while preserving the observable behaviour of the whole service w.r.t. the high-level
specification. The main service is now composed of three entities as follows:
[req2f , req5f , resp2f , resp5f ] ( ∗M | ∗ 2F | ∗ 5F ) (3.2)
The delimitation operator is used here to declare that req2f , req5f , resp2f and resp5f are
private operation names known to the three components M, 2F and 5F, and only to them.
The three subservices are defined as follows:
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evens • throw〈first, cbB, 1〉 odds • throw〈first, cbA, 2〉
odds • throw〈first, cbA, 2〉 evens • throw〈first, cbB, 1〉
cbB • res〈first, l〉 cbA • res〈first, w〉
cbA • res〈first, w〉 cbB • res〈first, l〉
Figure 3.1: Long-running interaction between clients and high-level Morra specification
M , [xid, xp, xnum, yp, ynum]
( odds • throw?〈xid, xp, xnum〉 | evens • throw?〈xid, yp, ynum〉
| [k] ( m • req2f !〈xid, xnum, ynum〉 | m • req5f !〈xid, xnum, ynum〉
| [xo, xe] m • resp2f ?〈xid, xo, xe〉.
( kill(k) | {|xp • res!〈xid, xo〉 | yp • res!〈xid, xe〉|} )
| [xo, xe] m • resp5f ?〈xid, xo, xe〉.
( kill(k) | {|xp • res!〈xid, xo〉 | yp • res!〈xid, xe〉|} ) )
2F , [x] ( m • req2f ?〈x, 1, 1〉.m • resp2f !〈x, l,w〉
+ m • req2f ?〈x, 1, 2〉.m • resp2f !〈x,w, l〉
+ m • req2f ?〈x, 2, 1〉.m • resp2f !〈x,w, l〉
+ m • req2f ?〈x, 2, 2〉.m • resp2f !〈x, l,w〉 )
5F , [x, y, z] ( m • req5f ?〈x, y, z〉.m • resp5f !〈x, err, err〉
+ m • req5f ?〈x, 0, 0〉.m • resp5f !〈x, l,w〉
+ m • req5f ?〈x, 0, 1〉.m • resp5f !〈x,w, l〉
+ . . . + m • req5f ?〈x, 5, 5〉.m • resp5f !〈x, l,w〉 )
Service M is publicly invocable and can interact with players as well as with the ‘in-
ternal’ services 2F and 5F. These latter two services, instead, can only be invoked by
M and have the task of calculating the winner of a match. In particular, 2F performs a
quick computation of simple matches where both players hold out either one or two fin-
gers, while 5F performs a slower computation of standard 5-fingers matches (that exactly
corresponds to the computation modelled by the function win( )). After the two initial
receives, for e.g. performance and fault tolerance purposes, M invokes services 2F and
5F concurrently. Communication between M and the other two subservices relies on the
match identifier (stored in x) as correlation data. When one of 2F and 5F replies, M im-
mediately stops the other computation. This is done by executing the kill activity kill(k),
that forces termination of all unprotected parallel terms inside the enclosing [k] , which
stops the killing effect. Kill activities are executed eagerly w.r.t. the other parallel activ-
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evens • throw〈first, cbB, 1〉 odds • throw〈first, cbA, 2〉
odds • throw〈first, cbA, 2〉 evens • throw〈first, cbB, 1〉
∅ (m • req2f )
∅ (m • req5f )
∅ (m • resp2f )
† (m • resp5f ?〈. . .〉)
cbB • res〈first, l〉 cbA • res〈first, w〉
cbA • res〈first, w〉 cbB • res〈first, l〉
Figure 3.2: Long-running interaction between clients and low-level Morra specification
ities included within the enclosing scope, because relatively to these latter activities they
take the greatest priority. However, critical activities can be protected from the effect of
a forced termination by using the protection operator {| |}; this is indeed the case of the
response xp • res!〈xid, xo〉 in our example. Finally, M forwards the responses to the players
and terminates.
Services 2F and 5F use the choice operator + to offer alternative behaviours: one of
them can be selected by executing an invoke matching the receive leading the behaviour.
If the throws are not integers between 0 and 5, 2F does not reply, while 5F returns the
string err. Indeed, the receive m • req5f ?〈x, y, z〉 is assigned less priority than the other
receive activities, i.e. it is only executed when none of the other receives matches the two
throws, thus avoiding to return err in case of admissible throws.
An interaction of specification (3.2) with the previous clients is shown in Figure 3.2,
where ∅(m • o) represents an internal communication along the endpoint m • o, while
†(m • o?w¯) denotes an invisible kill-action that terminates the activity m • o?w¯ (and its
continuation). Dotted lines stand for alternative behaviours. Notably, after execution of
a communication along m • resp2f , the prioritised semantics of COWS permits executing
only the kill action.
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3.2 The language COWS
To gradually introduce the technicalities and distinctive features of COWS, we present
its syntax and operational semantics in three steps. More specifically, in Section 3.2.1
we consider µCOWSm (µCOWS minus priority), the fragment of COWS without priority
in parallel composition and linguistic constructs dealing with termination. It retains all
the other COWS’s features, like e.g. global scope and pattern matching. In Section 3.2.2
we move on µCOWS (micro COWS), the calculus obtained by enriching µCOWSm with
priority in parallel composition. Finally, in Section 3.2.3 we study the full calculus, that
extends µCOWS with primitives for termination. For each of the three calculi we show
some simple clarifying examples.
3.2.1 µCOWSm : the priority-, protection- and kill-free fragment of COWS
The fragment of COWS introduced in this section, namely µCOWSm, dispenses with
priority in parallel composition and linguistic constructs dealing with termination.
3.2.1.1 Syntax
The syntax of µCOWSm is presented in Table 3.1. We use two countable disjoint sets:
the set of values (ranged over by v, v′, . . . ) and the set of ‘write once’ variables (ranged
over by x, y, . . . ). The set of values is left unspecified; however, we assume that it in-
cludes the set of names (ranged over by n, m, p, o, . . . ) mainly used to represent partners
and operations. We also use a set of expressions (ranged over by ), whose exact syn-
tax is deliberately omitted; we just assume that expressions contain, at least, values and
variables.
Partner names and operation names can be combined to designate endpoints, written
p • o. In fact, alike channels in [60], an endpoint is not atomic but results from the
composition of a partner name p and of an operation name o, which can also be interpreted
as a specific implementation of o provided by p. This results in a very flexible naming
mechanism that allows a service to be identified by means of different logic names (i.e. to
play more than one partner role as in WS-BPEL). For example, the following service
pslow • o?w¯.sslow + pfast • o?w¯.sfast
accepts requests for the same operation o through different partners with distinct access
modalities: process sslow implements a slower service provided when the request is pro-
cessed through the partner pslow, while sfast implements a faster service provided when
the request arrives through pfast. Additionally, it allows the names composing an end-
point to be dealt with separately, as in a request-response interaction, where usually the
service provider knows the name of the response operation, but not the partner name of
the service it has to reply to. For example, the ping service p • oreq?〈x〉.x • ores!〈“I live”〉
will know at run-time the partner name for the reply activity. This mechanisms is also
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s ::= (services) g ::= (receive-guarded choice)
u • u′!¯ (invoke) 0 (nil)
| g (receive-guarded choice) | p • o?w¯.s (request processing)
| s | s (parallel composition) | g + g (choice)
| [u] s (delimitation)
| ∗ s (replication)
Table 3.1: µCOWSm syntax
sufficiently expressive to support implementation of explicit locations: a located service
can be represented by using a same partner for all its receiving endpoints. Partner and
operation names can be exchanged in communication, thus enabling many different in-
teraction patterns among service instances. However, dynamically received names can
only be used for service invocation (as in localised pi-calculus [147]). Indeed, endpoints
of receive activities are identified statically because their syntax only allows using names
and not variables.
Remark 3.2.1 (Localised receive activities) As in localised pi-calculus and differently
from the standard pi-calculus, COWS disallows ‘input capability’, i.e. the ability of ser-
vices to receive a name and subsequently accept inputs along an endpoint containing such
name. This choice is motivated, on the one hand, by the fact that the design of COWS has
been influenced by the current (web) service technologies where endpoints of receive ac-
tivities are statically determined (recall that service endpoints are not pi-calculus channels)
and, on the other hand, by the will to support an easier implementation of the calculus.
However, the former is the major motivation. In fact, implementation problems due to
input capability can be solved by relying on the theory of linear forwarders [99] as in
PiDuce [64].
To model asynchronous communication, invoke activities cannot be used as prefixes
and choice can only be guarded by receive activities (as in asynchronous pi-calculus [7]).
Indeed, in service-oriented systems, communication paradigms are usually asynchronous
(mainly for scalability reasons [43]), in the sense that there may be an arbitrary delay
between the sending and the receiving of a message, the ordering in which messages are
received may differ from that in which they were sent, and a sender cannot determine if
and when a sent message will be received.
In the sequel, w ranges over values and variables and u ranges over names and vari-
ables. Notation ·¯ stands for tuples, e.g. x¯ means 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 (with n ≥ 0) where variables
in the same tuple are pairwise distinct. We write a, b¯ to denote the tuple obtained by con-
catenating the element a to the tuple b¯. All notations shall extend to tuples component-
wise. n ranges over communication endpoints that do not contain variables (e.g. p • o),
while u ranges over communication endpoints that may contain variables (e.g. u • u′).
Sometimes, we will use notation n and u for the tuples 〈p, o〉 and 〈u, u′〉, respectively, and
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∗ 0 ≡ 0 ∗ s ≡ s | ∗ s
s | 0 ≡ s s1 | s2 ≡ s2 | s1 (s1 | s2) | s3 ≡ s1 | (s2 | s3)
g + 0 ≡ g g1 + g2 ≡ g2 + g1 (g1 + g2) + g3 ≡ g1 + (g2 + g3)
[u] 0 ≡ 0 [u1] [u2] s ≡ [u2] [u1] s s1 | [u] s2 ≡ [u] (s1 | s2) if u < fu(s1)
Table 3.2: µCOWSm structural congruence
rely on the context to resolve any ambiguity. When convenient, we shall regard a tuple
(hence, also an endpoint) simply as a set, writing e.g. x ∈ y¯ to mean that x is an element
of y¯. We will omit trailing occurrences of 0, writing e.g. p • o?w¯ instead of p • o?w¯.0, and
write [〈u1, . . . , un〉] s in place of [u1] . . . [un] s. We will write I , s to assign a name I to
the term s.
We adopt the following conventions about the operators precedence: monadic opera-
tors bind more tightly than parallel composition, and prefixing more tightly than choice.
The only binding construct is delimitation: [u] s binds u in the scope s. In fact, to
enable concurrent threads within each service instance to share (part of) the state, receive
activities in COWS bind neither names nor variables. This is different from most pro-
cess calculi and somewhat similar to update [168] and fusion [169] calculi. In COWS,
however, inter-service communication give rise to substitutions of variables with values
(alike [168]), rather than to fusions of names (as in [169]). The range of application
of the substitutions generated by a communication is regulated by the delimitation op-
erator, that additionally permits to generate fresh names (as the restriction operator of
pi-calculus). Thus, the occurrence of a name/variable is free if it is not under the scope
of a delimitation for it. Bound and free names are also called private and public names,
respectively. We denote by fu(t) the set of free names/variables that occur free in t. Two
terms are α-equivalent if one can be obtained from the other by consistently renaming
bound names/variables. As usual, we identify terms up to α-equivalence.
3.2.1.2 Operational semantics
The operational semantics of µCOWSm is defined only for closed services, i.e. services
without free variables. Formally, the semantics is given in terms of a structural congru-
ence and of a labelled transition relation. The structural congruence, written ≡, identifies
syntactically different services that intuitively represent the same service. It is defined as
the least congruence relation induced by the equational laws shown in Table 3.2. All the
laws are straightforward. In particular, commutativity of consecutive delimitations im-
plies that the order among the ui in [〈u1, . . . , un〉] s is irrelevant, thus in the sequel we may
use the simpler notation [u1, . . . , un] s. The last law permits to extend the scope of names
(as in the pi-calculus) and variables, thus enabling possible communication.
To define the labelled transition relation, we use two auxiliary functions. Firstly, we
use the function [[ ]] for evaluating closed expressions (i.e. expressions without vari-
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M(x, v) = {x 7→ v} M(v, v) = ∅ M(〈〉, 〈〉) = ∅ M(w1, v1) = σ1 M(w¯2, v¯2) = σ2M((w1, w¯2), (v1, v¯2)) = σ1 unionmulti σ2
Table 3.3: Matching rules
[[¯]] = v¯
(inv)
n!¯
n v¯−−−−−→ 0
n?w¯.s
n w¯−−−−−−→ s (rec) g
α−−→ s
(choice)
g + g′
α−−→ s
s1
n w¯−−−−−−→ s′1 s2
n v¯−−−−−→ s′2 M(w¯, v¯)=σ
(com)
s1 | s2 σ−−−→ s′1 | s′2
s1
α−−→ s′1
(par)
s1 | s2 α−−→ s′1 | s2
s
σunionmulti {x 7→v}−−−−−−−−−→ s′
(delcom)
[x] s
σ−−−→ s′ ·{x 7→ v}
s
α−−→ s′ u< u(α)
(del)
[u] s
α−−→ [u] s′
s ≡ α−−→≡ s′
(str)
s
α−−→ s′
Table 3.4: µCOWSm operational semantics
ables): it takes a closed expression and returns a value. It is not explicitly defined since
the exact syntax of expressions is deliberately not specified. Secondly, we use the partial
functionM( , ) for performing pattern-matching on semi-structured data and, thus, de-
termining if a receive and an invoke over the same endpoint can synchronise. The rules
definingM( , ) are shown in Table 3.3. They state that two tuples match if they have the
same number of fields and corresponding fields have matching values/variables. Variables
match any value, and two values match only if they are identical. When tuples w¯ and v¯
do match,M(w¯, v¯) returns a substitution for the variables in w¯; otherwise, it is undefined.
Substitutions (ranged over by σ) are functions mapping variables to values and are written
as collections of pairs of the form x 7→ v. Application of substitution σ to s, written s · σ,
has the effect of replacing every free occurrence of x in s with v, for each x 7→ v ∈ σ, by
possibly using α-conversion for avoiding v to be captured by name delimitations within
s. We use ∅ to denote the empty substitution, |σ | to denote the number of pairs in σ, and
σ1 unionmulti σ2 to denote the union of σ1 and σ2 when they have disjoint domains.
The labelled transition relation
α−−→ is the least relation over services induced by the
rules in Table 3.4, where label α is generated by the following grammar:
α ::= n v¯ | n w¯ | σ
The meaning of labels is as follows: n  v¯ and n  w¯ denote execution of invoke and
receive activities over the endpoint n with arguments v¯ and w¯, respectively; σ denotes
execution of a communication with generated substitution σ to be still applied. ∅ denotes
a computational step corresponding to taking place of communication without pending
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substitutions. In the sequel, we will use u(α) to denote the set of names and variables
occurring in α, where u({x 7→ v}) = {x} ∪ fu(v) and u(σ1 unionmulti σ2) = u(σ1) ∪ u(σ2).
We comment on salient points. A service invocation can proceed only if the expres-
sions in the argument can be evaluated (rule (inv)). This means, for example, that if it
contains a variable x (in its endpoint or argument) it is stuck until x is not replaced by a
value because of execution of a receive assigning a value to x. A receive activity offers
an invocable operation along a given partner name (rule (rec)), and execution of a receive
permits to take a decision between alternative behaviours (rule (choice)). Communication
can take place when two parallel services perform matching receive and invoke activities
(rule (com)). Communication generates a substitution that is recorded in the transition la-
bel (for subsequent application), rather than a silent transition as in most process calculi.
Execution of parallel services is interleaved (rule (par)). When the delimitation of a vari-
able x argument of a receive involved in a communication is encountered, i.e. the whole
scope of the variable is determined, the delimitation is removed and the substitution for
x is applied to the term (rule (delcom)). Variable x disappears from the term and cannot
be reassigned a value (for this reason we say that COWS’s variables are ‘write once’).
[u] s behaves like s (rule (del)), except when the transition label α contains u. Rule (str) is
standard and states that structurally congruent services have the same transitions.
We end with a property of the operational semantics regarding computational steps.
Property 3.2.1 Let s be a µCOWSm closed term. If s
σ−−−→ s′, then σ = ∅ and s′ is closed.
The above property can be proved by a straightforward induction on the depth of the
shortest inference for the transitions in the hypothesis, by exploiting the fact that s is
closed.
3.2.1.3 Examples
We report here a few observations and examples aimed at clarifying the peculiarities of
µCOWSm.
Communication. Communication can exploit scope extension (last law of Table 3.2) to
allow receive and invoke activities to interact. In fact, they can synchronise only if both
are in the scopes of the delimitations that bind the variables argument of the receive. Thus,
we must possibly extend the scopes of some variables, as in the following example:
odds • throw!〈first, cbA, 2〉 | [xp, xnum] (odds • throw?〈first, xp, xnum〉. s | s′) ≡
[xp, xnum] (odds • throw!〈first, cbA, 2〉 | odds • throw?〈first, xp, xnum〉. s | s′) ∅−−−→
(s | s′) · {xp 7→ cbA , xnum 7→ 2}
Notice that the substitution {xp 7→ cbA , xnum 7→ 2} is applied to all terms delimited by
[xp, xnum] , not only to the continuation s of the service performing the receive. This is
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different from most process calculi and accounts for the global scope of variables. This
very feature permits to easily model the delayed input of fusion calculus [169], which is
instead difficult to express in pi-calculus.
Communication of private names. Communication of private names is standard and
exploits scope extension as in pi-calculus. To enable communication of private names,
besides their scopes, we must possibly extend the scopes of some variables. Consider
to modify the previous example by restricting the scope of the partner name cbA to the
invoke activity, with cbA fresh in s and s′. Now, the communication can take place as
follow:
[cbA] (odds • throw!〈first, cbA, 2〉) | [xp, xnum] (odds • throw?〈first, xp, xnum〉. s | s′) ≡
[cbA] (odds • throw!〈first, cbA, 2〉 | [xp, xnum] (odds • throw?〈first, xp, xnum〉. s | s′) ) ≡
[cbA, xp, xnum] (odds • throw!〈first, cbA, 2〉 | odds • throw?〈first, xp, xnum〉. s | s′) ∅−−−→
[cbA] (s | s′) · {xp 7→ cbA , xnum 7→ 2}
XML messages. Nested tuples can be roughly used to represent XML documents, the
standard format of messages exchanged among web services, by adopting the convention
that the first field of each tuple acts as a ‘tag’2 (like originally proposed in the coordination
language Linda [100]). For example, the following XML message representing a paper
reference
<paper>
<title>A Calculus for Orchestration of Web Services </title>
<authors>
<author>Lapadula </author>
<author>Pugliese </author>
<author>Tiezzi </author>
</authors>
<conference>ESOP </conference>
<year> 2007 </year>
</paper>
could be rendered through the following COWS tuple
〈paper, 〈title,A Calculus for Orchestration of Web Services〉 ,
〈authors, 〈author,Lapadula〉 , 〈author,Pugliese〉 , 〈author,Tiezzi〉 〉 ,
〈conference,ESOP〉 ,
〈year, 2007〉 〉
Thus, to extract the title and the name of the second author of the paper above, one can
use the following pattern (as argument of a receive activity):
2Element attributes could be rendered in a similar way.
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〈paper, 〈title, xtitle〉 , 〈authors, , 〈author, xsecName〉 , 〉 , , 〉
where, for simplicity sake, we assume that the don’t care symbol matches any
value/tuple.
Service instances and message correlation. The replication operator, that spawns in
parallel as many copies of its argument term as necessary (law ∗ s ≡ s | ∗ s of Table 3.2),
permits specifying persistent services, i.e. services capable of creating multiple instances
to serve several requests simultaneously.
The loosely coupled nature of SOC implies that the connection between communicat-
ing instances should not be assumed to persist for the duration of a whole business activity.
Therefore, it is up to each single message to provide a form of context that enables services
to associate the message with others. This is achieved by embedding values, called cor-
relation data, in the content of the message itself. Pattern-matching is the mechanism for
locating such data important to identify service instances for the delivering of messages.
Consider, for example, the following (persistent) service definition running in parallel
with two clients:
( odds • throw!〈first, cbA, 2〉 | odds • throw!〈second, cbA, 3〉 | sA )
| ( evens • throw!〈first, cbB, 1〉 | sB )
| ∗ [xid, xp, xnum, yp, ynum] odds • throw?〈xid, xp, xnum〉. evens • throw?〈xid, yp, ynum〉. s
After a computational step, due to the interaction between the service definition and the
client A, a new instance identified by the correlation datum first runs in parallel with the
other terms:
( odds • throw!〈second, cbA, 3〉 | sA )
| ( evens • throw!〈first, cbB, 1〉 | sB )
| ∗ [xid, xp, xnum, yp, ynum] odds • throw?〈xid, xp, xnum〉. evens • throw?〈xid, yp, ynum〉. s
| [yp, ynum] evens • throw?〈first, yp, ynum〉. s · {xid 7→ first , xp 7→ cbA , xnum 7→ 2}
If, again, the client A invokes the service, a second instance, identified by the correlation
datum second, is created:
sA
| ( evens • throw!〈first, cbB, 1〉 | sB )
| ∗ [xid, xp, xnum, yp, ynum] odds • throw?〈xid, xp, xnum〉. evens • throw?〈xid, yp, ynum〉. s
| [yp, ynum] evens • throw?〈first, yp, ynum〉. s · {xid 7→ first , xp 7→ cbA , xnum 7→ 2}
| [yp, ynum] evens • throw?〈second, yp, ynum〉. s · {xid 7→ second , xp 7→ cbA , xnum 7→ 3}
Now, the client B invokes the service and, since the sent message contains the cor-
relation datum first, the interaction takes place with the first service instance (indeed,
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M(〈second, yp, ynum〉, 〈first, cbB, 1〉) does not hold):
sA
| sB
| ∗ [xid, xp, xnum, yp, ynum] odds • throw?〈xid, xp, xnum〉. evens • throw?〈xid, yp, ynum〉. s
| (s · {xid 7→ first , xp 7→ cbA , xnum 7→ 2}) · {yp 7→ cbB , ynum 7→ 1}
| [yp, ynum] evens • throw?〈second, yp, ynum〉. s · {xid 7→ second , xp 7→ cbA , xnum 7→ 3}
Therefore, although two instances waiting for a message along the endpoint evens • throw
were available when B invoked the service, the message sent by B has been delivered
to the correct instance. This behaviour is achieved simply by allowing the two receive
activities of the service definition to share the variable xid, used to store the correlation
datum.
It is worth noticing that, as witnessed by the above example, this correlation mecha-
nism is flexible enough for allowing a single message to participate in multiparty conver-
sations (indeed, the above conversation involves one provider service and two clients).
Notice also that, differently from other correlation-based formal languages for SOC,
such as ws-calculus [130], SOCK [104] and Blite [135], correlation variables in COWS
are not syntactically distinguished by other data variables. In fact, correlation variables
can be recognized by their use (as in the example above, where xid is used as argument of
two consecutive receives). This is due to the fact that COWS intends to be a foundational
model (specifically, a process calculus), with a small number of simple primitives.
Imperative constructs. We present how some higher level imperative constructs can be
rendered in µCOWSm.
Suppose to add a matching with assignment construct [w = ] to COWS basic activ-
ities. Hence, we can also write terms of the form [w = ].s whose intended semantics
is that, if w and  do match, a substitution is returned that will eventually assign to the
variable in w the corresponding value of , and service s can proceed. In COWS, this
meaning can be rendered through the following encoding
〈〈[w = ].s〉〉 = [n] (n!〈〉 | n?〈w〉.〈〈s〉〉) (3.3)
for n fresh. The new construct generalizes standard assignment because it allows values
to occur on the left of =, in which case it behaves as a matching mechanism. Similarly,
we can encode conditional choice as follows:
〈〈if () then {s1} else {s2}〉〉 = [n] (n!〈〉 | (n?〈true〉.〈〈s1〉〉 + n?〈false〉.〈〈s2〉〉) ) (3.4)
where true and false are the values that can result from evaluation of .
Like the receive activity, matching with assignment does not bind the variables on the
left of =, thus it cannot reassign a value to them if a value has already been assigned.
Therefore, the behaviour of matching with assignment may differ from standard assign-
ment, even when the former uses only variables on the left of = as the latter does. For
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example, activity [x = 1] will not necessarily generate substitution {x 7→ 1}. In fact, when
it will be executed, x could have been previously replaced by a value v in which case ex-
ecution of the activity corresponds to checking if v and 1 do match. For similar reasons,
activity [x = x + 1] does not have the effect of increasing the value of x by 1, but that of
checking if the value of x and that of x + 1 do match, which always fails.
Standard variables (that can be repeatedly assigned) can be rendered as services pro-
viding ‘read’ and ‘write’ functionalities. When the service variable is initialized (i.e. the
first time the ‘write’ operation is used), an instance is created that is able to provide the
value currently stored. When this value must be read (resp. updated), the current instance
terminates and a new instance is created which stores the current (resp. new) value. Here
is the specification:
Varx , [xv, xa] x •write?〈xv, xa〉.
[n] ( n!〈xv, xa〉
| ∗ [x, y] n?〈x, y〉. ( y!〈〉
| [x′, y′] ( x • read?〈y′〉. [m] ( n!〈x, m〉 | m?〈〉. y′!〈x〉 )
+ x •write?〈x′, y′〉. n!〈x′, y′〉 ) ) )
where x is a public partner name. Service Varx provides two operations: read, for getting
the current value; write, for replacing the current value with a new one. To access the
service, a user must invoke these operations by providing a communication endpoint for
the reply and, in case of write, the value to be stored. The write operation can be invoked
along the public partner x, which corresponds, the first time, to initialization of the vari-
able. Thus, Varx uses the delimited endpoint n in which to store the current value of the
variable. This last feature is exploited to implement operations read and write in terms of
re-instantiation. Notably, notation Varx , s is used here to assign the name Varx to the
service s and to indicate that the name x occurs free in s. Thus, Varn is a family of names,
one for each name n identifying the variable service invocable by using the partner name
n.
Now, suppose temporarily that standard variables, ranged over by X, Y ,. . . , may occur
in the syntax of COWS anywhere a variable can. We can remove them by using the
following encodings. If  contains standard variables X1, . . . , Xn, we can let
〈〈〉〉m,n = [n1, . . . , nk] ( x1 • read!〈n1〉 | · · · | xk • read!〈nk〉
| [x1, . . . , xk] ( n1?〈x1〉. · · · . nk?〈xk〉. m!〈 ·{Xi 7→ xi}i∈{1,..,k}, n〉 ) )
where {Xi 7→ xi} denotes substitution of Xi with xi, endpoint m returns the result of eval-
uating , and endpoint n permits to receive an acknowledgment when the resulting value
is assigned to a service variable (of course, we are assuming that m, n, ni and xi are fresh).
Basically, the encoded term reads the current values of the standard variables within  (by
means of partner names xis associated to standard variables Xis) and uses them to evaluate
. With this encoding of expression evaluation, the encoding of matching with assignment
50
3.2 The language COWS
becomes
〈〈[w = ].s〉〉= [m, n] (〈〈〉〉m,n | m?〈w, n〉.〈〈s〉〉)
〈〈[X = ].s〉〉= [n] (〈〈〉〉x•write,n | n?〈〉.〈〈s〉〉)
(3.5)
where w is a value v or a variable x, while X is a standard variable. In the sequel, we
will write [w¯ = ¯].s, where w¯ = 〈w1, . . . ,wk〉 and ¯ = 〈1, . . . , k〉, with w¯ and ¯ that may
contain standard variables, for the sequence of assignments [w1 = 1]. · · · . [wk = k].s.
The encodings of the remaining constructs, where standard variables may directly occur,
are
〈〈[X] s〉〉 = [x] (Varx | 〈〈s〉〉)
〈〈X • u!¯〉〉 = [x, n] ( x • read!〈n〉 | n?〈x〉. 〈〈x • u!¯〉〉 )
〈〈u •X!¯〉〉 = [x, n] ( x • read!〈n〉 | n?〈x〉. 〈〈u • x!¯〉〉 )
〈〈u • u′!〈1, . . . , k〉〉〉 = [x1, n1, m1, . . . , xk, nk, mk]
( 〈〈1〉〉n1,m1 | . . . | 〈〈k〉〉nk ,mk
| n1?〈x1, m1〉. · · · . nk?〈xk, mk〉. u • u′!〈x1, . . . , xk〉 )
if u and u′ do not contain standard variables
〈〈p • o?w¯.s〉〉 = [x1, . . . , xk] p • o?w¯·{Xi 7→ xi}i∈{1,..,k}.
[n1, . . . , nk] ( x1 •write!〈x1, n1〉 | . . . | xk •write!〈xk, nk〉
| n1?〈〉. · · · . nk?〈〉.〈〈s〉〉 )
if w¯ contains standard variables X1, . . . , Xk and
x1, . . . , xk are fresh
(3.6)
This way, occurrences of standard variables can be completely removed. It is worth notic-
ing that in the encoding of p • o?w¯.s, standard variables Xi occurring within w¯ are replaced
by auxiliary fresh variables xi that are then used to update the corresponding standard
variables. This means that standard variables are not used for correlation purposes. This
choice is motivated by the fact that, differently from standard variables, correlation vari-
ables are write-once variables.
Sequential composition can be encoded alike in CCS [148, Chapter 8]. However, due
to the asynchrony of invoke activities, the notion of well-termination must be relaxed w.r.t.
CCS. Firstly, we settle that terms may indicate their termination by exploiting the invoke
activity xdone • odone!〈〉, where xdone is a distinguished variable and odone is a distinguished
name. Secondly, we say that a term s is well-terminating if, for every reduct s′ of s and
fresh partner p, s′ · {xdone 7→ p} p •odone〈〉−−−−−−−−−−→ implies that if s′ · {xdone 7→ p} α−−→ then
α = p′ •o v¯, for some p′, o and v¯. Notably, well-termination does not demand a term to
terminate, but only that whenever the term can perform activity p • odone!〈〉, then it termi-
nates except for, possibly, some parallel pending invoke activities. As usual, the encoding
of sequential composition relies on the assumption that all calculus operators (in particu-
lar, parallel composition) can be rendered as to preserve well-termination. Therefore, if
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we only consider well-terminating terms, then, for a fresh p, we can let:
〈〈s1; s2〉〉 = [p] ( 〈〈s1 · {xdone 7→ p}〉〉 | p • odone?〈〉. 〈〈s2〉〉 ) (3.7)
Finally, iterative constructs can be encoded by exploiting the previous encodings:
〈〈while () {s}〉〉 = [n] ( n!〈〉 | ∗ n?〈〉. if () then {〈〈s〉〉; n!〈〉} else {xdone • odone!〈〉} ) (3.8)
Services’ execution modalities. In the previous examples and in that presented in Sec-
tion 3.1 we have shown that persistent services create one specific instance to serve each
received request. Once created, service instances can be executed concurrently or se-
quentially, and may also share (part of) the state. The following examples illustrate how
different services’ execution modalities, e.g. concurrent vs. sequential execution, local
vs. shared state, can be modelled in µCOWSm (see [104] for an account of this topic in
another process language for SOC).
In µCOWSm, a service can be modelled by a term of the form ∗ [u¯ ] s, where tuple
u¯ contains all the free variables of s. The use of replication enables providing as many
concurrent instances as needed, while that of delimitation permits modelling the state (by
restricting the scope of variables). This means that the previous term corresponds to a
service whose instances are concurrently executed without a shared state. For instance,
consider the following service definition:
∗ [x1, . . . , xn] p • o?〈x1〉.s
If we put it in parallel with the invocation p • o!〈v1〉, the resulting system can evolve as
follows:
∗ [x1, . . . , xn] p • o?〈x1〉.s | p • o!〈v1〉 ∅−−→
∗ [x1, . . . , xn] p • o?〈x1〉.s | [x2, . . . , xn] s · {x1 7→ v1}
Each time an invocation is processed, a new service instance with private variables x2, . . . ,
xn is activated. For example, if we have two concurrent invocations, we get
∗ [x1, . . . , xn] p • o?〈x1〉.s | p • o!〈v1〉 | p • o!〈v2〉 ∅−−→ ∅−−→
∗ [x1, . . . , xn] p • o?〈x1〉.s | [x2, . . . , xn] s · {x1 7→ v1} | [x2, . . . , xn] s · {x1 7→ v2}
The resulting system is composed of the service definition and of two different instances,
each with its own state.
To allow instances of a same service to be concurrently executed while sharing (part
of) the state, we move the delimitations of the variables to be shared outside the scope of
replication. Thus, if x1, . . . , xk are shared and xk+1, . . . , xn are not, the previous example
can be modified as follows:
[x1, . . . , xk] ∗ [xk+1, . . . , xn] p • o?〈x1〉.s
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After a parallel request p • o!〈v1〉 has been processed, we have:
[x2, . . . , xk] ( ∗ [xk+1, . . . , xn] p • o?〈v1〉.s · {x1 7→ v1} | [xk+1, . . . , xn] s · {x1 7→ v1} )
In this case, since x1 is shared both by the service definition and by its instances, new
instances can be created only if the service definition receives requests along p • o with
the same value (i.e. v1) as the first invocation. In general, however, instantiation variables,
such as x1, are not shared, in order to allow service invocations with different arguments
to trigger instance creation. To model this behaviour, we can simply leave instantiation
variables within the scope of replication. Consider for example the term:
[x2] ∗ [x1, x3] p • o?〈x1〉.s
If requests p • o!〈v1〉 and p • o!〈v2〉 are put in parallel, the resulting system can evolve as
follows:
[x2] ∗ [x1, x3] p • o?〈x1〉.s | p • o!〈v1〉 | p • o!〈v2〉 ∅−−→ ∅−−→
[x2] ( ∗ [x1, x3] p • o?〈x1〉.s | [x3] s · {x1 7→ v1} | [x3] s · {x1 7→ v2} )
After two computational steps, two instances, each with a local state (i.e. the variable x3)
and sharing variable x2, are activated.
Suppose now we want to model the fact that service instances can only be sequentially
executed without sharing a state. We can exploit the sequential operator ‘;’ (see encoding
(3.7)) and a fresh endpoint n (to signal termination of an instance). For example, consider
the term:
[n] ( n!〈〉 | ∗ n?〈〉. [x1, . . . , xk] ( (p • o?〈x1〉.s) ; n!〈〉 ) )
After processing a parallel request p • o!〈v1〉, the resulting system becomes
[n] ( ∗ n?〈〉. [x1, . . . , xk] ( (p • o?〈x1〉.s) ; n!〈〉 ) | [x2, . . . , xk] (s · {x1 7→ v1} ; n!〈〉) )
Now, another request cannot be processed, and creation of a new service instance is dis-
abled, until the existing instance emits the termination signal n!〈〉. This guarantees that at
most one service instance is executed at a time.
Finally, by combining all the previous patterns, we can also model services whose in-
stances are sequentially executed and share (part of) a state, as the following term shows:
[n, x2] ( n!〈〉 | ∗ n?〈〉. [x1, x3] ( (p • o?〈x1〉.s) ; n!〈〉 ) )
Flow graphs. In business process management, flow graphs3 provide a direct and in-
tuitive way to structure workflow processes, where activities executed in parallel can be
synchronized by settling dependencies, called (flow) links, among them. At the beginning
3Here, we refer to the corresponding notion of WS-BPEL rather than to similar synchronization constructs
of some process calculi (see e.g. [125]) or to the homonymous graphical notation used for representing
processes and their interconnection structure (see, e.g., [148, 150]).
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s ::= . . . | [ f l ] ls | ∑i∈I pi • oi?w¯i.si (services)
ls ::= ( jc)
s j f⇒ s⇒ ( f l, ¯) | s⇒ ( f l, ¯) | ls | ls (linked services)
jc ::= true | false | f l | ¬ jc | jc ∨ jc | jc ∧ jc (join conditions)
s j f ::= yes | no (supp. join failure)
〈〈[ f l] ls〉〉 = [x¯ f l] 〈〈ls〉〉 〈〈ls1 | ls2〉〉 = 〈〈ls1〉〉 | 〈〈ls2〉〉 〈〈s⇒ ( f l, ¯)〉〉 = 〈〈s〉〉; [x¯ f l = ¯]
〈〈( jc) yes⇒ s⇒ ( f l, ¯)〉〉 = if ( jc) then { 〈〈s〉〉; [x¯ f l = ¯] } else { [outLinkOf (s) = false] }
〈〈( jc) no⇒ s⇒ ( f l, ¯)〉〉 = if ( jc) then { 〈〈s〉〉; [x¯ f l = ¯] } else { throw(φ join f ) }
〈〈∑i∈{1..n} pi • oi?w¯i.si〉〉 = p1 • o1?w¯1. [⋃ j∈{2..n} outLinkOf (s j) = false]. 〈〈s1〉〉
+ . . . + pn • on?w¯n. [
⋃
j∈{1..n−1} outLinkOf (s j) = false]. 〈〈sn〉〉
Table 3.5: Syntax and encoding of flow graphs
of a parallel execution, all involved links are inactive and only those activities with no syn-
chronization dependencies can execute. Once all incoming links of an activity are active
(i.e., they have been assigned either a positive or negative state), a guard, called join condi-
tion, is evaluated. When an activity terminates, the status of the outgoing links, which can
be positive, negative or undefined, is determined through evaluation of a transition con-
dition. When an activity in the flow graph cannot execute (i.e., the join condition fails), a
join failure fault is emitted to signal that some activities have not completed. An attribute
called ‘suppress join failure’ can be set to yes to ensure that join condition failures do not
throw the join failure fault (this way obtaining the so-called Dead-Path Elimination effect
[166]).
To express the constructs above, we extend the syntax of µCOWSm as illustrated in
the upper part of Table 3.5. A flow graph activity [ f l] ls is a delimited linked service,
where the activities within ls can synchronize by means of the flow links in f l, rendered
as (boolean) variables. A linked service is a service equipped with a set of incoming flow
links that forms the join condition, and a set of outgoing flow links that represents the
transition condition. Incoming flow links and join condition are denoted by ( jc)
s j f⇒. Out-
going links are represented by ⇒ ( f li∈I , ¯i∈I) where each pair ( f li, i) is composed of a
flow link f li and the corresponding transition (boolean) condition i. Attribute s j f per-
mits suppressing possible join failures. Input-guarded summation replaces binary choice,
because we want all the branches of a multiple choice to be considered at once.
Again, we show that in fact it is not necessary to extend the syntax because flow graphs
can be easily encoded by exploiting the capability of µCOWSm of modelling a state shared
among a group of activities. The most interesting cases of the encoding are shown in the
lower part of Table 3.5. The encoding uses the auxiliary function outLinkOf (s), that
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returns the tuple of outgoing links in s and is inductively defined as follows:
outLinkOf ([ f l] ls) = outLinkOf (ls)
outLinkOf (
∑
i∈{1..n} pi • oi?w¯i.si) = outLinkOf (s1), . . . , outLinkOf (sn)
outLinkOf (( jc)
s j f⇒ s⇒ ( f l, ¯)) = outLinkOf (s) , x¯ f l
outLinkOf (s⇒ ( f l, ¯)) = outLinkOf (s) , x¯ f l
outLinkOf (ls1 | ls2) = outLinkOf (ls1) , outLinkOf (ls2)
outLinkOf (0) = outLinkOf (u • u′!¯) = 〈〉
outLinkOf (s1 | s2) = outLinkOf (s1) , outLinkOf (s2)
outLinkOf ([u] s) = outLinkOf (∗ s) = outLinkOf (s)
Basically, flow graphs are rendered as delimited services, while flow links are rendered
as variables. A join condition is encoded as a boolean condition within a conditional
construct, where the transition conditions are rendered as the assignment [x¯ f l = ¯]. In
case attribute ‘suppress join failure’ is set to no, a join condition failure produces a fault
signal that can be caught by a proper fault handler (see Section 3.2.3.3 for an account of
fault handling with COWS). Choice among (linked) services is implemented in such a
way that, when a branch is selected, the links outgoing from the activities of the discarded
branches are set to false. The same rationale underlies the new encoding of conditional
choice that becomes as follows
〈〈if () then {s1} else {s2}〉〉 = if () then { [outLinkOf (s2) = false]. 〈〈s1〉〉 }
else { [outLinkOf (s1) = false]. 〈〈s2〉〉 }
3.2.2 µCOWS : the protection- and kill-free fragment of COWS
The fragment of COWS presented in this section, namely µCOWS, dispenses with those
activities dealing with termination, i.e. kill and protection. In other words, µCOWS ex-
tends µCOWSm with priority in the parallel composition.
3.2.2.1 Syntax and operational semantics
The syntax of µCOWS and the set of laws defining the structural congruence coincide
with that of µCOWSm, shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Instead, the labelled
transition relation
α−−→ is the least relation over µCOWS services induced by the rules in
Table 3.6. The rules in the upper part of the table are directly borrowed from µCOWSm
(Table 3.4), while those in the lower part are the new rules used to deal with priority in
the parallel composition. Labels are now generated by the following grammar:
α ::= n v¯ | n w¯ | nσ ` v¯
The new label nσ ` v¯, which replaces the label σ, denotes execution of a communica-
tion over n with matching values v¯, generated substitution having ` pairs, and substitu-
tion σ to be still applied. Now, computational steps are denoted by label of the form
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[[¯]] = v¯
(inv)
n!¯
n v¯−−−−−→ 0
n?w¯.s
n w¯−−−−−−→ s (rec) g
α−−→ s
(choice)
g + g′
α−−→ s
s
α−−→ s′ u< u(α)
(del)
[u] s
α−−→ [u] s′
s ≡ α−−→≡ s′
(str)
s
α−−→ s′
s1
n w¯−−−−−−→s′1 s2
n v¯−−−−−→s′2 M(w¯, v¯)=σ noConf(s1 | s2, n, v¯, |σ |)
(com 2)
s1 | s2 nσ |σ| v¯−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s′2
s1
α−−→ s′1 α , nσ ` v¯
(par 2)
s1 | s2 α−−→ s′1 | s2
s1
nσ ` v¯−−−−−−→ s′1 noConf(s2, n, v¯, `)
(parcom)
s1 | s2 nσ ` v¯−−−−−−→ s′1 | s2
s
nσunionmulti{x 7→v} ` v¯−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′
(delcom 2)
[x] s
nσ ` v¯−−−−−−→ s′ ·{x 7→ v}
Table 3.6: µCOWS operational semantics
n ∅ ` v¯. Notation u(α), indicating the set of names and variables occurring in α, is such
that u(nσ ` v¯) = u(σ).
The definition of the labelled transition relation exploits a new auxiliary predicate
noConf(s, n, v¯, `), with ` natural number. The predicate, defined in Table 3.7, holds true if
s cannot immediately perform a receive over the endpoint n matching v¯ and generating a
substitution σ with |σ |< `.
We comment on salient points. In µCOWS, the communication label nσ ` v¯, pro-
duced by rule (com2), carries information about the communication that has taken place
(i.e. the endpoint, the transmitted values, the generated substitution and its length) used
to check the presence of conflicting receives in parallel components. Indeed, if more than
one matching is possible, the receive that needs fewer substitutions is selected to progress
(rules (com2) and (parcom)). This mechanism permits to correlate different service commu-
nications thus implicitly creating interaction sessions and can be exploited to model the
precedence of a service instance over the corresponding service specification when both
can process the same request (see Section 3.2.2.2 for some examples). Rule (delcom 2) is
similar to (delcom) (shown in Table 3.4) but deals with labels generated by communications
subject to priority. Notably, during the inference of a transition labelled by nσ ` v¯, the
length of the substitution to be applied decreases (rule (delcom 2)), while the length ` of the
initial substitution does never change, which makes it suitable to check, in any moment,
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noConf(u!¯, n, v¯, `) = noConf(0, n, v¯, `) = true
noConf(n′?w¯.s, n, v¯, `) =
{
false if n′ = n ∧ |M(w¯, v¯) |< `
true otherwise
noConf(g + g′, n, v¯, `) = noConf(g, n, v¯, `) ∧ noConf(g′, n, v¯, `)
noConf(s | s′, n, v¯, `) = noConf(s, n, v¯, `) ∧ noConf(s′, n, v¯, `)
noConf([u] s, n, v¯, `) =
{
noConf(s, n, v¯, `) if u < n
true otherwise
noConf(∗ s, n, v¯, `) = noConf(s, n, v¯, `)
Table 3.7: There are not conflicting receives along n matching v¯
existence of better matching, i.e. of parallel receives with greater priority. Execution of
parallel services is interleaved (rule (par 2)), but when a communication is performed. In
such case, the progress of the receive activity with greater priority must be ensured.
3.2.2.2 Examples
We present now some examples that point out the peculiarities of µCOWS.
Multiple start activities. Web services could be able of receiving multiple messages in
a statically unpredictable order and in such a way that the first incoming message trig-
gers creation of a service instance which subsequent messages are routed to. This would
require all those receive activities that can be immediately executed (according to [166],
Section 16.3, there are multiple start activities) to share a non-empty set of variables (the
so-called correlation set).
Consider, for example, an excerpt of the high-level specification of the Morra game
scenario presented in Section 3.1:
( odds • throw!〈first, cbA, 2〉 | [xA] cbA • res?〈first, xA〉. sA )
| ( evens • throw!〈first, cbB, 1〉 | [xB] cbB • res?〈first, xB〉. sB )
| ∗ [xid, xp, xnum, yp, ynum]
( odds • throw?〈xid, xp, xnum〉 | evens • throw?〈xid, yp, ynum〉
| xp • res!〈xid,win(xnum, ynum, 1)〉 | yp • res!〈xid,win(xnum, ynum, 0)〉 )
After an interaction with the client B, an instance running in parallel with the service
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definition is created.
( odds • throw!〈first, cbA, 2〉 | [xA] cbA • res?〈first, xA〉. sA )
| ( [xB] cbB • res?〈first, xB〉. sB )
| ∗ [xid, xp, xnum, yp, ynum]
( odds • throw?〈xid, xp, xnum〉 | evens • throw?〈xid, yp, ynum〉
| xp • res!〈xid,win(xnum, ynum, 1)〉 | yp • res!〈xid,win(xnum, ynum, 0)〉 )
| [xp, xnum]
( odds • throw?〈first, xp, xnum〉
| xp • res!〈first,win(xnum, 1, 1)〉 | cbB • res!〈first,win(xnum, 1, 0)〉 )
Now, the service definition and the created instance, being both able to receive the
same tuple 〈first, cbA, 2〉 along the endpoint odds • throw, compete for the request
odds • throw!〈first, cbA, 2〉 (i.e., in WS-BPEL jargon, two conflicting receive activities are
enabled). However, µCOWS’s (prioritized) semantics, in particular rule (com 2) in combi-
nation with rule (parcom), allows only the existing instance to evolve. Indeed, suppose to
try to infer the transition corresponding to the interaction between client A and the service
definition. Then, the generated substitution would have length 3 and, hence, the predicate
noConf(sinst, odds • throw, 〈first, cbA, 2〉, 3), where sinst is the created instance, would not
hold. In fact, the instance can perform a receive matching the same message and pro-
ducing a substitution with fewer pairs (it has length 2). This way, the creation of a new
instance is prevented and the only feasible computation leads to the following term:
( [xA] cbA • res?〈first, xA〉. sA )
| ( [xB] cbB • res?〈first, xB〉. sB )
| ∗ [xid, xp, xnum, yp, ynum]
( odds • throw?〈xid, xp, xnum〉 | evens • throw?〈xid, yp, ynum〉
| xp • res!〈xid,win(xnum, ynum, 1)〉 | yp • res!〈xid,win(xnum, ynum, 0)〉 )
| ( cbA • res!〈first,win(2, 1, 1)〉 | cbB • res!〈first,win(2, 1, 0)〉 )
At the end, the result of the match is sent to both players and the term evolves to:
( sA · {xA 7→ w} )
| ( sB · {xB 7→ l} )
| ∗ [xid, xp, xnum, yp, ynum]
( odds • throw?〈xid, xp, xnum〉 | evens • throw?〈xid, yp, ynum〉
| xp • res!〈xid,win(xnum, ynum, 1)〉 | yp • res!〈xid,win(xnum, ynum, 0)〉 )
It is worth noticing that the above considerations still hold if we use choice rather than
parallel to compose the start activities of the Morra service, as shown below:
∗ [xid, xp, xnum, yp, ynum]
( odds • throw?〈xid, xp, xnum〉. evens • throw?〈xid, yp, ynum〉
+ evens • throw?〈xid, yp, ynum〉. odds • throw?〈xid, xp, xnum〉 ) ; . . .
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No conflict predicate. Rules (com 2) and (parcom) use the no conflict predicate
noConf( , n, v¯, `) for checking the presence of concurrent conflicting receives. When these
rules must be used to infer a transition, a preventive α-conversion may be necessary. In-
deed, condition noConf(n?w¯.s, n, v¯, `) might single out patterns that could not really match
the transmitted values. These false alarms would block the inference (but allow us to stay
on the ‘safe’ side).
For instance, consider the following term:
n!〈m〉 | [x] n?〈x〉 | [m] n?〈m〉 (3.9)
Apparently, both receive activities match the invoke activity, but only n?〈x〉 can synchro-
nise with n!〈m〉, because the argument of n?〈m〉 is a restricted name, thus it is certainly
different from the name transmitted by the invoke. However, if we try to naively infer
the transition corresponding to the synchronisation between n!〈m〉 and n?〈x〉, we fail due
to rules (com 2) or (parcom). In fact, noConf([m] n?〈m〉, n, 〈m〉, 1) does not hold because
M(m,m) produces the substitution ∅, that is smaller than {x 7→ m}, that is produced by
M(x,m).
However, the wanted transition can be inferred by first applying α-conversion. In fact,
(3.9) can be re-written as follows:
n!〈m〉 | [x] n?〈x〉 | [m′] n?〈m′〉
Now, it is clear that n?〈m′〉 is not a conflicting receive, becauseM(m′,m) is undefined.
The same observations hold for the term:
[m] ( n!〈m〉 | [x] n?〈x〉 ) | n?〈m〉
Again, α-conversion is necessary for inferring the correct transitions. Instead, if in (3.9)
we replace delimitation of m with that of n, the correct transition can be directly inferred
because noConf([n] n?〈m′〉, n, v¯, `) holds true.
Default behaviour. The priority mechanism of µCOWS can be used for coordination,
other than for orchestration, purposes. For example, in the service 5F of Section 3.1
reported below
[x, y, z] ( m • req5f ?〈x, y, z〉.m • resp5f !〈x, err, err〉
+ m • req5f ?〈x, 0, 0〉.m • resp5f !〈x, l,w〉
+ m • req5f ?〈x, 0, 1〉.m • resp5f !〈x,w, l〉
+ . . . + m • req5f ?〈x, 5, 5〉.m • resp5f !〈x, l,w〉 )
the priority mechanism enables implementing a sort of ‘default’ behaviour. Indeed, when
the service is invoked along the endpoint m • req5f with a correct tuple of values, i.e. the
second and third elements are integers between 0 and 5, a tuple containing the strings w
and l is returned along m • resp5f . For example, if 5F is invoked by m • req5f !〈id, 0, 0〉, al-
though the invocation and the receive m • req5f ?〈x, y, z〉 do match, the priority mechanism
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ensures that the service replies with m • resp5f !〈id, l,w〉. The above receive can progress
only when a throw is not admissible, e.g. m • req5f !〈id, 0, 7〉, and allows the service to
reply with a tuple containing two string err.
Implementing sessions by means of correlation mechanisms. In a service-oriented
scenario, service definitions are used as templates for creating service instances that de-
liver application functionality to either end-user applications or other instances. Sessions
and correlation are used in this scenario to allow service instances to have conversations
by means of different communication mechanisms. Session-based communication takes
place along private channels and is, usually, regulated by session types [112, 207]. Cor-
relation, instead, is a mechanism that simply permits delivering messages to the proper
service instances by means of their same contents.
Here, we show that correlation can be used to suitably implement sessions. To this
aim, suppose to temporarily extend µCOWS syntax with session constructs inspired by
those introduced in [112] as shown in the upper part of Table 3.8, where c, c′, . . . denote
channels and l, l1, . . . denote branching labels. The initiation of a session is requested, via
a name a, by a construct request a(c) in s, and causes the generation of a fresh channel
c that shall be used by s for later communications. Conversely, accept a(c) in s permits
receiving the request for the initiation of a session via a and generating a new channel
c, which shall be used for communications in s. Activities c![¯] and c?(w¯) in s denote
(asynchronous) data sending and receiving via a channel c of a session, respectively. c l
and c  {l1 : s1 ‖ . . . ‖ lr : sr} denote label selection and label branching (where l1,. . . ,
lr are assumed to be pairwise distinct) via a channel c, respectively. They mime method
invocation in object-based programming. Finally, throw c[c′] and catch c(c′) in s denote
session channel sending and receiving, and permit to pass a channel, that is being used in
a session, to another process (this feature is called ‘delegation’), thus allowing complex
nested structured communications. Constructs request a(c) in s, accept a(c) in s, and
catch c′(c) in s bind channel c in s.
Now we show that, by exploiting private names as correlation data, the introduced
session constructs can be easily encoded in µCOWS, thus it is not necessary to extend its
syntax. This means that session-based communication can be implemented by using cor-
relation mechanisms. The most interesting cases of the encoding are reported in the lower
part of Table 3.8 (in the remaining cases, the encoding acts as an homomorphism). The
distinguished operation names oinit and ostart are used for initialising and starting sessions,
respectively, while the distinguished endpoints req and acc are used for modelling the
two sides of sessions, i.e. the requestor- and acceptor-side, respectively. For simplicity
sake, we assume that bound channels are pairwise distinct and different from the free ones
(as usual, this condition is not restrictive and can always be fulfilled by possibly using
α-conversion).
The encoding function 〈〈·〉〉C , that is inductively defined on the extended syntax, is
parameterized by a set of channels C. The encoding of an extended service s is given
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s ::= . . . (services)
| request a(c) in s (session request)
| accept a(c) in s (session acceptance)
| c![¯] (data sending)
| c?(w¯) in s (data reception)
| c l (label selection)
| c {l1 : s1 ‖ . . . ‖ lr : sr} (label branching)
| throw c[c′] (channel sending)
| catch c(c′) in s (channel reception)
〈〈request a(c) in s〉〉C = [c] ( a • oinit!〈c〉 | a • ostart?〈c〉.〈〈s〉〉C )
〈〈accept a(c) in s〉〉C = [xc] ( a • oinit?〈xc〉.( a • ostart!〈xc〉 | 〈〈s〉〉C∪ {c} ) )
〈〈c![¯]〉〉C =
req!(xc, ¯) if c ∈ Cacc!(c, ¯) otherwise 〈〈c?(w¯) in s〉〉C =
acc?(xc, w¯).〈〈s〉〉C if c ∈ Creq?(c, w¯).〈〈s〉〉C otherwise
〈〈c l〉〉C =
req!〈xc, l〉 if c ∈ Cacc!〈c, l〉 otherwise
〈〈c {l1 : s1 ‖ . . .‖ lr : sr}〉〉C =
acc?〈xc, l1〉.〈〈s1〉〉C +. . .+ acc?〈xc, lr〉.〈〈sr〉〉C if c ∈ Creq?〈c, l1〉.〈〈s1〉〉C +. . .+ req?〈c, lr〉.〈〈sr〉〉C otherwise
〈〈throw c[c′]〉〉C =
req!〈xc, 〈〈c′〉〉C〉 if c ∈ Cacc!〈c, 〈〈c′〉〉C〉 otherwise
〈〈catch c(c′) in s〉〉C =
acc?〈xc, 〈〈c′〉〉C〉.〈〈s〉〉C if c ∈ C 〈〈c〉〉C∪{c} = xcreq?〈c, 〈〈c′〉〉C〉.〈〈s〉〉C otherwise 〈〈c〉〉C = c if c < C
Table 3.8: Syntax and encoding of session constructs
by a µCOWS service 〈〈s〉〉C with C = ∅; as the encoding proceeds, C is used to record
the channels that were initially bound by a session acceptance. In fact, the crux of the
encoding is mapping each session request in a µCOWS term that generates a fresh name
(by means of delimitation operator) and sends it to the encoding of the corresponding
session acceptance. Then, data sending and reception, label selection and branching, and
channel sending and reception use the new private name as first element of messages for
correlation purposes. A subtle point of the encoding is that whenever a session channel
is bound by a session acceptance, then it is mapped to a µCOWS variable, otherwise it is
mapped to a µCOWS name. Moreover, in the former case reception takes place along acc
and sending along req, and vice versa in the latter case; this way, internal synchronization
within a single side of a session is avoided.
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In the above encoding, if acc and req are not distinguished (and reserved) endpoints,
we could write malicious services that can steal messages exchanged over a session and
use the correlation datum to pass themselves off as one of the two session parties. For
example, consider an already initialised session where the requestor party can perform the
activities c![5, “foo”] | s and the acceptor the activity c?(x, y) in clok. The corresponding
encoded term is as follows:
[c] ( (acc!〈c, 5, “foo”〉 | 〈〈s〉〉∅) | [x, y] acc?〈c, x, y〉. req!〈c, lok〉 ) (∗)
Now, if we simply put in parallel the above term with [z1, z2, z3] acc?〈z1, z2, z3〉.s′, that
uses improperly channel acc, i.e.
[c] ( (acc!〈c, 5, “foo”〉 | 〈〈s〉〉∅) | [x, y] acc?〈c, x, y〉. req!〈c, lok〉 )
| [z1, z2, z3] acc?〈z1, z2, z3〉.s′
due to the prioritised semantics of parallel composition, the communication takes place in
the proper way and the term correctly evolves to
[c] ( 〈〈s〉〉∅ | req!〈c, lok〉 ) | [z1, z2, z3] acc?〈z1, z2, z3〉.s′
By the way, in µCOWSm, since parallel composition does not have a prioritised semantics,
the receive acc?〈z1, z2, z3〉 can steal the message by synchronising with acc!〈c, 5, “foo”〉.
Come back to µCOWS and put in parallel the term (∗) with [z] acc?〈z, 5, “foo”〉.
req!〈z, lno〉, that is a malicious service able to guess the content of the exchanged message
(except for the correlation datum that, indeed, is a restricted name), i.e.
[c] ( (acc!〈c, 5, “foo”〉 | 〈〈s〉〉∅) | [x, y] acc?〈c, x, y〉. req!〈c, lok〉 )
| [z] acc?〈z, 5, “foo”〉. req!〈z, lno〉
Then, a communication bug can occur and lead to the following term
[c] ( 〈〈s〉〉∅ | [x, y] acc?〈c, x, y〉. req!〈c, lok〉 | req!〈c, lno〉 )
where req!〈c, lno〉 is enabled instead of req!〈c, lok〉.
This demonstrates that, in general, service communication based on correlation can be
prone to security issues. Such problems are due to the fact that messages do not contain
enough ‘private information’ to be delivered in a secure way. However, we can easily cope
with this problem by using the restricted correlation datum more than once within each
message. Therefore, before to apply the encoding to a term, we analyse it to calculate
the maximal length of messages. Then, let r be this length, we will encode each message
¯ along the session channel c with the message (c, . . . , c︸  ︷︷  ︸
r+1
, ¯). In this way, the previous
example can be rewritten as follows:
[c] ( (acc!〈c, c, c, 5, “foo”〉 | 〈〈s〉〉∅) | [x, y] acc?〈c, c, c, x, y〉. req!〈c, c, c, lok〉 )
| [z1, z2, z3] acc?〈z1, z2, z3, 5, “foo”〉. req!〈z1, z2, z3, lno〉
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This time, the correct receive activity acc?〈c, c, c, x, y〉 always wins the race condition
with the malicious one. However, also this last encoding does not work for some session
protocols, since it requires that when a party is ready to send a message, the other party is
ready to receive it. We leave the generalisation of this encoding for future work.
Of course, we could solve the above security problems also by using private endpoints,
as it is done in session-based calculi [112, 57, 35], i.e. the encoding of the session request
creates a private endpoint to receive data and sends it to the encoding of the corresponding
session acceptance, that creates in its turn a private endpoint to receive data and sends it
to the other party. However, here we want to point out that correlation can be exploited in
a powerful and flexible way.
‘Blind date’ session joining. We present here a service capable of arranging matches
of 2-players online games, such as e.g. morra or rock/paper/scissors4 (here called rps for
short). To join a match, a player has only to provide the kind of game and its partner
name; players do not need to know on advance any further information, such as e.g. the
identifier of the match or the identifier of the other player. Thus, the arrangement of
matches is completely transparent to players (for this reason, we call ‘blind date’ this
particular kind of session joining). Such service can be rendered in COWS as follows:
masterService , ∗ [xgame, xplayer1, xplayer2]
master • join?〈xgame, xplayer1〉.
master • join?〈xgame, xplayer2〉.
[matchId] ( xplayer1 • start!〈matchId〉 | xplayer2 • start!〈matchId〉 )
Consider now the following players
PlayerA , master • join!〈morra, pA〉 | [xid] pA • start?〈xid〉. 〈rest of PlayerA〉
PlayerB , master • join!〈rps, pB〉 | [xid] pB • start?〈xid〉. 〈rest of PlayerB〉
PlayerC , master • join!〈morra, pC〉 | [xid] pC • start?〈xid〉. 〈rest of PlayerC〉
and the system
PlayerA | PlayerB | PlayerC | masterService
If PlayerA requests to join to a match, since there are not matches under arrangement,
masterService initialises a new match and the system evolves to:
[xid] pA • start?〈xid〉. 〈rest of PlayerA〉
| PlayerB | PlayerC | masterService
| [xplayer2] master • join?〈morra, xplayer2〉.
[matchId] ( pA • start!〈matchId〉 | xplayer2 • start!〈matchId〉 )
4For an account of rock/paper/scissors visit http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rock-paper-scissors.
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Now, if PlayerB invokes masterService, a second match instance is created:
[xid] pA • start?〈xid〉. 〈rest of PlayerA〉
| [xid] pB • start?〈xid〉. 〈rest of PlayerB〉
| PlayerC | masterService
| [xplayer2] master • join?〈morra, xplayer2〉.
[matchId] ( pA • start!〈matchId〉 | xplayer2 • start!〈matchId〉 )
| [xplayer2] master • join?〈rps, xplayer2〉.
[matchId′] ( pB • start!〈matchId′〉 | xplayer2 • start!〈matchId′〉 )
When PlayerC invokes masterService, he is joined to the existing morra match:
[xid] pA • start?〈xid〉. 〈rest of PlayerA〉
| [xid] pB • start?〈xid〉. 〈rest of PlayerB〉
| [xid] pC • start?〈xid〉. 〈rest of PlayerC〉
| masterService
| [matchId] ( pA • start!〈matchId〉 | pC • start!〈matchId〉 )
| [xplayer2] master • join?〈rps, xplayer2〉.
[matchId′] ( pB • start!〈matchId′〉 | xplayer2 • start!〈matchId′〉 )
Finally, since a morra match has been completely arranged, PlayerA and PlayerC can start
to play, while PlayerB continues to wait an rps player:
[matchId] ( 〈rest of PlayerA〉 | 〈rest of PlayerC〉 )
| [xid] pB • start?〈xid〉. 〈rest of PlayerB〉
| masterService
| [xplayer2] master • join?〈rps, xplayer2〉.
[matchId′] ( pB • start!〈matchId′〉 | xplayer2 • start!〈matchId′〉 )
Of course, masterService can be easily tailored to arrange match for n-players online
games with n > 2 (e.g. poker, bridge, . . . ). Notably, a player can play concurrently in
more than one match. However, for the sake of simplicity, we assume here that a player
can ask to play to the same game more than once only if each time it waits the response
to the previous request, otherwise it can be assigned more than once to the same match.
3.2.3 COWS
COWS is obtained by enriching µCOWS with two primitive operators to enable fault and
compensation handling and guarantee transactional properties of services.
3.2.3.1 Syntax
The syntax of COWS is presented in Table 3.9 (the new constructs are highlighted by a
gray background). In COWS, besides the sets of values and variables, we also use the
set of (killer) labels (ranged over by k, k′, . . .). Notably, expressions do not include killer
labels that, hence, are non-communicable values. This way the scope of killer labels
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s ::= (services) g ::= (receive-guarded choice)
kill(k) (kill) 0 (nil)
| u • u′!¯ (invoke) | p • o?w¯.s (request processing)
| g (receive-guarded choice) | g + g (choice)
| s | s (parallel composition)
| {|s|} (protection)
| [e] s (delimitation)
| ∗ s (replication)
Table 3.9: COWS syntax
{|0|} ≡ 0 [k] 0 ≡ 0
{| {|s|} |} ≡ {|s|} [k1] [k2] s ≡ [k2] [k1] s
{|[e] s|} ≡ [e] {|s|} s1 | [k] s2 ≡ [k] (s1 | s2) if k < fk(s1)∪fk(s2)
Table 3.10: COWS structural congruence (additional laws)
cannot be dynamically extended and the activities whose termination would be forced by
execution of a kill can be statically determined.
We still use w to range over values and variables, u to range over names and variables,
while we use e to range over elements, namely killer labels, names and variables. Delim-
itation now is a binder also for killer labels. fe(t) denotes the set of free elements in t, and
fk(t) denotes the set of free killer labels in t. A closed service is a COWS term without
free variables and killer labels.
3.2.3.2 Operational semantics
The structural congruence ≡ for COWS, besides the laws in Table 3.2, additionally in-
cludes the laws in Tables 3.10. Notably, the last law of Table 3.10 prevents extending
the scope of a killer label k when it is free in s1 or s2 (this avoids involving s1 in the ef-
fect of a kill activity inside s2 and is essential to statically determine which activities can
be terminated by a kill). Thus, this law can be used to garbage-collect killer labels, e.g.
[k] n!¯ ≡ [k] (n!¯ | 0) ≡ n!¯ | [k] 0 ≡ n!¯ | 0 ≡ n!¯.
To define the labelled transition relation, we need two new auxiliary functions. The
function halt( ) takes a service s as an argument and returns the service obtained by only
retaining the protected activities inside s. halt( ) is defined inductively on the syntax of
services. The most significant case is halt({|s|}) = {|s|}. In the other cases, halt( ) returns 0,
except for parallel composition, delimitation and replication operators, for which it acts
as an homomorphism.
halt(kill(k)) = halt(u!¯) = halt(g) = 0 halt({|s|}) = {|s|}
halt(s1 | s2) = halt(s1) | halt(s2) halt([e] s) = [e] halt(s) halt(∗ s) = ∗ halt(s)
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noKill(s, e) = true if fk(e) = ∅ noKill(s | s′, k) = noKill(s, k) ∧ noKill(s′, k)
noKill(kill(k), k) = false noKill([e] s, k) = noKill(s, k) if e , k
noKill(kill(k′), k) = true if k , k′ noKill([k] s, k) = true
noKill(u!¯, k) = noKill(g, k) = true noKill({|s|}, k) = noKill(∗ s, k) = noKill(s, k)
Table 3.11: There are no active kill(k)
Then, in Table 3.11, we inductively define the predicate noKill(s, e), that holds true if
either e is not a killer label or e = k and s cannot immediately perform a free kill activity
kill(k). Moreover, the predicate noConf(s, n, v¯, `), defined for µCOWS by the rules in
Table 3.7, is extended to COWS by adding the following rules:
noConf(kill(k), n, v¯, `) = true noConf({|s|}, n, v¯, `) = noConf(s, n, v¯, `)
noConf([e] s, n, v¯, `) =
{
noConf(s, n, v¯, `) if e < n
true otherwise
The labelled transition relation
α−−→ is the least relation over COWS services induced
by the rules in Table 3.12. The rules in the upper part of the table are directly borrowed
from µCOWS (Table 3.6), while those in the lower part are the new rules used to deal with
forced termination. Labels are now generated by the following grammar:
α ::= n v¯ | n w¯ | nσ ` v¯ | k | †
The meaning of the new labels is as follows: k denotes execution of a request for ter-
minating a term from within the delimitation [k] , and † denotes a computational step
corresponding to taking place of forced termination. In the sequel, we use e(α) to denote
the set of elements occurring in α (it is defined similarly to u(α), Section 3.2.1.2, page 46).
Let us now comment on the operational rules. Activity kill(k) forces termination of all
unprotected parallel activities (rules (kill) and (parkill)) inside an enclosing [k] , that stops
the killing effect by turning the transition label k into † (rule (delkill 1)). Existence of such
delimitation is ensured by the assumption that the semantics is only defined for closed
services. Critical activities can be protected from killing by putting them into a protection
{| |}; this way, {|s|} behaves like s (rule (prot)). Similarly, [e] s behaves like s (rule (del 2)),
except when the transition label α contains e, in which case α must correspond either
to a communication assigning a value to e (rule (delcom 2)) or to a kill activity for e (rule
(delkill 1)), or when a free kill activity for e is active in s, in which case only actions cor-
responding to kill activities can be executed (rules (delkill 2) and (delkill 3)), that also apply
when the third premise of (del 2) does not hold, i.e. α = k or α = †). This means that kill
activities are executed eagerly with respect to the activities enclosed within the delimita-
tion of the corresponding killer label. Execution of parallel services is interleaved (rule
(par 3)), but when a kill activity or a communication is performed. Indeed, the former must
trigger termination of all parallel services (according to rule (parkill)), while the latter must
ensure that the receive activity with greater priority progresses (rules (com 2) and (parcom)).
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[[¯]] = v¯
(inv)
n!¯
n v¯−−−−−→ 0
n?w¯.s
n w¯−−−−−−→ s (rec) g
α−−→ s
(choice)
g + g′
α−−→ s
s1
n w¯−−−−−−→s′1 s2
n v¯−−−−−→s′2 M(w¯, v¯)=σ noConf(s1 | s2, n, v¯, |σ |)
(com 2)
s1 | s2 nσ |σ| v¯−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s′2
s
nσunionmulti{x 7→v} ` v¯−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′
(delcom 2)
[x] s
nσ ` v¯−−−−−−→ s′ ·{x 7→ v}
s ≡ α−−→≡ s′
(str)
s
α−−→ s′
s1
nσ ` v¯−−−−−−→ s′1 noConf(s2, n, v¯, `)
(parcom)
s1 | s2 nσ ` v¯−−−−−−→ s′1 | s2
kill(k)
k−−→ 0 (kill) s
α−−→ s′
(prot)
{|s|} α−−→ {|s′|}
s1
α−−→ s′1 α , k, nσ ` v¯
(par 3)
s1 | s2 α−−→ s′1 | s2
s1
k−−→ s′1
(parkill)
s1 | s2 k−−→ s′1 | halt(s2)
s
k−−→ s′
(delkill 1)
[k] s
†−−→ [k] s′
s
k−−→ s′ k , e
(delkill 2)
[e] s
k−−→ [e] s′
s
†−−→ s′
(delkill 3)
[e] s
†−−→ [e] s′
s
α−−→ s′ e< e(α) α , k, † noKill(s, e)
(del 2)
[e] s
α−−→ [e] s′
Table 3.12: COWS operational semantics
3.2.3.3 Examples
We conclude with some examples aimed at clarifying the peculiar features of COWS.
An ‘efficient’ implementation of standard variables. Service Varx, described in Sec-
tion 3.2.1.3 (page 50), implements a standard variable, which can be repeatedly assigned,
by creating a new service instance to store the current value any time that operations read
or write are invoked. This is due to the fact that the two offered operations are provided
by two receives composed by using the choice operator. In fact, in case of reading, since
the stored value does not change, it is not necessary to re-instantiate the service. This
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behaviour can now easily implemented by exploiting kill and protection operators as fol-
lows:
Varx , [xv, xa] x •write?〈xv, xa〉.
[n] ( n!〈xv, xa〉
| ∗ [x, y] n?〈x, y〉. (y!〈〉 | [k] (∗ [y′] x • read?〈y′〉. {|y′!〈x〉|}
| [x′, y′] x •write?〈x′, y′〉.
( kill(k) | {|n!〈x′, y′〉|} ) ) ) )
Now, read access to the variable does not require re-instantiation of the whole service,
since the receive along x • read is replicated. Instead, when the stored value must be
updated, the current instance is terminated, by executing kill(k), and a new instance stor-
ing the new value is created (alike the memory cell service of [34]). Delimitation [k] is
used to confine the effect of the kill activity to the current instance, while protection {| |}
avoids forcing termination of pending replies and of the invocation that will trigger the
new instance.
Protected kill activity. The following simple example illustrates the effect of executing
a kill activity within a protection block:
[k] ({|s1 | {|s2|} | kill(k)|} | s3) | s4 †−−→ [k] {| {|s2|} |} | s4
where, for simplicity, we assume that halt(s1) = halt(s3) = 0. In essence, kill(k) termi-
nates all parallel services inside delimitation [k] (i.e. s1 and s3), except those that are
protected at the same nesting level of the kill activity (i.e. s2).
Interplay between communication and kill activity. Kill activities can break commu-
nication, as the following example shows:
n!〈v〉 | [k] ([x] n?〈x〉.s | kill(k)) †−−→ n!〈v〉 | [k] [x] 0
In fact, due to the priority of the kill activity over communication, this is the only possible
evolution of the above term. Communication can however be guaranteed by protecting
the receive activity, as follows
n!〈v〉 | [k] ([x] {|n?〈x〉.s|} | kill(k)) †−−→
n!〈v〉 | [k] [x] {|n?〈x〉.s|} ≡
[x] (n!〈v〉 | [k] {|n?〈x〉.s|}) n ∅ 1 〈v〉−−−−−−−→
[k] {|s · {x 7→ v}|}
Notably, priority of kill activities over communication acts only with respect to the
activities enclosed within the delimitation of the corresponding killer labels (i.e. priority
is local to killer label scopes). For instance, if we re-write the above example as follows:
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[y] n?〈y〉.s′ | n!〈v〉 | [k] ([x] n?〈x〉.s | kill(k))
communication between n!〈v〉 and n?〈x〉 is still preempted by kill(k), while communica-
tion with n?〈y〉 can take place and lead to
s′ · {y 7→ v} | [k] ([x] n?〈x〉.s | kill(k))
Non-communicability of killer labels. We require killer labels not to be communicable
to avoid a service be capable to indiscriminately stop the execution of other services’
activities. However, when desired, this behaviour can be modelled in COWS. Consider,
for example, the following term where two parallel services share the private name stop:
[stop] ( s1 | s2 ) | s3
where s1 , [k] (n?〈stop〉.kill(k) | s′1) and s2 , n!〈stop〉 | s′2. In s1, the activity kill(k) is
prefixed by the receive n?〈stop〉 that does not allow forced termination to take place until
the ‘termination signal’ stop is received. In fact, if a communication between s1 and s2
takes place along the endpoint n, the term evolves to
[stop] ( [k] (kill(k) | s′1) | s′2 ) | s3
Now, due to the priority of the kill activity over communication, the term [k] (kill(k) | s′1)
can only perform a kill activity and evolve, e.g., to [k] halt(s′1).
Delimitation of killer labels. We require killer labels to be delimited to avoid a single
service be capable to stop all the other parallel services which would be unreasonable
in a service-oriented setting. Indeed, suppose a service s can perform a kill(k) with k
undelimited in s. The killing effect could not be stopped, thus, due to a transition labelled
by k, the whole service s would be terminated (but for protected activities). Moreover, the
effect of kill(k) could not be confined to s, thus, if there are other parallel services, the
whole service composition might be terminated by kill(k).
Fault and compensation handlers. In the SOC approach, fault handling is strictly re-
lated to the notion of compensation, namely the execution of specific activities (attempt-
ing) to reverse the effects of previously executed activities. Here, we consider a WS-BPEL
compensation protocol5. To begin with, we extend COWS syntax as shown in the upper
part of Table 3.13. The scope activity [s : catch(φ1){s1} : . . . : catch(φn){sn} : sc]i per-
mits explicitly grouping activities together. The declaration of a scope activity contains
a unique scope identifier i, a service s representing the normal behaviour, an optional list
of fault handlers s1, . . . , sn, and a compensation handler sc. The fault generator activity
5This protocol only permits to compensate on specified inner scopes and does not provide an automatic
reverse compensation mechanism a` la Sagas [98]. This latter mechanism, however, can be realized in COWS
by relying on queues; for an account of this protocol implemented in COWS we refer to [12] and [129].
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s ::= . . . (services)
| throw(φ) (fault generator)
| compensate(i) (compensate)
| [s : catch(φ1){s1} : . . . : catch(φn){sn} : sc]i (scope)
〈〈[s : catch(φ1){s1} : . . . : catch(φn){sn} : sc]i〉〉k =
[φ1, . . . , φn] ( 〈〈catch(φ1){s1}〉〉k | . . . | 〈〈catch(φn){sn}〉〉k
| [ki] 〈〈s〉〉ki ; ( xdone • odone!〈〉 | [k′] {|undo?〈i〉.〈〈sc〉〉k′ |} ) )
〈〈catch(φ){s}〉〉k = throw?〈φ〉.[k′] 〈〈s〉〉k′
〈〈compensate(i)〉〉k = undo!〈i〉 | xdone • odone!〈〉
〈〈throw(φ)〉〉k = {|throw!〈φ〉|} | kill(k)
Table 3.13: Syntax and encoding of fault and compensation handling
throw(φ) can be used by a service to rise a fault signal φ. This signal will trigger exe-
cution of activity s′, if a construct of the form catch(φ){s′} exists within the same scope.
The compensate activity compensate(i) can be used to invoke a compensation handler of
an inner scope named i that has already completed normally (i.e. without faulting). Com-
pensation can only be invoked from within a fault or a compensation handler. Here, we fix
two syntactic constraints: handlers do not contain scope activities and, as in WS-BPEL
(see [166, Section 12.4.3.1]), for each compensate(i) occurring in a service there exists
at least an inner scope i. Notably, an activity [s : catch(φ1){s1} : . . . : catch(φn){sn} : sc]i
acts as a binder for φ1, . . . , φn; in this way, a scope can only catch and handle faults
coming from its enclosed activities.
Now we show that fault and compensation handling can be easily encoded in COWS,
thus it is not necessary to extend its syntax. The most interesting cases of the encoding are
shown in the lower part of Table 3.13 (in the remaining cases, the encoding acts as an ho-
momorphism). The two distinguished endpoints throw and undo are used for exchanging
fault and compensation signals, respectively. Each scope identifier i or fault signal φ can
be used to activate scope compensation or fault handling, respectively.
The encoding 〈〈·〉〉k is parameterized by the label k that identifies the closest enclosing
scope, if any. The parameter is used when encoding a fault generator, to launch a kill activ-
ity that forces termination of all the remaining activities of the enclosing scope, and when
encoding a scope, to delimit the field of action of inner kill activities. The compensation
handler sc of scope i is installed when the normal behaviour s successfully completes, but
it is activated only when signal undo!〈i〉 occurs. Similarly, if during normal execution
a fault φ occurs, a signal throw!〈φ〉 triggers execution of the corresponding fault han-
dler (if any). Installed compensation handlers are protected from killing by means of {| |}.
Notably, the compensate activity can immediately terminate (thus enabling possible se-
quential compositions, see encoding (3.7) at page 52); this, of course, does not mean that
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the corresponding handler is terminated.
At this moment, it is not completely clear to us if it is possible to define a sound
encoding of fault and compensation constructs into pi-calculus. However, if we assume
that it can be defined, we believe that the encoded terms would be very large and, probably,
the encoding would be untenable (e.g. non-compositional or semantically not complete).
This motivates our choice of considering a calculus equipped with specific primitives to
deal with fault and compensation handling. Anyway, as a future work we plan to further
investigate the expressive power of such primitives.
A shipping service scenario. We consider an extended version of the shipping service
described in the official specification of WS-BPEL [166, Section 15.1]. This example
allows us to illustrate most of the language features and previously introduced high-level
constructs, including message correlation, shared variables, control flow structures, fault
and compensation handling.
The shipping service handles the shipment of orders. From the service point of view,
orders are composed of a number of items. The service offers two types of shipment:
shipments where the items are held and shipped together and shipments where the items
are shipped piecemeal until the order is fulfilled. A possible computation of a scenario
where the shipping service interacts with a customer service is shown in the customized
UML sequence diagram of Figure 3.3. The shipping service is specified in COWS as
follows:
∗ [xcust, xid, xc, xitems]
ship • req?〈xcust, xid, xc, xitems〉.
if (xc) then { xcust • notice!〈xid, xitems〉 }
else { [ sship : catch(φnoItems){ compensate(price)
| xcust • err!〈xid, “sorry”〉 } : 0 ] non−complete }
where the normal behaviour sship is
[xratio] ( [ spriceCalc : spriceComp ] price ;
[while] ( ship •while!〈0〉
| ∗ [xshipped] ship •while?〈xshipped〉.
if (xshipped < xitems) then { [xcount]
[xcount = rand(xitems − xshipped)].
if (xcount 6 0) then {
[xratio = xshipped / xitems].throw(φnoItems) }
else { xcust • notice!〈xid, xcount〉
| ship •while!〈xshipped + xcount〉 } } ) )
The partner name ship is associated with the shipping service, the operation name req
is used to receive the shipping request, and the tuple of variables 〈xcust, xid, xc, xitems〉 is
used for the request shipping message: xcust stores the customer’s partner name, xid stores
the order identifier, that is used to correlate the ship notice(s) with the ship order, xc stores
71
CHAPTER 3 A Calculus for Orchestration of Web Services
Figure 3.3: A computation in the shipping service scenario
a boolean indicating whether the order is to be shipped complete or not, and xitems stores
the total number of items in the order. Shipping notices and error messages to customers
are sent using the partner stored in xcust and operations notice and err, respectively. A
notice message is a tuple composed of the order identifier and the number of items in the
shipping notice. When partial shipment is acceptable, xshipped is used to record the number
of items already shipped. Replication and the internal operation while are used to model
iteration.
Our example extends that in [166] by allowing the service to generate a fault in case
the shipping company has ended the stock of items (this is modelled by function rand(n)
returning an integer less or equal to 0). The fault is handled by sending an error message
to the customer and by compensating the inner scope price, that has already completed
successfully. Function rand(n) returns a random integer number not greater than n and
represents an internal interaction with a back-end system (that, for simplicity, we do not
further describe). Moreover, we do not show services spriceCalc and spriceComp. Basically,
the former calculates the shipping price according to the value assigned to xitems and sends
the result to the accounts department. The latter is the corresponding compensation ac-
tivity, that sends information about the non-shipped items to the accounts department and
sends a refund to the customer according to the ratio (stored in xratio) between the shipped
items (stored in xshipped) and the required ones (stored in xitems).
3.3 A formal account of WS-BPEL
In this section, we informally present the close correspondence between WS-BPEL activ-
ities and COWS terms.
3.3.1 Basic activities
We start with the mapping of activities allowing a WS-BPEL process to send/receive a
message. Among the different patterns of interaction provided by WSDL, only two of
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Partner link type
<partnerLinkType name="plt">
<role name="r"> <portType name="pt"/> </role>
</partnerLinkType>
Client-side Provider-side
WS-BPEL WS-BPEL
<partnerLink name="plc" <partnerLink name="plp"
partnerLinkType="plt" partnerLinkType="plt"
partnerRole="r" /> myRole="r" />
<invoke partnerLink="plc" <receive partnerLink="plp"
operation="op" inputVariable="y1" /> operation="op" variable="y2" />
COWS COWS
ur • op!y¯1 pr • op?y¯2
Table 3.14: Mapping of partner links, invoke and receive activities (one-way)
them are directly supported by WS-BPEL: one-way and (synchronous) request-response.
There is another interaction pattern that is largely used in WS-BPEL (see, e.g., the ex-
ample 15.1 in [166]) but it is not directly provided by WSDL: asynchronous request-
response. These three interaction patterns are illustrated in Tables 3.14, 3.15 and 3.16. It
is worth noticing the use of the element <partnerLinkType> that, in case of the first two
interaction patterns, contains a single role, while, in case of the last pattern, contains two
roles. Each role has associated an element <portType> that declares a set of operations.
Each interacting partner must implement an element <partnerLink> with an associated
<partnerLinkType>. Elements <partnerLinkType> and <portType> do not have a
counterpart in COWS (that does not have declarative constructs), instead the information
they provide is exploited to map elements <partnerLink> into COWS partner names,
that are then used in receive and invoke activities.
An activity <receive> allows a WS-BPEL process to wait for a matching message
to arrive and can be associated with an activity <reply> to form a synchronous request-
response operation. One-way is the simplest interaction pattern: the service providing
the operation performs the receive activity, whereas the client service performs the in-
voke activity. Our mapping in Table 3.14 shows how one-way <receive> and <invoke>
activities are directly supported in COWS. Here, we use ur to indicate the fact that the
client either knows the provider’s partner name at design-time (when ur = pr) or discover
it dynamically (when ur = xr). A synchronous request-response interaction, as shown
in Table 3.15, is implemented in COWS through a pair of one-way interactions (the re-
quest and the callback). Thus, COWS forces the client to send the partner cb used by
the provider for sending the reply back to the client. On the other hand, to be capable
to handle such a request, the service providing the operation is ready to receive also such
partner name (stored in x). Table 3.16 shows that an asynchronous request-response is im-
plemented through a partner link connecting two one-way interactions. Here, the partner
ur2 is used whether it is required to initialize a partner link’s partner role. If the attribute
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Partner link type
<partnerLinkType name="plt">
<role name="r"> <portType name="pt"/> </role>
</partnerLinkType>
Client-side Provider-side
WS-BPEL WS-BPEL
<partnerLink name="plc" <partnerLink name="plp"
partnerLinkType="plt" partnerLinkType="plt"
partnerRole="r" /> myRole="r" />
<invoke partnerLink="plc" <receive partnerLink="plp"
operation="op" inputVariable="yi" operation="op" variable="zi" />
outputVariable="yo" /> ...
<reply partnerLink="plp"
operation="op" variable="zo" />
COWS COWS
[cb] ( ur • op!(cb, y¯i) | cb • op?y¯o ) [x] ( pr • op?(x, z¯i) . . . x • op!z¯o )
Table 3.15: Mapping of partner links, invoke, receive and reply activities (sync. request-
response)
initializePartnerRole is set to yes then ur2 is xr2, otherwise ur2 is pr2. Notably, for
the sake of simplicity, we do not consider standard variables, i.e. all variables can be as-
signed only once; however, they could be dealt with by exploiting the encoding introduced
in Section 3.2.1.3 (page 50).
The mapping of the remaining basic activities is quite straightforward and is illustrated
in Table 3.17. We have adopted the convention that each part of a message is stored in a
COWS variable (in Section 3.2.1.3 we have shown that, at a certain level of abstraction, tu-
ples can be used to represent XML messages). Thus, in the mapping of activity <assign>,
variables zpart1 of x and zpart2 of y store message parts part1_of_x and part2_of_y, re-
spectively. Mappings of the activities <throw> and <compensateScope> are shown in
Table 3.13. Activity <exit> is rendered as a kill activity specifying a killer label having as
scope a whole process instance (see last raw of Table 3.19), while <empty> is modelled
by a COWS term that can only perform an internal step. Notably, the fact that activi-
ties <throw>, <compensateScope>, <exit> and <empty> are short-lived activities (i.e.
sufficiently brief activities that may be allowed to complete) is rendered in COWS by
protecting them with {| |}.
Activities <rethrow> and <compensate> are not considered here. In fact, the former
can be rendered by an activity throw(φ) within a fault handler, by using an appropriate
φ (recall that, according to the mapping in Table 3.13, scope constructs act as binders
for fault names). Instead, implementing activity <compensate> requires some ingenuity
mainly because installed compensation handlers have to be stored in queues to execute
them in the reverse order of completion when compensation is invoked (for a detailed
account of the implementation in COWS of activity <compensate> we refer to [12]).
Finally, activities <validate> and <extensionActivity> have been left out because
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Partner link type
<partnerLinkType name="plt">
<role name="client"> <portType name="pt1"/> </role>
<role name="provider"> <portType name="pt2"/> </role>
</partnerLinkType>
Client-side Provider-side
WS-BPEL WS-BPEL
<partnerLink name="plc" <partnerLink name="plp"
partnerLinkType="plt" partnerLinkType="plt"
myRole="client" /> myRole="provider" />
partnerRole="provider" /> partnerRole="client"
initializePartnerRole="yes/no" />
<invoke partnerLink="plc" <receive partnerLink="plp"
operation="op1" operation="op1"
inputVariable="y1" /> variable="z1" />
... ...
<receive partnerLink="plc" <invoke partnerLink="plp"
operation="op2" operation="op2"
variable="y2" /> inputVariable="z2" />
COWS COWS
ur1 • op1!(pr2, y¯1) . . . pr2 • op2?y¯2 pr1 • op1?(ur2, z¯1) . . . ur2 • op2!z¯2
Table 3.16: Mapping of partner links, invoke and receive activities (async. request-
response)
they are specifically related to XML mechanisms (namely, schema validation and lan-
guage extensibility).
3.3.2 Structured activities
By exploiting the encoding introduced in the previous sections, the mapping of WS-BPEL
structured activities into COWS terms is straightforward. Activities <sequence>, <if>,
<while>, <repeatUntil> and <flow> are shown in Table 3.18, while activities <pick>,
<scope> and <process> are shown in Table 3.19. These latter activities are supported
with some limitations due to the fact that COWS does not provide timed activities/events
(see Section 5.2.1 for an extension of COWS with timed constructs) and termination sig-
nals/handlers (since their handling seems not to differ from that of fault signals/handlers).
We omit the mapping of the <forEach> activity because its sequential form is a special
case of <while> activity, while its parallel form can be rendered by a sophisticated (but
not particularly interesting) encoding (e.g., by exploiting replication to spawn in parallel
a non-statically known number of copies of the argument of the <forEach>).
3.3.3 Specification of the WS-BPEL processes from Section 2.2.2
We report here the COWS specifications of the WS-BPEL processes graphically presented
in the examples of Section 2.2.2.
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<assign> [zpart2 of y = zpart1 of x]
<copy>
<from variable="x" where
part="part1_of_x" /> x¯ = 〈zpart1 of x, zpart2 of x, zpart3 of x〉
<to variable="y" y¯ = 〈zpart1 of y, zpart2 of y〉
part="part2_of_y" />
</copy> mappings (3.3) and (3.5)
</assign>
<throw faultName="fname" /> {|throw(φfname)|} mapping in Table 3.13
<compensateScope target="sname" /> {|compensate(isname)|} mapping in Table 3.13
<exit /> {|kill(kexit)|}
<empty /> {|[n] (n!〈〉 | n?〈〉)|}
Table 3.17: Mapping of assign, throw, compensateScope, exit and empty activities
Message correlation. The example of Figure 2.3(a) of the two uncorrelated receive
activities corresponds to the following COWS term:
∗ [xcb, xlogID, xinfo] LogOnServ •LogOn?〈xcb, xlogID, xinfo〉.
LogOnServ •RequestLogInfo?〈〉.
xcb • SendLogInfo!〈xlogID, xinfo〉
By correlating consecutive messages by means of the correlation variable xlogID, as in
Figure 2.3(b), we obtain the following modified service:
∗ [xcb, xlogID, xinfo] LogOnServ •LogOn?〈xcb, xlogID, xinfo〉.
LogOnServ •RequestLogInfo?〈xlogID〉.
xcb • SendLogInfo!〈xlogID, xinfo〉
The special case when the two initial receives LogOn are identical (see Figure 2.3(c)) is
expressed in COWS as follows:
∗ [xcb, xlogID, xinfo1, xinfo2] LogOnServ •LogOn?〈xcb, xlogID, xinfo1〉.
LogOnServ •LogOn?〈xcb, xlogID, xinfo2〉.
LogOnServ •RequestLogInfo?〈xlogID〉.
xcb • SendLogInfo!〈xlogID, xinfo1, xinfo2〉
To illustrate, consider the following composition that also includes the deployment of two
client processes:
∗ [xcb, xlogID, xinfo1, xinfo2] LogOnServ •LogOn?〈xcb, xlogID, xinfo1〉.
LogOnServ •LogOn?〈xcb, xlogID, xinfo2〉.
LogOnServ •RequestLogInfo?〈xlogID〉.
xcb • SendLogInfo!〈xlogID, xinfo1, xinfo2〉
| ( LogOnServ •LogOn!〈c1, id, data1〉
| LogOnServ •RequestLogInfo!〈id〉
| [xinfo1, xinfo2] c1 • SendLogInfo?〈id, xinfo1, xinfo2〉. s )
| LogOnServ •LogOn!〈c1, id, data2〉
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<sequence> sactivity1 ; . . . ; sactivityN
activity1
. . . mapping (3.7)
activityN
</sequence>
<if> if ( cond) then {sactivity1} else {sactivity2}
<condition> cond </condition>
activity1 mapping (3.4)
<else>
activity2
</else>
</if>
<while> while ( cond) {sactivity}
<condition> cond </condition>
activity mapping (3.8)
</while>
<repeatUntil> sactivity ; while ( cond) {sactivity}
activity
<condition> cond </condition> mappings (3.7) and (3.8)
</repeatUntil>
<flow> sactivity1 | . . . | sactivityN
activity1
. . . mapping in Table 3.5
activityN
</flow>
Table 3.18: Mapping of structured activities
According to the semantics of COWS, the client processes trigger only one instantiation
of the service. Thus, the only possible evolution, after three computational steps, leads to
∗ [xcb, xlogID, xinfo1, xinfo2] LogOnServ •LogOn?〈xcb, xlogID, xinfo1〉.
LogOnServ •LogOn?〈xcb, xlogID, xinfo2〉.
LogOnServ •RequestLogInfo?〈xlogID〉.
xcb • SendLogInfo!〈xlogID, xinfo1, xinfo2〉
| c1 • SendLogInfo!〈id, data1, data2〉
| [xinfo1, xinfo2] c1 • SendLogInfo?〈id, xinfo1, xinfo2〉. s
Asynchronous message delivering. To illustrate the example in Figure 2.5, consider
the following COWS term:
∗ [xcb, xlogID, xinfo] LogOnServ •LogOn?〈xcb, xlogID, xinfo〉.
LogOnServ •RequestLogInfo?〈xlogID〉.
xcb • SendLogInfo!〈xlogID, xinfo〉
| ( LogOnServ •RequestLogInfo!〈id〉
| LogOnServ •LogOn!〈c, id, data〉 | [xinfo] c • SendLogInfo?〈id, xinfo〉. s )
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<pick>
<onMessage partnerLink="pl1" p1 • op1?y¯1. sactivity1 + p2 • op2?y¯2. sactivity2
operation="op1" variable="y1">
activity1
</onMessage>
<onMessage partnerLink="pl2"
operation="op2" variable="y2">
activity2
</onMessage>
</pick>
<scope name="i"> [sactivity
<faultHandlers> : catch(φ f ault1){sactivityF1}
<catch faultName="fault1"> : catch(φ f ault2){sactivityF2}
activityF1 : sactivityC] i
</catch>
<catch faultName="fault2"> mapping in Table 3.13
activityF2
</catch>
</faultHandlers>
<compensationHandler>
activityC
</compensationHandler>
activity
</scope>
<process name="pname"> ∗ [kexit,Vars]
<faultHandlers> [sactivity
<catch faultName="fault1"> : catch(φ f ault1){sactivityF1}
activityF1 : catch(φ f ault2){sactivityF2} : 0 ] pname
</catch>
<catch faultName="fault2"> Vars denotes the set of variables of pname
activityF2
</catch> mapping in Table 3.13
</faultHandlers>
activity
</process>
Table 3.19: Mapping of structured activities (cont.)
After a service instance is created as a result of consumption of the message 〈c, id, data〉
produced by the second invoke activity, the first produced message 〈id〉 can be consumed
by the newly created service instance.
Multiple start and conflicting receive activities. A term corresponding to the multiple
start activities in Figure 2.6(a) is:
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∗ [xcb, xlogID, xinfo1, xinfo2, n]
( ( LogOnServ1 •LogOn?〈xcb, xlogID, xinfo1〉. n!〈〉
| LogOnServ2 •LogOn?〈xlogID, xinfo2〉. n!〈〉 )
| n?〈〉. n?〈〉.LogOnServ1 •RequestLogInfo?〈xlogID〉.
xcb • SendLogInfo!〈xlogID, xinfo1, xinfo2〉 )
while that in Figure 2.6(b) can be modelled as follows:
∗ [xcb, xlogID, xinfo1, xinfo2, n]
( ( LogOnServ1 •LogOn?〈xcb, xlogID, xinfo1〉.LogOnServ2 •LogOn?〈xlogID, xinfo2〉. n!〈〉
+ LogOnServ2 •LogOn?〈xlogID, xinfo2〉.LogOnServ1 •LogOn?〈xcb, xlogID, xinfo1〉. n!〈〉 )
| n?〈〉.LogOnServ1 •RequestLogInfo?〈xlogID〉. xcb • SendLogInfo!〈xlogID, xinfo1, xinfo2〉 )
Scheduling of parallel activities. The example of Figure 2.8(a) in COWS can be ren-
dered by the following term:
[x1 = v1] | [x2 = v2] | [x3 = v3]
The semantics of COWS prescribes that the three assignments can be executed in an
unpredictable order that may change in different executions.
Forced termination. The example of Figure 2.9(a) in COWS can be rendered by the
following term:
{|kill(kexit)|} | [x1 = v1] ; [x2 = v2]
while that of Figure 2.9(b) can be rendered by the following term:
{|throw(φ)|} | [x1 = v1] ; [x2 = v2]
Operator {| |} is used to distinguish short-lived activities from the other basic activities.
Eager execution of activities causing termination. The COWS terms are the same as
the example before. To illustrate that activities <throw> and <exit> have higher priority
than the remaining ones, consider the following term:
{|throw(φ)|} | {|s1|} ; {|s2|} | p • o?〈x〉. s
for some short-lived activities s1 and s2. If the term is embedded in a proper context
modelling an enclosing scope construct, by executing activity throw(φ), it can only reduce
to:
halt({|s1|} ; {|s2|}) | halt(p • o?〈x〉. s) ≡ {|s1|}
In fact, due to definition of encoding (3.7), we get that halt({|s1|} ; {|s2|}) = {|s1|}, as required.
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Handlers protection. The following COWS term corresponds to the example illustrated
in Figure 2.11:
[x] [ ( [ [ [x = b1] : [x = b2] ]inner ; throw(φ1) : catch(φ1){sFH1} : 0 ]outer
| if (x) then {throw(φ2)} )
: catch(φ2){sFH2} : 0 ] main
where three different gray tones are used to distinguish the three scope constructs.
3.4 Specification of the case studies
We present now the more relevant parts of the specifications in COWS of the automo-
tive and finance case studies introduced in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, respectively. The
complete specifications, written in CMC6 ‘machine readable’ syntax, are reported in Ap-
pendix A.
3.4.1 Automotive case study
The COWS term modelling the overall scenario of Section 2.4.1 is:
[pcar] ( SensorsMonitor | GpsSystem | Discovery | Reasoner | Orchestrator )
| Bank | OnRoadRepairServices
All services of the in-vehicle platform share a private partner name pcar, that is used for
intra-vehicle communication and is passed to external services (e.g. the bank service) for
receiving data from them.
When an engine failure occurs, a signal (raised by SensorsMonitor) triggers the execu-
tion of the Orchestrator and activates the corresponding ‘recovery’ service. Orchestrator,
the most important component of the in-vehicle platform, is
[xcarData] ( pcar • oengineFailure?〈xcarData〉.sengfail + pcar • olowOilFailure?〈xcarData〉.slowoil + . . . )
This term uses the choice operator + to pick one of those alternative recovery behaviours
whose execution can start immediately. Notice that, while executing a recovery behaviour,
Orchestrator does not accept other recovery requests. We are also assuming that it is
reinstalled at the end of the recovery task.
The recovery behaviour sengfail executed when an engine failure occurs is
[pend, oend, xloc, xlist, oundo]
( [k] ( CardCharge | FindServices ) | pend • oend?〈〉. pend • oend?〈〉.ChooseAndOrder )
6CMC [192] is a tool supporting specification and verification of COWS terms. In particular, CMC
supports model checking of SocL [83, 84] formulae and deriving all computations originating from a COWS
term in an automated way. A prototypical version of CMC, developed by Franco Mazzanti at ISTI-CNR of
Pisa, can be experimented via a web interface available at the address http://fmt.isti.cnr.it/cmc/.
We refer to Sections 4.2 and Appendix A for more details about CMC and SocL.
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pend • oend is a scoped endpoint along which successful termination signals (i.e. com-
munications that carry no data) are exchanged to orchestrate execution of the different
components. CardCharge corresponds to the homonymous UML action of Figure 2.13,
while FindServices corresponds to the sequential composition of the UML actions Re-
questLocation and FindServices. The two terms are defined as follows:
CardCharge , pbank • ocharge!〈pcar, ccNum, amount, pcar〉
| {|pcar • ochargeFail?〈pcar〉.kill(k)
+ pcar • ochargeOK?〈pcar〉.
( pend • oend!〈〉
| pcar • oundo?〈cc〉. pcar • oundo?〈cc〉. pbank • orevoke!〈pcar〉 ) |}
FindS ervices , pcar • oreqLoc!〈〉
| pcar • orespLoc?〈xloc〉.
( pcar • o f indS erv!〈xloc, servicesType〉
| pcar • o f ound?〈xlist〉. pend • oend!〈〉
+ pcar • onotFound?〈〉.
( {|pcar • oundo!〈cc〉 | pcar • oundo!〈cc〉|} | kill(k) ) )
Therefore, the recovery service concurrently contacts service Bank, to charge the driver’s
credit card with a security amount, and services GpsSystem and Discovery, to get the car’s
location (stored in xloc) and a list of on road services (stored in xlist). When both activities
terminate (the fresh endpoint pend • oend is used to appropriately synchronise their success-
ful terminations), the recovery service forwards the obtained list to service Reasoner, that
will choose the most convenient services (see definition of ChooseAndOrder). Whenever
services finding fails, FindServices terminates the whole recovery behaviour (by means
of the kill activity kill(k)) and sends two signals cc (abbreviation of ‘card charge’) along
the endpoint pcar • oundo. Similarly, if charging the credit card fails, then CardCharge ter-
minates the whole recovery behaviour. Otherwise, it installs a compensation handler that
takes care of revoking the credit card charge. Activation of this compensation activity re-
quires two signals cc along pcar • oundo and, thus, takes place either whenever FindService
fails or, as we will see soon, whenever both garage and car rental orders fail.
ChooseAndOrder tries to order the selected services by contacting a car rental and,
concurrently, a garage and a tow truck. It is defined as follows:
[xgps] ( pcar • ochoose!〈xlist〉
| [xgarage, xtowTruck, xrentalCar] pcar • ochosen?〈xgarage, xtowTruck, xrentalCar〉.
( OrderGarageAndTowTruck | RentCar ) )
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OrderGarageAndTowTruck , [xgarageIn f o]
( xgarage • oorderGar!〈pcar, xcarData〉
| pcar • ogarageFail?〈〉.
( pcar • oundo!〈cc〉 | [p, o] (p • o!〈xloc〉 | p • o?〈xgps〉) )
+ pcar • ogarageOk?〈xgps, xgarageIn f o〉.
( OrderTowTruck
| pcar • oundo?〈gar〉.
( xgarage • ocancel!〈pcar〉
| pcar • oundo!〈cc〉 | pcar • oundo!〈rc〉 ) ) )
OrderTowTruck , [xtowIn f o]
( xtowTruck • oorderTow!〈pcar, xloc, xgps〉
| pcar • otowTruckFail?〈〉. pcar • oundo!〈gar〉
+ pcar • otowTruckOK?〈xtowIn f o〉 )
RentCar , [xrcIn f o]
( xrentalCar • oorderRC!〈pcar, xgps〉
| pcar • orentalCarFail?〈〉. pcar • oundo!〈cc〉
+ pcar • orentalCarOK?〈xrcIn f o〉.
pcar • oundo?〈rc〉. xrentalCar • oredirect!〈pcar, xloc〉 )
If ordering a garage fails, the compensation of the credit card charge is invoked by sending
a signal cc along the endpoint pcar • oundo, and the car’s location (stored in xloc) is assigned
to variable xgps (whose value will be passed to the rental car service). This assignment is
rendered in COWS as a communication along the private endpoint p • o. Otherwise, the
tow truck ordering starts and the garage’s location is assigned to variable xgps. Moreover,
a compensation handler is installed; it will be activated whenever tow truck ordering fails
and, in that case, attempts to cancel the garage order (by invoking operation ocancel) and
to compensate the credit card charge and the rental car order (by sending signal cc and
rc along the endpoint pcar • oundo). Renting a car proceeds concurrently and, in case of
successful completion, the compensation handler for the redirection of the rented car is
installed; otherwise, the compensation of the credit card charge is invoked.
For the sake of presentation, we relegate the specification of the remaining components
of the in-vehicle platform, i.e. SensorsMonitor, GpsSystem, Discovery and Reasoner, to
Appendix A.2.
The COWS specification of the bank service is composed of two persistent subser-
vices: BankInterface, that is publicly invocable by customers, and CreditRating, that in-
stead is an ‘internal’ service that can only interact with BankInterface. Specifically, Bank
is the COWS term
[ocheck, ocheckOK , ocheckFail] ( ∗BankInterface | ∗CreditRating )
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where BankInterface and CreditRating are defined as follows:
BankInterface , [xcust, xcc, xamount, xid]
pbank • ocharge?〈xcust, xcc, xamount, xid〉.
( pbank • ocheck!〈xid, xcc, xamount〉
| pbank • ocheckFail?〈xid〉. xcust • ochargeFail!〈xid〉
+ pbank • ocheckOK?〈xid〉.
[k′] ( xcust • ochargeOK!〈xid〉 | pbank • orevoke?〈xid〉.kill(k′) ) )
CreditRating , [xid, xcc, xa]
pbank • ocheck?〈xid, xcc, xa〉.
[p, o] ( p • o!〈〉 | p • o?〈〉. pbank • ocheckOK!〈xid〉
+ p • o?〈〉. pbank • ocheckFail!〈xid〉 )
Whenever prompted by a client request, BankInterface creates an instance to serve
that specific request and is immediately ready to concurrently serve other requests. Each
instance forwards the request to CreditRating, by invoking the ‘internal’ operation ocheck
through the invoke activity pbank • ocheck!〈xid, xcc, xamount〉, then waits for a reply on one of
the other two internal operations ocheckOK and ocheckFail, by exploiting the receive-guarded
choice operator, and finally sends the reply back to the client by means of a final invoke
activity using the partner name of the client stored in the variable xcust. In case of a positive
answer, the possibility of revoking the request through invocation of operation orevoke is
enabled (in fact, should the other request fail, the customer charge operation should be
cancelled in order to implement the wanted transactional behaviour). Revocation causes
deletion of the reply to the client, if this has still to be performed. Notably, if an invocation
along the endpoints pbank • ocheckOk, pbank • ocheckFail or pbank • orevoke takes place after
a certain number of service instances have been created, then it could be received by
any of these instances. Hence, to synchronise with the proper instance, an appropriate
customer datum stored in the variable xid is exploited as a correlation value. Service
CreditRating takes care of checking clients’ requests and decides if they can be authorised
or not. For the sake of simplicity, the choice between approving or not a request is left
here completely non-deterministic.
OnRoadRepairServices is actually a composition of various on road services, i.e. it is
Garage1 | Garage2 | TowTruck1 | TowTruck2 | RentalCar1 | RentalCar2
Such concurrent on road services are all modelled in a similar way, e.g.
Garagei , ∗ [xcust, xsensorsData, ocheckOK , ocheckFail]
pgarage i • oorderGar?〈xcust, xsensorsData〉.
( pgarage i • ocheckOK!〈〉 | pgarage i • ocheckFail!〈〉
| pgarage i • ocheckFail?〈〉. xcust • garageFail!〈〉
+ pgarage i • ocheckOK?〈〉.
[k] ( xcust • garageOK!〈garageGPS, garageInfo〉
| pgarage i • ocancel?〈xcust〉.kill(k) ) )
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For simplicity, success or failure of garage orders are modelled by means of non-
deterministic choice by exploiting internal operations ocheckOK and ocheckFail.
3.4.2 Finance case study
The COWS term representing the overall scenario of Section 2.4.2 is
[key] ( Customer | CreditInstitute )
| Validation | Employee1 | . . . | Employeen | Supervisor1 | . . . | Supervisorm
The delimitation [key] is used to declare that key is a shared element known to Customer
and CreditInstitute, and only to them.
CreditInstitute is defined as follows
[createInst, reqProcessing, reqUpdate, contractProcessing]
( [authentication, notAuthorized, authorized] ( Portal | Authentication )
| InformationUpload | InformationUpdate | RequestProcessing
| ContractProcessing | EmployeeTaskList | SupervisorTaskList )
The term is the parallel composition of the (considered) subservices of the credit institute:
the behaviour of Portal, InformationUpload, InformationUpdate and RequestProcessing
is graphically represented by the UML activity diagrams depicted in Figures 2.15, 2.16,
2.17 and 2.18; Authentication and ContractProcessing appear as external services in Fig-
ures 2.15 and 2.18, respectively.
The delimitation operator ensures that operations authentication, notAuthorized and
authorized are used to communicate only by Portal and Authentication, while operations
createInst, reqProcessing, reqUpdate and contractProcessing can also be used by the
other subservices. This guarantees that external services cannot interfere with the credit
portal during the login and instantiation phases.
Service Portal is publicly invocable and can interact with customers other than with
the ‘internal’ services of the credit institute. Portal is defined as follows:
∗ [xuser, xpwd, xcust]
portal • login?〈xuser, xpwd, xcust〉.
( portal • authentication!〈xuser, xpwd〉
| portal • notAuthorized?〈xuser〉. xcust • f ailedLogin!〈key〉
+ portal • authorized?〈xuser〉.
[sessionID] ( xcust • logged!〈key, sessionID〉
| portal • creditRequest?〈sessionID〉.
portal • createInst!〈sessionID〉
+ portal • bankTransferRequest?〈sessionID〉. . . .
+ . . . other services provided by the credit portal . . . ) )
The replication operator is exploited to model the fact that Portal can create multiple in-
stances to serve several customer requests simultaneously. Each interaction with the portal
starts with a receive activity of the form portal • login?〈xuser, xpwd, xcust〉 corresponding
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to reception of a request emitted by a customer. The receive activity initializes the vari-
ables xuser, xpwd and xcust, declared local to Portal by the delimitation operator, with data
provided by a customer. Whenever prompted by a customer request, Portal creates an in-
stance to serve that specific request and is immediately ready to concurrently serve other
requests. Each instance forwards the request to Authentication, by invoking the ‘internal’
operation authentication through the invoke activity portal • authentication!〈xuser, xpwd〉,
and waits for a reply on one of the other two internal operations notAuthorized and
authorized, by exploiting the receive-guarded choice operator. In case of a positive an-
swer, by means of the delimitation operator, a fresh session identifier sessionID is gen-
erated, and a reply is sent back to the customer by means of an invoke activity using
the partner name of the customer stored in the variable xcust. Moreover, by using the
choice operator again, Portal allows the customer to choose among several services (how-
ever, only the credit request service is actually modelled). Whenever the customer selects
this service, InformationUpload is instantiated through invocation of the private opera-
tion createInst. Notably, the identifier sessionID is passed both to Customer and to the
created instance of InformationUpload, to allow them to safely communicate. In fact, in
each interaction between Customer and the instances of the credit institute subservices,
the identifier is used as a correlation datum, i.e. it appears within each message. Pattern-
matching permits locating such datum in the messages and, therefore, delivering them to
the instances identified by the same datum.
InformationUpload is defined as follows:
∗ [xid] portal • createInst?〈xid〉.
[k, f ault, abort] (
[kabortFault] (
[xcustData, xsecData, x f inal balance, xamount, xcust]
portal • getCreditRequest?〈xid, xcustData, xamount, xcust〉.
[end]
( portal • securities?〈xid, xsecData〉. end!〈〉
| [repeat]
( repeat!〈〉
| ∗ repeat?〈〉.
[xbalance] portal • balance?〈xid, xbalance〉.
( validation • validateBalance!〈xid, portal, xbalance〉
| portal • validateBalance?〈xid, no〉.
(xcust • balanceNotValid!〈xid〉 | repeat!〈〉)
+ portal • validateBalance?〈xid, yes〉. end!〈xbalance〉 ) )
| end?〈〉. end?〈x f inal balance〉.
(kill(k) | {|portal • reqProcessing!〈xid, xcustData, xsecData,
x f inal balance, xamount, xcust〉|})
| portal • cancel?〈xid〉. (kill(kabortFault) | {| f ault • abort!〈〉|}) )
| f ault • abort?〈〉. 0 )
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Each instance of InformationUpload is created to serve a customer request identified by
a specific session identifier. Once created, an instance is actually activated by Customer
by invoking operation getCreditRequest and transmitting the credit request application
data (i.e. name, address, desired credit amount, . . . ). Then, two activities are concur-
rently executed: (1) additional security data are received, and (2) balance information are
received and forwarded to Validation for checking consistency and validation; if the veri-
fication was negative (i.e. the second argument of operation validateBalance is no), then
Customer is informed and (2) is repeated. Notice that, endpoints end and repeat have
been exploited to model sequential and repeat loop constructs. When (1) and (2) termi-
nate successfully, RequestProcessing is instantiated, by invoking the (private) operation
reqProcessing and initialising the created instance with all the request data (i.e. customer
data, amount, security data and balance information). Notably, at any time after the login
Customer can require the cancellation of the credit request processing by invoking op-
eration cancel using the identifier. This causes the forced termination of all unprotected
parallel activities, through the execution of the activity kill(kabort), and the emission of an
(internal) fault signal f ault • abort!〈〉. To deal with such faults, each instance has a specific
fault handler, that catches a fault and does nothing. If an instance completes successfully,
then its fault handler is removed by executing the activity kill(k).
RequestProcessing is defined as follows:
∗ [xid, xcustData, xsecData, xbalance, xamount, xcust]
portal • reqProcessing?〈xid, xcustData, xsecData, xbalance, xamount, xcust〉.
[k, f ault, abort, undo] (
[kabortFault] (
portal • addToETL!〈xid, xsecData, xbalance, xamount〉
| portal • taskAddedToETL?〈xid〉.
( {|portal • undo?〈empTaskList〉. portal • removeTaskETL!〈xid〉|}
| EmployeeEval )
| portal • cancel?〈xid〉. (kill(kabortFault) | {| f ault • abort!〈〉|}) )
| f ault • abort?〈〉.
(portal • undo!〈empTaskList〉 | portal • undo!〈supTaskList〉) )
When an instance of RequestProcessing is created, all the data relevant for computing the
rating are inserted in the EmployeeTaskList, through invocation of operation addToETL.
When an acknowledgment from EmployeeTaskList is received, a compensation handler
for undoing the insertion activity is installed, and the instance is blocked waiting for
the employee evaluation (term EmployeeEval). The compensation handler is a protected
term waiting for a compensation request, i.e. a signal empTaskList along portal • undo.
When this signal is received, the compensation handler becomes active and, to compensate
the insertion activity, invokes operation removeTaskETL provided by EmployeeTaskList.
Compensation is activated by the body of the fault handler, that sends the two compensa-
tion signals empTaskList and supTaskList (corresponding to action Compensate All
of Figure 2.18).
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The term EmployeeEval is
[xrating, xin f o, xdecision]
portal • empEvaluation?〈xid, xrating, xin f o, xdecision〉.
[cond, choice] (cond • choice!〈xdecision〉
| cond • choice?〈no〉. (kill(k) | {|xcust • negativeResp!〈xid, xin f o〉|})
+ cond • choice?〈update〉.
(kill(k) | {|portal • reqUpdate!〈xid, xcustData, xsecData, xbalance, xamount, xcust, xin f o〉|})
+ cond • choice?〈yes〉.
( portal • addToS T L!〈xid, xsecData, xbalance, xamount, xin f o〉
| portal • taskAddedToS T L?〈xid〉.
( {|portal • undo?〈supTaskList〉. portal • removeTaskS T L!〈xid〉|}
| SupervisorEval ) )
It receives the employee evaluation and performs a choice on the basis of the value stored
in the variable xdecision, that can be either no (i.e. the credit request is rejected), or update
(i.e. the customer is asked to update the desired amount and/or the security data), or yes
(i.e. the employee accepts the request). Conditional choice is modelled in a natural way
by a choice among three receives along the private endpoint cond • choice, and by relying
on pattern-matching. In case of no and update, the instance is halted (by means of a kill
activity), while in case of acceptance the request data are inserted in the supervisor task
list, the corresponding compensation handler (i.e. the protected term) is installed, and the
instance is blocked waiting for the supervisor evaluation (term SupervisorEval).
Finally, SupervisorEval is
[xoffer, xmotivation, xsupDecision]
portal • supEvaluation?〈xid, xoffer, xmotivation, xsupDecision〉.
[cond, choice] (cond • choice!〈xsupDecision〉
| cond • choice?〈no〉. (kill(k) | {|xcust • negativeResp!〈xid, xmotivation〉|})
+ cond • choice?〈update〉.
(kill(k) | {|portal • reqUpdate!〈xid, xcustData, xsecData, xbalance,
xamount, xcust, xmotivation〉|})
+ cond • choice?〈yes〉.
( xcust • offer!〈xid, xoffer, xmotivation〉
| portal • answer?〈xid, yes〉.
( kill(k) | {|portal • contractProcessing!〈xid, xcustData, xsecData,
xbalance, xamount, xcust, xrating, xin f o, xoffer, xmotivation〉|})
+ portal • answer?〈xid, no〉.kill(k) ) )
The above term behaves similarly to EmployeeEval except for the case of positive evalu-
ation, for which it sends an offer to the customer and, in case of acceptance, forwards all
the information to ContractProcessing.
The remaining terms composing the scenario are reported in Appendix A.3. In par-
ticular, the task list services EmployeeTaskList and SupervisorTaskList could be modelled
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in different ways, according to the underlying data structures and the properties that they
enjoy. For simplicity sake, in the specification reported in the appendix, task lists do not
preserve the arrival order of requests that are then withdrawn in a non-deterministic way.
3.5 Concluding remarks
We have introduced COWS, a formalism for specifying and combining services, while
modelling their dynamic behaviour (i.e. it deals with service orchestration rather than
choreography). COWS borrows many constructs from well-known process calculi, e.g.
pi-calculus, update calculus, StACi, and Lpi, but combines them in an original way, thus
being different from all existing calculi. COWS permits modelling different and typical
aspects of (web) services technologies, such as multiple start activities, receive conflicts,
delivering of correlated messages, service instances and interactions among them. As a
further evidence of COWS’s suitability for modelling SOC applications, we have also
presented the close correspondence between WS-BPEL activities and COWS terms.
Since its definition, however, some linguistic variants of COWS have been introduced
to model timed activities [133] (presented in Section 5.2.1) and dynamic service discovery
and negotiation [136] (presented in Section 5.2.2), thus obtaining a linguistic formalism
capable of modelling all the phases of the life cycle of service-oriented applications. A
number of methods and tools have also been devised to analyse COWS specifications,
such as the stochastic extension and the BPMN-based notaion defined in [172, 173] to
enable quantitative reasoning on service behaviours, the type system introduced in [132]
to check confidentiality properties, the logic and model checker presented in [83, 84]
to express and check functional properties of services, the bisimulation-based observa-
tional semantics defined in [174] to check interchangeability of services and conformance
against service specifications, and the symbolic characterisation of the operational seman-
tics of COWS presented in [175] to avoid infinite representations of COWS terms due to
the value-passing nature of communication. In the next chapter, we present some of the
tools mentioned above and illustrate the classes of properties that can be analysed by using
them.
Let us comment on related work. The correlation mechanism was first exploited in
[200], that, however, only considers interaction among different instances of a single busi-
ness process. Instead, to connect the interaction protocols of clients and of the respective
service instances, SCC [34] and CaSPiS [35] rely on the explicit modelling of sessions
and their dynamic creation (that exploits the mechanism of private names of pi-calculus).
Interaction sessions are not explicitly modelled in COWS, instead they can be identified
by tracing all those exchanged messages that are correlated each other through their same
contents (as in [104]). We believe that the mechanism based on correlation sets (also
used by WS-BPEL), that exploits business data and communication protocol headers to
correlate different interactions, is more robust and fits the loosely coupled world of Web
Services better than that based on explicit session references.
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Many works put forward enrichments of some well-known process calculus with con-
structs inspired by those of WS-BPEL. The most of them deal with issues of web transac-
tions such as interruptible processes, failure handlers and time. This is, for example, the
case of [127, 128, 143, 144] that present timed and untimed extensions of the pi-calculus,
called webpi and webpi∞, tailored to study a simplified version of the scope construct of
WS-BPEL. Other proposals on the formalization of flow compensation are [46, 44] that
give a more compact and closer description of the Sagas mechanism [98] for dealing with
long running transactions, while some other works [127, 144] have concentrated on mod-
elling web transactions and on studying their properties in programming languages based
on the pi-calculus.
Many efforts have been devoted to develop analytical tools for SOC foundational lan-
guages. Some of these works study mechanisms for comparing global descriptions (i.e.
choreographies) and local descriptions (i.e. orchestrations) of a same system. Means to
check conformance of these different views have been defined in [49, 50] and, by rely-
ing on session types, in [56]. COWS, instead, only considers service orchestration and
focuses on modelling the dynamic behaviour of services without the limitations possibly
introduced by a layer of choreography. Other approaches are based on the use of schema
languages [63] and Petri nets [109]. In [125] a sort of distributed input-guarded choice of
join patterns, called smooth orchestrators, gives a simple and effective representation of
synchronization constructs. A type system specifying security policies for orchestration
has been introduced in [14] for a very basic formalism based on the λ-calculus. Finally,
a type system for checking compliance between (simplified) WS-BPEL terms and the
associated WSDL documents has been defined in [130].
The work presenting the formalism closest to COWS is [130], where ws-calculus is
introduced to formalize the semantics of WS-BPEL. COWS represents a more founda-
tional formalism than ws-calculus in that it does not rely on explicit notions of location
and state, it is more manageable (e.g. has a simpler operational semantics) and, at least,
equally expressive (as the encoding of ws-calculus in COWS shows, Section 5.1.3).
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Chapter 4
Analysis techniques for COWS
specifications
The previous chapter has introduced the formal language COWS we designed for speci-
fying SOC applications. This chapter, instead, is devoted to illustrate some methods and
tools we have devised to analyse COWS terms.
As a first analysis technique, we introduce a type system for checking confidentiality
properties: types are used to express and enforce policies for regulating the exchange of
data among services. Then, we present a logical verification methodology for checking
functional properties of SOC systems specified using COWS. The properties are described
by means of a branching-time temporal logic specifically designed to express in a conve-
nient way peculiar aspects of services. Thereafter, we introduce a bisimulation-based
observational semantics for COWS. Specifically, we define notions of (strong and weak)
open barbed bisimilarities and prove their coincidence with more manageable character-
isations in terms of labelled bisimilarities. Finally, we define a symbolic characterisation
of the operational semantics of COWS to avoid infinite representations of COWS terms
due to the value-passing nature of communication.
Structure of the chapter. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1
introduces a typed variant of COWS for regulating data exchange and presents type safety
and subject reduction. Section 4.2 presents the logic SocL and the verification method-
ology for checking SocL formulae over COWS specifications. Section 4.3 introduces a
bisimulation theory for COWS. Section 4.4 describes a symbolic semantics for COWS.
At the end of each section, a comparison with related work is reported.
4.1 A type system for checking confidentiality properties
In this section, we present a typed variant of COWS that permits expressing and forcing
policies regulating the exchange of data among interacting services and ensuring that, in
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that respect, services do not manifest unexpected behaviours. Programmers can indeed
settle the partners usable to exchange any given datum (and, then, the services that can
share it), thus avoiding the datum be accessed (by unwanted services) through unautho-
rized partners. The (static and dynamic) language semantics then guarantees that well-
typed services always comply with the constraints expressed by the type associated to
each single datum. This enables us to check confidentiality properties, e.g., that critical
data such as credit card information are shared only with authorized partners.
4.1.1 Static and dynamic semantics of typed COWS
The type system we present in this section permits to express and enforce policies for reg-
ulating the exchange of data among services. To implement such policies, programmers
can annotate data with sets of partner names characterizing the services authorized to use
and exchange them; these sets are called regions. The language operational semantics
uses these annotations to guarantee that computations proceed according to them. This
property, called soundness, can be stated as follows
A service s is sound if, for any datum v in s associated to region r and for all
evolutions of s, it holds that v can be exchanged only by using partners in r.
To facilitate the task of decorating COWS terms with type annotations, we let the type sys-
tem partially infer such annotations a` la ML: service programmers explicitly write only
the annotations necessary to specify the wanted policies for communicable data; then, a
type inference system (statically) performs some coherence checks (e.g. the partner used
by an invoke must belong to the regions of all data occurring in the argument of the ac-
tivity) and derives the minimal region annotations for variable declarations that ensure
consistency of services initial configuration. This allows us to define an operational se-
mantics with types [102] which is simpler than a full-fledged typed operational semantics,
because it only performs simple checks (i.e. subset inclusion) using region annotations to
authorize or block transitions. Our main results prove that the type system and the opera-
tional semantics are sound. As a consequence, we have that services always comply with
the constraints expressed by the type of each single datum.
We present now the syntax of COWS extended with regions, the type inference system
and the operational semantics for typed COWS terms.
4.1.1.1 Syntax
We will consider here raw services, namely COWS terms written according to the syntax
in Table 4.1. Such syntax differs from that introduced in the previous chapter only for the
presence of data annotations (i.e. regions) in the invoke activities. Intuitively, raw services
only contain those region annotations that implement the policies for data exchange settled
by the service programmers.
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s ::= (services) g ::= (receive-guarded choice)
kill(k) (kill) 0 (nil)
| u • u′!{}r (invoke) | p • o?w¯.s (request processing)
| g (receive-guarded choice) | g + g (choice)
| s | s (parallel composition)
| {|s|} (protection)
| [e] s (delimitation)
| ∗ s (replication)
Table 4.1: COWS syntax (raw services)
Regions can be either finite subsets of partners and variables or the distinct element >
(denoting the universe of partners). The set of all regions, ranged over by r, is partially
ordered by the subset inclusion relation ⊆, and has > as top element. An expression 
tagged with region r will be written as {}r; an untagged  will stand for {}>. We will
write (x¯) to make explicit all the variables x¯ occurring in  (we still write  when this
information is not needed), and ¯ (resp. r¯) to denote the tuple of the expressions (resp.
regions) occurring in {}r.
In the sequel, we shall denote by fe(t) (resp. be(t)) the set of elements that occur free
(resp. bound) in a term t, by fv(t) (resp. bv(t)) the set of free (resp. bound) variables in
t, and by fk(t) the set of free killer labels in t. For simplicity sake, we assume that bound
variables in services are pairwise distinct (of course, this condition is not restrictive and
can always be fulfilled by possibly using α-conversion).
4.1.1.2 A type inference system
The annotations put by the type inference are written as superscripts, to better distinguish
them from those put by the programmers. Thus, the syntax of variable delimitation be-
comes [{x}r] s, which means that the datum that dynamically will replace x will be used
at most by the partners in r. Typed COWS services have the same syntax of raw services
except for the presence of region annotations on variable declarations. Typed services
are then generated by the syntax in Table 4.1 where, differently from Section 4.1.1.1, e
ranges over killer labels, names and annotated variables as {x}r. Notably, types may de-
pend on partner variables, i.e. on parameters of receiving activities; during computation,
they are therefore affected by application of substitutions that replace partner variables
with partner names. We assume that the region of a partner name always contains, at least
implicitly, such partner.
The type inference system is presented in Table 4.2. Typing judgements are written
Γ ` s  Γ′ ` s′, where the type environment Γ is a finite function from variables to
regions such that fv(s) ⊆ dom(Γ) and bv(s) ∩ dom(Γ) = ∅ (the same holds for Γ′ and
s′). Type environments are written as sets of pairs of the form x : r, where x is a partner
variable and r is its assumed region annotation. The domain of an environment is defined
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Γ ` 0  Γ ` 0 (t-nil) Γ ` kill(k)  Γ ` kill(k) (t-kill)
∀ r′ ∈ {ri}i∈{1,..,n} u1 ∈ r′
(t-inv)
Γ ` u1 • u2!〈{1(y¯1)}r1 , . . . , {n(y¯n)}rn〉 
(Γ + {x : r1}x∈y¯1 + . . . + {x : rn}x∈y¯n) ` u1 • u2!〈{1(y¯1)}r1 , . . . , {n(y¯n)}rn〉
Γ + {x : {p}}x∈fv(w¯) ` s  Γ′ ` s′
(t-rec)
Γ ` p • o?w¯.s  Γ′ ` p • o?w¯.s′
Γ ` g1  Γ1 ` g′1 Γ ` g2  Γ2 ` g′2
(t-sum)
Γ ` g1 + g2  Γ1 + Γ2 ` g′1 + g′2
Γ ` s  Γ′ ` s′
(t-prot)
Γ ` {|s|}  Γ′ ` {|s′|}
Γ ` s  Γ′ ` s′
(t-repl)
Γ ` ∗ s  Γ′ ` ∗ s′
Γ ` s  Γ′ ` s′ n < reg(Γ′)
(t-delname)
Γ ` [n] s  Γ′ ` [n] s′
Γ ` s  Γ′ ` s′
(t-dellab)
Γ ` [k] s  Γ′ ` [k] s′
Γ, {x : ∅} ` s  Γ′, {x : r} ` s′ x < reg(Γ′)
(t-delvar)
Γ ` [x] s  Γ′ ` [{x}r−{x}] s′
Γ ` s1  Γ1 ` s′1 Γ ` s2  Γ2 ` s′2
(t-par)
Γ ` s1 | s2  Γ1 + Γ2 ` s′1 | s′2
Table 4.2: Type inference system
as usual: dom(∅) = ∅ and dom(Γ, {x : r}) = dom(Γ)∪{x}, where ‘,’ denotes union between
environments with disjoint domains. The region of Γ is the union of the regions in Γ, i.e.
reg(∅) = ∅ and reg(Γ, {x : r}) = r∪ reg(Γ). We will write Γ + Γ′ to denote the environment
obtained by extending Γ with Γ′; + is inductively defined by
Γ + ∅ = Γ
Γ + {x : r} =
{
Γ′, {x : r ∪ r′} if Γ = Γ′, {x : r′}
Γ, {x : r} otherwise
Γ + ({x : r},Γ′) = (Γ + {x : r}) + Γ′
Hence, the judgement ∅ ` s  ∅ ` s′ can be derived only if s is a closed raw service
(because the initial environment is empty); if it is derivable, then s′ is the typed service
obtained by decorating s with the region annotations describing the use of each variable
of s in its scope. Type inference determines such regions by considering the invoking and
receiving partners where the variables occur.
We now comment on the most significant typing rules. Rule (t-inv) checks if the in-
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voked partner u1 belongs to the regions of the communicated data. If it succeeds, the
type environment Γ is extended by associating a proper region to each variable used in
the expressions argument of the invoke activity. Rule (t-rec) tries to type s in the type
environment Γ extended by adding the receiving partner to the regions of the variables
in w¯. Rules (t-sum) and (t-par) yield the same typing; this is due to the sharing of vari-
ables. For instance, service [x] (p • o?〈x〉 | p′ • o′!〈{x}r〉) with p′ ∈ r is annotated as
[{x}r′] (p • o?〈x〉 | p′ • o′!〈{x}r〉) with r′ = ({p} ∪ r − {x}). In rule (t-delname), premise
n < reg(Γ′) prevents a new name n to escape from its binder [n] in the inference. As an
example, consider the closed raw service
[z] p • o?〈z〉 . [p′] p′′ • o′′!〈{z}{p′′,p′}〉 (4.1)
Without the premise n < reg(Γ′), the service resulting from the type inference would
be [{z}{p′′,p′,p}] p • o?〈z〉 . [p′] p′′ • o′′!〈{z}{p′′,p′}〉. The problem with this service is that
the name p′ occurring in the annotation associated to z by the inference system escapes
from the scope of its binder and, thus, represents a completely different name. Although,
service (4.1) is not typable, by a simple semantics preserving manipulation one can get a
typable service as, e.g., the following one [p′] [z] p • o?〈z〉 . p′′ • o′′!〈{z}{p′′,p′}〉.
Similarly, in rule (t-delvar), premise x < reg(Γ′) prevents initially closed services to be-
come open at the end of the inference. Otherwise, e.g., the type inference would transform
the closed raw service
[x] p • o?〈x〉 . [y] p′ • o′?〈y〉 . p′′ • o′′!〈{x}{p′′,y}〉 (4.2)
into the open service [{x}{p,p′′,y}] p • o?〈x〉 . [{y}{p′}] p′ • o′?〈y〉 . p′′ • o′′!〈{x}{p′′,y}〉. Also in
this case, we can easily modify the untypable service (4.2) to get a typable one with a
similar semantics like, e.g., the service [y] [x] p • o?〈x〉 . p′ • o′?〈y〉 . p′′ • o′′!〈{x}{p′′,y}〉.
Furthermore, in (t-delvar), x is annotated with r − {x}, rather than with r, otherwise
initially closed services could become open. E.g., the closed raw service [x] p • o?〈x〉 .
p′ • o′!〈{x}{p′,x}〉 would be transformed into the open service [{x}{p,p′,x}] p • o?〈x〉 . p′ •
o′!〈{x}{p′,x}〉 (indeed, x occurs in the annotation associated to its declaration). Notice
that, although the region associated to x by the inference does never record that a service
possibly transmits x with regions containing x, rule (t-delvar) is sound because we assumed
that the region of a partner name, at least implicitly, contains the partner name.
Definition 4.1.1 A service s is well-typed if ∅ ` s′  ∅ ` s for some raw service s′.
4.1.1.3 Operational semantics
The structural congruence ≡ remains the same of the original Tables 3.2 and 3.10 except
for laws in Table 4.3. All the presented (extended) laws are straightforward and describe
the interplay between delimited names/variables and region annotations.
The modified rules of the labelled transition relation
α−−→ are shown in Table 4.4 (the
remaining ones are those of Table 3.12) which exploit the same predicates and auxiliary
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[e1] [e2] s ≡ [e2] [e1] s if e1, {x}r1 and e2, {y}r2
[n] [{x}r] s ≡ [{x}r] [n] s if n<r
[{x}r1] [{y}r2] s ≡ [{y}r2] [{x}r1] s if y<r1 and x<r2
Table 4.3: Structural congruence (extended laws) for typed COWS
[[¯]] = v¯ fv(r¯) = ∅
(r-inv)
n!{}r n {v}r−−−−−−−→ 0
s
α−−→ s′ x<e(α)
(r-delvar)
[{x}r] s α−−→ [{x}r] s′
s
nσunionmulti{x 7→{v}r} ` v¯−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′ r′ · σ ⊆ r
(r-delcom)
[{x}r′] s nσ ` v¯−−−−−−→ s′ ·{x 7→ {v}r}
s
α−−→ s′ e , {x}r e< e(α) α , k, † noKill(s, e)
(r-del)
[e] s
α−−→ [e] s′
s1
n w¯−−−−−−→s′1 s2
n {v}r−−−−−−−→s′2 M(w¯, v¯)=σ noConf(s1 | s2, n, v¯, |σ |)
(r-com)
s1 | s2 n {w¯7→{v}r} |σ| v¯−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s′2
Table 4.4: Typed COWS operational semantics (modified rules)
functions of the original semantics of COWS. Label α is now generated by the following
grammar:
α ::= n {v}r | n w¯ | nσ ` v¯ | k | †
The meaning of the new labels is as follows: n  {v}r denotes execution of an invoke
activity over the endpoint n with argument the annotated data {v}r, while nσ ` v¯ has the
same meaning as usual but for the substitution σ that now maps variables to annotated
values. We will use {w¯ 7→ {v}r}, with w = 〈w1, . . . ,wn〉 and {v}r = 〈{v1}r1 , . . . , {vn}rn〉,
to denote the substitution obtained by removing the pairs of the form v 7→ {v}r from
{w1 7→ {v1}r1 , . . . ,wn 7→ {vn}rn}. The definition of e(α) remains the same (Section 3.2.3,
page 66) except for α = nσ ` v¯ for which we let e(nσ ` v¯) = e(σ), where e({x 7→ {v}r}) =
{x, e(v)} ∪ r. Finally, a computation from a closed service s0 is a sequence of connected
transitions of the form
s0
α1−−−→ s1 α2−−−→ s2 α3−−−→ s3 . . .
where, for each i, αi is either n ∅ ` v¯ or †, and si is called reduct of s0.
We comment on salient points. A service invocation can proceed only if the expres-
sions in the argument can be evaluated and their regions do not contain variables (rule
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(r-inv)). Communication can take place when two parallel services perform matching re-
ceive and invoke activities (rule (r-com)). Communication generates a substitution that is
recorded in the transition label (for subsequent application). A substitution {x 7→ {v}r} for
a variable x is applied to a term (rule (r-delcom)) when the delimitation for x is encoun-
tered, i.e. the whole scope s of x is determined, provided that the region annotations of
the variable declaration and of the substituent datum v do comply i.e. r′ · σ ⊆ r. This
condition also means that as a value is received it gets annotated with a smaller region.
The substitution for x is then applied to s and, as usual, x disappears from the term and
cannot be reassigned a value.
4.1.2 Main results
Our main results are standard and state that well-typedness is preserved along computa-
tions (subject reduction) and that well-typed services do respect region annotations (type
safety). Together, these results imply the soundness of our theory, i.e. no violation of
data regions will ever occur during the evolution of well-typed services. For the sake of
readability, we only outline here the techniques used in the proofs and refer the interested
reader to Appendix B.1 for a full account.
For the proof of subject reduction, we need some standard lemmata concerning sub-
stitution and weakening. The substitution lemma handles the substitution of partner vari-
ables by partner names. Application of a substitution σ to a type environment Γ, written
Γ · σ, is defined only when dom(σ) ∩ dom(Γ) = ∅ and, for each x 7→ {v}r ∈ σ, has the
effect of replacing every occurrence of x in the regions of Γ with v, i.e.
∅ · {x 7→ {v}r} = ∅ and (Γ, {y : r′}) · {x 7→ {v}r} = Γ · {x 7→ {v}r}, {y : (r′ · {x 7→ {v}r})}
Lemma 4.1.1 (Substitution Lemma) If Γ, {x : r} ` s  Γ′, {x : r′} ` s′ and σ = {x 7→
{v}r′′}, then Γ · σ ` s · σ  Γ′ · σ ` s′ · σ.
Proof (sketch). By induction on the length of the inference used to derive the typing
judgement, with a case analysis on the last rule used in the derivation. 2
Lemma 4.1.2 (Weakening Lemma) Let Γ′ ` s′  Γ ` s and x < be(s), then Γ′ + {x :
r} ` s′  Γ + {x : r} ` s.
Proof. By a straightforward induction on the length of the type derivation, with a case
analysis on the last used rule, and by exploiting the fact that extending Γ by adding {x : r}
does not affect the premise of rule (t-inv). 2
We also need a few auxiliary results. The first one states that function halt( ) preserves
well-typedness and can be easily proved by induction on the definition of halt( ).
Lemma 4.1.3 If s is well-typed then halt(s) is well-typed.
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The other two auxiliary results establish well-typedness preservation by the structural
congruence and by the labelled transition relation, respectively. We will use the following
preorder v on type environments: we write Γ v Γ′ if there exists a type environment Γ′′
such that Γ + Γ′′ = Γ′.
Lemma 4.1.4 If Γ′ ` s′1  Γ ` s1 and s1 ≡ s2 then there exists a raw service s′2 such
that Γ′ ` s′2  Γ ` s2.
Proof. By a straightforward induction on the derivation of s1 ≡ s2. 2
Theorem 4.1.1 If Γ′1 ` s′1  Γ1 ` s1 and s1
α−−→ s2 then there exist a raw service s′2
and two type environments Γ2 and Γ′2 such that Γ2 v Γ1, Γ′1 v Γ′2 and Γ′2 ` s′2  Γ2 ` s2.
Proof (sketch). By induction on the length of the inference of s1
α−−→ s2, with a case
analysis on the last used rule. 2
We can now easily prove that well-typedness is preserved along computations.
Corollary 4.1.1 (Subject Reduction) If s is well-typed and s
α−−→ s′ with α ∈ {†, n ∅ ` v¯},
then s′ is well-typed.
To characterize the errors that our type system can capture we use predicate ⇑ : s ⇑
holds true when s can immediately generate a runtime error. This happens when in an
active context there is an invoke activity on a partner not included in the region annotation
of some of the expressions argument of the activity. Formally, ⇑ is defined as the least
predicate closed under the following rules
∃ r′ ∈ r¯ . p < r′
p • o!{}r ⇑
s ⇑
A[[s]] ⇑
s ≡ s′ s ⇑
s′ ⇑
where A is an active context, namely a service A with a ‘hole’ [[·]], i.e. a term generated
by the following grammar:
A ::= [[·]] | A + g | g + A | A | s | s | A | {|A|} | [e]A | ∗ A
such that, once the hole is filled with a service s, the resulting term A[[s]] is a COWS
service that is capable of immediately performing an activity of s.
We remark that the runtime errors that our type discipline can capture are related to
the policies for the exchange of data. We skip such runtime errors as ‘unproper use of
variables’ (e.g. in x • o!v¯ the variable x is not replaced by a partner name) that can be
easily dealt with standard type systems. We can now prove that well-typed services do
respect region annotations.
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Theorem 4.1.2 (Type Safety) If s is a well-typed service then s ⇑ does not hold.
Proof (sketch). By induction on the derivation of s ⇑, with a case analysis on the last used
rule, we prove that if s ⇑ then s is not well-typed, from which the thesis follows. 2
We can finally conclude by stating that the type system and the operational semantics
are sound.
Corollary 4.1.2 (Type Soundness) Let s be a well-typed service. Then s′ ⇑ does not hold
for every reduct s′ of s.
Proof. Corollary 4.1.1 can be repeatedly applied to prove that s′ is well-typed, then
Theorem 4.1.2 permits to conclude. 2
4.1.3 Application scenarios
In this section, we illustrate some applications of our framework. The first example is a
simplified but realistic electronic marketplace scenario inspired by W3C [178]. To show
usefulness of our approach, we focus on the central part of the protocol where sensitive
data are exchanged, i.e. we omit the initial bartering and the concluding interactions,
and expand the part relative to the payment process. The second example is inspired to
an automotive scenario focussing in security issues studied in the Sensoria project [185],
while the last two examples are applications to the case studies presented in Sections 2.4.1
and 2.4.2.
An electronic marketplace. Suppose a service buyer invokes a service seller to pur-
chase some goods. Once seller has received an order request, it sends back the partner
name of the service credit agency to be used for the payment. buyer can then check the
information on credit agency and, possibly, confirm the payment by sending its credit
card data to seller. In this case, seller forwards the received data to credit agency and
passes the order to the service shipper. In the end, the whole system is
EMP , buyer | credit agency | [psh] (seller | shipper)
When fixing the policies for data exchange, services can (safely) assume that, at
the outset, partner names ps, pca and pb are publicly available for invoking seller,
credit agency and buyer, respectively. Instead, the partner name psh for invoking shipper
is private and only shared with seller. Of course, due to the syntactical restrictions, the
‘locality’ condition for partner names is preserved by the semantics. Thus, the initials
assumptions remain true forever.
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The buyer service is defined as
buyer , [id] (ps • oord!〈{id}{ps,pb}, pb, order〉
| [xca] pb • oca in f o?〈id, xca〉.
[p, o] ( p • o!〈〉 | p • o?〈〉.ps • opay!〈{id}{ps,pb}, {cc data}{ps,xca}〉
+ p • o?〈〉.ps • ocanc!〈{id}{ps,pb}〉 ) )
The endpoint ps • oord is used for invoking the seller service and transmitting the order
together with the buyer’s partner name pb. The (restricted) name id represents the order
identifier and is used for correlating all those service interactions that logically form a
same session relative to the processing of order. For example, the specification of buyer
could be slightly modified to allow the service to simultaneously make multiple orders:
of course, although all such parallel threads must use the same partner ps to interact
with seller, they can exploit different order identifiers as a means to correlate messages
belonging to different interaction sessions. The type attached to id only allows buyer and
seller to exchange and use it, since they are the only services that can receive along ps
and pb. Instead, pb comes without an attached policy, since it is publicly known (it is
transmitted to indicate the service making the invocation for the call-back operation). For
simplicity, also order has no attached policy; thus, it could be later on communicated
to any other service. Variable xca is used to store the partner name of the credit agency
service to be used to possibly finalize the purchase and also to implement the policy for
buyer’s credit card data. After the information on the credit agency service are verified,
buyer sends a message to seller either to confirm or to cancel the order. This is simply
modelled as an internal non-deterministic choice, by exploiting the private endpoint p • o.
The seller service is defined as
seller , ∗ [xb, xid, xord, k] ps • oord?〈xid, xb, xord〉.
( xb • oca in f o!〈{xid}{xb}, pca〉
| [xcc] ps • opay?〈xid, xcc〉.( pca • ocr req!〈xord, {xcc}{pca}〉
| psh • osh req!〈xord〉 )
| ps • ocanc?〈xid〉.kill(k) )
Once seller receives an order along ps • oord, it creates one specific instance that sends
back to buyer (via xb) the partner name pca of the credit agency service where the payment
will be made. Whenever the seller instance receives the credit card data correlated to xid,
it forwards them to credit agency and passes the order to the (internal) shipper service.
Instead, if buyer demands cancellation of the order, the corresponding instance of seller
is immediately terminated. Label k is used to delimit the effect of the kill activity only to
the relevant instance.
The remaining two services are defined as
credit agency , ∗ [x, y] pca • ocr req?〈x, y〉.“execute the payment”
shipper , ∗ [z] psh • osh req?〈z〉.“process the order”
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Let now consider the type inference phase. Service seller gets annotated as follows:
seller′ , ∗ [{xb}{ps}] [{xid}{ps,xb}, {xord}>, k] ps • oord?〈xid, xb, xord〉.
( xb • oca in f o!〈{xid}{xb}, pca〉
| [{xcc}{ps,pca}] ps • opay?〈xid, xcc〉.( pca • ocr req!〈xord, {xcc}{pca}〉
| psh • osh req!〈xord〉 )
| ps • ocanc?〈xid〉.kill(k) )
The type inference has to check consistency of region annotations of the arguments
occurring within invoke activities and that of deriving the annotations for variable dec-
larations. As regards consistency, there are only two explicitly typed expressions used
as arguments of invoke activities, i.e. xid and xcc, and their types {xb} and {pca} satisfy
the consistency constraint (see rule (t-inv)). The remaining expressions occurring as ar-
guments of invoke activities, i.e. the only xord, have implicitly assigned type > (indeed,
recall that we assumed that an untagged  stands for {}>) and are thus trivially consis-
tent. As regards type derivation, when a variable is put in the environment (rule (t-delvar)),
it is assigned type ∅. Later on, when a variable is used as an argument of an invoke or
receive, its type can possibly be enriched (rules (t-inv) and (t-rec)). Thus, at the end of the
inference, declaration of variable xb, that is only used in ps • oord?〈xid, xb, xord〉, will have
assigned region {ps} (application of rule (t-rec)). Instead, declaration of xord has assigned
type > (rule (t-inv) is used) while that of xcc has assigned type {ps, pca} and, similarly, dec-
laration of xid gets annotated with {ps, xb} (in both cases rules (t-inv) and (t-rec) are used).
Notably, in seller′, delimitation [{xb}ps] does not commute any longer with delimitations
[{xid}{ps,xb}, {xord}>, k] (otherwise the service would become opened).
The variable declarations of the other services are annotated in a trivial way: xca with
{pb}, x and y with {pca}, and z with {psh} (we assume that credit agency and shipper do
not re-transmit the received data). Thus, if we call buyer′, credit agency′ and shipper′
the other typed services, then the system resulting from the type inference is
buyer′ | credit agency′ | [psh] (seller′ | shipper′)
After some computational steps, the system can become
[id] (ps • opay!〈{id}{ps,pb}, {cc data}{ps,pca}〉 | [psh] ( seller′ |
[k, {xcc}{ps,pca}] ( ps • opay?〈id, xcc〉.( pca • ocr req!〈order, {xcc}{pca}〉
| psh • osh req!〈order〉 )
| ps • ocanc?〈id〉.kill(k) )
| ∗ [{x}{pca}, {y}{pca}] pca • ocr req?〈x, y〉.“execute the payment”
| ∗ [{z}{psh}] psh • osh req?〈z〉.“process the order” ) )
Thus, after buyer′ sends the credit card data, we get
[id, psh] (seller′
| [k] ( pca • ocr req!〈order, {cc data}{pca}〉 | psh • osh req!〈order〉
| ps • ocanc?〈id〉.kill(k) )
| ∗ [{x}{pca}, {y}{pca}] pca • ocr req?〈x, y〉.“execute the payment”
| ∗ [{z}{psh}] psh • osh req?〈z〉.“process the order” )
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At this point, seller′ can safely communicate credit card data of buyer′ to credit agency′
and, then, forward the order to shipper′.
Suppose now that seller′ also contains such a malicious invoke as
psh • o!〈. . . , {xcc}r, . . .〉. In order to successfully pass the type inference phase, it
should be that psh ∈ r (otherwise rule (t-inv) could not be applied). Therefore, in the
resulting typed service we would have the variable declaration [{xcc}r′] , with r ⊆ r′.
Now, communication with buyer′ would be blocked by the runtime checks because the
datum is tagged as {cc data}{ps,pca}, and psh ∈ r ⊆ r′ implies that r′ * {ps, pca}.
Automotive security. A car manufacturer offers an integrated infotainment system ca-
pable of forwarding the GPS coordinates of a car to relevant recipient services. We con-
sider the case of a system designed to allow drivers to assist each other on deserted roads
until professional service can arrive at the scene. The system is based on an automobile
association monitoring the location of all trustworthy members’ cars and contacting the
drivers nearest to an accident to ask them to provide first aid. The driver in trouble is as-
sured that information about his location cannot become available to unauthorized users.
We suppose that customers of the automobile association service may not be trustworthy
members. Thus, a driver can play both helper and customer roles, or only the latter one.
We consider the following (simplified) scenario
C | T1 | T2 | T3 | A
where C is the service installed in the customer’s car, T1, T2, and T3 are services installed
in the trustworthy members’ cars, and A is the service provided by the automobile associ-
ation. For simplicity, we do not consider the customer services installed in the member’s
cars.
The customer service is defined as
C , [psys] ( psys • oaccident!〈gps〉 | [y T] [ygps] psys • oaccident?〈ygps〉.CfindHelp )
CfindHelp , ( pA • ocarAccident!〈{pC}{pA}, {ygps}{pA}〉
| [yid] ( pC • ohelpNotFound?〈〉
+
pC • ohelpFound?〈yid, y T〉.pA • oposition!〈yid, {ygps}{pA,y T}〉 ) )
When the diagnostic system of the customer’s car detects that an accident has happened,
it activates the recovery service by sending the current GPS coordinates of the car along
the private endpoint psys • oaccident. Then, it invokes the automobile association service
A, by using the endpoint pA • ocarAccident, and transmits its partner name (i.e. pC, for the
reply) and its coordinates. The type attached to those data only allows A to exchange and
use them, since A is the only service that can receive along pA. Afterwards, C waits a
reply from A. If no trustworthy helper has been found, then the driver has to wait until
professional service arrives at the scene. In case A has found a trustworthy helper Ti, C
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transmits its coordinates again, this time with region enlarged with the partner name of Ti.
Deliberately we do not model C as a persistent service; instead, we assume that it will be
reinstalled at the end of the repairing activity.
A trustworthy member service is defined as
Ti , [m] (m!〈〉 | ∗ m?〈〉.[xid] pTi • ocheck?〈xid〉.
[n] ( n!〈〉 | n?〈〉.( pA • ore f use!〈xid〉 | m!〈〉 )
+
n?〈〉.( pA • ook!〈xid〉
| [xgps] pTi • o f wdPos?〈xgps〉.
“go to xgps and provide first aid”. m!〈〉 ) )
This is a persistent service that, however, can serve requests only sequentially (i.e. one at
time). When the automobile association contacts one of its members, firstly asks him (by
invoking the operation ocheck) if he is willing to provide first aid to a near driver. Service
Ti can accept or refuse by replying on the operations ook or ore f use, respectively. For
simplicity, we model the above decision by means of an internal non-deterministic choice
exploiting the private endpoint n. In case of negative reply, Ti is immediately reactivated
(by means of m!〈〉). Otherwise, i.e. in case of positive reply, the service waits for the
position of the driver in trouble from A, goes to the accident scene, provides first aid and,
finally, reactivates itself.
The automobile association service is defined as
A , [o f ind, o f ound, onotFound]
( ∗ [z C, zgps] pA • ocarAccident?〈z C, zgps〉. [id] Ainst
| ∗ [zid, zpos] pA • o f ind?〈zid, zpos〉.
“find in DB and reply on o f ound or onotFound” )
Ainst , [n] ( n!〈〉 | ∗ n?〈〉. ( pA • o f ind!〈id, zgps〉
| [z′T ] ( pA • onotFound?〈id〉. z C • ohelpNotFound!〈〉
+
pA • o f ound?〈id, z′T〉. ( z′T • ocheck!〈id〉| pA • ore f use?〈id〉. n!〈〉
+
pA • ook?〈id〉. [z T, o] ( pA • o!〈z′T〉| pA • o?〈z T〉.
( z C • ohelpFound!〈id, {z T}{z C}〉
| [z′gps] pA • oposition?〈id, z′gps〉.
z T • o f wdPos!〈{z′gps}{z T}〉 ) ) ) ) ) )
This service is composed of two persistent subservices, both capable of receiving along
pA. Service A is publicly invocable and can interact with customers and members ser-
vices, other than with the ‘internal’ service Ainst. This latter service, instead, can only be
invoked by A (indeed, all the operations used by the service, i.e. o f ind, o f ound, onotFound,
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are restricted and this prevents them to be invoked from the outside) and has the task of
looking up in a database the member nearest to given a location and replying accordingly.
Differently from C and Ti, A and Ainst can serve requests concurrently and, thus, ex-
ploit correlation mechanisms to route each received message to its right instance. In-
deed, when a customer request is received along pA • ocarAccident, a new specific ser-
vice instance is created that is uniquely identified by a fresh correlation identifier id;
this identifier is generated by the instance itself and is communicated to every other in-
volved service. The instance then tries to find a helper member that is near to the ac-
cident scene and is willing to provide first aid. This is done by repeatedly looking up
the database (pA • o f ind!〈id, zgps〉) and checking willingness of the returned trustworthy
member (z′T • ocheck!〈id〉), until either one available member is found (i.e. the member
replies on operation ook) or the looking up in the database fails (i.e. a reply on onotFound
is returned). Technically, the cycle is implemented by means of the replication operator
and the private endpoint n. If no available helper is found, the instance notifies this to
the customer (z C • ohelpNotFound!〈〉) and terminates; otherwise, it sends the partner name
of the found helper to the customer (z C • ohelpFound!〈id, {z T}{z C}〉), waits for the customer
location (whose region now also include the partner name of the helper) and forwards it
to the helper (z T • o f wdPos!〈{z′gps}{z T}〉).
Notably, the only relevant types are that attached to the partner name of the found
helper, which allows only C to receive this partner, and that attached to the customer
location, which allows only the found helper to receive such location.
Let now consider the type inference phase. Service C gets annotated as follows:
C′ , [psys] ( psys • oaccident!〈gps〉
| [{y T}{pC}] [{ygps}{psys,pA,y T}] psys • oaccident?〈ygps〉.C′findHelp )
C′findHelp , ( pA • ocarAccident!〈{pC}{pA}, {ygps}{pA}〉
| [{yid}>] ( pC • ohelpNotFound?〈〉
+
pC • ohelpFound?〈yid, y T〉. pA • oposition!〈yid, {ygps}{pA,y T}〉 ) )
As regards consistency of region annotations, the only explicitly typed expressions used
as arguments of invoke activities are pC and ygps (this latter is used twice); in any case,
their types ({pA}, {pA} and {pA, y T}, resp.) satisfy the consistency constraint (see rule (t-
inv)). The remaining expressions occurring as arguments of invoke activities, i.e. gps and
yid, have implicitly assigned type > and, thus, the consistency constraint is trivially satis-
fied. As regards derivation of types for variable declarations, at the end of the inference,
declaration of variable y T, that is only used in pC • ohelpFound?〈yid, y T〉 and in the region
of ygps, will have assigned region {pC} (application of rule (t-rec)). Instead, ygps will have
assigned type {psys, pA, y T} (rules (t-inv) and (t-rec)), while yid will have assigned type >
(rule (t-inv)). Notably, in C′, delimitation [{y T}{pC}] does not commute any longer with
delimitation [{ygps}{psys,pA,y T}] (otherwise the service would become opened).
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Services Ti get annotated as follows:
T′i , [m] (m!〈〉 | ∗ m?〈〉.[{xid}>] pTi • ocheck?〈xid〉.
[n] ( n!〈〉 | n?〈〉.( pA • ore f use!〈xid〉 | m!〈〉 )
+
n?〈〉.( pA • ook!〈xid〉
| [{xgps}{pTi}] pTi • o f wdPos?〈xgps〉.
“go to xgps and provide first aid”. m!〈〉 ) )
In this case, derivation of types for variables is trivial: xid has type > and xgps has type
{pTi} (we assume that Ti does not re-transmit the GPS data store in xgps).
Service A and Ainst get annotated as follows:
A′ , [o f ind, o f ound, onotFound]
( ∗ [{z C}{pA}, {zgps}{pA}] pA • ocarAccident?〈z C, zgps〉. [id] A′inst| ∗ [{zid}{pA}, {zpos}{pA}] pA • o f ind?〈zid, zpos〉.
“find in DB and reply on o f ound or onotFound” )
A′inst , [n] ( n!〈〉 | ∗ n?〈〉. ( pA • o f ind!〈id, zgps〉| [{z′T }{pA}] ( pA • onotFound?〈id〉. z C • ohelpNotFound!〈〉
+
pA • o f ound?〈id, z′T〉. (z′T • ocheck!〈id〉| pA • ore f use?〈id〉. n!〈〉
+
pA • ook?〈id〉. [{z T}{pA,z C}, o] ( pA • o!〈z′T〉| pA • o?〈z T〉.( z C • ohelpFound!〈id, {z T}{z C}〉
| [{z′gps}{pA,z T}] pA • oposition?〈id, z′gps〉.
z T • o f wdPos!〈{z′gps}{z T}〉 ) ) ) ) ) )
Variables z C, zgps, zid, zpos, z′T are trivially annotated with type {pA}, because A does not
re-transmit the corresponding data, while variables z T and z′gps are annotated with {pA, z C}
and {pA, z T}, respectively.
Therefore, the system resulting from the type inference is
C′ | T′1 | T′2 | T′3 | A′
Figure 4.1 shows a possible evolution of the scenario, where T′3 is too far from the accident
scene, T′2 is not available, and T
′
1 accepts to provide first aid to C
′.
For example, after the computation steps 1–9 described in Figure 4.1, the system be-
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Figure 4.1: Automotive security scenario
comes
pA • oposition!〈id, {gps}{pA,pT1}〉
|
[o f ind, o f ound, onotFound]
( ∗ [{z C}{pA}, {zgps}{pA}] pA • ocarAccident?〈z C, zgps〉. · · ·
| ∗ [{zid}{pA}, {zpos}{pA}] pA • o f ind?〈zid, zpos〉. · · ·
| [{z′gps}{pA,pT1}] pA • oposition?〈id, z′gps〉. pT1 • o f wdPos!〈{z′gps}{pT1}〉 )
|
[m] (∗ m?〈〉. · · ·
| [{xgps}{pT1}] pT1 • o f wdPos?〈xgps〉. “go to xgps and provide first aid”. m!〈〉 )
|
T′2 | T′3
At this point, the customer can safely communicate its location to the automobile associa-
tion (namely, rule (r-delsub) of the operational semantics can be applied because the region
annotations of gps and z′gps are both {pA, pT1} and, hence, do comply), and the system
becomes
[o f ind, o f ound, onotFound]
( ∗ [{z C}{pA}, {zgps}{pA}] pA • ocarAccident?〈z C, zgps〉. · · ·
| ∗ [{zid}{pA}, {zpos}{pA}] pA • o f ind?〈zid, zpos〉. · · ·
| pT1•o f wdPos!〈{gps}{pT1}〉 )
|
[m] (∗ m?〈〉. · · ·
| [{xgps}{pT1}] pT1 • o f wdPos?〈xgps〉. “go to xgps and provide first aid”. m!〈〉 )
|
T′2 | T′3
Now, the automobile association can safely forward the customer location, because also
the region annotations of gps and xgps do comply.
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Applying the approach to the automotive case study. We illustrate here some rele-
vant properties for the automotive case study informally presented in Section 2.4.1 and
specified in COWS in Section 3.4.1.
Firstly, a driver in trouble must be assured that information about his credit card and
his location cannot become available to unauthorized users. Thus, for example, the credit
card identifier ccNum, communicated by activity CardCharge to service Bank, gets anno-
tated with the policy {pbank}, that allows Bank to receive the datum but prevents it from
transmitting the datum to other services. Other non-critical data, e.g. amount, can be
transmitted without an attached policy. The typed version of CardCharge is defined as
follows
pbank • ocharge!〈pcar, {ccNum}{pbank} , amount, pcar〉
| {|pcar • ochargeFail?〈pcar〉.kill(k)
+ pcar • ochargeOK?〈pcar〉.
( pend • oend!〈〉
| pcar • oundo?〈cc〉. pcar • oundo?〈cc〉. pbank • orevoke!〈pcar〉 ) |}
Once the type inference phase ends, BankInterface gets annotated as follows
[{xcust}{pbank}, {xcc}{pbank}, {xamount}{pbank}, {xid}{pbank ,xcust}]
pbank • ocharge?〈xcust, xcc, xamount, xid〉.
( pbank • ocheck!〈xid, xcc, xamount〉
| pbank • ocheckFail?〈xid〉. xcust • ochargeFail!〈xid〉
+ pbank • ocheckOK?〈xid〉.
[k′] ( xcust • ochargeOK!〈xid〉 | pbank • orevoke?〈xid〉.kill(k′) ) )
Indeed, the annotations inferred for variables xcust, xcc, xamount and xid are derived from
the use of these variables made by BankInterface. Thus, the first three are assigned region
{pbank} because they are only used in the receive along pbank • ocharge and in the internal
invocation pbank • ocheck. Of course, the partner name of the endpoint must belong to the
region of the variables. Instead, variable xid is assigned region {pbank, xcust} because it
is also used in the reply to the customer, i.e. activity xcust • ochargeFail!〈xid〉. For similar
reasons, CreditRating, the other subservice of Bank, gets annotated as follows
[{xid}{pbank}, {xcc}{pbank}, {xa}{pbank}]
pbank • ocheck?〈xid, xcc, xa〉.
[p, o] ( p • o!〈〉 | p • o?〈〉. pbank • ocheckOK!〈xid〉
+ p • o?〈〉. pbank • ocheckFail!〈xid〉 )
Thus, the fact that in both subservices variable xcc, which will store the credit card identi-
fier, is assigned region {pbank} guarantees that Bank will not transimit such information to
other (unathorized) services, as required by the policy {pbank} attached to ccNum.
Suppose instead that service Bank (accidentally or maliciously) attempts to reveal the
credit card number through some ‘internal’ operation such as pint • o!〈{xcc}r〉, for some
region r. For Bank to successfully complete the type inference phase, we should have
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pint ∈ r. Then, as result of the inference, we would get the annotated variable declaration
[{xcc}r′] , for some region r′ with r ⊆ r′. Now, the interaction between the typed terms
CardCharge and Bank would be blocked by the runtime checks because the datum sent
by CardCharge would be annotated as {ccNum}{pbank} while the region r′ of the receiving
variable xcc is such that pint ∈ r ⊆ r′ * {pbank}.
When delivering a datum, we can specify different policies according to the invoked
service. For example, when sending the car’s current location stored in xloc to services
OrderTowTruck and RentCar, we annotate it with the regions {xtowTruck} and {xrentalCar},
respectively. This means that the corresponding service invocations get annotated as fol-
lows:
xtowTruck • oorderTow!〈pcar, {xloc}{xtowTruck}, xgps〉
xrentalCar • oredirect!〈pcar, {xloc}{xrentalCar}〉
Notably, the used policies are not fixed at design time, but depend on the partner variables
xtowTruck and xrentalCar, and, thus, will be determined by the services that these variables
will be bound to as computation proceeds. For example, consider a towing truck service
annotated as follows:
TowTruck , ∗ [{xcust}r1 , {xcarGPS }r2 , {xgarageGPS }r3 , ocheckOK , ocheckFail]
ptowTruck • oorderTow?〈xcust, xcarGPS , xgarageGPS 〉. . . .
Now, the car’s current location can be communicated to the towing truck if, and only if,
the region of the variable xcarGPS that, after communication, will store the datum and the
region of xloc do comply, i.e. r2 ⊆ {ptowTruck}.
As a final example, the on road services could want to guarantee that critical data
sent to the in-vehicle services, such as cost and quality of the service supplied, are not dis-
closed to competitors. For example, suppose that the towing truck services, like TowTruck
before, must send the estimated travel time (ETT ) to clients. To prevent this datum from
being sent to competitor services, ETT is communicated with an attached policy that only
authorizes the client partner to access it, as in the following activity
xcust • otowTruckOK!〈{ETT }{xcust}〉
Applying the approach to the finance case study. As in the previous examples, we
can identify some confidentiality properties also for the finance case study informally
presented in Section 2.4.2 and specified in COWS in Section 3.4.2.
From the customer point of view, the service programmer can specify policies stating
that the customer’s personal information, the security values and the required amount will
not be transmitted by the portal to other services, while the customer’s balance can be
only communicated to the validation service identified by the partner name validation
(assumed to be known a priori by the customer). This means that the service invocations
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performed by the customer get annotated as follows:
portal • getCreditRequest!〈xid, {customerData}{portal}, {amount}{portal}, customer〉
portal • securities!〈xid, {securityValues}{portal}〉
portal • balance!〈xid, {balance}{portal,validation}〉
As expected, the typed version of the portal services, first of all InformationUpload, re-
spect the above policies.
Instead, from the portal point of view, the service programmer can require the cus-
tomer to not pass to other services the session identifier, to avoid these services act in
customer’s stead, and the final offer, which has been specifically computed for the cus-
tomer demands. Therefore, the corresponding invocations performed by the portal get
annotated as follows:
xcust • logged!〈key, {sessionID}{xcust}〉
xcust • offer!〈xid, {xoffer}{xcust}, xmotivation〉
4.1.4 Concluding remarks
We have introduced a first analytical tool for checking that COWS specifications enjoy
some desirable properties concerning the partners, and hence the services, that can safely
access any given datum and, in that respect, do not manifest unexpected behaviors. Our
type system is quite simple: types are just sets and operations on types are union, inter-
section, subset inclusion, etc. The language operational semantics only involves types
in efficiently implementable checks, i.e. subset inclusions. While implementation of our
framework (and, hence, of a type inference algorithm) is currently in progress, we are
also working on the definition of a completely static variant where all dynamic checks
have been moved to the static phase. This would require a static analysis that gathers
information about all the values that each variable can assume at runtime and uses these
information to verify the compliance with the specified policies. At the price of a more
complex static phase, this approach, on the one hand, would alleviate the runtime checks
but, on the other hand, could discard terms that at runtime would behave safely since
statically they cannot guarantee to comply with their policies. A relational static analysis
[160], which is not a type system, for a fragment of COWS has been introduced in [16].
It can be used for ensuring that, in a COWS term, service invocations do not interfere in
malign ways.
Our types are essentially inspired by the ‘region types’ for Confined-λ of [120] and
for global computing calculi of [75]. There are however some noticeable differences. In
fact, COWS permits describing systems exchanging heterogeneous data along endpoints,
which calls for a more dynamic typing mechanism than that used with communication
channels. Moreover, COWS permits annotating only the relevant data while Confined-λ
109
CHAPTER 4 Analysis techniques for COWS specifications
requires typing any constant, function and channel. The group types, originally proposed
for the Ambients calculus [62] and then recast to the pi-calculus [61], have purposes similar
to our region annotations, albeit they are only used for constraining the exchanges of
ambient and channel names. Confinement has been also explored in the context of Java,
and related calculi, for confining classes and objects within specific packages [201, 208].
More expressive type disciplines based, e.g., on session types and behavioural types
are emerging as powerful tools for taking into account behavioural and non-functional
properties of computing systems. In the case of services, they could permit to express
and enforce many relevant policies for, e.g., regulating resources usage, constraining the
sequences of messages accepted by services, ensuring service interoperability and compo-
sitionality, guaranteeing absence of deadlock in service composition, checking that inter-
action obeys a given protocol. Some of the studies developed for the pi-calculus (see e.g.
[112, 56, 207, 121, 117, 122, 114]) are promising starting points, but they need non-trivial
adaptations to deal with all COWS peculiar features. For example, one of the major prob-
lems we envisage concerns the treatment of killing and protection activities and priorities,
that are not commonly used in process calculi.
4.2 A logical verification methodology
Modal and temporal logics have long been used to represent properties of concurrent and
distributed systems owing to their ability of expressing notions of necessity, possibility,
eventuality, etc. (see e.g. [116]). These logics have proved suitable to reason about
complex software systems because they only provide abstract specifications of these sys-
tems and can thus be used for describing system properties rather than system behaviours.
Moreover, the application of temporal logics to the analysis of systems is often supported
by software tools (see e.g. [67, 68, 110]). By following this line of research, we introduce
a logical verification methodology for checking functional properties of services. The
properties are described by means of SocL, a logic specifically designed to express in a
convenient way distinctive aspects of services. The verification of SocL formulae over
their interpretation domain, abstract representations of service behaviours, is assisted by
the on-the-fly model checker CMC1. Service behaviours can be initially specified using
COWS. Then, by relying on the semantics of the calculus and appropriate transformation
rules, CMC can extract the corresponding abstract representations to be used for model
checking purposes.
1CMC [192] is a tool supporting specification and verification of COWS terms. Besides model checking
of SocL formulae, CMC also permits deriving all computations originating from a COWS term in an auto-
mated way. A prototypical version of CMC, developed by Franco Mazzanti at ISTI-CNR of Pisa, can be
experimented via a web interface available at the address http://fmt.isti.cnr.it/cmc/. We refer to
Sections 4.2.4 and Appendix A for more details about CMC.
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4.2.1 An overview of the verification methodology
Our verification methodology does not put any specific demand on what a service is,
rather, for the sake of generality, takes an abstract point of view. Thus, we think of services
as software entities which may have an internal state and can interact with each other
by, e.g., sending/accepting requests, delivering corresponding responses and, on-demand,
cancelling requests. Thus, for example, we say that a service is
1. available: if it is always capable to accept a request;
2. parallel: if, after accepting a request, before giving a response it can accept further
requests;
3. sequential: if, after accepting a request, it cannot accept further requests before
giving a response;
4. one-shot: if, after accepting a request, it cannot accept any further requests;
5. off-line: if it provides an unsuccessful response to each received request;
6. cancelable: if, before a response has been provided, it permits to cancel the corre-
sponding request;
7. revocable: if, after a successful response has been provided, it permits to cancel a
request;
8. responsive: if it guarantees at least a response to each received request;
9. single-response: if, after accepting a request, it provides no more than one response;
10. multiple-response: if, after accepting a request, it provides more than one response;
11. no-response: if it does never provide a response to any accepted request;
12. reliable: if it guarantees a successful response to each received request.
Albeit not exhaustive, the above list contains many desirable properties (see, e.g., [196, 6,
29]) of the externally observable behaviour of services.
The previous properties are stated in terms of the visible actions that services may
perform. Any of these actions has a type, e.g. accept a request, provide a response, etc.,
and is part of an interaction started when a client (possibly another service) firstly invokes
one of the operations exposed by the service. At first sight, then, the service properties
could be formulated by properly tailoring an action-based temporal logic among those al-
ready proposed in the literature of concurrency theory (see e.g. [107, 81, 187]). However,
these logics are not expressive enough to, e.g., associate a response action to the request
acceptance action that originated the interaction. The possible presence of more request
actions, sharing the same type and interaction name, may prevent this association. Indeed,
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multiple instances of an interaction can be simultaneously active since service operations
can be independently invoked by several clients. Hence, by taking inspiration from SOC
emerging standards like WS-BPEL and WS-CDL, to enable the previously mentioned
association we use correlation data as a third attribute of actions that services can do.
By relying on the actions described above, the branching time, temporal logic SocL,
introduced in [83, 84], is capable of expressing in a convenient way peculiar aspects of ser-
vices and of formalizing the ‘abstract’ properties previously stated. Being SocL an action-
and state-based logic, its formulae predicate properties of systems in terms of states and
state changes and of the actions that are performed when moving from one state to an-
other. Indeed, the interpretation domain of SocL formulae are Doubly Labelled Tran-
sition Systems (L2TSs, [80]), namely extensions of Labelled Transition Systems (LTSs)
with a labelling function from states to sets of atomic propositions. The combination of
the action paradigm, classically used to describe systems via LTS, with propositions that
are true over states, as usually exploited when using Kripke structures as semantic model,
facilitates the task of formalizing properties of concurrent systems, where it is often nec-
essary to specify both state information and evolution in time by actions. To assist the
verification of SocL formulae over L2TSs we are developing CMC [192], an on-the-fly
model checker, whose use we also describe in this thesis.
Although the proposed methodology handles L2TSs, we put forward to use COWS as
a language for concretely specifying service behaviours. In practice, once the service or
SOC system to be analysed has been specified in COWS, to check if the corresponding
term enjoys some abstract properties expressed as SocL formulae, the following steps
must be performed. Firstly, the LTS representing the semantics of the COWS term is
transformed into an L2TS by labelling each state with the set of activities the COWS term
is able to immediately perform from that state. Then, by applying a set of application-
dependent abstraction rules, the concrete L2TS is transformed into a more abstract one.
Finally, the SocL formulae are checked over this abstract L2TS. The overall verification
process is supported by CMC.
4.2.2 The logic SocL
SocL is an action- and state-based, branching time, temporal logic, that is a development
of the logic UCTL [190]. The two logics mainly differ for the fact that SocL formulae
are parameterized by data values and, hence, are more suitable for representing distinctive
aspects of services. In this section, we first define SocL and then show how it can be used
to formalize the service properties we have mentioned in Section 4.2.1.
4.2.2.1 Syntax and semantics
We start introducing the set of actions which the logic is based upon, then we define
the auxiliary logic of actions. As we said before, the actions of the logic should corre-
spond to the actions performed by service providers and service consumers. They are
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characterised by three attributes: type, interaction name, and correlation data. Moreover,
to enable capturing correlation data used to link together actions executed as part of the
same interaction, they may also contain variables, that we call correlation variables. In
the sequel, we will usually write val to denote a generic value and var to denote a generic
correlation variable. For a given correlation variable var, its binding occurrence will be
denoted by var; all remaining occurrences, that are called free, will be denoted by var.
Definition 4.2.1 (Actions) SocL actions have the form t(i, c), where t is the type of the
action, i is the name of the interaction which the action is part of, and c is a tuple of cor-
relation values and variables identifying the interaction (i and c can be omitted whenever
do not play any role). We will say that an action is closed if it does not contain variables.
We will use Act to denote the set of all actions, a as a generic element of Act (notation
· emphasises the fact that the action may contain variable binders), and a as a generic
action without variable binders. We will use Act c to denote the subset of Act that only
contains closed actions (i.e. actions without variables) and A as a generic subset of Act c
(as usual, ∅ denotes the empty set).
Example 4.2.1 Action request(charge, 1234, 1) could stand for a request action for start-
ing an (instance of the) interaction charge which will be identified through the correlation
tuple 〈1234, 1〉. If some correlation value is unknown at design time, a (binder for a) cor-
relation variable id can be used instead, as in the action request(charge, 1234, id). This
way, during the formula verification process, id will capture the corresponding value that
can be then used to correlate subsequent actions performed as part of the same interac-
tion. Thus, for example, the response action corresponding to the request above could be
written as response(charge, 1234, id).
Definition 4.2.2 (Action formulae) The language AF (Act) of the action formulae on
Act is defined as follows:
γ ::= a | χ χ ::= tt | a | τ | ¬χ | χ ∧ χ
Thus, an action formula γ can be either an action a, which may contain variable binders,
or an action formula χ, which is a boolean compositions of unobservable internal actions
τ and actions a without variable binders. As we shall clarify later, the distinction between
action formulae γ and χ is motivated by two reasons: (1) some logical operators can accept
as argument only action formulae without variable binders, and (2) actions containing
variable binders cannot be composed. As usual, we will use ff to abbreviate ¬tt and χ∨χ′
to abbreviate ¬(¬χ ∧ ¬χ′).
Satisfaction of an action formula is determined with respect to a set of closed ac-
tions, that represent the observable actions actually executed by the service under anal-
ysis. Therefore, since action formulae may contain variables, to define their semantics
we introduce the notion of substitution and a partial function match that checks matching
between an action and a closed action and, if it is defined, returns a substitution.
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Definition 4.2.3 (Substitutions) Substitutions, ranged over by ρ, are functions mapping
correlation variables to values and are written as collections of pairs of the form var/val.
The empty substitution is denoted by ∅. Application of substitution ρ to a formula φ,
written φ ρ, has the effect of replacing every free occurrence of var in φ with val, for each
var/val ∈ ρ.
Definition 4.2.4 (Matching function) The partial function match from Act×Act c to sub-
stitutions is defined by structural induction by means of auxiliary functions defined over
syntactic subcategories of Act through the following rules:
match(t(i, c), t(i, c′)) = matchc(c, c′)
matchc((e1, c1), (e2, c2)) = matche(e1, e2) ∪ matchc(c1, c2)
matchc(〈〉, 〈〉) = ∅
matche(var, val) = {var/val}
matche(val, val) = ∅
where (e, c) stands for a tuple with first element e, and 〈〉 stands for the empty tuple.
Example 4.2.2 Let us consider again the actions introduced in Example 4.2.1. Then,
we have match(request(charge, 1234, id), request(charge, 1234, 1)) = {id/1} and also
match(response(charge, 1234, 1), response(charge, 1234, 1)) = ∅. Instead, since the ac-
tions have different types, match(request(charge, 1234, id), response(charge, 1234, 1)) is
not defined.
Definition 4.2.5 (Action formulae semantics) The satisfaction relation |= for action for-
mulae is defined over a set A of closed actions and a substitution ρ.
• A |= a ρ iff ∃! a′ ∈ A such that match(a, a′) = ρ;
• A |= χ ∅ iff A |= χ, where the relation A |= χ is defined as follows:
– A |= tt holds always;
– A |= a iff a ∈ A
– A |= τ iff A = ∅;
– A |= ¬χ iff not A |= χ;
– A |= χ ∧ χ′ iff A |= χ and A |= χ′.
Notation A |= γ  ρ means: the formula γ is satisfied over the set of closed actions
A under substitution ρ. Notably, the semantics of action formulae requires that an action
a or a matches exactly one closed action in A (see Section 4.2.6.1 for comments and for
an extension of the logic where this requirement is relaxed). Moreover, since match is
undefined when its first argument is a (free) variable, the semantics of actions containing
free occurrences of correlation variables is undefined as well.
Before defining the syntax of the logic, we introduce atomic propositions. They cor-
respond to the properties that can be true over the states of services.
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Definition 4.2.6 (Atomic propositions) SocL atomic propositions have the form p(i, c),
where p is the name, i is an interaction name, and c is a tuple of correlation values and
(free) variables identifying i (as before, i and c can be omitted whenever do not play any
role). Notably, atomic propositions cannot contain variable binders.
We will use AP to denote the set of all atomic propositions and pi as generic element of
AP.
Example 4.2.3 Proposition accepting request(charge) could indicate that a state can ac-
cept requests for interaction charge, while proposition accepting cancel(charge, 1234, 1)
could indicate that a state permits to cancel those requests for interaction charge identified
by the correlation tuple 〈1234, 1〉.
Definition 4.2.7 (SocL syntax) The syntax of SocL formulae is defined as follows:
(state formulae) φ ::= true | pi | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ′ | EΨ | AΨ
(path formulae) Ψ ::= Xγφ | φ χUγ φ′ | φ χWγ φ′
E and A are existential and universal (resp.) path quantifiers. X, U and W are the next,
(strong) until and weak until operators drawn from those firstly introduced in [81] and
subsequently elaborated in [145].
Intuitively, the formula Xγφ says that in the next state of the path, reached by an action
satisfying γ, the formula φ holds.
Example 4.2.4 Formula EXrequest(charge,1234,id) AXresponse(charge,1234,id) true can be satis-
fied by a service capable of accepting in the current state a request for the interaction
charge and evolving to a state where all actions that it can perform are responses corre-
lated to the accepted request. As another example, the formula ¬ EXtt true means that the
service is deadlocked.
The formula φχUγφ′ says that φ′ holds at some future state of the path reached by a last
action satisfying γ, while φ holds from the current state until that state is reached and all
the actions executed in the meanwhile along the path satisfy χ or τ (i.e. are unobservable).
Example 4.2.5 Formula E(true response(check,1234) U request(stop,1234) (¬ EXtt true) ) is satis-
fied by a service that, after a (possible empty) sequence of actions response(check, 1234),
reaches a deadlock state by performing the action request(stop, 1234).
The formula φ χWγ φ′ holds on a path either if the corresponding strong until operator
holds or if for all the states of the path the formula φ holds and all the actions of the path
satisfy χ or τ.
Example 4.2.6 Consider formula E(trueresponse(check,1234) W request(stop,1234) (¬ EXtt true) ),
a variant of the formula introduced in Example 4.2.5 where operator W replaces U.
This formula can be also satisfied by a service that performs an infinite sequence of
response(check, 1234).
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Notice that the weak until operator (also called unless) is not derivable from the until
operator since disjunction or conjunction of path formulae is not expressible in the syntax
of SocL, similarly to any other pure branching-time temporal logic.
The interpretation domain of SocL formulae are Doubly Labelled Transition Systems
[80] over the set of actions Act and the set of atomic propositions AP, as introduced by
the following definition.
Definition 4.2.8 (Doubly Labelled Transition System, L2TS) An L2TS over the set of
actions Act and the set of atomic propositions AP is a tuple 〈Q, q0, Act,R,AP, L〉, where:
• Q is a set of states;
• q0 ∈ Q is the initial state;
• R ⊆ Q × 2Act c × Q is the transition relation;
• L : Q −→ 2AP is the labelling function.
Recall that Act c is the subset of Act that only contains closed actions. Notably, tran-
sitions are labelled by sets of actions whilst in the standard definition of L2TS they are
labelled by a single action (see Section 4.2.6.1 for further comments). Those transitions
labelled by the empty set correspond to execution of ‘unobservable’ internal actions. As
a matter of notation, instead of (q,A, q′) ∈ R we will sometimes write q A−→ q′.
To define the semantics of SocL, we need the notion of path in an L2TS.
Definition 4.2.9 (Path) Let 〈Q, q0, Act,R,AP, L〉 be an L2TS and q ∈ Q.
• σ is a path from q if σ = q (the empty path from q) or σ is a (possibly infinite)
sequence (q0,A1, q1)(q1,A2, q2) · · · with q0 = q and (qi−1,Ai, qi) ∈ R for all i > 0.
• We write path(q) for the set of all paths from q.
• If σ = (q0,A1, q1)(q1,A2, q2) · · · then the ith state in σ, i.e. qi−1, is denoted by
σ(i − 1) and the ith set of action in σ, i.e. Ai, is denoted by σ{i}.
• The concatenation of paths σ1 and σ2, denoted by σ1σ2, is a partial operation,
defined only if σ1 is finite and its final state coincides with the first state of σ2.
We can now define the semantics of SocL formulae. In fact, the semantics is only
defined for closed formulae, namely those formulae where any free occurrence of a cor-
relation variable is syntactically preceded by its binding occurrence.
Definition 4.2.10 (SocL semantics) Let 〈Q, q0, Act,R,AP, L〉 be an L2TS, q ∈ Q, and
σ ∈ path(q′) for some q′ ∈ Q. The satisfaction relation of closed SocL formulae is
defined as follows:
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• q |= true holds always;
• q |= pi iff pi ∈ L(q);
• q |= ¬φ iff not q |= φ;
• q |= φ ∧ φ′ iff q |= φ and q |= φ′;
• q |= EΨ iff ∃σ ∈ path(q) : σ |= Ψ;
• q |= AΨ iff ∀σ ∈ path(q) : σ |= Ψ;
• σ |= Xγφ iff ∃ ρ : σ{1} |= γ  ρ, and σ(1) |= φ ρ;
• σ |= φ χUγφ′ iff σ(0) |= φ, and there exists j > 0 such that
∃ ρ : σ{ j} |= γ  ρ, σ( j) |= φ′ρ, and for all 0 < i < j:
σ(i) |= φ and σ{i} |= χ or σ{i} = ∅;
• σ |= φ χWγφ′ iff σ(0) |= φ and
either there exists j > 0 such that ∃ ρ : σ{ j} |= γ  ρ, σ( j) |= φ′ρ,
and for all 0 < i < j: σ(i) |= φ and σ{i} |= χ or σ{i} = ∅
or for all j > 0: σ( j) |= φ and σ{ j} |= χ or σ{ j} = ∅.
A distinctive feature of SocL is that the satisfaction relation of the next and until op-
erators may define a substitution which is propagated to subformulae. Notably, in the
left hand side of the until operators we use χ (i.e., closed actions) instead of γ, to prevent
writing such formulae as φ request(i,var)Uγφ′ whose semantics would require request(i, var)
to be performed zero or more times before γ, which could produce undefined or multiple
defined bindings on var. The distinction between γ and χ, moreover, permits to pre-
vent writing action formulae that contain binding occurrences of correlation variables as
arguments of boolean operators. Indeed, if we would try to evaluate, for example, the
formula AXrequest(charge,1234,id)∨ request(check,1234) EXresponse(charge,1234,id) true over a state q
of an L2TS such that q
{request(check,1234)}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ q′, we would have to check the satisfaction of
the subformula EXresponse(charge,1234,id) true over q′, but this cannot be verified since this
last formula is not closed (as required by the satisfaction relation). All these constraints on
the syntax of formulae guarantee that, when checking the satisfaction of a SocL formula,
evaluation of the involved action formulae always returns a unique substitution.
Other useful logic operators can be derived as usual. In particular, the ones that we use
in the sequel are:
• false stands for ¬ true.
• < γ > φ stands for EXγ φ; this is the diamond operator introduced in [107] and,
intuitively, states that it is possible to perform an action satisfying γ and thereby
satisfy formula φ.
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• [γ] φ stands for ¬ < γ > ¬ φ; this is the box operator introduced in [107] and states
that no matter how a process performs an action satisfying γ, the state it reaches in
doing so will necessarily have property φ.
• EFφ stands for E(true tt Uφ) and means that there is some path that leads to a state
at which φ holds; that is, φ potentially holds.
• EFγ true stands for E(true tt Uγ true) and means that there is some path that leads
to a state reached by a last action satisfying γ; that is, an action satisfying γ will
eventually be performed;
• AFγ true stands for A(true tt Uγ true) and means that an action satisfying γ will be
performed in the future along every path; that is, an action satisfying γ is inevitable.
• AG φ stands for ¬ EF ¬ φ and states that φ holds at every state on every path; that
is, φ holds globally.
• Variants of until operators, which do not specify the last action leading to the state
at which the formula on the right hand side holds, can be defined as follows:
– E(φ χU φ′) stands for φ′ ∨ E(φχUχ∨τ φ′);
– A(φ χU φ′) stands for φ′ ∨ A(φχUχ∨τ φ′);
– E(φ χW φ′) stands for φ′ ∨ E(φχWχ∨τ φ′);
– A(φ χW φ′) stands for φ′ ∨ A(φχWχ∨τ φ′).
4.2.2.2 A few patterns of service properties
We now show how the service properties presented in Section 4.2.1 can be expressed as
formulae in SocL. To do this, we instantiate the set of actions Act and the set of atomic
propositions AP which the logic is based upon as follows.
• Act contains (at least) the following five types of actions: request, responseOk,
responseFail, cancel and undo. The intended meaning of the actions is:
request(i, c) indicates that the action performed by the service starts the interac-
tion i which is identified by the correlation tuple c; similarly, responseOk(i, c),
responseFail(i, c), and cancel(i, c) correspond to actions that provide a successful
response, an unsuccessful response, a cancellation, respectively, of the interaction i
identified by c; undo(i, c) corresponds to override the effects of a previous request.
• AP contains (at least) the atomic propositions accepting request, accepting cancel
and accepting undo, whose meaning is obvious.
For the sake of readability, in the formalization of the properties we consider correla-
tion tuples composed of only one element (their generalization to tuples of any length is
obvious).
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1. - - Available service - -
AG (accepting request(i)).
This formula means that in every state the service may accept a request. A weaker
interpretation of service availability, meaning that the service accepts a request in-
finitely often, is given by the formula AG AF (accepting request(i)).
2. - - Parallel service - -
AG [request(i, var)]
E(true¬ (responseOk(i,var)∨responseFail(i,var) )U accepting request(i)).
3. - - Sequential service - -
AG [request(i, var)]
A(¬ accepting request(i) tt UresponseOk(i,var)∨responseFail(i,var)true).
4. - - One-shot service - -
AG [request(i)] AG ¬ accepting request(i).
5. - - Off-line service - -
AG [request(i, var)] AFresponseFail(i,var) true.
6. - - Cancelable service - -
AG [request(i, var)]
A(accepting cancel(i, var) ttWresponseOk(i,var)∨responseFail(i,var)true).
This formula means that the service is ready to accept a cancellation required by the
client (fairness towards the client). A different formulation is given by the formula
AG [responseOk(i, var)]¬EF < cancel(i, var) > true
meaning that the service cannot accept a cancellation after responding to a request
(fairness towards the service).
7. - - Revocable service - -
EFresponseOk(i,var) EF(accepting undo(i, var))
Again, we can have two interpretations. While the previous formula expresses a
sort of weak revocability, the following one corresponds to a stronger interpretation
AG [responseOk(i, var)] A(accepting undo(i, var) ttWundo(i,var)true).
8. - -Responsive service - -
AG [request(i, var)] AFresponseOk(i,var)∨responseFail(i,var) true.
9. - - Single-response service - -
AG [request(i, var)]
¬EFresponseOk(i,var)∨responseFail(i,var) EFresponseOk(i,var)∨responseFail(i,var) true.
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10. - - Multiple-response service - -
AG [request(i, var)]
AFresponseOk(i,var)∨responseFail(i,var) AFresponseOk(i,var)∨responseFail(i,var) true.
11. - - No-response service - -
AG [request(i, var)] ¬EFresponseOk(i,var)∨responseFail(i,var) true.
12. - - Reliable service - -
AG [request(i, var)] AFresponseOk(i,var) true.
Notably, the response belongs to the same interaction i of the accepted request and
they are correlated by the variable var.
The SocL formulation of the above properties is instructive in that it witnesses that the
natural language descriptions of the properties can sometimes be interpreted in different
ways: therefore, formalization within the logic enforces a choice among different inter-
pretations. Notably, the formulation is given in terms of abstract actions and states thus,
rather than specific properties, the properties we have considered so far represent sort of
generic patterns or classes of properties. In other words, from time to time, type/name,
interaction and correlation tuple of actions and propositions have to be projected on the
actual actions performed by the specific service to be analysed. They, however, can be
easily instantiated, as shown in Section 4.2.5, and such instantiation can be in principle
automated. This is helpful e.g. to hide the temporal logic details to a developer only
interested to know if the service he has designed is, say, responsive. Anyway, as shown
in Section 4.2.4, the developer still keeps full control on the mapping from the (concrete)
actions and states of the service to the abstract actions and states in terms of which the
properties are formulated.
4.2.3 L2TS semantics for COWS terms
The operational semantics of COWS associates an LTS to a COWS term. We have seen
instead that SocL is interpreted over L2TSs. We need therefore to transform the LTS
associated to a COWS term into an L2TS by defining a proper labelling for the states of
the LTS. This is done by enriching the LTS with a function labelling each state with the set
of activities that any active subterm of the COWS term corresponding to that state would
be able to perform immediately. Of course, the transformation preserves the structure of
the original LTS. Both in the LTS and in the obtained L2TS, being computational steps,
transitions are labelled by actions of the form p •o v¯ or †. In fact, for the sake of simplicity,
labels of the form p •o ∅ ` v¯ generated by the operational semantics are written p •o v¯;
indeed, the two omitted components can be safely removed at the end of transitions’
inference phase since they are only used to support implementation of global scope of
variables and precedence among concurrent actions. In the next figures, we shall use
arrows of the form to denote multi-step computations, and arrows of the form
to denote further unspecified computations.
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q0
q1
p • o 〈v〉
q0
{ p • o!〈v〉, p • o?〈x〉, p • o′?〈x〉 }
q1
{ p • o′?〈v〉 }
p • o 〈v〉
Figure 4.2: From LTS to L2TS
We explain this transformation through a simple example. Consider the following
COWS term:
p • o!〈v〉 | [x] ( p • o?〈x〉 | p • o′?〈x〉. [y] p • o′′?〈x, y〉 )
The corresponding LTS and L2TS are as in Figure 4.2. The LTS on the left hand side says
that the term can actually perform only the computation corresponding to the communi-
cation along the endpoint p • o. However, besides the activities p • o!〈v〉 and p • o?〈x〉, the
COWS term can potentially perform also the receive activity p • o′?〈x〉. Thus, to record
this information, the state q0 of the L2TS on the right hand side is labelled by a set contain-
ing all the three potential activities. Similarly, the state q1 is labelled by the only potential
receive activity p • o′?〈v〉. Notably, the receive p • o′′?〈x, y〉, that cannot be immediately
performed by the term, is missing both in the LTS and in the L2TS.
Consider now the bank service presented in Section 3.4.1 and modelled in COWS by
the term
[ocheck, ocheckOK , ocheckFail] ( ∗BankInterface | ∗CreditRating )
where BankInterface is a service publicly invocable by customers, while CreditRating is
an ‘internal’ service that can only interact with BankInterface. To show the behaviour
of the bank service we consider here the terms Client1 and Client2 that model a pair of
mutually dependent requests for charging a customer’s credit card with some amount.
In fact, we want to model a sort of ‘transactional’ behaviour: for a charge operation to
succeed, both requests by Client1 and Client2 must succeed; otherwise, no effect will be
produced. Thus, the COWS term representing the considered scenario is
[ocheck, ocheckOK , ocheckFail] ( ∗BankInterface | ∗CreditRating ) | [k] ( Client1 | Client2 )
where the customer processes are defined as follows:
Client1 , pbank • ocharge!〈pC , 1234, 100, id1〉
| pC • ochargeOK?〈id1〉. s1 + pC • ochargeFail?〈id1〉 .( {|pbank • orevoke!〈id2〉|} | kill(k) )
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Client2 , pbank • ocharge!〈pC , 1234, 200, id2〉
| pC • ochargeOK?〈id2〉. s2 + pC • ochargeFail?〈id2〉 .( {|pbank • orevoke!〈id1〉|} | kill(k) )
The LTS of the above bank scenario is shown in Figure 4.3, while the concrete L2TS
obtained by applying the transformation is shown in Figure 4.4. Transitions of both sys-
tems are labelled by ‘concrete’ information generated by the operational rules of the cal-
culus. Thus, since we are interested in verifying abstract properties of services, such as
those shown in Section 4.2.2.2, we need to abstract away from unnecessary details. This
is done by using a set of suitable abstraction rules that permit to replace concrete actions
on the transitions with ‘abstract’ actions of SocL, i.e. request(i, c), responseOk(i, c),
responseFail(i, c), cancel(i, c) and undo(i, c). Similar rules permit to replace the con-
crete activities labelling the states with predicates of SocL, e.g. accepting request(i),
accepting cancel(i, c), and accepting undo(i, c). Of course, in doing these further trans-
formations, different concrete actions can be mapped into the same SocL action. More-
over, the transformations may involve only those concrete actions/activities that are con-
sidered worthwhile to be observed to carry on the analysis of interest. Indeed, those that
are not replaced by their abstract counterparts may not be observed.
The abstraction procedure must however preserve those names and values occurring
within concrete actions/activities of COWS specifications that are important to express
properties of service behaviour. To capture such names and values, transformation rules
can make use of ‘metavariables’, written as names starting with the character “$”; other-
wise, they can use the wildcard “ ∗ ”. To avoid cumbersome notations, we refrain from
introducing new symbols and write v. to indicate that v can be either a value, or a metavari-
able, or the wildcard (this notation also applies to tuples, actions and predicates with a
similar meaning). Anyway, take into account that the wildcard can only occur in the left
hand side of the abstraction rules.
Formally, abstraction rules follow the templates:
Action p. • o. , v¯. → a. (1)
State p. • o. ?w¯. → pi. (2)
State p. • o. !v¯. → pi. (3)
where a. is a closed action and pi. is a closed atomic proposition of the logic SocL (except
for, possibly, the occurrence of some of the metavariables introduced in the left hand side
of the rule). Rules following the template (1) apply to concrete actions of transitions,
while the remaining ones apply to concrete activities labelling states.
To define the effect of the application of abstraction rules to an L2TS, we exploit
an auxiliary function matcht( , ), that checks the matching between tuples of the form
〈p. , o. , v¯.〉 drawn from the left hand sides of abstraction rules and tuples of the form 〈p, o, w¯〉
drawn from concrete actions/activities. This function is defined by the following rules:
matcht(v, v) = ∅ matcht(∗, v) = ∅ matcht($n, v) = {$n/v}
matcht(∗, x) = ∅
matcht(v.1,w1) = ρ1 matcht(v¯.2, w¯2) = ρ2
matcht((v.1, v¯.2), (w1, w¯2)) = ρ1 unionmulti ρ2
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q0
pbank •ocharge 〈pC , 1234, 100, id1〉pbank •ocharge 〈pC , 1234, 200, id2〉
q1 q2
pbank •ocheck 〈id1, 1234, 100〉
pbank •ocharge 〈pC , 1234, 200, id2〉
q3
q4
pbank •ocheck 〈id2, 1234, 200〉
q5
pC •ochargeOK 〈id1〉
pC •ochargeFail 〈id2〉
q53
q57
Figure 4.3: Excerpt of the LTS for the bank scenario
When using the left hand side of a rule to build the tuple 〈p. , o. , v¯.〉, if any of p. or o.
is missing, it is replaced by the wildcard, while if v¯. is missing, it is replaced by one or
more tuples of wildcards of appropriate length (as drawn from the COWS specification
according to the tuples of values that can be exchanged along the endpoints matching
p. • o. ). In practice, each abstraction rule applies to the largest possible set of concrete
actions/activities according to function matcht( , ). Omitting any of the elements in the
left hand side of the rule corresponds then to enlarging its application domain.
For example, the abstract L2TS of the bank scenario shown in Figure 4.5 is obtained
by applying to the concrete L2TS of Figure 4.4 the following abstraction rules:
Action pbank • ocharge, 〈∗, ∗, ∗, $id〉 → request(charge, $id)
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q0
{ pbank • ocharge!〈pC , 1234, 100, id1〉,
pbank • ocharge!〈pC , 1234, 200, id2〉,
pbank • ocharge?〈xcust , xcc, xamount , xid〉, . . . }
pbank • ocharge 〈pC , 1234, 100, id1〉pbank • ocharge 〈pC , 1234, 200, id2〉
q1
{ pbank • ocharge!〈pC , 1234, 100, id1〉,
pbank • ocharge?〈xcust , xcc, xamount , xid〉, . . . }
q2
{ pbank • ocharge!〈pC , 1234, 200, id2〉,
pbank • ocharge?〈xcust , xcc, xamount , xid〉, . . . }
pbank • ocheck 〈id1, 1234, 100〉
pbank • ocharge 〈pC , 1234, 200, id2〉q3
{ pbank • ocharge!〈pC , 1234, 200, id2〉,
pbank • ocharge?〈xcust , xcc, xamount , xid〉, . . . }
q4
{ pbank • ocharge?〈xcust , xcc, xamount , xid〉, . . . }
pbank • ocheck 〈id2, 1234, 200〉
q5
{ pbank • ocharge?〈xcust , xcc, xamount , xid〉, . . .}
pC • ochargeOK 〈id1〉
pC • ochargeFail 〈id2〉
q53
{ pbank • ocharge?〈xcust , xcc, xamount , xid〉, . . . }
q57
{ pbank • ocharge?〈xcust , xcc, xamount , xid〉, . . . }
Figure 4.4: Excerpt of the L2TS for the bank scenario with concrete labels
Action ∗ • ochargeOK , 〈$id〉 → responseOk(charge, $id)
Action ∗ • ochargeFail, 〈$id〉 → responseFail(charge, $id)
State pbank • ocharge? → accepting request(charge)
Thus, as a consequence of the application of the first rule, the concrete action pbank •
ocharge, 〈pC , 1234, 200, id2〉 that matches the left hand side of the rule producing the
substitution {$id/id2}, is replaced by the SocL abstract action request(charge, id2) that
is obtained by applying the produced substitution to the right hand side of the rule.
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q0
{ accepting request(charge) }
{ request(charge, id1) }{ request(charge, id2) }
q1
{ accepting request(charge) }
q2
{ accepting request(charge) }
∅
{ request(charge, id2) }
q3
{ accepting request(charge) }
q4
{ accepting request(charge) }
∅
q5
{ accepting request(charge) }
{ responseOk(charge, id1) }
{ responseFail(charge, id2) }
q53
{ accepting request(charge) }
q57
{ accepting request(charge) }
Figure 4.5: Excerpt of the L2TS for the bank scenario with abstract labels
Similarly, as a consequence of the application of the last rule, the concrete action
pbank • ocharge?, 〈xcust, xcc, xamount, xid〉 labelling state q0 and matching the left hand side of
the rule is replaced by the SocL atomic proposition accepting request(charge). Notably,
concrete actions corresponding to (internal) communications between the bank subser-
vices are not transformed and, thus, become unobservable (the corresponding action in
the abstract L2TS is ∅).
Of course, the sets of transformation rules are not defined once and for all, but are
application-dependent and, thus, must be defined from time to time. Indeed, they embeds
information, like the intended semantics of each action and the predicates on the states,
that are not coded into the COWS specification. Due to the low level of the COWS actions,
125
CHAPTER 4 Analysis techniques for COWS specifications
q0
{ accepting request(charge) }
{ request(charge, id1) }{ request(charge, id2) }
q1
{ accepting request(charge) }
q2
{ accepting request(charge) }
{ responseFail(charge, id1) } { responseOk(charge, id1) }
q3 q4
Figure 4.6: An example of L2TS
a preliminary analysis of the behaviour may be needed to tell the abstract type of the
actions, as well for defining the state predicates: this requires a certain knowledge of the
actual meaning of the designed services, although heuristics can be defined to support this
analysis.
4.2.4 Model checking COWS specifications
To assist the verification process of SocL formulae over L2TS, we are contributing to the
development of CMC, a model checker for SocL that can be used to verify properties of
services specified in COWS. A prototypical version of CMC can be experimented via a
web interface available at the address http://fmt.isti.cnr.it/cmc/.
CMC is implemented by exploiting an efficient on-the-fly algorithm whose complexity
is comparable to that of the best on-the-fly model checking algorithms. Therefore, the
complexity is linear with respect to the size of the state space and the number of operators
of the formula [188, 23, 86]. Indeed, depending on the formula to be checked, only a
fragment of the overall state space might need to be generated and analyzed in order to
produce the correct result. Moreover, in case of parametric formulae, only a subset of
their possible instantiations will be generated as requested by the on-the-fly evaluation.
The basic idea behind CMC is that, given a state of an L2TS, the validity of a SocL
formula on that state can be established by checking the satisfiability of the state predi-
cates, by analyzing the transitions allowed in that state, and by establishing the validity of
some subformulae in some/all of the next reachable states.
To show the peculiarity of our methodology with respect to parametric formulae eval-
uation, we illustrate the process of establishing the satisfiability of the SocL formula
φ = EXrequest(charge,id) AXresponseOK(charge,id) true
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Evaluate (F : Formula, Start : State, Current : State) is
if we have already done this computation and its result is available,
i.e. (〈F, Start, Current〉 → Result) has already been computed then
return the already known result;
else if we were already computing the value of exactly this computation,
i.e. (〈F,Start,Current〉→inprogress) has already been computed then
return True or False depending on max or min fixed point semantics;
else
keep track that we started to compute the value of this computation,
i.e. set (〈F, Start, Current〉 → inprogress);
foreach subformula F′ and next state S′ to be computed do loop
if F′ , F (i.e. this is a syntactically nested subformula) then
call Evaluate(F′, S′, S′);
else if F′ = F ( i.e. this is just a recursive evaluation of F) then
call Evaluate(F, Start, S′);
end
if the result of the call suffices to establish the final result then
exit from the loop;
end
end loop
At this point we have in any case a final result. We keep track of the
result of this computation (e.g. set (〈F, Start, Current〉 → Result)).
return the final result;
end
end Evaluate;
Table 4.5: Simplified schema of the evaluation process
on the abstract L2TS of Figure 4.6; namely, we must establish that q0 |= φ. Since
q0
{request(charge,id1)}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ q2, and {request(charge, id1)} |= request(charge, id)  {id/id1}, we
have that the label of the transition from q0 to q2 satisfies the first action formula by
producing the substitution {id/id1}. By using this substitution, we construct the new sub-
formula
φ′ = (AXresponseOK(charge,id) true){id/id1} = AXresponseOK(charge,id1)
thus we are left to check if q2 |= φ′ , i.e. if the path formula XresponseOK(charge,id1) true is
satisfied by all outgoing transitions from q2. In our case we have two outgoing transitions:
q2
{responseOK(charge,id1)}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ q4 satisfies the path formula under a trivial matching between the
action formula and the action on the transition, while q2
{responseFail(charge,id1)}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ q3 does not
satisfy the action formula under any matching. Therefore, we conclude that φ′, and hence
φ, is not satisfied.
The simplified schema shown in Table 4.5 gives an idea of the algorithmic structure
of the evaluation process: F denotes the SocL formula (or subformula) to be evaluated,
Start denotes the state in which the (recursive) evaluation of F was started and Current
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Evaluate (AXγ φ, StartState, CurrentState) is
if we have already done this computation and its result is available,
i.e. 〈AXγ φ, CurrentState, CurrentState〉 → Result
has already been computed then
return the already known Result
end
if there are no outgoing transitions from CurrentState then
set 〈AXγ φ, CurrentState, CurrentState〉 → False
return False
end
Result := True
foreach Transition in OutgoingTransitions(CurrentState) do
if Satisfies(Transition.Label, γ) then
TargetState := Transition.TargetState
ρ := TransitionBindings(Transition.Label, γ)
φ′ := ApplySubstitution(φ, ρ)
Result := Evaluate(φ′, TargetState, TargetState)
if Result = False then
exit
end
else
Result := False
exit
end
end loop
set 〈AXγ φ, CurrentState, CurrentState〉 → Result
return result
end Evaluate;
Table 4.6: More detailed schema of the evaluation process for AX operator
denotes the current state in which the evaluation of F is being continued. This schema has
been extended with appropriate data-collection activities in order to be able to produce, in
the end, also a clear and detailed explanation of the returned results (i.e. a counterexam-
ple), and with appropriate formula instantiation activities in order to deal with parametric
formulae. Table 4.6 shows a more detailed view of the same schema which refers to the
specific case of evaluation of the ‘universal quantified next’ operator AX, while Table 4.7
shows a more detailed view of the same schema which refers to the specific case of eval-
uation of the ‘existential quantified until’ operator E(φ χUγ φ′).
In case of infinite state space, this algorithm may fail to produce a result even when
a result could actually be deduced in a finite number of steps. This is a consequence of
its ‘depth-first’ recursive structure. The solution taken to solve this problem consists of
adopting a bounded model-checking approach [25], i.e. the evaluation is started assuming
a certain value as limit of the maximum depth of the evaluation. In this case, if a formula
is given as result of the evaluation within the requested depth, then the result holds for the
whole system; otherwise the maximum depth is increased and evaluation is subsequently
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Evaluate (E φ1χUγ φ2, StartState, CurrentState) is
if we have already done this computation and its definitive result is available,
i.e. 〈E φ1χUγ φ2, StartState, CurrentState〉 → Result
has already been computed then
return the already known Result
end
if we have already started this computation which is still in progress,
i.e. 〈E φ1χUγ φ2, StartState, CurrentState〉 → InProgress
then
return False accordin to its min f ixpoint semantics
end
set 〈E φ1χUγ φ2, StartState, CurrentState〉 → InProgress
if there are no outgoing transitions from CurrentState then
set 〈E φ1χUγ φ2, StartState, CurrentState〉 → False
return False
end
Result := Evaluate(φ1, CurrentState, CurrentState)
if Result = False then
set 〈E φ1χUγ φ2, StartState, CurrentState〉 → False
return False
end
check f or possible structural induction
foreach Transition in OutgoingTransitions(CurrentState) do
if Satisfies(Transition.Label, γ) then
TargetState := Transition.TargetState
ρ := TransitionBindings(Transition.Label, γ)
φ2′ := ApplySubstitution(φ2, ρ)
Result := Evaluate(φ2′, TargetState, TargetState)
if Result = True then
set 〈E φ1χUγ φ2, StartState, CurrentState〉 → True
return True
end
end
end loop
check f or possible continuation o f recursion
foreach Transition in OutgoingTransitions(CurrentState) do
if Satisfies(Transition.Label, χ) then
TargetState := Transition.TargetState
Result := Evaluate(E φ1χUγ φ2, StartState, TargetState)
if Result = True then
set 〈E φ1χUγ φ2, StartState, CurrentState〉 → True
return True
end
end
end loop
set 〈E φ1χUγ φ2, StartState, CurrentState〉 → False
return False
end Evaluate;
Table 4.7: More detailed schema of the evaluation process for E(φ χUγ φ′) operator
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retried (preserving all useful subresults that were already found). This approach, initially
introduced to overcome the problem of infinite state machines, turns out to be quite useful
also for another reason. By setting a small initial maximum depth and a small automatic
increment of this limit at each re-evaluation failure, once we finally find a result then we
have a reasonable (almost minimal) explanation for it, and this is very useful also in the
case of finite states machines.
4.2.5 Analysis of the case studies
Now, we demonstrate usability of our methodology by specifying and analysing the auto-
motive and finance case studies specified in COWS in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2.
4.2.5.1 Automotive case study
We start the analysis of the automotive scenario by verifying if its main service, i.e. the
engine failure recovery service executed by Orchestrator, enjoys the abstract properties
expressed as SocL formulae in Section 4.2.2.2. To this aim, we focus our observations on
the recovery service by applying the following abstraction rules:
Action $car • oengineFailure → request(road assistance, $car)
Action $car • otowTruckOK → responseOk(road assistance, $car)
Action $car • orentalCarOK → responseOk(road assistance, $car)
Action $car • ochargeFail → responseFail(road assistance, $car)
Action $car • onotFound → responseFail(road assistance, $car)
Action $car • ogarageFail → responseFail(road assistance, $car)
Action $car • orentalCarFail → responseFail(road assistance, $car)
Action $car • otowTruckFail → responseFail(road assistance, $car)
State $car • oengineFailure? → accepting request(road assistance)
According to this abstraction, the service accepts a request for the interaction
road assistance when it receives an engine failure signal, and replies with a positive
response when an order (of garage/tow truck or of rental car) succeeds. Indeed, in
this case, the driver may continue its journey. If during the recovery phase some op-
eration fails (e.g. the bank does not accept the request of charging the driver’s credit
card), the service replies with a negative response. More specifically, in case of com-
plete success, two actions responseOk(road assistance, $car) are performed and no ac-
tion responseFail(road assistance, $car) is observed, while, in case of complete fail-
ure, some actions responseFail(road assistance, $car) are performed and no action
responseOk(road assistance, $car) is observed. By means of the last abstraction rule,
each state that can accept requests for interaction road assistance is labelled by the
atomic proposition accepting request(road assistance).
Now, by using CMC, the SocL formulae of Section 4.2.2.2 can be checked over the ob-
tained abstract L2TS; the instantiation of those generic formulae over the recovery service
has been obtained by simply replacing any occurrence of the generic interaction name
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i with road assistance. In addition, we will check some variants of such formulae, to
understand in more detail the properties of the service under analysis.
1. - - Available service - -
AG (accepting request(road assistance))
This abstract property clearly does not hold for the considered service because,
being the service of the one-shot kind, it will not be permanently available.
However, we can check whether the service is at least available until it is invoked.
A(accepting request(road assistance)Urequest(road assistance) true)
This second property, as intuitively expected, holds for our specification.
2. - - Parallel service - -
AG [request(road assistance, var)]
E(true ¬ (responseOk(road assistance,var) ∨ responseFail(road assistance,var))
U accepting request(road assistance))
Also in this case, being our service activated only once, it does not make much
sense to check whether the service becomes available again after its first activation
(and in particular even before providing a response to the initial request). Hence,
this property correctly does not hold for our specification.
3. - - Sequential service - -
AG [request(road assistance, var)]
A(¬ accepting request(road assistance) tt
UresponseOk(road assistance,var) ∨ responseFail(road assistance,var) true)
In this case, although the service is of the one-shot kind, it satisfies the sequentiality
property because it is true that it will not be available at least until a response is
provided.
4. - - One-shot service - -
AG [request(road assistance)] AG ¬ accepting request(road assistance)
After accepting a first request the service becomes permanently unavailable, hence
this property holds. Actually, in our case also a stronger version of the above prop-
erty, stating in addition that a first request will always be accepted, holds.
AFrequest(road assistance) AG ¬ accepting request(road assistance)
5. - - Off-line service - -
AG [request(road assistance, var)] AFresponseFail(road assistance,var) true
The recovery service is not off-line because there exist some execution paths that
lead to a complete success, i.e. no negative responses are provided. Hence, the
above property does not hold.
131
CHAPTER 4 Analysis techniques for COWS specifications
6. - - Cancelable service - -
AG [request(road assistance, var)]
A(accepting cancel(road assistance, var) tt
WresponseOk(road assistance,var) ∨ responseFail(road assistance,var) true)
This property is trivially false, since the recovery service does not permit cancelling
requests, i.e. the atomic proposition accepting cancel(road assistance, var) does
not hold in any state.
7. - - Revocable service - -
EFresponseOk(road assistance,var) EF(accepting undo(road assistance, var) )
The recovery service does not accept undo requests, i.e. the atomic proposition
accepting undo(road assistance, var) does not hold in any state. Hence, this prop-
erty is trivially false.
8. - -Responsive service - -
AG [request(road assistance, var)]
AFresponseOk(road assistance,var) ∨ responseFail(road assistance,var) true
The service is responsive because it always provides a response (at least one) for
each accepted request.
9. - - Single-response service - -
AG [request(road assistance, var)]
¬ EFresponseOk(road assistance,var) ∨ responseFail(road assistance,var)
EFresponseOk(road assistance,var) ∨ responseFail(road assistance,var) true
This property, stating that for each request a single response is provided, is false
because the service provides generally more than one response (for example, two
positive responses in case of complete success).
10. - - Multiple-response service - -
AG [request(road assistance, var)]
AFresponseOk(road assistance,var) ∨ responseFail(road assistance,var)
AFresponseOk(road assistance,var) ∨ responseFail(road assistance,var) true
This property, which states that each request has at least two separate responses,
does not hold for the service, because in some cases, e.g. when the credit card
charge is denied by the bank or the discovery phase fails, only one response is
provided.
11. - - No-response service - -
AG [request(road assistance, var)]
¬ EFresponseOk(road assistance,var) ∨ responseFail(road assistance,var) true
In at least one case (actually, in all cases) the service provides a response, hence
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this property clearly does not hold.
12. - - Reliable service - -
AG [request(road assistance, var)] AFresponseOk(road assistance,var) true
The service is not reliable because it may produce no positive responses to a request
(e.g. when the credit card charge is denied by the bank).
We can also investigate in more detail the request-response relation for the recovery
service. To do this, firstly we define a different abstraction of the scenario by applying the
following rules:
Action $car • oengineFailure → request(road assistance, $car)
Action $car • otowTruckOK → responseOk(road assistance, $car, truckGarage)
Action $car • orentalCarOK → responseOk(road assistance, $car, rentalCar)
Action $car • ochargeFail → responseFail(road assistance, $car, truckGarage)
Action $car • ochargeFail → responseFail(road assistance, $car, rentalCar)
Action $car • onotFound → responseFail(road assistance, $car, truckGarage)
Action $car • onotFound → responseFail(road assistance, $car, rentalCar)
Action $car • ogarageFail → responseFail(road assistance, $car, truckGarage)
Action $car • orentalCarFail → responseFail(road assistance, $car, rentalCar)
Action $car • otowTruckFail → responseFail(road assistance, $car, truckGarage)
The obtained L2TS differs from that previously introduced for the presence of a further
argument (that can be either truckGarage or rentalCar, and indicates which order
succeeds or fails) in the correlation tuple of the response actions. Now, we can verify for
example if, once requested, the service always provides at least one response about the
status of the garage/tow truck ordering and at least one response about the status of the
car renting.
AG [request(road assistance, var)]
AFresponseOk(road assistance,var,truckGarage) ∨ responseFail(road assistance,var,truckGarage) true
AG [request(road assistance, var)]
AFresponseOk(road assistance,var,rentalCar) ∨ responseFail(road assistance,var,rentalCar) true
Similarly, we can verify that a positive response is never followed by a negative one
(and vice versa) for the same order:
AG[responseOk(road assistance, var, order)]
¬ EFresponseFail(road assistance,var,order) true
AG[responseFail(road assistance, var, order)]
¬ EFresponseOk(road assistance,var,order) true
All these last four properties are indeed satisfied by the second abstraction of the ser-
vice.
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Analysis of other services of the automotive scenario. By changing again the abstrac-
tion rules applied to the concrete L2TS modelling the automotive scenario, we can verify
the above abstract properties (and possibly some specific variants of them) also over other
services appearing in the scenario. For example, we consider here GpsSystem, Bank and
RentCar, and apply the following rules:
Action $car • oreqLoc → request(gps, $car)
Action $car • orespLoc → responseOk(gps, $car)
State $car • oreqLoc? → accepting request(gps)
Action pbank • ocharge, 〈∗, ∗, ∗, $id〉 → request(charge, $id)
Action ∗ • ochargeOK , 〈$id〉 → responseOk(charge, $id)
Action ∗ • ochargeFail, 〈$id〉 → responseFail(charge, $id)
Action pbank • orevoke, 〈$id〉 → undo(charge, $id)
State pbank • ocharge? → accepting request(charge)
State pbank • orevoke?〈$id〉 → accepting undo(charge, $id)
Action prentalCar1 • oorderRC , 〈$car, ∗〉 → request(rental car1, $car)
Action $car • orentalCarOK → responseOk(rental car1, $car)
Action $car • orentalCarFail → responseFail(rental car1, $car)
State prentalCar1 • oorderRC? → accepting request(rental car1)
All the following properties hold for the obtained abstraction of the case study.
• The service GpsSystem is always available.
AG (accepting request(gps) )
• The service GpsSystem always replies with successful responses, i.e. it is reliable.
AG [request(gps, var)] AFresponseOk(gps,var) true
• The service Bank is always available.
AG (accepting request(charge) )
• The service Bank, after it has accepted a request, always provides a single (either
positive or negative) response.
AG [request(charge, id)]
AFresponseOk(charge,id) ∨ responseFail(charge,id)
¬ EFresponseOk(charge,id) ∨ responseFail(charge,id) true
• After a successful response to a credit card charge request, the bank accepts undo
requests for the successfully completed transaction, i.e. Bank is a strong revocable
service.
AG [responseOk(charge, id)] A(accepting undo(charge, id) ttWundo(charge,id) true)
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• The service RentalCar1 is always available.
AG (accepting request(rental car1) )
• The service RentalCar1, once a request is accepted, provides a single (either posi-
tive or negative) response.
AG [request(rental car1, customer)]
AFresponseOk(rental car1,customer) ∨ responseFail(rental car1,customer)
¬ EFresponseOk(rental car1,customer) ∨ responseFail(rental car1,customer) true
Orchestration and compensation properties. The properties we have introduced and
checked so far imply a sort of black-box view of the single services. In fact, their state-
ments are general and given in terms of the externally observable behaviour of services.
Of course, whenever details on the internal architecture of a given service, in terms of its
subcomponents, are known, i.e. when the service is a sort of white-box, further functional
properties can be stated in terms of the behaviours of these subcomponents. In general,
these properties can express desirable orchestration or compensation behaviours. In the
following, we show some examples of formalization of this kind of properties in SocL in
the context of our automotive scenario.
The considered abstraction of the case study is obtained by applying the following
rules:
Action $car • oengineFailure → request(road assistance, $car)
Action $car • otowTruckOK → responseOk(road assistance, $car, truckGarage)
Action $car • orentalCarOK → responseOk(road assistance, $car, rentalCar)
Action $car • ochargeFail → responseFail(road assistance, $car, truckGarage)
Action $car • ochargeFail → responseFail(road assistance, $car, rentalCar)
Action $car • onotFound → responseFail(road assistance, $car, truckGarage)
Action $car • onotFound → responseFail(road assistance, $car, rentalCar)
Action $car • ogarageFail → responseFail(road assistance, $car, truckGarage)
Action $car • orentalCarFail → responseFail(road assistance, $car, rentalCar)
Action $car • otowTruckFail → responseFail(road assistance, $car, truckGarage)
Action pbank • ocharge, 〈∗, ∗, ∗, $id〉 → request(charge, $id)
Action ∗ • ochargeOK , 〈$id〉 → responseOk(charge, $id)
Action ∗ • ochargeFail, 〈$id〉 → responseFail(charge, $id)
Action pbank • orevoke, 〈$id〉 → undo(charge, $id)
Action $car • ogarageOK → responseOk(garage, $car)
Action ∗ • ocancel, 〈$car〉 → undo(garage, $car)
Action $car • otowTruckFail→ responseFail(towtruck, $car)
The above set of rules is obtained by putting together some of the rules previously intro-
duced with some new rules for capturing interactions with garage, tow truck and rental
car services.
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Now, we can check the following properties for the automotive scenario.
• After a successful credit card charge, the rental car will be booked, or the garage
and tow truck will be ordered, or the credit chard charge will be revoked.
AG [responseOk(charge, id)]
AFresponseOk(road assistance,id,rentalCar) ∨
responseOk(road assistance,id,truckGarage) ∨ undo(charge,id) true
• It cannot happen that, after the driver’s credit card has been charged and some
service ordered, the credit card charge is revoked.
¬ EFresponseOk(charge,id)
EFresponseOk(road assistance,id,rentalCar) ∨ responseOk(road assistance,id,truckGarage)
EFundo(charge,id) true
• It cannot happen that, after the credit card has been charged and then revoked, some
order succeeds.
¬ EFresponseOk(charge,id)
EFundo(charge,id)
EFresponseOk(road assistance,id,rentalCar) ∨ responseOk(road assistance,id,truckGarage) true
• After the garage has been booked, if the tow truck service is not available then the
garage is revoked.
AG [responseOk(garage, var)]
AG ( [responseFail(towtruck, var)] AFundo(garage,var) true )
4.2.5.2 Finance case study
There are several requirements and properties concerning liveness, correctness, and secu-
rity that an implementation of the finance case study is expected to fulfill. Among these,
in the following we will focus on:
• Availability: The credit portal is always capable to accept a credit request.
• Responsiveness: Whenever the customer uploads a credit request he always gets an
answer, unless he cancels his own request.
• Correlation soundness: The customer always receives an answer which is relative
to his credit request. Thus, it never occurs that the service sends him an evalua-
tion related to another credit request or that it mixes data related to different credit
requests.
• Interruptibility: The customer may require the abort of the process after that he has
selected the credit request service.
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To verify such abstract properties, and other behavioral properties more specific for
the case study, we need to apply the following abstraction rules:
Action creditRequest〈$1〉 → request(cr, $1)
Action offer〈$1, ∗, ∗〉 → response(cr, $1)
Action update〈$1, ∗〉 → fail(cr, $1)
Action negativeResp〈$1, ∗〉 → fail(cr, $1)
Action cancel〈$1〉 → cancel(cr, $1)
Action balanceNotValid〈$1〉 → fail(cr, $1)
Action empEvaluation〈$1, ∗, ∗, yes〉 → response(eeval, $1)
Action empEvaluation〈$1, ∗, ∗, no〉 → fail(eeval, $1)
Action supEvaluation〈$1, ∗, ∗, yes〉 → response(seval, $1)
Action supEvaluation〈$1, ∗, ∗, no〉 → fail(seval, $1)
Action validateBalance〈$1, yes〉 → response(beval, $1)
Action validateBalance〈$1, no〉 → fail(beval, $1)
Action taskAddedToET L〈$1〉 → request(eval, $1)
Action taskAddedToS T L〈$1〉 → request(eval, $1)
Action taskAddedToS T L〈$1〉 → request(tostl, $1)
Action removeTaskS T L〈$1〉 → cancel(eval, $1)
Action removeTaskET L〈$1〉 → cancel(eval, $1)
Action reqU pdate〈$1, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗〉 → request(upd, $1)
Action update〈$1, ∗〉 → response(upd, $1)
Action securities〈$1, ∗〉 → request(sec, $1)
Action balance〈$1, ∗〉 → request(bal, $1)
Action reqProcessing〈$1, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗〉 → request(rproc, $1)
State login → accepting request(login)
We comment on some of the rules, the remaining ones are interpreted similarly. The
first rule prescribes that whenever an action over the endpoint portal•creditRequest, with
any sent data 〈id〉 matching 〈$1〉, occurs in the label of a transition, then it is replaced
by the abstract action request(cr, id). Similarly, the second rule prescribes that whenever
an action over the endpoint cust •offer, with any sent data 〈id, offer,motivation〉 match-
ing 〈$1, ∗, ∗〉, occurs in the label of a transition, then it is replaced by the abstract action
response(cr, id). This way, data offer and motivation are discharged in the ‘abstraction
process’, while session identifier id is used to correlate responses from the contacted
Portal service. To correlate cancellations to the corresponding credit requests, the fifth
rule permits replacing actions involving operation cancel, with any sent data 〈id〉 match-
ing 〈$1〉, by abstract action cancel(cr, id). The last rule works similarly, but it applies to
labels of states rather than to labels of transitions.
Now, we can check the following properties for the finance case study.
• - - Availability - -
AG(accepting request(login))
This formula means that the service CreditInstitute is always capable to accept a
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credit request. Indeed, atomic proposition accepting request(login) means that a
state is able to accept a credit request for interaction login.
• - - Responsiveness and correlation soundness - -
Both properties are expressed by the following SocL formula:
AG [request(cr, id)] AFresponse(cr,id)∨fail(cr,id)∨cancel(cr,id) true
This formula means that CreditInstitute always guarantees an answer (i.e. an of-
fer or a negative response, sent by means of actions response(cr, id) or fail(cr, id),
respectively) to each received credit request, unless the customer cancels his own
request (by means of action cancel(cr, id)). The answers from CreditInstitute and
the request of cancellation from Customer belong to the same interaction cr of the
credit request and are properly correlated by variable id.
• - - Interruptibility - -
AG [request(cr, id)] EFcancel(cr,id) true
Other behavioral properties, more specific for this case study, are expressed in SocL
as follows.
1. The customer can receive an offer (action response(cr, id)) only after its credit
request has been successfully evaluated by a supervisor (action response(seval, id)).
AG [request(cr, id)]¬E(true¬ response(seval,id)Uresponse(cr,id)true)
2. The customer can receive a negative response only after its credit request has been
negatively evaluated by an employee or a supervisor (as indicated by the failure of
the interactions eeval and seval, respectively) or the given balance has deemed not
to be valid (as indicated by the failure of the interaction beval).
AG [request(cr, id)]¬E(true¬ (fail(eeval,id)∨fail(seval,id)∨fail(beval,id))Ufail(cr,id)true)
3. If a credit request is accepted to be evaluated (i.e. it is added to some task list as
indicated by the interaction eval) and the customer requires the cancellation (action
cancel(cr, id)), then compensation must be activated, i.e. the task must be removed
from the list (action cancel(eval, id)).
AG [request(eval, id)] EF [cancel(cr, id)]AFcancel(eval,id) true
4. If a credit request is demanded to be updated (interaction upd), the customer will
be notified or a cancellation will be invoked.
AG [request(upd, id)] AFresponse(upd,id)∨cancel(cr,id) true
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5. Before processing a credit request (interaction rproc), the customer must insert
securities (interaction sec) and balance data (interaction bal).
AG [request(cr, id)]¬E(true¬ (request(sec,id)∨request(bal,id))Urequest(rproc,id)true)
6. A credit request can always succeed.
AG [request(cr, id)] AF¬cancel(cr,id)∨response(cr,id) true
7. A supervisor can always be involved for evaluating a credit request ( interaction
tostl starts when a request is added to the supervisor tasks list).
AG [request(cr, id)] AF¬cancel(cr,id)∨request(tostl,id) true
As expected, all the abstract properties we presented before do hold for the COWS
specification of the finance case study, except for the last two properties, because, e.g.,
a supervisor can evaluate a credit request negatively. In case a property does not hold,
CMC produces a clear and detailed explanation of the returned results, i.e. a so called
counterexample. For example, Figure 4.8 shows an excerpt of the output returned by
CMC when checking the second-last property.
4.2.6 Further Issues
We linger here on some side issues related to our methodology which are nevertheless
useful to understand the overall schema into which our research and experimentation has
to be considered. Several other research directions remain open, and we plan to further
investigate them even if not necessarily in the short term.
4.2.6.1 Possible extensions of SocL for supporting multiple substitutions
In the presentation of SocL in Section 4.2.2, when introducing the action formulae seman-
tics, we have defined that a set of abstract labels A satisfies an action a of the logic (po-
tentially containing variable binders) if and only if exactly one of the labels of A matches
the action a, thus identifying a unique substitution ρ for the variables of the action.
This simplification relies on the assumption that inside a single transition of an L2TS
two or more actions with the same type and interaction name never occur. Now, this as-
sumption is reasonable for the COWS computational model because of the interleaving
semantics of the language. In a more general setting, e.g. in the case of languages with
a truly parallel interpretation model (like UML statecharts parallel states) or with com-
posite sequential actions (like UML statechart actions), the assumption and, hence, the
simplification, would not be feasible any longer.
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The Formula: "AG [request(cr,$id)] AF {not cancel(cr,%id) or response(cr,%id)}true"
is: FALSE
(states generated= 255, computations fragments generated= 403)
cmc> -------------------------------------------
The formula: AG [ request(cr,$id) ] AF {not cancel(cr,%id) or response(cr,%id)} true
is FOUND_FALSE in State C1
...
C9 --> C10 { portal.creditRequest!<sessionID#1#>,
portal.creditRequest?<sessionID#1#> }
{{ {{ request(cr,sessionID#1#) }} }}
and the formula: AF {not cancel(cr,sessionID#1#) or response(cr,sessionID#1#)} true
is FOUND_FALSE in State C10
because
C10 --> C12 { portal.getCreditRequest!<sessionID#1#,data,15000,customer>,
portal.getCreditRequest?<sessionID#1#,CUST_DATA,AMOUNT,CUST> }
{{ {{ }} }}
C12 --> C14 { portal.securities!<sessionID#1#,secValues>,
portal.securities?<sessionID#1#,SEC_DATA> }
{{ {{ request(sec,sessionID#1#) }} }}
C14 --> C17 { portal.balance!<sessionID#1#,balance>,
portal.balance?<sessionID#1#,BALANCE> }
{{ {{ request(bal,sessionID#1#) }} }}
C17 --> C23 { validation.validateBalance!<sessionID#1#,portal,balance>,
validation.validateBalance?<ID,BANK,BALANCE> }
{{ {{ }} }}
C23 --> C28 { portal.validateBalance!<sessionID#1#,yes>,
portal.validateBalance?<sessionID#1#,yes> }
{{ {{ response(beval,sessionID#1#) }} }}
C31 --> C112 { portal.reqProcessing#1#!<sessionID#1#,data,secValues,balance,15000,customer>,
portal.reqProcessing#1#?<ID,CUST_DATA,SEC_DATA,BALANCE,AMOUNT,CUST> }
{{ {{ }} }}
C112 --> C244 { portal.empEvaluation!<sessionID#1#,rating,additionalInfo,no>,
portal.empEvaluation?<sessionID#1#,RATING,ADDITIONAL_INFO,DECISION> }
{{ {{ fail(eeval,sessionID#1#) }} }}
C249 --> C251 { customer.negativeResp!<sessionID#1#,additionalInfo>,
customer.negativeResp?<sessionID#1#,MOTIVATIONS> }
{{ {{ fail(cr,sessionID#1#) }} }}
-------------------------------------------
Table 4.8: CMC: a counterexample
In fact, we can generalize our methodology by relaxing this simplification. This would
require a slightly more complex definition of the semantics of SocL, since we would
have to consider the possibility of applying multiple substitutions to formulae in parallel.
Formally, the satisfaction relation |= for action formulae would be defined over a set A of
closed actions and a set P of substitutions:
• A |= a P iff P = { ρ | match(a, a′) = ρ , a′ ∈ A } is not empty;
• A |= χ {∅} iff A |= χ.
where the relation A |= χ is defined in Section 4.2.2.1 (Definition 4.2.5). Hence, the
satisfaction relation for SocL formulae must be modified accordingly; we report here the
definition of |= for the next operator (the cases for the until operators are similar):
• q |= EXγφ iff ∃σ ∈ path(q) : σ{1} |= γ  P, and ∃ ρ ∈ P : σ(1) |= φ ρ;
• q |= AXγφ iff ∀σ ∈ path(q) : σ{1} |= γ  P, and ∀ ρ ∈ P : σ(1) |= φ ρ.
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Of course, the above semantics leads to a model checking algorithm with higher com-
plexity compared to that presented in Section 4.2.4.
4.2.6.2 Towards a real-life formal verification environment
The development of CMC is still in progress and the current prototypical versions of the
tool are mainly being used at ISTI-CNR for academic and experimental purposes. So far
the focus of the development has been on the design of qualitative features one would
desire for a verification tool, thus experimenting with various logics, system modelling
languages and user interfaces. For the moment we do not plan to transform the prototypes
into real-life development tools. Such an evolution would require addressing issues like
strong code optimizations, scalability over massively large systems, exhaustive testing
and validation issues.
For what concerns the adoption of the overall methodology into an effective software
engineering practice, we see two main difficulties:
• generating COWS specifications from within an industrial context
• correctly identifying and encoding the full set of properties the model should satisfy.
For the first aspect, a reasonable approach might rely on some kind of mechanical transla-
tion of higher-level description languages, like WS-BPEL, already accepted and adopted
in industrial contexts, into a computational model supported by CMC, like e.g. COWS
(see Section 3.3 for a preliminary work in this direction).
For the second aspect, the solution necessarily passes through a formalization of the
requirement collection phase, allowing for the collection of the properties to be verified
on the system. A mechanical/interactive translation of the initial requirements (e.g. from
UML sequence diagrams, structured informal natural language, or other logics) into SocL
formulae is definitely a goal which should be pursued and which does not seem to be too
far from the current state of art.
4.2.7 Concluding remarks
We have tackled the problem of analysing the functional behaviour of services and SOC
systems. To this aim, we have defined a state- and action-based branching time temporal
logic, SocL, capable of representing distinctive aspects of services and have used it to
express a set of desirable functional properties of services. With respect to previous state-
and action-based logics SocL adds the possibility that formulae can be parameterized by
data values. In this sense, SocL resembles other logics stating properties of message-
passing systems, such as that introduced in [106], in which a formula referring input and
output actions acts as a binder for those variables that occur free in expressions within
the sequel of the formula. Parametric formulae are also considered in the modal logic
for mobile agents introduced in [79], although limited to variables ranging over localities,
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and in its extension MOSL [78] with more general message-passing capabilities, including
communication of data, locations and processes.
In SocL, parameterization with data values concerns correlation data, which is ex-
ploited to effectively express properties of service-oriented systems. In fact, being in-
herently loosely coupled, SOC systems do not provide intrinsic mechanisms to enable
linking together actions executed as part of the same interaction. Emerging standards like
WS-BPEL and WS-CDL have hence put forward the idea that messages exchanged by
actions as part of the same interaction must contain some common data that the interact-
ing partners can identify. This simple concept has in practice many instantiations. For
example, in WS-Addressing [103] correlation data are implicitly dealt with (by the under-
lying communication protocols) thus resulting in a less flexible mechanism with respect
to that provided by WS-BPEL, where instead correlation data must be explicitly dealt
with by the developer and included among the data used for invoking services’ opera-
tions. These different levels of abstraction are somehow reflected by the process calculi
for SOC proposed so far, which may be roughly classified in session-based, like those in
[57, 124, 35, 45, 199], and correlation-based, like those in [104, 50, 131], respectively.
We have also developed an efficient on-the-fly model checker for the SocL logic that
could be very fruitful to analyse functional behaviours of SOC applications at modelling
stage. By means of the two case studies introduced in Section 2.4 we have illustrated an
application of our methodology: first, specify the service-oriented application to be anal-
ysed by means of a formal language like, e.g., COWS; then, by also taking into account
the properties to be checked, transform this concrete specification into a more abstract
one in terms of L2TSs; finally, use the model checker to perform the verification. In fact,
this approach shows a novel use of temporal logics and model checkers. The properties to
be checked are expressed in the logic SocL in a way that is independent from the model
of the system under analysis; then, through an abstraction process, the model is tailored
to be checked against the properties of interest. Although SocL can also be used in a
more standard way to directly express the expected properties of a given COWS specifi-
cation in terms of the concrete actions occurring therein, the possibility to express service
properties in a model independent way is a first important advantage of our approach.
Another advantage is that, since the logic interpretation domain (i.e. L2TSs) is inde-
pendent from the service specification language (i.e. COWS), the approach can be tailored
to be used in conjunction with other SOC specification languages. To this aim, one has
to define first an L2TS-based operational semantics for the language of interest and then
a suitable set of abstraction rules mapping the concrete actions of the language into the
abstract actions of SocL. In fact, a first attempt along this direction has been done in [191]
for accommodating an UML based computational model within the approach described
here.
Furthermore, SocL permits expressing properties about any kind of interaction pat-
terns, such as one–way, request–response, one request–multiple responses, one request–
one of two possible responses, etc. In fact, properties of complex interaction patterns can
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be expressed by correlating SocL observable actions using interaction names and corre-
lation values. A similar approach to express properties of the interaction protocols that
are responsible for interconnecting the different parties involved in a composite service
architecture has been recently proposed in [2]. The authors employ SRML [90] to specify
service architectures, and a logic adapted from UCTL [190] to express the properties of
the interaction protocols. However, the logic they propose does not allow correlation to
be taken into account and, hence, such general properties as those shown in Section 4.2.1
cannot be expressed.
We leave for future work the extension of our environment to support a more compo-
sitional verification methodology. In fact, systems of services can currently be analysed
only ‘as a whole’, while it is not possible to analyse isolated services (e.g. a provider
service without a client). This is somewhat related to the original semantics of COWS
that follows a ‘reduction’ style; in Section 4.4 we present an alternative operational se-
mantics (see also [175]), based on a ‘symbolic’ approach, that should permit to overcome
this limitation.
4.3 A bisimulation-based observational semantics
In Chapter 3, we have shown through many examples that COWS’s priority mechanisms,
which allow some actions to take precedence over others, can be very fruitful to model
SOC scenarios. For example, when a message arrives, the problem arises of rightly han-
dling race conditions among those service instances and the corresponding service defi-
nition which are able to receive the message. By assigning to receive activities priority
values which depend on the messages available, and by exploiting a parallel composi-
tion operator that gives precedence to actions with greater priority, service instances take
precedence over the corresponding service definition when both can process the same
message, thus preventing creation of wrong new instances (see Section 3.2.2.2).
Notably, receives would have dynamically assigned priority values since these values
depend on the matching ability of their argument pattern. Indeed, while computation pro-
ceeds, some of the variables used in the argument pattern of a receive can be assigned
values, because of execution of syntactically preceding receives or of concurrent threads
sharing these variables. This, on the one hand, restricts the set of messages matching the
pattern but, on the other hand, increases the priority of the receive in comparison with
other receives matching the same message. Furthermore, priority is local since receives
having a more defined pattern have a higher execution priority with respect to only the
other receives matching the same message. In fact, e.g. receives non-matching the mes-
sage and invoke activities can be executed in any order.
Moreover, in Section 3.2.3.3, we have shown other situations where local pre-emption
is needed. For example, when a fault arises in a scope, (some of) the remaining activities
of the enclosing scope should be terminated before starting the execution of the relative
fault handler. This is modelled in COWS by exploiting the same parallel operator as
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before together with actions for forcing immediate termination of concurrent activities
which take the greatest priority. The same mechanism, of course, can also be used for
exception and compensation handling.
However, to the best of our knowledge, such priority mechanisms that combine dy-
namic priority with local pre-emption, have not yet been investigated in the literature
[69], apart from COWS. Therefore, we study the impact of COWS’s priority mechanisms
on observational semantics for SOC. The obtained semantic theories are directly usable to
check interchangeability of services and conformance against service specifications. They
can also be used to reduce the size of the model representing services, thus e.g. facilitat-
ing model checking of service properties (see the verification methodology presented in
Section 4.2).
Since we want to investigate how COWS distinctive features affect well-established
semantic theories, we present the observational semantics of COWS in three steps, as we
have done in Chapter 3 for its operational semantics.
1. In Section 4.3.1, to understand the effect of non-binding and localised receives,
pattern-matching, and global scope on the semantics, we first define strong and
weak open barbed bisimilarities [181, 113] for µCOWSm. We then provide more
manageable labelled bisimilarities and prove that they are sound and complete with
respect to barbed (contextual) ones. Both semantics recall those for asynchronous
pi-calculus of [7]. A major complication is that, due to the locality of received
endpoints (i.e. only the output capability of names may be transmitted, as in the
localised pi-calculus [147]), the definition of labelled bisimilarities involves a family
of relations indexed by sets of names. This is somewhat similar to the definition of
quasi-open bisimilarity for pi-calculus [181].
2. In Section 4.3.2, to understand the effect of actions with dynamic changing priority
on the semantics, we move on µCOWS. Again, we provide sound and complete
characterisations of the barbed bisimilarities in terms of corresponding labelled
bisimilarities. The obtained semantics inhabits between asynchrony and synchrony
because, with respect to a purely asynchronous setting, the priority mechanism per-
mits partially recovering the capability to observe receive actions.
3. In Section 4.3.3, we extend our investigation to COWS. The primitives with greatest
priority causing termination require specific conditions on the labelled bisimilarities
for these to be congruences. The resulting observations are hence more fine-grained
than the previous ones. The results of coincidence still hold.
4.3.1 Observational semantics of µCOWSm
Before defining an observational theory for µCOWSm, whose syntax and operational se-
mantics are presented in Section 3.2.1, we have to slightly adapt its operational semantics
to this purpose. More specifically, to properly define the labelled transition relation
α−−→,
144
4.3 A bisimulation-based observational semantics
s
n [m¯] v¯−−−−−−−−→ s′ n ∈ v¯ n < (n ∪ m¯)
(openinv)
[n] s
n [n,m¯] v¯−−−−−−−−−→ s′
s
n [y¯] w¯−−−−−−−−→ s′ x ∈ w¯ x < y¯
(openrec)
[x] s
n [x,y¯] w¯−−−−−−−−−→ s′
Table 4.9: µCOWSm operational semantics (additional rules)
we have to add the two operational rules shown in Table 4.9 to those of Table 3.4. Label
α is now generated by the following grammar:
α ::= n [n¯] v¯ | n [x¯] w¯ | σ
The meaning of new labels is as follows: n  [n¯] v¯ denotes bound invocations, which
transmit private names n¯ and can be generated by rule (openinv), while n  [x¯] w¯ denotes
delimited receive activities, with delimited arguments x¯, which can proceed thanks to rule
(openrec). As usual, σ denotes execution of a communication and ∅ denotes a computa-
tional step. In the sequel, we will write n  v¯ (resp. n  w¯) instead of n  [ ] v¯ (resp.
n  [ ] w¯) and use bu(α) to denote the set of names/variables that occur bound in α, i.e.
bu(n  [n¯] v¯) = n¯, bu(n  [x¯] w¯) = x¯ and bu(σ) = ∅. As before, u(α) denotes the set of
names and variables occurring in α.
Notably, bound invocation actions do not appear in rule (com) (Table 3.4), and there-
fore cannot directly interact with receive actions, and similarly delimited receive actions
cannot synchronise with invoke actions. Such interactions are instead inferred by using
structural congruence to pull name/variable delimitations outside of both interacting ac-
tivities. Since rules (openinv) and (openrec) have no impact on inferring computational steps,
they have been omitted from the rules defining the operational semantics of µCOWSm in
Section 3.2.1.2. However, when it comes to developing behavioural equivalences, such
rules turn out to be indispensable. It is also worth noticing that when rule (openrec) is
applied to a closed µCOWSm service, the resulting term could be open.
A couple of properties of the operational semantics that will be exploited in the rest of
the section follow.
Property 4.3.1 Let s be a µCOWSm term. The following facts hold:
• If s n [n¯] v¯−−−−−−−−→ s′, then n¯ ⊆ v¯ and n < n¯.
• If s n [x¯] w¯−−−−−−−−→ s′, then x¯ ⊆ w¯. Moreover, if s is closed then w¯\x¯ does not contain
variables (i.e. it is either a tuple of values or the empty tuple).
The above properties can be proved by a straightforward induction on the depth of the
shortest inference for the transitions in the hypothesis.
We introduce now an observational semantics for µCOWSm. Specifically, we define
natural notions of strong and weak open barbed bisimilarities and prove their coincidence
with more manageable characterisations in terms of labelled bisimilarities.
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4.3.1.1 Strong open barbed bisimilarity
We want to define a notion of (open) barbed bisimilarity for the calculus along the line of
[113, 181]. To this aim, we must first identify an appropriate basic observable, namely
a predicate that points out the interaction capabilities of a term. Since communication
is asynchronous, an obvious starting point is considering as observable only the output
capabilities of terms, like for asynchronous pi-calculus [7]. The intuition is that an asyn-
chronous observer cannot directly observe the receipt of data that he has sent. Thus, our
notion of observation is as follows.
Definition 4.3.1 (Observable for µCOWSm) Let s be a µCOWSm closed term. Predi-
cate s ↓n holds true if s can immediately perform an invoke over the (public) endpoint n,
that is if there exist s′, n¯ and v¯ such that s
n [n¯] v¯−−−−−−−−→ s′.
A desirable property of a behavioural equivalence, that enables compositional reason-
ing, is to be preserved by all contexts of the language. An equivalence that enjoys this
property is called congruence. A µCOWSm (closed) context is a service C with a ‘hole’
[[·]], i.e. a term generated by the following grammar:
C ::= [[·]] | G | C | s | s | C | [u]C | ∗ C G ::= n?w¯.C | G+ g | g +G
such that, once the hole is filled with a closed service s, the resulting term C[[s]] is a
µCOWSm closed service.
The above definitions of observation and context lead to the following notion of barbed
bisimilarity.
Definition 4.3.2 (Open barbed bisimilarity) A symmetric binary relation R on
µCOWSm closed terms is an open barbed bisimulation if whenever s1Rs2 the following
holds:
(Barb preservation) if s1 ↓n then s2 ↓n;
(Computation closure) if s1
∅−−→ s′1 then there exists s′2 such that s2
∅−−→ s′2 and s′1Rs′2;
(Context closure) C[[s1]]RC[[s2]], for every closed context C.
Two closed terms s1 and s2 are open barbed bisimilar, written s1 'm s2, if s1Rs2 for some
open barbed bisimulation R. 'm is called open barbed bisimilarity.
Of course, because of context closure, 'm is a congruence for µCOWSm closed terms.
4.3.1.2 Strong labelled bisimilarity
The definition of 'm suffers from universal quantification over all possible language con-
texts, which makes the reasoning on terms very hard. Hence, we provide a purely co-
inductive notion of bisimulation that only requires considering transitions of the labelled
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transition system defining the semantics of the terms under analysis. The notion of la-
belled bisimulation introduced for asynchronous pi-calculus in [7] does not turn out to
be suitable for µCOWSm, since the bisimilarity defined on top of it would not properly
characterise 'm. Consider, for example, the following two µCOWSm terms:
s1 , [n] ( m!〈n〉 | n!〈〉 ) s2 , [n] m!〈n〉
They only differ for the fact that the first one is able to perform an invocation along
the private endpoint n. However, they can exhibit the same barbs, and no context can
tell them apart since it cannot be able to perform a receive along (the received name)
n because of the constraint on the ‘localisation’ of names (indeed, contexts of the form
[[·]] | m?〈x〉. x?〈〉. 0 are not allowed). Hence, s1 and s2 are barbed bisimilar. The natu-
ral asynchronous labelled bisimilarity derived from the pi-calculus one would instead tell
them apart and, hence, need to be weakened. Therefore we define a labelled bisimulation
as a family of relations indexed with sets of names corresponding to the names that can-
not be used by contexts (to test) for reception since they are dynamically exported private
names.
Definition 4.3.3 (Names-indexed family of relations) A names-indexed family F of re-
lations is a set of symmetric binary relations RN on µCOWSm closed terms, one for each
set of names N , i.e. F = {RN }N .
Definition 4.3.4 (Labelled bisimilarity) A names-indexed family of relations {RN }N is a
labelled bisimulation if, whenever s1RN s2 and s1 α−−→ s′1, where bu(α) are fresh, then:
1. if α = n [x¯] w¯ then one of the following holds:
(a) ∃ s′2 : s2
n [x¯] w¯−−−−−−−−→ s′2 and ∀ v¯ s.t. M(x¯, v¯) = σ : s′1 · σRN s′2 · σ
(b) ∃ s′2 : s2
∅−−→ s′2 and ∀ v¯ s.t. M(x¯, v¯) = σ : s′1 · σRN (s′2 | n!(w¯ · σ) )
2. if α = n [n¯] v¯ where n < N then ∃ s′2 : s2 n[n¯] v¯−−−−−−−→ s′2 and s′1 RN∪ n¯ s′2
3. if α = ∅ then ∃ s′2 : s2
∅−−→ s′2 and s′1 RN s′2
Two closed terms s1 and s2 areN-bisimilar, written s1 ∼Nm s2, if s1RN s2 for some RN in a
labelled bisimulation. They are labelled bisimilar, written s1 ∼m s2, if they are ∅-bisimilar.
∼Nm is called N-bisimilarity, while ∼m is called labelled bisimilarity.
The resulting definition somewhat recalls that of quasi-open bisimilarity for pi-calculus
[181]. Clause 1 states that a receive action can be simulated either in a normal way
(clause 1.(a)) or by a computational step leading to a term that, when composed with the
invoke activity consumed by the receive, stands in the appropriate relation (clause 1.(b)).
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Execution of receives whose argument contains variables leads to open terms, which the
operational semantics is not defined for. Since the freed variables are placeholders for
values to be received, we require the two continuations to be related for any matching tuple
of values (similarly to late bisimulation for pi-calculus [150]). We say that the bisimulation
is given in a late style because in clause 1 the choice of the tuple of values v¯ takes place
after the choice of s′2; that is, s
′
2 does not depend on the tuple of values v¯. Clause 2,
and the use of names-indexed families of relations, handles the fact that dynamically
exported private names cannot be used by a receiver within the endpoint of a receive
(whose syntax, as we have seen in Section 3.2.1.1, does not allow to use variables). With
abuse of notation, n < N in clause 2, with n = p • o, stands for p < N ∧ o < N . Thus,
invocations along endpoints using either of the names inN are unobservable, hence these
endpoints cannot be used to tell the executing terms apart. Finally, clause 3 deals with
computational steps. Notably, actions σ different from ∅ are not taken into account, since
they cannot be performed by closed terms (see rules (com) and (delcom)).
To illustrate our labelled bisimilarity, let us consider a tailored version of the input
absorption law characterizing asynchronous bisimulation in asynchronous pi-calculus (i.e.
the equation a(b). a¯b + τ = τ presented in [7]):
[x] ( ∅ + n?〈x, v〉. n!〈x, v〉 ) ∼m ∅ (4.3)
where, for the sake of presentation, we exploit the context ∅ + [[·]] , [m] (m!〈〉 | m?〈〉 + [[·]])
and the term ∅ , [m] (m!〈〉 | m?〈〉). Communication along the private endpoint m models the
τ action of pi-calculus, while activities n?〈x, v〉 and n!〈x, v〉 recall the pi-calculus actions
a(b) and a¯b, respectively. Intuitively, the equality means that a service that emits the data it
has received behaves as a service that simply performs an unobservable action. Although
the two terms in (4.3) are syntactically different, it turns out that they are bisimilar. Indeed,
the only transition that the term ∅ can perform is:
∅ ∅−−→ 0
Trivially, the other term can reply by executing the activity on the left-hand side of +:
[x] ( ∅ + n?〈x, v〉. n!〈x, v〉 ) ∅−−→ 0
Moreover, the term on the left in (4.3) can also perform the following transition:
[x] ( ∅ + n?〈x, v〉. n!〈x, v〉 ) n [x] 〈x,v〉−−−−−−−−−−→ [m] (m!〈〉 | n!〈x, v〉)
To this, ∅ can reply with an ∅-transition and, then, for all v′, [m] (m!〈〉 | n!〈v′, v〉) and
(0 | n!〈v′, v〉) are bisimilar. Indeed, both of them can only perform a transition labelled
by n  〈v′, v〉 and evolve to [m] m!〈〉 and 0, respectively, that cannot perform any further
transition.
As another example regarding labelled bisimilarity, we can now prove that
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[n] ( m!〈n〉 | n!〈〉 ) ∼m [n] m!〈n〉
In fact, the family of relations {R∅,R{n}}, where R∅ = { ( [n] ( m!〈n〉 | n!〈〉 ) , [n] m!〈n〉 ) }
and R{n} = { ( n!〈〉 , 0 ) }, is a labelled bisimulation.
We want now to prove that labelled bisimilarity is a congruence for µCOWSm. To
this aim we also need to consider open terms, i.e. terms with free variables, although we
have only defined (strong) labelled bisimulation and bisimilarity over closed terms. We
proceed as in [148, Section 4.4], where a similar situation is faced in the setting of CCS.
Therefore, we extend the definition of ∼Nm as follows.
Definition 4.3.5 Let s1 and s2 be two µCOWSm terms containing free variables x¯ at most.
Then s1 ∼Nm s2 if, for all values v¯ such that | x¯ |=| v¯ | , s1 ·{x¯ 7→ v¯} ∼Nm s2 ·{x¯ 7→ v¯}.
In other words, ∼Nm is generalised to open terms as an hyperequivalence.
To prove the congruence result, we introduce also the notion of bisimulation up-to
structural congruence: it is defined as a labelled bisimulation except for the fact that
the RN in the three clauses of Definition 4.3.4 is replaced by the (compound) relation
≡ RN ≡. The next lemma shows that a bisimulation up-to ≡ can be used as a sound proof-
technique for labelled bisimulation. In the sequel, for the sake of simplicity, we explicitly
write index N in a relation RN only when it is necessary or is modified in the considered
case. Moreover, for the sake of readability, we only outline here the techniques used in
the proofs and refer the interested reader to Appendix B.2 for a full account.
Lemma 4.3.1 Let F be a labelled bisimulation up-to ≡; then, F is a labelled bisimula-
tion.
Proof. We need to prove that the family of relations
{ { (s1, s2) : s1 ≡ s′1, s′2 ≡ s2, s′1Rs′2 } : R ∈ F }
is a labelled bisimulation. The key point of the proof is that if s1
α−−→ s′ then, by rule
(cong) and since s1 ≡ s′1, we get that s′1
α−−→ s′. The proof then proceeds by case analysis
on α, exploiting the fact that s′1Rs′2. 2
Theorem 4.3.1 ∼m is a congruence for µCOWSm closed terms.
Proof (sketch). We shall prove that, given two µCOWSm closed terms s1 and s2, if
s1 ∼m s2 then C[[s1]] ∼m C[[s2]] for every (possibly open) context C. The proof is by
induction on the structure of the context C. 2
It is worth noticing that Theorem 4.3.1 does not hold in case of open terms. For
example, consider the following equation:
∅ + n?〈x〉. n!〈x〉 ∼m [m] (m!〈x〉 | m?〈x〉)
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Although the two terms above are open, we can easily prove that they are bisimilar. In-
deed, we can prove that ∅ + n?〈v〉. n!〈v〉 ∼m [m] (m!〈v〉 | m?〈v〉) holds for all v (we can
proceed as for (4.3)). However, the context [x] [[·]] can tell the two terms apart, since
[x] (∅ + n?〈x〉. n!〈x〉) can perform action n  [x] 〈x〉, while [x, m] (m!〈x〉 | m?〈x〉) cannot
perform any transition.
Now, we prove that open barbed bisimilarity and labelled bisimilarity coincide. In
other words, labelled bisimilarity is sound and complete with respect to the barbed (con-
textual) one.
Theorem 4.3.2 (Soundness of ∼m w.r.t. 'm) Given two µCOWSm closed terms s1 and
s2, if s1 ∼m s2 then s1 'm s2.
Proof (sketch). By Theorem 4.3.1, we have that ∼m is context closed. Thus, we only need
to prove that ∼m is barb preserving and computation closed. 2
Theorem 4.3.3 (Completeness of ∼m w.r.t. 'm) Given two µCOWSm closed terms s1
and s2, if s1 'm s2 then s1 ∼m s2.
Proof (sketch). We define a family of relations F = { RN : N set of names } such that 'm
is included in R∅ and show that it is a labelled bisimulation. LetN be the set {n1, . . . , nm},
then s1RN s2 if there exist m1, . . . , mm fresh such that
[n1, . . . , nm] (s1 | m1!〈n1〉 | . . . | mm!〈nm〉) 'm [n1, . . . , nm] (s2 | m1!〈n1〉 | . . . | mm!〈nm〉)
Take s1RN s2 and a transition s1 α−−→ s′1; then, the proof proceeds by case analysis on α.2
Corollary 4.3.1 ∼m and 'm coincide.
Proof. Directly from Theorems 4.3.2 and 4.3.3. 2
4.3.1.3 Weak open barbed and labelled bisimilarities
Our semantic theories extend in a standard way to the weak case. Therefore, weak tran-
sitions are defined as follows: =⇒ means ( ∅−−→)∗, i.e. zero or more ∅-transitions; α==⇒
means =⇒ α−−→=⇒; αˆ==⇒ means α==⇒ if α , ∅ and =⇒ if α = ∅. Predicate s ⇓n holds true
if there exist s′ such that s =⇒ s′ and s′ ↓n.
Then, weak open barbed bisimilarity, written um, is obtained by replacing s ↓n with
s ⇓n, and ∅−−→ with =⇒ in Definition 4.3.2.
To define weak labelled bisimilarity we replace
α−−→ with αˆ==⇒ in the three clauses
of Definition 4.3.4. As for pi-calculus, the only subtle point is the case of receive actions,
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which have to be simulated by =⇒ n [x¯] w¯−−−−−−−−→=⇒ and requires the substitution to be applied
immediately after the transition
n [x¯] w¯−−−−−−−−→, i.e. before further ∅-transitions (otherwise, just
like in pi-calculus, the resulting relation would not be an equivalence).
Definition 4.3.6 (Weak labelled bisimilarity) A names-indexed family of relations
{RN }N is a weak labelled bisimulation if, whenever s1RN s2 and s1 α−−→ s′1, where bu(α)
are fresh, then:
1. if α = n [x¯] w¯ then one of the following holds:
(a) ∃ s′′2 : s2 =⇒
n[x¯] w¯−−−−−−−→ s′′2 and
∀ v¯ s.t. M(x¯, v¯) = σ ∃ s′2 : s′′2 ·σ =⇒ s′2 and s′1 ·σRN s′2
(b) ∃ s′2 : s2 =⇒ s′2 and ∀ v¯ s.t. M(x¯, v¯) = σ : s′1 · σRN (s′2 | n!(w¯· σ) )
2. if α = n [n¯] v¯ where n < N then ∃ s′2 : s2 n[n¯] v¯=======⇒ s′2 and s′1 RN∪ n¯ s′2
3. if α = ∅ then ∃ s′2 : s2 =⇒ s′2 and s′1 RN s′2
Two closed terms s1 and s2 are weak N-bisimilar, written s1 ≈Nm s2, if s1RN s2 for some
RN in a weak labelled bisimulation. They are weak labelled bisimilar, written s1 ≈m s2,
if they are weak ∅-bisimilar. ≈Nm is called weak N-bisimilarity, while ≈m is called weak
labelled bisimilarity.
Results of congruence and coincidence still hold for the weak case. We omit the
corresponding proofs because they do not require new techniques and, indeed, are the
standard generalisation of the strong ones.
We conclude with an example inspired to the law !(a(b). a¯b) = 0 that holds for weak
bisimilarity in asynchronous pi-calculus [7]. In fact, the analogous of equality (4.3) for the
weak case is:
∗ [x] n?〈x, v〉. n!〈x, v〉 ≈m 0 (4.4)
To prove validity, the most significant case is simulating the transition
∗ [x] n?〈x, v〉. n!〈x, v〉 n [x] 〈x,v〉−−−−−−−−−−→ ∗ [x] (n?〈x, v〉. n!〈x, v〉) | n!〈x, v〉
The term on the right of (4.4) replies with an empty transition (i.e. it does not perform
any action) and it is easy to show that, for all v′, (∗ [x] (n?〈x, v〉. n!〈x, v〉) | n!〈v′, v〉) and
(0 | n!〈v′, v〉) are weak bisimilar.
4.3.2 Observational semantics of µCOWS
As in the previous section, we extend the operational semantics of µCOWS presented
in Section 3.2.2 by adding the rules in Tables 4.9 and 4.10 to those of Table 3.6, where
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s1
n v¯−−−−−→ s′1 s2
n v¯−−−−−→ s′2
(match)
s1 | s2 ∅−−→ s′1 | s′2
s
nσ ` v¯−−−−−−→ s′ n ∈ n
(private)
[n] s
σ−−−→ [n] s′
Table 4.10: µCOWS operational semantics (additional rules)
condition u < (u(α) ∪ ce(α)) replaces u < u(α) in the premise of rule (del), and condition
| σ |> 1 is added to the premise of (com 2). Label α is now generated by the following
grammar:
α ::= n [n¯] v¯ | n [x¯] w¯ | nσ ` v¯ | σ
We use ce(α) to denote the names composing the endpoint in case α denotes execution of
a communication, i.e. ce(α) is ∅ except for α = nσ ` v¯ for which we let ce(nσ ` v¯) = n.
This way, in µCOWS, two different kinds of communication labels can be generated:
nσ ` v¯ and σ. The former label, produced by rule (com2) (shown in Table 3.6), carries
information about the communication that has taken place (i.e. the endpoint, the trans-
mitted values, the generated substitution and its length) and is used to check the presence
of conflicting receives in parallel components. The check for presence of a conflict is not
needed when either the performed receive has the highest priority (i.e. the substitution has
length 0) or the communication takes place along a private endpoint. In the former case,
label ∅ is immediately generated by rule (match) (this is guaranteed by condition |σ |> 1
in the premise of rule (com2)). In the latter case, when the delimitation of a name belong-
ing to the endpoint of a communication label is encountered (i.e. the communication is
identified as private), the transition label nσ ` v¯ is turned into σ by applying rule (private)
(this is guaranteed by condition u< ce(α) in the premise of rule (del)).
As we have done for µCOWSm in the previous section, we define now open barbed
and labelled bisimilarities for µCOWS.
4.3.2.1 Strong open barbed bisimilarity
The notion of basic observable defined for µCOWSm (Definition 4.3.1) can be used also
to define the open barbed bisimilarity for µCOWS.
Definition 4.3.7 (Open barbed bisimilarity) A symmetric binary relation R on µCOWS
closed terms is an open barbed bisimulation if whenever s1Rs2 the following holds:
(Barb preservation) if s1 ↓n then s2 ↓n;
(Computation closure) if s1
∅−−→ s′1 (resp. s1
n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−→ s′1) then there exists s′2 such that
s2
∅−−→ s′2 (resp. s2
n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−→ s′2 or `=| v¯ | ∧ s2
∅−−→ s′2) and s′1Rs′2;
(Context closure) C[[s1]]RC[[s2]], for every closed context C.
Two closed terms s1 and s2 are open barbed bisimilar, written s1 'µ s2, if s1Rs2 for some
open barbed bisimulation R. 'µ is called open barbed bisimilarity.
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The major difference with the definition of barbed bisimilarity for µCOWSm (Defini-
tion 4.3.2) is that here we also take care of computations of the form n ∅ ` v¯.
We show now that in µCOWS it is not true any longer that receive activities are always
unobservable. In fact, in Section 4.3.1 we have shown that, for µCOWSm, ∼m enjoys
the equality (4.3). Hence, by Theorem 4.3.3, we get that [x] ( ∅ + n?〈x, v〉. n!〈x, v〉 ) 'm
∅, which means that receive activities cannot be observed (similarly to asynchronous pi-
calculus). In µCOWS, however, the context C , [y, z] n?〈y, z〉. m!〈〉 | n!〈v′, v〉 | [[·]] can tell
the two terms above apart. In fact, we have
C[[∅]] n ∅ 2 〈v
′,v〉−−−−−−−−−→ m!〈〉 | ∅
where the term (m!〈〉 | ∅) satisfies the predicate ↓m. Instead, the other term cannot properly
reply because the receive n?〈x, v〉 has higher priority than n?〈y, z〉 when synchronising
with the invocation n!〈v′, v〉. Thus, C[[[x] ( ∅+n?〈x, v〉. n!〈x, v〉 )]] can only evolve to terms
that cannot immediately satisfy the predicate ↓m. From this, we have
[x] ( ∅ + n?〈x, v〉. n!〈x, v〉 ) 6'µ ∅ (4.5)
This means that, receive activities that exercise a priority (i.e. receives whose arguments
contain some values) can be detected by an interacting observer.
Now, consider the term [x, x′] ( ∅ + n?〈x, x′〉. n!〈x, x′〉 ). Since n?〈x, x′〉 does not exer-
cise any priority on parallel terms, we have that
[x, x′] ( ∅ + n?〈x, x′〉. n!〈x, x′〉 ) 'µ ∅ C[[[x, x′] ( ∅ + n?〈x, x′〉. n!〈x, x′〉 )]] 'µ C[[∅]]
For similar reasons, we have that ∅ + n?〈〉. n!〈〉 'µ ∅ and D[[∅ + n?〈〉. n!〈〉]] 'µ D[[∅]] for
D , n?〈〉. m!〈〉 | n!〈〉 | [[·]].
Therefore, differently from µCOWSm, communication in µCOWS is neither purely
asynchronous nor purely synchronous. Indeed, receives having the smallest priority (i.e.
whose arguments are, possible empty, tuples of variables) cannot be observed, while, by
exploiting proper contexts, the other receives can be detected.
4.3.2.2 Strong labelled bisimilarity
For what we have seen in the previous paragraph, the equivalence ∼m is not suitable for
characterising the open barbed bisimilarity for µCOWS. Indeed, ∼m enjoys equality (4.3)
while 'µ enjoys disequality (4.5). As consequence, ∼m is not preserved by all closed
language contexts (which would prevent compositional reasoning).
Thus, we provide a new notion of bisimulation defined on top of the labelled transition
system defining the semantics of µCOWS.
Definition 4.3.8 (Labelled bisimilarity) A names-indexed family of relations {RN }N is a
labelled bisimulation if, whenever s1RN s2 and s1 α−−→ s′1, where bu(α) are fresh, then:
1. if α = n [x¯] w¯ then one of the following holds:
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(a) ∃ s′2 : s2
n[x¯] w¯−−−−−−−→ s′2 and
∀ v¯ s.t. M(x¯, v¯) = σ and noConf(s2, n, w¯·σ, | x¯ |) : s′1 ·σRN s′2 ·σ
(b) | x¯ |=| w¯ | and ∃ s′2 : s2
∅−−→ s′2 and
∀ v¯ s.t. M(x¯, v¯) = σ and noConf(s2, n, w¯·σ, | x¯ |) : s′1 · σRN (s′2 | n!v¯)
2. if α = n ∅ ` v¯ where ` =| v¯ | then one of the following holds:
(a) ∃ s′2 : s2
n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−−→ s′2 and s′1 RN s′2 (b) ∃ s′2 : s2
∅−−→ s′2 and s′1 RN s′2
3. if α = n [n¯] v¯ where n < N then ∃ s′2 : s2 n[n¯] v¯−−−−−−−→ s′2 and s′1 RN∪ n¯ s′2
4. if α = ∅ or α = n ∅ ` v¯, where ` ,| v¯ |, then ∃ s′2 : s2
α−−→ s′2 and s′1 RN s′2
Two closed terms s1 and s2 areN-bisimilar, written s1 ∼Nµ s2, if s1RN s2 for some RN in a
labelled bisimulation. They are labelled bisimilar, written s1 ∼µ s2, if they are ∅-bisimilar.
∼Nµ is called N-bisimilarity, while ∼µ is called labelled bisimilarity.
Clause 1 deals with both observable and unobservable receives. In fact, all receives
can be simulated in a normal way (clause 1.(a)); additionally, receives such that | x¯ |=| w¯ |,
i.e. w¯ contains only variables or is the empty tuple (since x¯ ⊆ w¯ and w¯\x¯ does not contain
variables), can be simulated by an internal action leading to a term that, when composed
with the invoke activity consumed by the receive, stands in the appropriate relation (clause
1.(b)). For similar reasons, clause 2 permits replying with an ∅-transition to communica-
tions involving an unobservable receive (` =| v¯ | implies that the tuple argument of the
receive is either empty or only contains variables). Indeed, such clause is explained by the
following equation: C[[[x, x′] (∅+n?〈x, x′〉. n!〈x, x′〉)]] ∼µ C[[∅]] for C , [[·]] | n!〈v′, v〉. In
fact, if we do not have that clause, we would have that
C[[[x, x′] ( ∅ + n?〈x, x′〉. n!〈x, x′〉 )]] n ∅ 2 〈v
′,v〉−−−−−−−−−→ and C[[∅]] n ∅ 2 〈v
′,v〉−−−−−−−−−→/
which would imply that C[[[x, x′] ( ∅ + n?〈x, x′〉. n!〈x, x′〉 )]] 6∼µ C[[∅]].
Differently from labelled bisimulation for µCOWSm, here in clause 1 the two continua-
tions are not related for any tuple of values, but only for those tuples that can be effectively
received (i.e. that do not give rise to communication conflicts). Indeed, for example, the
following two µCOWS terms:
s1 , [x] ( n?〈v〉 + n?〈x〉. [m] (m!〈x〉 | m?〈x〉 + m?〈v〉. m′!〈〉) )
s2 , [x] ( n?〈v〉 + n?〈x〉. [m] (m!〈x〉 | m?〈x〉) )
are both barbed and labelled bisimilar. Instead, if the definition of bisimulation does
not have condition noConf(s2, n, w¯ ·σ, | x¯ |) in clause 1, we would have that s1 'µ s2
but s1 6∼µ s2. Indeed, after execution of action n  [x¯] x¯, it is not correct to consider
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the continuations under substitutions {x 7→ v′} for all v′, because such action cannot be
performed in case the received value v′ is v (it is pre-empted by n?〈v〉).
In clauses 1.(b) and 2.(b) we require that s2 can only reply with an ∅-transition and
not with a transition labelled by m ∅ ` v¯. Otherwise, the relation would not be preserved
by parallel composition, because communication m ∅ ` v¯ is subject to conflict check and,
hence, could be blocked by a receive with higher priority performed by a parallel term.
Some illustrative equalities follow.
1. n!〈〉 | n?〈〉 6∼µ m!〈〉 | m?〈〉
2. [n] (n!〈〉 | n?〈〉) ∼µ [m] (m!〈〉 | m?〈〉) ∼µ [m] (m!〈v¯〉 | [x¯] m?〈x¯〉)
3. [x] ( ∅ + n?〈x, v〉. n!〈x, v〉 ) 6∼µ ∅
4. [x, x′] ( ∅ + n?〈x, x′〉. n!〈x, x′〉 ) ∼µ ∅
5. ∅ + n?〈〉. n!〈〉 ∼µ ∅
6. C[[[x, x′] (∅+n?〈x, x′〉. n!〈x, x′〉)]]∼µC[[∅]] for C , [y, z] n?〈y, z〉. n′!〈〉 |n!〈v′, v〉 | [[·]]
Remark 4.3.1 (On computational steps) µCOWS supports two different kinds of com-
putational steps, labelled by ∅ and n ∅ ` v¯. To be a congruence, labelled bisimilarity
deals with them separately. Indeed, let τ denote any computational step, and suppose
to weaken Definition 4.3.8 by replacing ∅ with τ in clause 1, by removing clause 2, and
by modifying clause 4 in order to only consider the case α = τ. We would have that
∗ n!〈v〉 | ∅ ∼µ ∗ n!〈v〉 | [x] n?〈x〉. n!〈x〉. In fact, the relevant cases are:
• if ∗ n!〈v〉 | ∅ ∅−−→ ∗ n!〈v〉 then ∗ n!〈v〉 | [x] n?〈x〉. n!〈x〉 n ∅ 1 〈v〉−−−−−−−→ ∗ n!〈v〉 | n!〈v〉 ≡
∗ n!〈v〉, and vice versa;
• if ∗ n!〈v〉 | [x] n?〈x〉. n!〈x〉 n[〈x〉] 〈x〉−−−−−−−−−−→ ∗ n!〈v〉 | n!〈x〉 then ∗ n!〈v〉 | ∅ ∅−−→ ∗ n!〈v〉
and for all v′ holds that ∗ n!〈v〉 | n!〈x〉 · {x 7→ v′} and ∗ n!〈v〉 | n!〈v′〉 are bisimilar.
However, the context n?〈v〉 | [[·]] can tell the two terms apart, because the transition la-
belled n ∅ 1 〈v〉 can be blocked by the activity n?〈v〉 (which has higher priority than n?〈x〉).
This means that the modified labelled bisimilarity is not a congruence for µCOWS. Of
course, the two terms above are not bisimilar according to Definition 4.3.8.
Now, we prove that labelled bisimilarity ∼µ is a congruence for µCOWS. To this aim,
besides the generalisation of ∼µ to open terms and a lemma showing that a bisimulation
up-to ≡ can be used as a sound proof-technique for labelled bisimulation, we need a
lemma establishing preservation of predicate noConf( , , , ) by the relations belonging
to a bisimulation. As usual, we only outline here the techniques used in the proofs and
refer the interested reader to Appendix B.2 for a full account.
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Definition 4.3.9 Let s1 and s2 be two µCOWS terms containing free variables x¯ at most.
Then s1 ∼Nµ s2 if, for all values v¯ such that | x¯ |=| v¯ | , s1 ·{x¯ 7→ v¯} ∼Nµ s2 ·{x¯ 7→ v¯}.
Lemma 4.3.2 Let F be a labelled bisimulation up-to ≡; then, F is a labelled bisimula-
tion.
Proof. The proof proceeds as the proof of Lemma 4.3.1. 2
Lemma 4.3.3 Let s1 and s2 be two µCOWS closed terms and R be a relation belonging
to a labelled bisimulation such that s1Rs2. Then, noConf(s1, n, v¯, `) = noConf(s2, n, v¯, `)
for any n, v¯ and `, with ` 6 | v¯ |.
Proof (sketch). The lemma is proved by contradiction. 2
Theorem 4.3.4 ∼µ is a congruence for µCOWS closed terms.
Proof (sketch). We shall prove that, given two µCOWS closed terms s1 and s2, if s1 ∼µ s2
then C[[s1]] ∼µ C[[s2]] for every (possibly open) context C. The proof is by induction on
the structure of the context C and proceeds similarly to that of Theorem 4.3.1. 2
Now, we prove that labelled bisimilarity is sound and complete with respect to open
barbed bisimilarity.
Theorem 4.3.5 (Soundness of ∼µ w.r.t. 'µ) Given two µCOWS closed terms s1 and s2,
if s1 ∼µ s2 then s1 'µ s2.
Proof (sketch). By Theorem 4.3.4, we have that ∼µ is context closed. Thus, we only need
to prove that ∼µ is barb preserving and computation closed. 2
Theorem 4.3.6 (Completeness of ∼µ w.r.t. 'µ) Given two µCOWS closed terms s1 and
s2, if s1 'µ s2 then s1 ∼µ s2.
Proof (sketch). We define a family of relations F = { RN : N set of names } such that 'µ
is included in R∅, and show that it is a labelled bisimulation. LetN be the set {n1, . . . , nm},
then s1RN s2 if there exist m1, . . . , mm fresh such that
[n1, . . . , nm] (s1 | m1!〈n1〉 | . . . | mm!〈nm〉) 'µ [n1, . . . , nm] (s2 | m1!〈n1〉 | . . . | mm!〈nm〉)
Take s1RN s2 and a transition s1 α−−→ s′1; then, the proof proceeds by case analysis on α.2
Corollary 4.3.2 ∼µ and 'µ coincide.
Proof. Directly from Theorems 4.3.5 and 4.3.6. 2
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4.3.2.3 Weak open barbed and labelled bisimilarities
As in Section 4.3.1.3, the observational semantic theories introduced for µCOWS extend
in a standard way to the weak case.
Weak open barbed bisimilarity, namely uµ, is obtained by replacing s ↓n with s ⇓n,
∅−−→ with =⇒, and n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−→ with n ∅ ` v¯=====⇒ in Definition 4.3.7.
To define weak labelled bisimilarity we replace
α−−→ with αˆ==⇒ in the four clauses of
Definition 4.3.8.
Definition 4.3.10 (Weak labelled bisimilarity) A names-indexed family of relations
{RN }N is a weak labelled bisimulation if, whenever s1RN s2 and s1 α−−→ s′1, where bu(α)
are fresh, then:
1. if α = n [x¯] w¯ then one of the following holds:
(a) ∃ s′′2 : s2 =⇒
n[x¯] w¯−−−−−−−→ s′′2 and ∀ v¯ s.t.M(x¯, v¯) = σ and noConf(s2, n, w¯·σ, | x¯ |)
∃ s′2 : s′′2 ·σ =⇒ s′2 and s′1 ·σRN s′2
(b) | x¯ |=| w¯ | and ∃ s′2 : s2 =⇒ s′2 and
∀ v¯ s.t. M(x¯, v¯) = σ and noConf(s2, n, w¯ ·σ, | x¯ |) : s′1·σRN (s′2 | n!v¯)
2. if α = n ∅ ` v¯ where ` =| v¯ | then one of the following holds:
(a) ∃ s′2 : s2
n ∅ ` v¯
======⇒ s′2 and s′1 RN s′2 (b) ∃ s′2 : s2 =⇒ s′2 and s′1 RN s′2
3. if α = n [n¯] v¯ where n < N then ∃ s′2 : s2 n[n¯] v¯=======⇒ s′2 and s′1 RN∪n¯ s′2
4. if α = ∅ or α = n ∅ ` v¯, where ` ,| v¯ |, then ∃ s′2 : s2
αˆ
==⇒ s′2 and s′1 R s′2
Two closed terms s1 and s2 are weak N-bisimilar, written s1 ≈Nµ s2, if s1RN s2 for some
RN in a weak labelled bisimulation. They are weak labelled bisimilar, written s1 ≈µ s2,
if they are weak ∅-bisimilar. ≈Nµ is called weak N-bisimilarity, while ≈µ is called weak
labelled bisimilarity.
The results of congruence and coincidence still hold for the weak case. We omit the
corresponding proofs because they do not require new techniques and, indeed, are the
standard generalisation of the strong ones.
We conclude with an example that is the analogous of equality (4.4) for µCOWS:
∗ [x, x′] n?〈x, x′〉. n!〈x, x′〉 ≈µ 0
To prove validity, the most significant case is simulating the transition
∗ [x, x′] n?〈x, x′〉. n!〈x, x′〉 n [x,x
′] 〈x,x′〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ ∗ [x, x′] (n?〈x, x′〉. n!〈x, x′〉) | n!〈x, x′〉
The term on the right replies with an empty transition and it is easy to show that, for all v
and v′, (∗ [x, x′] (n?〈x, x′〉. n!〈x, x′〉) | n!〈v, v′〉) and (0 | n!〈v, v′〉) are weak bisimilar.
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4.3.3 Observational semantics of COWS
We extend the operational semantics of COWS presented in Section 3.2.3 as we have
done in the previous sections, i.e. we add the rules in Tables 4.9 and 4.10 to those of
Table 3.12, where condition e < (e(α) ∪ ce(α)) replaces e < e(α) in the premise of rule
(del 2) and condition | σ |> 1 is added to the premise of (com 2). Thus, labels are now
generated by the following grammar:
α ::= n [n¯] v¯ | n [x¯] w¯ | nσ ` v¯ | σ | k | †
When considering observational semantics for COWS we soon discover that ∼µ is not
preserved by those contexts forcing termination of the activities in the hole. For example,
∅ ∼µ {|∅|} trivially holds. However, the COWS context [k] (kill(k) | [[·]]) can tell the
two terms apart. Indeed, [k] (kill(k) | ∅) ∼µ [k] (kill(k) | {|∅|}) does not hold since, after
execution of the kill activity (that has highest priority), we would get 0 ∼µ {|∅|} which is
trivially false. Therefore, ∼µ is not a congruence for COWS.
4.3.3.1 Strong open barbed bisimilarity
Open barbed bisimilarity is by definition closed under all contexts and its definition only
needs to be tuned for considering also †-transitions in the ‘Computation closure’.
Definition 4.3.11 (Open barbed bisimilarity) A symmetric binary relation R on COWS
closed terms is an open barbed bisimulation if whenever s1Rs2 the following holds:
(Barb preservation) if s1 ↓n then s2 ↓n;
(Computation closure) if s1
∅−−→ s′1, s1
†−−→ s′1, s1
n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−→ s′1 respectively, then there
exists s′2 such that s2
∅−−→ s′2, s2
†−−→ s′2, s2
n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−→ s′2 or
`=| v¯ | ∧ s2 ∅−−→ s′2 respectively, and s′1Rs′2;
(Context closure) C[[s1]]RC[[s2]], for every closed context C.
Two closed terms s1 and s2 are open barbed bisimilar, written s1 ' s2, if s1Rs2 for some
open barbed bisimulation R. ' is called open barbed bisimilarity.
4.3.3.2 Strong labelled bisimilarity
Labelled bisimilarity must explicitly take care of the terms resulting from application
of function halt( ) (that gets the same effect as of plunging a term within the context
[k] (kill(k) | [[·]])). It must also consider that if a closed term s performs a transition
labelled by n  [m¯] v¯, then s contains an invoke of the form n!¯, with [[¯]] = v¯, which can
be either protected or not. These differences w.r.t. to Definition 4.3.8 are highlighted with
a gray background.
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Definition 4.3.12 (Labelled bisimilarity) A names-indexed family of relations {RN }N is
a labelled bisimulation if s1RN s2 then halt(s1)RN halt(s2) and if s1 α−−→ s′1, where
bu(α) are fresh, then:
1. if α = n [x¯] w¯ then one of the following holds:
(a) ∃ s′2 : s2
n[x¯] w¯−−−−−−−→ s′2 and
∀ v¯ s.t. M(x¯, v¯) = σ and noConf(s2, n, w¯·σ, | x¯ |) : s′1 ·σRN s′2 ·σ
(b) | x¯ |=| w¯ | and ∃ s′2 : s2
∅−−→ s′2 and ∀ v¯ s.t. M(x¯, v¯) = σ and
noConf(s2, n, w¯·σ, | x¯ |) : s′1 · σRN (s′2 | n!v¯) or s′1 · σRN (s′2 | {|n!v¯|})
2. if α = n ∅ ` v¯ where ` =| v¯ | then one of the following holds:
(a) ∃ s′2 : s2
n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−−→ s′2 and s′1 RN s′2 (b) ∃ s′2 : s2
∅−−→ s′2 and s′1 RN s′2
3. if α = n [n¯] v¯ where n < N then ∃ s′2 : s2 n[n¯] v¯−−−−−−−→ s′2 and s′1 RN∪ n¯ s′2
4. if α = ∅, α = † or α = n ∅ ` v¯, where ` ,| v¯ |, then ∃ s′2 : s2
α−−→ s′2 and s′1 RN s′2
Two closed terms s1 and s2 areN-bisimilar, written s1 ∼N s2, if s1RN s2 for some RN in a
labelled bisimulation. They are labelled bisimilar, written s1 ∼ s2, if they are ∅-bisimilar.
∼N is called N-bisimilarity, while ∼ is called labelled bisimilarity.
Notably, halt-closure takes into account execution of outer kill activities (i.e. kills
performed by contexts), while the inner ones that are active in the considered terms are
taken into account by clause 4.
Remark 4.3.2 (On computational steps) COWS supports three different kinds of com-
putational steps (labelled by ∅, n ∅ ` v¯, or †) and they are dealt with separately because the
priority of forced termination over communication permits to observe the kind of compu-
tational steps that take place. Indeed, let τ denote any computational step, and suppose
to weaken computation closure in Definition 4.3.11 and clause 4 of Definition 4.3.12
by only requiring that if s1
τ−−→ then s2 τ−−→. We would have that [k] kill(k) 6' ∅
while [k] kill(k) ∼ ∅. In fact, the above terms are easily distinguished by the context
[k′] (kill(k′) | [[·]]), because the term obtained by filling the context with the term on the
left can perform the following transitions
[k′] (kill(k′) | [k] kill(k)) τ−−→ [k′] kill(k′) τ−−→ 0
while, due to priority of kill over communication, the other term can only reply as follows
[k′] (kill(k′) | ∅) τ−−→ 0 τ−−→/
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This means that [k′] (kill(k′) | [k] kill(k)) 6' [k′] (kill(k′) | ∅), and hence [k] kill(k) 6' ∅.
Moreover, it would hold that [k′] (kill(k′) | [k] kill(k)) 6∼ [k′] (kill(k′) | ∅), which also
implies that ∼ would not be a congruence for COWS.
Thus, to enable ∼ to tell [k] kill(k) and ∅ apart, we must allow ∼ to distinguish com-
putational steps (as in clause 4 of Definition 4.3.12). This way, we also have that the
following holds:
{| [k] kill(k) |} 6∼ {| ∅ |}
However, they have the same barbs and no context can take them apart. Thus,
{| [k] kill(k) |} ' {| ∅ |}
Therefore, to have a sound and complete characterisation of ' in terms of ∼, we must
allow ' to distinguish computational steps (as in the computation closure required by
Definition 4.3.11).
We can now prove that labelled bisimilarity is a congruence for COWS.
Definition 4.3.13 Let s1 and s2 be two COWS term containing free variables x¯ at most.
Then s1 ∼N s2 if, for all values v¯ such that | x¯ |=| v¯ | , s1 ·{x¯ 7→ v¯} ∼N s2 ·{x¯ 7→ v¯}.
Theorem 4.3.7 ∼ is a congruence for COWS.
Proof (sketch). We shall prove that, given two COWS closed terms s1 and s2, if s1 ∼ s2
then C[[s1]] ∼ C[[s2]] for every context C. The proof is by induction on the structure of the
context C. 2
We prove now that barbed bisimilarity and labelled bisimilarity coincide.
Theorem 4.3.8 (Soundness of ∼ w.r.t. ') Given two COWS closed terms s1 and s2, if
s1 ∼ s2 then s1 ' s2.
Proof. The proof proceeds as the proof of Theorem 4.3.5, by also exploiting the fact that,
by Definition 4.3.12, if s1
†−−→ s′1 then s2
†−−→ s′2 and s′1 ∼ s′2, for some s′2. 2
Theorem 4.3.9 (Completeness of ∼ w.r.t. ') Given two COWS closed terms s1 and s2,
if s1 ' s2 then s1 ∼ s2.
Proof. The proof proceeds as the proof of Theorem 4.3.6, by also exploiting the fact that,
by Definition 4.3.11, if s1
†−−→ s′1 then s2
†−−→ s′2 and s′1 ' s′2, for some s′2. 2
Corollary 4.3.3 ∼ and ' coincide.
Proof. Directly from Theorems 4.3.8 and 4.3.9. 2
160
4.3 A bisimulation-based observational semantics
4.3.3.3 Weak open barbed and labelled bisimilarities
Extension to the weak case is standard. Let τ denote any computational step, i.e. either
∅ or †. With respect to the strong case, and to the analogous extension for µCOWSm and
µCOWS, we relax the requirement for the computational steps, by merely requiring each τ
to be matched by zero or more τ. Specifically, weak transitions are defined as follows: =⇒
means (
τ−−→)∗, i.e. zero or more τ-transitions; α==⇒ means =⇒ α−−→=⇒; αˆ==⇒ means α==⇒
if α , τ and =⇒ if α = τ. Thus, we obtain the following definition of weak bisimulations.
Weak open barbed bisimilarity, namely u, is obtained by replacing s ↓µ with s ⇓µ,
∅−−→ and †−−→ with =⇒, and n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−→ with n ∅ ` v¯=====⇒ in Definition 4.3.11.
Definition 4.3.14 (Weak labelled bisimilarity) A names-indexed family of relations
{RN }N is a weak labelled bisimulation if s1RN s2 then halt(s1)RN halt(s2) and if
s1
α−−→ s′1, where bu(α) are fresh, then:
1. if α = n [x¯] w¯ then one of the following holds:
(a) ∃ s′′2 : s2 =⇒
n[x¯] w¯−−−−−−−→ s′′2 and ∀ v¯ s.t.M(x¯, v¯) = σ and noConf(s2, n, w¯·σ, | x¯ |)
∃ s′2 : s′′2 ·σ =⇒ s′2 and s′1 ·σRN s′2
(b) | x¯ |=| w¯ | and ∃ s′2 : s2 =⇒ s′2 and
∀ v¯ s.t. M(x¯, v¯) = σ and noConf(s2, n, w¯ ·σ, | x¯ |) : s′1·σRN (s′2 | n!v¯)
or s′1 · σRN (s′2 | {|n!v¯|})
2. if α = n ∅ ` v¯ where ` =| v¯ | then one of the following holds:
(a) ∃ s′2 : s2
n ∅ ` v¯
======⇒ s′2 and s′1 RN s′2 (b) ∃ s′2 : s2 =⇒ s′2 and s′1 RN s′2
3. if α = n [n¯] v¯ where n < N then ∃ s′2 : s2 n[n¯] v¯=======⇒ s′2 and s′1 RN∪ n¯ s′2
4. if α = ∅, α = † or α = n ∅ ` v¯, where ` ,| v¯ |, then ∃ s′2 : s2
αˆ
==⇒ s′2 and s′1 RN s′2
Two closed terms s1 and s2 are weak N-bisimilar, written s1 ≈N s2, if s1RN s2 for some
RN in a weak labelled bisimulation. They are weak labelled bisimilar, written s1 ≈ s2,
if they are weak ∅-bisimilar. ≈N is called weak N-bisimilarity, while ≈ is called weak
labelled bisimilarity.
Again, results of congruence and coincidence hold.
4.3.3.4 Analysing the ‘Morra game’ scenario
We now study the relationship between the high- and low-level specifications of the Morra
service introduced in Section 3.1. We can prove that (3.1) 6≈ (3.2). Indeed, (3.1) can per-
form transitions
evens • throw[xid ,yp,ynum] 〈xid ,yp,ynum〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ and odds • throw[xp,xnum] 〈 f irst,xp,xnum〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
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and, because of application of substitutions {xid 7→ f irst, yp 7→ cbB, ynum 7→ 1} and
{xp 7→cbA, xnum 7→2}, evolve to
( cbA • res!〈 f irst,win(2, 1, 1)〉 | cbB • res!〈 f irst,win(2, 1, 0)〉 )
Instead, (3.2) can properly simulate the above transitions but it can only evolve to
{| cbA • res!〈 f irst,w〉 | cbB • res!〈 f irst, l〉 |}
Of course, the latter term behaves differently from the former one in presence of kill
activities. In fact, given the context C , [k′] ( [n] (n!〈〉 | n?〈〉.kill(k′)) | [[·]] ), we have that
C[[(3.1)]] 6≈ C[[(3.2)]].
If we modify the last two invoke activities in the high-level specification (3.1) as fol-
lows:
∗ [xid, xp, xnum, yp, ynum]
( odds • throw?〈xid, xp, xnum〉 | evens • throw?〈xid, yp, ynum〉
| {| xp • res!〈xid,win(xnum, ynum, 1)〉 | yp • res!〈xid,win(xnum, ynum, 0)〉 |} )
(4.6)
the problem persists, because (4.6) after the first two transitions always provides a re-
sponse, while (3.2) could fail to provide a response in presence of kill activities. Instead,
by replacing M in (3.2) by
[xid, xp, xnum, yp, ynum]
( odds • throw?〈xid, xp, xnum〉 | evens • throw?〈xid, yp, ynum〉 | {| [k] ( . . . ) |} )
we can equate (4.6) with the so obtained low-level specification.
We can also prove that M is congruent to the following variant:
[xid, xp, xnum, yp, ynum]
( odds • throw?〈xid, xp, xnum〉 | evens • throw?〈xid, yp, ynum〉
| m • req2f !〈xid, xnum, ynum〉 | m • req5f !〈xid, xnum, ynum〉
| [xo, xe] ( m • resp2f ?〈xid, xo, xe〉. {|xp • res!〈xid, xo〉 | yp • res!〈xid, xe〉|}
+ m • resp5f ?〈xid, xo, xe〉. {|xp • res!〈xid, xo〉 | yp • res!〈xid, xe〉|} ) )
This somehow suggests us that we can use kill, delimitation and protection to model
choice among receive activities that prefix protected terms, like in the following case
[x¯] ( n?w¯. {|s|} + n′?w¯′. {|s′|} ) ≈ [k, x¯] ( n?w¯. (kill(k) | {|s|}) | n′?w¯′. (kill(k) | {|s′|}) )
4.3.4 Concluding remarks
We have investigated the impact of COWS’s dynamic priority mechanisms combined with
local pre-emption on the definitions of semantic theories for SOC systems. We have in-
troduced natural notions of strong and weak open barbed bisimilarities for COWS, and
then proved their coincidence with more manageable characterisations in terms of la-
belled bisimilarities. We have also demonstrated our approach through the analysis of the
example specified in Section 3.1.
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We leave for future work the identification of appropriate sets of sound and general
equational laws that can facilitate the task of analysing SOC systems through the semantic
theories introduced in this section. In fact, as shown in Section 3.3, WS-BPEL applica-
tions can be modelled using COWS, thus we hope eventually to be able to verify them.
We also plan to develop efficient symbolic characterisations of the labelled bisimilarities
over the symbolic operational semantics for COWS introduced in Section 4.4.
One major distinctive feature of COWS is the parallel operator that takes priority of
actions into account, where actions have assigned priority values that can dynamically
change and have a scope. In Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, we have largely discussed the rel-
evance of this feature to deal with correlation, and service instantiation and termination.
Many process calculi with priority have been proposed in the literature; a comprehen-
sive survey, with terminology and classification of different approaches, can be found in
[69]. In previous proposals, dynamic priorities are basically used to model scheduling
approaches and real-time aspects (see e.g. [24, 42, 85]) while in COWS they are used for
coordination, as well as for orchestration, purposes. For example, in the service 5F of
Section 3.1 they enable implementing a sort of ‘default’ behaviour, that returns err when
a throw is not admissible. To the best of our knowledge (see also [69]), the interplay be-
tween dynamic priorities and local pre-emption, and their impact on semantic theories of
processes have never been explored before.
In some calculi for SOC, strong or weak notions of labelled bisimilarity have been
used for proving existence of normal forms for services [199], for program transformation
[92], for checking conformance of a calculus of orchestration to a calculus of choreogra-
phy [50], and for proving compliance between service implementations and specifications
[124, 45]. The latter two mentioned works share our same aims, but consider process cal-
culi that, to link together actions executed as part of the same interaction, rely on sessions
rather than on correlation data. Behavioural theories based on testing preorders have in-
stead been exploited to check if a service exposing a given contract can play a specific
role within a service choreography [41].
COWS’s barbed bisimilarities follow the approach of open barbed bisimilarities
[113, 181] rather than that of barbed congruence [152], i.e. quantification over contexts
occurs recursively inside the definition of bisimilarity. This approach is commonly used
in recent works on defining barbed bisimilarities and, then, their labelled characteriza-
tions for process calculi with intricate features as e.g. Distributed pi-calculus [96] and
Klaim [76]. This because it simplifies the proof of completeness since it allows to choose
a context at any computational step. Moreover, for asynchronous pi-calculus, it has been
proved in [95] that the two approaches coincide. However, since this is not true for (syn-
chronous) pi-calculus [181], and since our calculus is not completely asynchronous, it is
probably worth considering also the approach used in [152, 7]. We leave this for future
investigation.
COWS’s labelled bisimilarities strongly recall the bisimilarities for asynchronous pi-
calculus introduced in [7]. However, COWS’s priority mechanisms make some receive
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actions observable (which leads to a novel notion of observation that refines the purely
asynchronous one), and require specific conditions on the labelled bisimilarities for these
to be congruences.
4.4 A symbolic semantics for COWS
In the previous sections, we have presented a logic and a model checker to express and
check functional properties of services specified in COWS, and some observational se-
mantic theories for COWS. To some extent, such tools suffer from a lack of composi-
tionality and efficiency. Indeed, generally speaking, model and equivalence checkers, and
other similar verification tools, do not work directly on syntactic specifications but rather
on abstract representations of the behaviour of processes. For value-passing languages,
such as COWS, using an inappropriate representation can lead to unfeasible verifications.
In fact, according to the COWS’s original operational semantics introduced in Chapter 3,
if the communicable values range over an infinite value set (e.g. natural numbers and
strings), the behaviour of a service that performs a receive activity is modelled by an in-
finite abstract representation. Such representation is a Labelled Transition System whose
initial state has infinite outgoing edges, each labelled with an input label having a different
value as argument and leading to a different state.
Hence, by taking inspiration from Hennessy and Lin [105], in this section we define
a symbolic operational semantics for COWS. Differently from the symbolic semantics for
more standard calculi, such as value-passing CCS or pi-calculus, ours deals at once with,
besides receive transitions, a number of complex features, such as, e.g., generation and ex-
portation of fresh names, pattern-matching, expressions evaluation, and priorities among
conflicting receives. The new semantics avoids infinite representations of COWS terms
due to the value-passing nature of communication in COWS and associates a finite repre-
sentation to each finite COWS term. It is then more amenable for automatic manipulation
by analytical tools, such as e.g. equivalence and model checkers. Our major result is a
theorem of ‘operational correspondence’. We prove that, under appropriate conditions,
any transition of the original semantics can be generated using the symbolic one, and
vice versa. In general, however, additional transitions can be derived using the symbolic
semantics since it also accounts for services ability to interact with the environment.
4.4.1 A symbolic approach to cope with verification problems
When the considered specification language is a value-passing process algebra and the
value-space is infinite, using standard Labelled Transition Systems (LTSs) for the seman-
tics can lead to infinite representations. This is, in fact, the case of COWS. For example,
consider a non-persistent (i.e. a non-replicated) variant of the high-level specification of
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cbA • res!〈first, l〉
cbB • res!〈first, w〉
cbB • res!〈first, l〉
cbA • res!〈first, w〉
odds • throw?〈first, cbA, 1〉
odds • throw?〈first, cbA, 2〉 odds • throw?〈first, cbA, 6〉
cbA • res!〈first, err〉
cbB • res!〈first, err〉
evens • throw?〈first, cbB, 1〉 evens
• throw?〈first, cbB, 2〉
odds • throw?〈six, cbE, 8〉
Figure 4.7: LTS for the Morra service (high-level specification)
the Morra service (that is, the COWS term presented in Section 3.1):
[xid, xp, xnum, yp, ynum]
( odds • throw?〈xid, xp, xnum〉 | evens • throw?〈xid, yp, ynum〉
| xp • res!〈xid,win(xnum, ynum, 1)〉 | yp • res!〈xid,win(xnum, ynum, 0)〉 )
(4.7)
Its operational behaviour can be represented by the infinite LTS in Figure 4.7, where
nodes denote states and edges denote transitions between states. Notably, for the sake of
presentation, the LTS shown in the figure relies on an operational semantics in early style,
where substitutions are applied when receive actions are inferred. However, the problem
of infinite representations remains also in case of late semantics, due to the fact that the
continuation of a receive action with argument a variable x has to be considered under all
possible substitutions for x.
To tackle the problems above, in [105] Hennessy and Lin have introduced the so-called
symbolic LTSs and used them to define finite semantical representations of terms of the
value-passing CCS. For example, the symbolic LTSs corresponding to the COWS ser-
vice (4.7) is shown in Figure 4.8. The symbolic actions evens • throw?〈xid, yp, ynum〉 and
odds • throw?〈xid, xp, xnum〉 denote reception of unknown values xid, yp, ynum, xp and xnum
along endpoints evens • throw and odds • throw, respectively; the condition-guarded sym-
bolic actions (z1 = win(xnum, ynum, 1) , xp
• res!〈xid, z1〉) and (z2 = win(xnum, ynum, 0) , yp •
res!〈xid, z2〉) denote sending of unknown values z1 and z2 such that z1 = win(xnum, ynum, 1)
and (z2 = win(xnum, ynum, 0).
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evens • throw?〈x id, x p, x num〉 odds • throw?〈x id, y p, y num〉
odds • throw?〈x id, y p, y num〉 evens • throw?〈xid, xp, xnum〉
( z 1 = win(xnum, ynum, 1) , x p • res!〈x id, z 1〉 ) ( z 2 = win(xnum, ynum, 0) , y p • res!〈x id, z 2〉 )
( z 2 = win(xnum, ynum, 0) , y p • res!〈x id, z 2〉 ) ( z 1 = win(xnum, ynum, 1) , x p • res!〈x id, z 1〉 )
Figure 4.8: Symbolic LTS for the Morra service (high-level specification)
To deal with infinite branching in the representations of COWS terms, we have de-
veloped a symbolic operational semantics for COWS. To achieve this goal, the main is-
sue is to give receive activities a proper semantics, because variables in their arguments
are placeholders for something to be received. For example, let us consider the service
p • o?〈x〉.s. If p • o?〈x〉.s p •o〈x〉−−−−−−−−→ s then the behaviour of the continuation service s
must be considered under all substitutions of the form {x 7→ v} (i.e. the semantics of s
can intuitively be thought of as a function λx. s from values to services). In case of the
standard semantics for pi-calculus [150], for example, this problem is not tackled at the
operational semantics level, but it is postponed to the observational semantics level. In
fact, in the definition of late bisimulation for pi-calculus, whenever P is bisimilar to Q, if
P
a(x)−−−−→ P′ then there is Q′ such that Q a(x)−−−−→ Q′ and P′{u/x} is bisimilar to Q′{u/x}
for every u. Thus, continuations P′ and Q′ are considered under all substitutions for x.
Instead, here we aim at defining an operational semantics for COWS that properly handles
input transitions, and allow finite state LTSs to be associated to finite COWS terms.
The basic idea is to allow receive activities to evolve by performing a communication
with the ‘external world’ (i.e. a COWS context), this way they do not need to synchronise
with invoke activities within the considered term. To avoid infinite branching (as in the
case of early operational semantics), we replace variables with unknown values rather than
with specific values. We denote by x the unknown value that replaces the variable x. This
way, the term [x] ( p • o?〈x〉. q • o′!〈x〉 ) can evolve as follows:
[x] ( p • o?〈x〉. q • o′!〈x〉 ) p •o[x]−−−−−−−−→ q • o′!〈x〉 q •o
′〈x〉−−−−−−−−−→ 0
Also receive activities having a value as argument (e.g. p • o?〈v〉) and invoke activities
(e.g. p • o!〈v〉) can evolve by communicating with the external world. Of course, these
kinds of communication do not produce substitutions.
When an external communication takes place, the behaviour of the continuation ser-
vice depends on the admittable values for the unknown value. To take care of the real
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Conditions: Φ, Φ′, . . . Exported private names: ∆, ∆′, . . .
Unknown values: x, y, . . . Variable/Names/Unknown values: u, u′, . . .
Values/Unknown values: v, v′, . . . Variable/Values/Unknown values: w, w′, . . .
Names/Unknown values: n, m′, . . . , p, o, . . . Endpoints/Unknown values: n, m′, . . . , u, u′, . . .
Constrained services: Φ,∆ ` s
Services: s ::= kill(k) | u • u′! | g | s | s | {|s|} | [e] s | ∗ s
Receive-guarded choice: g ::= 0 | p • o?w.s | g + g
Table 4.11: Constrained services
values that the unknown values can assume, we define a symbolic semantics for COWS,
where the label on each transition has two components: the condition that must hold for
the transition to be enabled and, as usual, the action of the transition. Moreover, to store
the conditions that must hold to reach a state and the names exported along the path, we
define the semantics over configurations of the form Φ,∆ ` s, called constrained services,
where the condition Φ and the set of names ∆ are used to determine the actions that s can
perform. Thus, the symbolic transitions are of the form Φ,∆ ` s1  Φ
′, α−−−−→ Φ′,∆′ ` s2,
meaning “if the condition Φ′ (such that Φ is a subterm of Φ′) holds then s1 can perform
the action α leading to s2 by extending the set of exported private names ∆ to the set ∆′”.
The symbolic LTS associated to a COWS term conveys in a distilled form all the
semantics information on the behaviour of terms. More specifically, besides receive tran-
sitions, symbolic representations take into account generation and exportation of fresh
names, pattern-matching, expressions evaluation, and priorities among conflicting re-
ceives. Dealing at once with all the above features at operational semantics level makes
the development of a symbolic semantics for COWS more complex than for more standard
calculi, such as value-passing CCS or pi-calculus.
4.4.2 A symbolic operational semantics for COWS
We apply now the symbolic approach outlined in the previous section to COWS. For the
sake of simplicity, here we consider a monadic version of COWS, i.e. communication
activities are of the form u! and n?w.s (we discuss in Section 4.4.4.2 how to tailor the
symbolic semantics to handle polyadic communication).
The symbolic operational semantics of COWS is defined over configurations of the
form Φ,∆ ` s, called constrained services and defined in Table 4.11, where Φ is the
condition that must hold to reach the current state, ∆ is the set of private names previously
exported, and s is a service whose actions are determined by Φ and ∆. The set ∆ will
be omitted when empty, writing e.g. Φ ` s instead of Φ, ∅ ` s. We define the semantics
over an enriched set of services that also includes those auxiliary terms resulting from
replacing (free occurrences of) variables with unknown values in terms produced by the
syntax introduced in Section 3.2.3, where now expressions contain also unknown values.
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In the extended syntax we use x to denote an unknown value and t to denote an unknown
value or a term t (where t can be n, v, u, w, n or u). Therefore, u • u′! and p • o?w.s denote
invoke and receive activities, respectively.
As in the standard semantics, the only binding construct is delimitation: let
Φ,∆ ` C[[[d] s]] be a constrained service (where C is a context2), [d] binds d in the scope
s, in the condition Φ and in the set ∆. We denote by bn(t) the set of names that occur
bound in a term t, and by uvar(t) the set of variables that have been replaced by corre-
sponding unknown values in t (i.e. if x is an unknown value in t, then x ∈ uvar(t)). For
simplicity sake, in the sequel we assume that bound variables in constrained services are
pairwise distinct and different from variables corresponding to the unknown values of the
constrained services, and bound names are all distinct and different from the free ones
(of course, these conditions are not restrictive and can always be fulfilled by possibly us-
ing α-conversion). This assumption avoids that distinct unknown values are denoted by
the same x in a condition Φ of a constrained service (see Example “Evaluation function,
condition x < uv and assumption on bound variables” in Section 4.4.3), and permits iden-
tifying the name delimitation binding each private name within a condition Φ and a set ∆
of a constrained service (see Remark 4.4.1).
The symbolic operational semantics of COWS is defined only for closed services,
and is given in terms of a structural congruence and of a (bi-)labelled transition relation.
The structural congruence ≡ is the trivial extension of that defined in Section 3.2.3 to the
enriched syntax of services used here. To define the labelled transition relation, we exploit
the trivial extension to the enriched syntax of function halt( ) and predicate noKill( , )
defined in Section 3.2.3. We also extend function [[ ]] to deal with unknown values.
Now, it takes a closed expression and returns a pair (Φ, v): the (possibly unknown) value
v is the result of the evaluation provided that the condition Φ holds. Specifically, let
 be an expression, if  does not contain unknown values and can be computed, then
[[]] = (true, v) where v is the result of the evaluation, as in the original COWS semantics.
Similarly, if  is an unknown value x, then [[]] = (true, x). If  contains unknown values
and is not a single unknown value (i.e.  , x for every x), then [[]] = ((y , bn ∧ y <
uv ∧ y =  ∧ Φ′), y) where y is a fresh unknown value that must be different from all
private names (i.e. y , bn) and from all existent unknown values (i.e. y < uv)3, and Φ′
is a condition that permits dealing with expression operators partially defined4. Function
[[ ]], and hence condition Φ′, cannot be explicitly defined because the exact syntax of
expressions is deliberately not specified. Then, consider as an example the following
2Recall that a context C is a service with a ‘hole’ [[·]] such that, once the hole is filled with a service s, the
resulting term C[[s]] is a COWS service.
3Notably, here y can be any unknown value, provide that it satisfies conditions y , bn and y < uv.
Notice that condition y < uv is a syntactical condition on the variable name y. Later we shall explain the
exact meaning of the above conditions and show how they are evaluated in the last step of the inference of a
transition.
4Of course, if all operators used in the considered expression are total functions, then condition Φ′ is true.
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simple language for expressions:
 ::= x | x | i |  +  |  −  |  ∗  | / | ()
where i is an integer value. For the above language function [[ ]] is such that:
• [[(5 − 2) ∗ 3]] = (true, 9);
• [[5 − x]] is undefined, because the expression 5 − x is not closed;
• [[5 − x]] = ((y , bn ∧ y < uv ∧ y = 5 − x), y);
• [[5/0]] is undefined;
• [[5/x]] = ((y , bn ∧ y < uv ∧ y = 5/x ∧ x , 0), y), where condition x , 0 is due
to the fact that operator / is not defined when its second argument is 0.
We also define a function confRec( , ), that takes a service s and an endpoint n as
an arguments and returns the set of (possibly unknown) values that are parameters of
receive activities over the endpoint n active in s. This function plays the role of predicate
noConf( , , , ) of the standard semantics and, indeed, is exploited to disable transitions
in case of communication conflicts (by setting transition conditions to false). The function
is inductively defined as follows:
confRec(0, n) = confRec(kill(k), n) = confRec(u!, n) = confRec(n?x.s, n) = ∅
confRec(g + g′, n) = confRec(g, n) ∪ confRec(g′, n) confRec(n?v.s, n) = { v }
confRec(n′?w.s, n) = ∅ if n , n′ confRec({|s|}, n) = confRec(s, n)
confRec(s | s′, n) = confRec(s, n) ∪ confRec(s′, n) confRec([e] s, n) = ∅ if e ∈ n
confRec([e] s, n) = confRec(s, n)\{e} if e < n confRec(∗ s, n) = confRec(s, n)
The labelled transition relation over constrained services, written  Φ , α−−−−→, relies on a
labelled transition relation
Φ , α−−−−−→, that is the least relation over services induced by the
rules in Table 4.12. Conditions Φ and actions α are generated by the following grammar:
Φ ::= true | false | v = v′ | v , v′ | x , bn | x < uv
| x < {xi}i∈I | x =  | Φ ∧ Φ′
α ::= n v | n [n] | n w | n  [x ] | nσ ` v | k | †
where, now, a substitutions σ can be either the empty substitution ∅ or a substitution
{x 7→ v} that maps the variable x to the (possibly unknown) value v.
The meaning of labels is as follows:
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kill(k)
true , k−−−−−−→ 0 (s-kill) n?w.s true , nw−−−−−−−−−→ s (s-rec)
s
Φ , n x−−−−−−−→ s′
(s-reccom)
[x] s
Φ∧ x,bn∧ x, confRec(s,n) , n[x]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′ ·{x 7→ x}
g
Φ , α−−−−−→ s
(s-choice)
g + g′
Φ , α−−−−−→ s
[[]] = (Φ, v )
(s-inv)
n!
Φ , n v−−−−−−−→ 0
s
Φ , n n−−−−−−−→ s′ n<n
(s-open)
[n] s
Φ , n [n]−−−−−−−−−→ s′
s
Φ , n {x 7→v} 1 v−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′
(s-delcom)
[x] s
Φ , n ∅ 1 v−−−−−−−−→ s′ ·{x 7→ v}
s
Φ , k−−−−→ s′
(s-delkill1)
[k] s
Φ , †−−−−→ [k] s′
s
Φ , k−−−−→ s′ k , e
(s-delkill2)
[e] s
Φ , k−−−−→ [e] s′
s
Φ , †−−−−→ s′
(s-delkill3)
[e] s
Φ , †−−−−→ [e] s′
s
Φ , α−−−−−→ s′ e< e(α) α , k , † noKill(s, e)
(s-del)
[e] s
Φ , α−−−−−→ [e] s′
s
Φ , α−−−−−→ s′
(s-prot)
{|s|} Φ , α−−−−−→ {|s′|}
s1
Φ1 , n v′−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 s2
Φ2 , n
′ v−−−−−−−−→ s′2 (s-match)
s1 | s2
Φ1 ∧Φ2 ∧ n=n′ ∧ v′=v , n ∅ 0 v−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s′2
s1
Φ1 , n x−−−−−−−−→ s′1 s2
Φ2 , n
′ v−−−−−−−−→ s′2 (s-com)
s1 | s2
Φ1 ∧Φ2 ∧ n=n′ ∧ v, confRec(s1 | s2,n) , n {x 7→v} 1 v−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s′2
s1
Φ , nσ 1 v−−−−−−−−→ s′1 (s-parcom1)
s1 | s2
Φ∧ v, confRec(s2,n) , nσ 1 v−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s2
s1
Φ , k−−−−→ s′1 (s-parkill)
s1 | s2 Φ , k−−−−→ s′1 | halt(s2)
s1
Φ , n[x ]−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 (s-parcom2)
s1 | s2
Φ∧ x, confRec(s2,n) , n[x ]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s2
s ≡ s1 s1 Φ , α−−−−−→ s2 s2 ≡ s′ (s-cong)
s
Φ , α−−−−−→ s′
s1
Φ , α−−−−−→ s′1 α , k , nσ 1 v , n  [x ] (s-par)
s1 | s2 Φ , α−−−−−→ s′1 | s2
Table 4.12: COWS symbolic semantics (rules for
Φ , α−−−−→)
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• Conditions: true (resp. false) denotes the condition always (resp. never) satisfied,
v = v′ (resp. v , v′) denotes an equality (resp. inequality) between (possibly
unknown) values, x , bn means that the unknown value x must be different from
all bound names of the considered service, x < uv means that the set of variables
corresponding to the unknown values of the considered constrained service may not
contain the variable x, x < {xi}i∈I means that x must not be in the set {xi}i∈I , x = 
states that the unknown value x is equal to the evaluation of the closed non-evaluable
expression  (conditions of this form are generated by the evaluation function, e.g.
condition y = 5/x is generated by evaluation of expression 5/x), and as usual ∧
denotes the logic conjunction. In the sequel, we will use notation v , {v 1, . . . , v n}
to indicate the condition v , v 1 ∧ . . . ∧ v , v n (where v , ∅ indicates true).
Moreover, we will use a function B( , , ) that, given a condition Φ, a service s
and a set of variables {xi}i∈I , returns a condition obtained by conjuncting Φ with all
inequalities between the unknown values of Φ and the bound names of s and with
all conditions x < {xi}i∈I for each x < uv in Φ. Formally, B( , , ) is defined as
follows:
B(true, s, {xi}i∈I) = true B(false, s, {xi}i∈I) = false
B(v = v′, s, {xi}i∈I) = v = v′ B(v , v′, s, {xi}i∈I) = v , v′
B(x , bn, s, {xi}i∈I) = x , bn ∧ x , bn(s) B(x < uv, s, {xi}i∈I) = x < {xi}i∈I
B(x < {y j} j∈J , s, {xi}i∈I) = x < {y j} j∈J B(x = , s, {xi}i∈I) = x = 
B(Φ ∧ Φ′, s, {xi}i∈I) = B(Φ, s, {xi}i∈I) ∧ B(Φ′, s, {xi}i∈I)
• Actions: n [n] denotes execution of a bound invoke activity over the endpoint n,
while n  [x ] denotes taking place of external communication over the endpoint
n with receive parameter x (that will be replaced by the unknown value x). The
remaining labels have the usual meaning. Notably, due to the restraint on monadic
communication, here the natural number ` can only be either 0 or 1.
We comment on the aspects of the symbolic semantics rules that mainly differ from the
standard ones. Bound invocations, that transmit private names, can be generated by rule
(s-open). Notably, bound invocation actions do not appear in rules (s-match) and (s-com),
and therefore cannot directly interact with receive actions. Such interactions are instead
inferred by using structural congruence to pull name delimitation outside both interacting
activities. Although the bound transitions and rule (s-open) can be omitted, we include
them both to give a proper semantics to terms [m] n!m and to support the development
of behavioural equivalences for COWS. Communication can be either internal or exter-
nal to a service. Internal communication can take place when two matching receive and
invoke activities (rules (s-match) and (s-com)) are simultaneously executed. External com-
munication can take place when a value is transmitted to the environment (rules (s-inv)
and (s-open)) or when a receive activity matches an unknown value provided by the envi-
ronment (rules (s-rec) and (s-reccom)). Differently from the standard semantics, conflicting
171
CHAPTER 4 Analysis techniques for COWS specifications
s
Φ′, α−−−−−→ s′ α , n [n] , n v Φ′′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′, s′, uvar(Φ))
(constServ)
Φ,∆ ` s  Φ
′′, α−−−−→ Φ′′,∆ ` s′
s
Φ′, n [n]−−−−−−−−−→ s′ n<∆ Φ′′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′, s′, uvar(Φ))
(constServexp)
Φ,∆ ` s  Φ
′′, n [n]−−−−−−−−−→ Φ′′,∆ ∪ {n} ` s′
s
Φ′, n v−−−−−−−−→ s′ n<∆ Φ′′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′, s′, uvar(Φ))
(constServinv)
Φ,∆ ` s  Φ
′′, n v−−−−−−−→ Φ′′,∆ ` s′
Table 4.13: COWS symbolic semantics (rules for  Φ , α−−−−→)
receives cannot be dealt with by using a predicate in the premises of rules for commu-
nication and interleaving, because unknown values can be involved. Here, the check for
conflicting receives is simply a condition of the form v , confRec(s, n) (rules (s-reccom),
(s-com), (s-parcom1)) and (s-parcom2)).
The labelled transition relation  Φ , α−−−−→ is the least relation over constrained services
induced by the rules reported in Table 4.13, where notation n<∆ means that set ∆ does not
contain the names of endpoint n. Rule (constServ) states that a constrained service Φ,∆ ` s
can perform all the ‘non-invoke’ transitions performed by s with an enriched condition
Φ′′ obtained by composing Φ and the condition on the label Φ′. Condition Φ′′ takes
care of the relationship between unknown values and private names. Indeed, by private
names definition, each unknown value, that is a value coming from the environment, must
be different from all bound (private) names of the considered service. If the transition
s
Φ′, α−−−−−→ s′ introduces a new unknown value x (rules (s-inv) and (s-reccom)), it is not
sufficient to add the condition x , bn(s′) (i.e. the unknown value is different from all
bound names of the current service), but we need also to consider bound names that could
be subsequently generated. For example, let us consider the following transition:
true ` [x] n?x.s | ∗ [n] n′!n  x,bn∧ x,n , n[x ]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ x , bn ∧ x , n ` s·{x 7→ x} | ∗ [n] n′!n
Now, if the obtained service performs the transition:
s · {x 7→ x} | ∗ [n] n′!n Φ , α−−−−−→ s′ · {x 7→ x} | ∗ [n] n′!n | [n′] n′!n′ | [n′′] n′!n′′
then, let Φ′ ` s′′ be the obtained constrained service, the condition Φ′ must contain x , n′
and x , n′′. To update after any transition the condition of a constrained service with in-
equalities between unknown values and private names, we use the condition x , bn, that
simply states that x has been introduced in the considered term (rules (s-inv) and (s-reccom)),
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and function B( , , ), that adds the inequalities for each unknown value (rules (constServ),
(constServexp) and (constServinv)). Moreover, function B( , , ) adds conditions of the form
x < {xi}i∈I to guarantee that unknown values introduced by rule (s-inv) because of expres-
sion evaluation differ from those of the considered constrained service (i.e. uvar(Φ) if
the constrained service is Φ,∆ ` s; for further details see Example “Evaluation function,
condition x < uv and assumption on bound variables” in Section 4.4.3).
Rules (constServexp) and (constServinv) deal with the localized receiving feature of
COWS. Indeed, if a COWS term communicates a private (partner or operation) name
to the environment, then the latter (that is a COWS context) may use the name to de-
fine a sending endpoint, but not a receiving one. For example, consider the following
constrained service:
true ` [p] ( q • o!p | p • o′!v )
It can perform the activity q • o!p (rule (s-open)) and become the term true, {p} ` p • o′!v
which is stuck. In fact, to further evolve it needs the environment to be able to perform
first a receive q • o?x and then a receive along the endpoint x • o′, that is disallowed
by the syntax. Therefore, to block invoke activities performed along endpoints using
previously exported private names, we record all exported private names in the set ∆ of
the constrained service and perform the check n < ∆ when an invoke activity along n
communicating with the environment is executed.
Remark 4.4.1 The assumption “bound names are all distinct and different from the free
ones” is used to guarantee the correlation between conditions and services. For example,
if we do not rely on this assumption, for the constrained service x , n ` [n] s | [n] s′ we
are not able to understand what is the binder for the n in the condition x , n. In fact, by
definition of bound names, the constrained service x , n ` [n] x • o!n is α-equivalent to
x , m ` [m] x • o!m, not to x , n ` [m] x • o!m.
Remark 4.4.2 In the definition of relation  Φ , α−−−−→, the conditions are never evaluated.
Thus, at operational semantics level, we do not distinguish unfeasible transitions (whose
condition holds false) from feasible ones. For example, transitions having the following
conditions are unfeasible: (oreq = oresp), (x , x) and (x = y ∧ x , y). Of course,
to identify unfeasible transitions, we can replace the condition Φ′′ in the conclusion of
rules (constServ), (constServexp) and (constServinv) with E(Φ′′), where E( ) is a function for
evaluating conditions.
Remark 4.4.3 Since the transition relation  Φ , α−−−−→ is defined over constrained services,
i.e. configuration of the form Φ,∆ ` s, the operational semantics can be naturally inter-
preted on L2TS [80]. Indeed, each edge label (of the form Φ, α) indicates the condition
which must hold for the transition to be enabled and the performed action, while each state
label (of the form Φ,∆) indicates the condition which must hold to reach the considered
state from the initial one and the set of previously exported private names.
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We can now formalize the correspondence between the original semantics introduced
in Section 3.2.3 and the symbolic semantics. We exploit here a function E( ) for eval-
uating conditions: it takes a condition Φ and returns false if certainly Φ does not hold;
otherwise, it returns Φ. For example, E(Φ′ ∧ (5 = 3)) is false whatever Φ′ may be. Since
a condition Φ can be of the form x =  and the syntax of expressions  is not specified,
function E( ) cannot be explicitly defined (like function [[ ]]). For the proof of semantics
correspondence, we use the following lemma concerning function B( , , ). For the sake
of simplicity, a condition Φ is deemed favourable if uvar(Φ) = ∅ and E(Φ) , false, i.e. it
does not contain unknown values and can be positively evaluated.
Lemma 4.4.1 Let Φ be a favourable condition, then E(B(Φ, s, ∅)) , false for any s.
Proof. The thesis follows from the fact that, under the considered hypotheses, B( , , )
acts as an homomorphism on the first argument, except when the argument is x , bn
and x < uv. We do not need to consider the former case because, by the hypothesis
uvar(Φ) = ∅, we have that Φ does not contain unknown values. For the latter case, we get
that B(x < uv, s, ∅) = x < uv since the third argument of B( , , ) is ∅. 2
Our major result is a theorem of ‘operational correspondence’. It is quite standard and
states that for each transition of the original LTS associated to a COWS term there exists
a corresponding symbolic transition of the symbolic LTS that does not involve unknown
values and bound names, and vice versa. Notice that, since the original semantics does
not take bound invocations into account, only constrained services of the form Φ ` s are
considered in the theorem. For the sake of readability, we only outline here the techniques
used in the proof of the theorem and refer the interested reader to Appendix B.3 for a full
account.
Theorem 4.4.1 Let uvar(α) = ∅ and α , n  [n] . s α−−→ s′ if and only if, for any
favourable condition Φ, Φ ` s  Φ
′ , α−−−−−→ Φ′ ` s′ for some favourable condition Φ′.
Proof (sketch). The proof of the “if” part proceeds by induction on the length of the
inference of s
α−−→ s′. The “only if” part of the theorem proceeds as follows. By the
premises of rules (constServ) and (constServinv), we get that s
Φ′′ , α−−−−−−→ s′ where Φ′ =
B(Φ ∧ Φ′′, s′, ∅). By hypothesis E(Φ′) , false, hence E(Φ′′) , false too. Then, the
proof proceeds by induction on the length of the inference of s
Φ′′ , α−−−−−−→ s′. 2
4.4.3 Examples
To shed light on the technical development of COWS symbolic semantics, we show some
simple illustrative examples. In the sequel, for the sake of readability, we shall evaluate
conditions, writing e.g. x , n instead of (p = p ∧ o = o ∧ true ∧ x , n).
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External communication. According to the operational semantics introduced in Sec-
tion 3.2.3, the service [x] n?x. m!x is blocked (because it cannot perform the receive activ-
ity). Instead, according to the symbolic semantics defined in this section, the constrained
service true ` [x] n?x. m!x can evolve as follows:
(s-rec)
n?x. m!x
true , n x−−−−−−−−−→ m!x
(s-reccom)
[x] n?x. m!x
x,confRec((n?x. m!x),n)∧ x,bn , n[x]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ m!x
(constServ)
true ` [x] n?x. m!x  x,bn , n[x]−−−−−−−−−−−→ x , bn ` m!x
since (x , confRec((n?x. m!x), n)) = (x , ∅) = true. Then, the continuation can perform
the following transition:
[[x]] = (true, x)
(s-inv)
m!x
true , m x−−−−−−−−−→ 0
(constServinv)
x , bn ` m!x  x,bn , m x−−−−−−−−−→ x , bn ` 0
Notice that, although the external communication generates the condition x , bn (that
means that the received unknown value must be different from all delimited names), the
condition is never exploited because the term does not contain delimited names.
External communication within name delimitations. Consider the constrained ser-
vice true ` [n] [x] n?x. x • o!n. Differently from the previous example, the above service
contains a delimited name (i.e. n). Thus, this time, condition x , bn is exploited to
generate the specific condition x , n. Indeed, the service evolves as follows:
(s-rec)
n?x. x • o!n
true , n x−−−−−−−−−→ x • o!n
(s-reccom)
[x] n?x. x • o!n
x,confRec((n?x. x • o!n),n)∧ x,bn , n[x]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ x • o!n
(s-delpass)
[n] [x] n?x. x • o!n
x,confRec((n?x. x • o!n),n)∧ x,bn , n[x]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [n] x • o!n
(constServ)
true ` [n] [x] n?x. x • o!n  x,n∧ x,bn , n[x]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ x , n ∧ x , bn ` [n] x • o!n
since (x , confRec((n?x. x • o!n), n) = true and B(x , bn, ([n] [x] n?x. x • o!n), ∅) = x ,
n ∧ x , bn. Then, the continuation can evolve only provided that condition x , n holds.
Internal communication. Consider the constrained service true ` [p] [x] ( p • o?x. n!x |
p • o!v ), where p < n. In this case, due to the delimitation [p] , the receive activity cannot
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communicate with the environment, but can synchronize with the internal invoke:
(s-rec)
p • o?x. n!x
true , p •ox−−−−−−−−−−−→ n!x
[[v]] = (true, v)
(s-inv)
p • o!v
true , p •ov−−−−−−−−−−−→ 0
(s-com)
p • o?x. n!x | p • o!v Φ , p •o {x 7→v} 1 v−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ n!x
(s-delcom)
[x] ( p • o?x. n!x | p • o!v ) Φ , p •o ∅ 1 v−−−−−−−−−−→ n!x · {x 7→ v}
(s-delpass)
[p] [x] ( p • o?x. n!x | p • o!v ) Φ , p •o ∅ 1 v−−−−−−−−−−→ [p] n!v ≡ n!v
(s-cong)
[p] [x] ( p • o?x. n!x | p • o!v ) Φ , p •o ∅ 1 v−−−−−−−−−−→ n!v
(constServ)
true ` [p] [x] ( p • o?x. n!x | p • o!v )  Φ , p •o ∅ 1 v−−−−−−−−−→ Φ ` n!v
where Φ = ( true ∧ true ∧ p = p ∧ o = o ∧ v , confRec(p • o?x. n!x | p • o!v, p • o) ).
Since confRec(p • o?x. n!x | p • o!v, p • o) = ∅, condition Φ holds true.
External and internal communication. Consider the constrained service true `
[x] ( n?x. m!x | n!v ). In this case, both internal and external communication can take
place. Its initial transitions are the following ones:
(ext. com.) true ` [x] ( n?x. m!x | n!v )  x,bn , n[x]−−−−−−−−−−−→ x , bn ` m!x | n!v
(ext. com.) true ` [x] ( n?x. m!x | n!v )  true , n v−−−−−−−−→ true ` [x] ( n?x. m!x )
(int. com.) true ` [x] ( n?x. m!x | n!v )  Φ , n ∅ 1 v−−−−−−−→ Φ ` m!v
where Φ = ( true ∧ true ∧ n = ce ∧ v , confRec(n?x.m!x | n!v, n) ). Since
confRec(n?x.m!x | n!v, n) = ∅, condition Φ holds true.
Conflicting receive. Consider the constrained service true ` [x] ( n?v | n?x | n!v ).
Due to the presence of the receive n?v, that has greater priority to synchronize with an
invocation n!v, the receive n?x can communicate with the environment only if the received
value is not v (indeed, confRec((n?v | n?x | n!v), n) = {v} ):
true ` [x] ( n?v | n?x | n!v )  x,bn∧ x,v , n[x]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ x , bn ∧ x , v ` n?v | n!v
Other possible transitions are as follows:
true ` [x] ( n?v | n?x | n!v )  true , n v−−−−−−−−→ true ` [x] ( n?v | n?x )
true ` [x] ( n?v | n?x | n!v )  true , n v−−−−−−−−→ true ` [x] ( n?x | n!v )
true ` [x] ( n?v | n?x | n!v )  true , n ∅ 0 v−−−−−−−−−→ true ` [x] n?x
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On constrained services. Consider the (plain) service [x, y] ( n?q | n?x | x • o!v | q • o?y )
where n , q • o. It can perform the following transition:
[x, y] ( n?q | n?x | x • o!v | q • o?y ) x,bn∧ x,q , n[x]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [y] ( n?q | x • o!v | q • o?y )
The obtained service can further perform the following transition:
[y] ( n?q | x • o!v | q • o?y ) x=q , q •o ∅ 1 v−−−−−−−−−−−−→ n?q
Condition x = q of this transition contradicts condition x , q of the previous one, but the
service can however evolve. Instead, by considering constrained services, we would have:
true ` [x, y] ( n?q | n?x | x • o!v | q • o?y )  x,bn∧ x,q , n[x]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
x , bn ∧ x , q ` [y] ( n?q | x • o!v | q • o?y )  x=q∧ x,bn∧ x,q , q •o ∅ 1 v−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ false ` n?q
because x = q ∧ x , q holds false, and the second transition could not be performed.
That’s why we resort to constrained services.
Evaluation function, condition x < uv and assumption on bound variables. Con-
sider the service s , [y, z] ( n!(5 + x) | n?y.s′ | m?z. m′!z′ ), where n, m and m′ are
pairwise distinct. If [[5 + x]] = ((r , bn ∧ r < uv ∧ r = 5 + x), r) then
n!(5 + x)
(r,bn∧ r<uv∧ r=5+x) , n r−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 0
Therefore, the constrained service x , bn ∧ x′ , bn ∧ z′ , bn ` s can evolve as follows:
x , bn ∧ x′ , bn ∧ z′ , bn ` s  Φ
′ , n ∅ 1 r−−−−−−−−→ Φ′ ` [z] (s′ · {y 7→ r} | m?z. m′!z′ )︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
s′′
for Φ′ = B((x , bn ∧ x′ , bn ∧ z′ , bn ∧ r , bn ∧ r < uv ∧ r = 5+ x), s′′, {x, x′, z′}) =
(x , bn ∧ x′ , bn ∧ z′ , bn ∧ r , bn ∧ r < {x, x′, z′} ∧ r = 5 + x). Now, we
cannot α-convert variable z into r, because we would violate the assumption that bound
variables differ from variables corresponding to unknown values (in this case, variable
z must be different from r because r is an unknown value occurring in the constrained
service). Similarly, if [[5 + x]] = ((z , bn ∧ z < uv ∧ z = 5 + x), z), then the constrained
service would become
Φ′′ ` [z] (s′ · {y 7→ z} | m?z. m′!z′ )
for some Φ′′, and the assumption would be violated again (because the service contains
both z and z). Finally, if [[5 + x]] = ((z′ , bn ∧ z′ < uv ∧ z′ = 5 + x), z′), i.e. the unknown
value returned by the evaluation function is not fresh, then the condition on the symbolic
transition holds false, because z′ < {x, x′, z′} does not hold.
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4.4.4 Extensions of the symbolic operational semantics
In this section, we present two extensions of COWS symbolic semantics for dealing with
open terms and polyadic communication.
4.4.4.1 Symbolic semantics for open terms
The symbolic operational semantics presented in Section 4.4.2 is defined only for closed
terms. Indeed, for a reduction semantics it is reasonable that well-formed services may
not contain free variables and labels. However, in order to be able to inspect also the
behaviour of a service component, we need to define the semantics also for open terms.
For example, let us consider the following open term:
n?x | n!x
The term can only perform the receive activity n?x (by communicating with the environ-
ment), because activity n!x is stuck until variable x is not replaced by a value. However,
since the scope of the variable is not declared in the term, the environment can substitute
the variable with an unknown value in any moment. The resulting term is as follows:
n?x | n!x
Now, the term can perform also the activity n!x (by communicating with the environment)
and the internal communication due to synchronisation of activities n?x and n!x.
Formally, the symbolic operational semantics for open terms is defined by the rules in
Table 4.12 and the new rules in Table 4.14, where the transition label x represents exe-
cution of a substitution by the environment. We denote by fv(t) the set of variables in t,
and we exploit a predicate noKill( ), a slightly modified variant of that defined in Sec-
tion 3.2.3, whose most significant case is noKill(kill(k)) = false (this way, the predicate
holds true if there are not free kill activities that can be immediately performed).
We comment on salient points. Rules (constServ), (constServexp) and (constServinv) deal
with invoke, input and communication actions that do not involve free variables. They
differ from that shown in Table 4.13 for the addition of the predicate noKill(s) to their
premises. Rule (constServkill) permits executing (bound and free) kill activities, while rules
(constServsub), (constServrec) and (constServcom) deal with actions involving free variables
(i.e. assignment of an unknown value to a free variable by the environment, execution of
a receive having a free variable as argument, execution of a communication assigning a
value to a free variable, respectively).
The presence of predicate noKill(s) in the rules of Table 4.14 guarantees the eager
execution of unbounded kill activities. Indeed, for instance, the open term (kill(k) | n?v)
can only evolve as follows (rule (constServkill)):
true ` (kill(k) | n?v)  true , k−−−−−→ true ` 0
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s
Φ′, α−−−−−→ s′ α = n  v , n  [x ] , n ∅ ` v
Φ′′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′, s′, uvar(Φ)) noKill(s)
(constServ)
Φ,∆ ` s  Φ
′′, α−−−−→ Φ′′,∆ ` s′
s
Φ′, n [n]−−−−−−−−−→ s′ n<∆ Φ′′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′, s′, uvar(Φ)) noKill(s)
(constServexp)
Φ,∆ ` s  Φ
′′, n [n]−−−−−−−−−→ Φ′′,∆ ∪ {n} ` s′
s
Φ′, n v−−−−−−−−→ s′ n<∆ Φ′′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′, s′, uvar(Φ)) noKill(s)
(constServinv)
Φ,∆ ` s  Φ
′′, n v−−−−−−−→ Φ′′,∆ ` s′
s
Φ′, α−−−−−→ s′ α = k , † Φ′′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′, s′, uvar(Φ))
(constServkill)
Φ,∆ ` s  Φ
′′, α−−−−→ Φ′′,∆ ` s′
x ∈ fv(s) Φ′ = B((Φ ∧ x , bn), s, uvar(Φ))
(constServsub)
Φ,∆ ` s  Φ
′, x−−−−→ Φ′,∆ ` s·{x 7→ x}
s
Φ′, n x−−−−−−−−→ s′ noKill(s)
Φ′′ = B((Φ ∧ Φ′ ∧ x , bn ∧ x , confRec(s, n)), s′, uvar(Φ))
(constServrec)
Φ,∆ ` s  Φ
′′, n x−−−−−−−→ Φ′′,∆ ` s′ ·{x 7→ x}
s
Φ′, n {x 7→v} 1 v−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′ Φ′′ = B((Φ ∧ Φ′), s′, uvar(Φ)) noKill(s)
(constServcom)
Φ,∆ ` s  Φ
′′, n {x 7→v} 1 v−−−−−−−−−−−→ Φ′′,∆ ` s′ ·{x 7→ v}
Table 4.14: Symbolic semantics for COWS open terms
We explain how the rules dealing with free variables work by means of some exam-
ples. By applying rule (constServrec), the term (n?x | n!x) can communicate with the
environment (by receiving an unknown value) and evolve as follows:
true ` (n?x | n!x)  x,bn , n x−−−−−−−−−→ x , bn ` n!x
Notably, variable x is replaced by an unknown value, thus now the invoke activity can be
performed. By applying rule (constServsub), the same term becomes closed:
true ` (n?x | n!x)  x,bn , x−−−−−−→ x , bn ` (n?x | n!x)
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Now, both receive and invoke activities can communicate with the environment and also
internal communication can take place. Finally, if we slightly modify the term as (n?x |
n!v | s), by applying rule (constServcom), we obtain the following transition:
true ` (n?x | n!v | s)  Φ , n {x 7→v} 1 v−−−−−−−−−−−→ Φ ` s·{x 7→ v}
where Φ = ( true ∧ true ∧ n = ce ∧ v , confRec(n?x | n!v | s, n) ). Also in this case
the substitution for x is applied to the whole term.
4.4.4.2 Symbolic semantics for COWS with polyadic communication
We now tailor COWS syntax and symbolic semantics to deal with polyadic communi-
cation. We first extend the syntax of invoke and receive activities as follows: u • u′!¯
stands for an invoke over the endpoint u • u′ with parameter the tuple of expres-
sions ¯, while p • o?w.s stands for a receive over the endpoint p • o with param-
eter the tuple of variables/(unknown) values w and continuation s. Tuples can be
constructed using a concatenation operator defined as 〈a1, . . . , an〉 : 〈b1, . . . , bm〉 =
〈a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm〉. To single out an element of a tuple, we will write (a¯, c, b¯) to
denote the tuple 〈a1, . . . , an, c, b1, . . . , bm〉, where a¯ or b¯ might not be present, and we will
use a¯i to denote the i-th element of the tuple a¯. Finally, we denote by v(t) the set of
variables in t.
The labelled transition relation
Φ , α−−−−−→ over services now is induced by the modified
rules shown in Table 4.15 (the remaining ones are those of Table 4.12, except for rule
(s-match) which we do not need anymore), where:
• conditions can also have the form Φ ∨ Φ′; we will use x , bn to denote condition
x1 , bn ∧ . . . ∧ x n , bn for x = 〈x1, . . . , x n〉;
• action labels are generated by the following grammar:
α ::= n v | n [n¯] v | n w | n [x¯] w | nσ ` v | k | †
All the above definitions shall extend to relation  Φ , α−−−−→.
The new rules exploit a modified version of functions M( , ) and noConf( , , , )
defined in Tables 3.3 and 3.7, now redefined by the rules in Table 4.16. The rules in the
upper part of the table state that variables match any value, and two values v and v′ do
match only if condition v = v′ holds. When tuples w and v do match, M( w, v ) returns
a pair (Φ, σ), where Φ is the condition so that the matching holds and σ is a substitu-
tion for the variables in w; otherwise, it is undefined. Function noConf(s, n, v, `) now
returns a condition that guarantees absence of conflicts for the inferred transition. Basi-
cally, noConf(s, n, v, `) exploits function rec(s, n, v, `) to identify the conflicting receives
of s, then for each argument w of these receives it determines a condition (i.e. a logical
disjunction of inequalities) that makes the conflicting matching between w and v false.
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n?w.s
true , nw−−−−−−−−−→ s (s-rec)
v( w ) = x¯ |x¯ | > 1
(s-reccom)
n?w.s
x,bn , n [x¯ ] w−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s
s
Φ , n [x¯ ] w−−−−−−−−−−→ s′ y ∈ x¯
(s-delsub1)
[y] s
Φ , n [x¯ ] w−−−−−−−−−−→ s′ · {y 7→ y}
[[1]] = (Φ1, v1 ) . . . [[n]] = (Φn, v n )
(s-inv)
n!〈1, . . . , n〉
Φ1 ∧ ...∧Φn , n 〈v1,...,v n〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 0
s
Φ , n v−−−−−−−→ s′ n ∈ v n<n
(s-open1)
[n] s
Φ , n [n] v−−−−−−−−−→ s′
s
Φ , n [m¯] v−−−−−−−−−−→ s′ n ∈ v n<n
(s-open2)
[n] s
Φ , n [〈n〉:m¯] v−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′
s1
Φ1 , nw−−−−−−−−→ s′1 s2
Φ2 , n
′ v−−−−−−−−→ s′2 M( w, v ) = (Φ, σ) noConf(s1 | s2, n, v, |σ | ) = Φ′
(s-com)
s1 | s2
Φ1 ∧Φ2 ∧ n=n′ ∧Φ∧Φ′ , nσ |σ | v−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s′2
s
Φ , nσunionmulti{x 7→v} ` v−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′
(s-delsub2)
[x] s
Φ , nσ ` v−−−−−−−−→ s′ · {x 7→ v}
s1
Φ , α−−−−−→ s′1 α , k , n  [x¯ ] w , nσ ` v
(s-par)
s1 | s2 Φ , α−−−−−→ s′1 | s2
s1
Φ , nσ ` v−−−−−−−−→ s′1 noConf(s2, n, v, `) = Φ′
(s-parcom1)
s1 | s2
Φ∧Φ′ , nσ ` v−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s2
s1
Φ , n [x¯ ] w−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 noConf(s2, n,w · {x¯ 7→ x}, |x¯ | ) = Φ′
(s-parcom2)
s1 | s2
Φ∧Φ′ , n [x¯ ] w−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s2
Table 4.15: Symbolic semantics with polyadic communication (excerpt of rules)
Finally, it returns the logical conjunction of the determined conditions. We use the auxil-
iary function gval( ) that, given a tuple w, returns a collection of pairs of the form (x, i),
where x is an unknown value such that w i = x. Notably, if rec(s, n, v, `) = ∅ then function
noConf(s, n, v, `) returns the condition true, because there are not conflicting receives;
while, if there is a w ∈ rec(s, n, v, `) such that gval( w ) = ∅, then the function returns the
condition false, because there are not conditions that can make the conflicting matching
false.
We end this section with an example aimed at clarifying how pattern-matching and
conflict checking functions work. Consider the following term:
n!〈v1, v2, v3〉 | [x, y, z] n?〈x, y, z〉 | [x′] n?〈x′, y′, z′〉 | [x′′, y′′] n?〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉
In this case, the invoke activity n!〈v1, v2, v3〉 can synchronize with each receive activity of
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M(x, v) = (true, {x 7→ v}) M(v, v′) = (v = v′, ∅) M(〈〉, 〈〉) = (true, ∅)
M(a1, b1) = (Φ1, σ1) M(a¯2, b¯2) = (Φ2, σ2)
M((a1, a¯2), (b1, b¯2)) = (Φ1 ∧ Φ2, σ1 unionmulti σ2)
noConf(s, n, v, `) =
∧
w∈ rec(s,n,v,`)(
∨
(x ,i)∈gval( w ) x , v i ∧ ( gval( w ) = ∅ ⇒ false ) )
rec(n?w.s, n, v, `) =
{ {w } ifM( w, v ) = (Φ, σ) ∧ |σ| < `
∅ otherwise
rec(0, n, v, `) = rec(kill(k), n, v, `) = rec(u!¯, n, v, `) = ∅ rec(n′?w.s, n, v, `) = ∅ if n , n′
rec([e] s, n, v, `) = rec(s, n, v, `) if e < n rec([e] s, n, v, `) = ∅ if e ∈ n
rec(g + g′, n, v, `) = rec(g, n, v, `) ∪ rec(g′, n, v, `) rec({|s|}, n, v, `) = rec(s, n, v, `)
rec(s | s′, n, v, `) = rec(s, n, v, `) ∪ rec(s′, n, v, `) rec(∗ s, n, v, `) = rec(s, n, v, `)
Table 4.16: Modified matching and conflicting receives rules
the term. Firstly, consider the receive n?〈x, y, z〉: its argument 〈x, y, z〉 matches the tuple
〈v1, v2, v3〉 by generating the substitution {x 7→ v1, y 7→ v2, z 7→ v3}. The other two receive
activities are in conflict, because they satisfy the matching with the invoke and generate
substitutions with fewer pairs than 3. Thus, function rec( , , , ) applied to the whole
term5 returns the set {〈x′, y′, z′〉, 〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉}. Then, function noConf( , , , ) returns the
condition (y′ , v2 ∨ z′ , v3) ∧ z′′ , v3. Hence, a transition of the term is
n!〈v1, v2, v3〉 | [x, y, z] n?〈x, y, z〉 | [x′] n?〈x′, y′, z′〉 | [x′′, y′′] n?〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉
(y′,v2 ∨ z′,v3)∧ z′′,v3 , n ∅ 3 〈v1,v2,v3〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [x′] n?〈x′, y′, z′〉 | [x′′, y′′] n?〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉
Consider now the receive n?〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉: in this case the matching function returns con-
dition z′′ = v3 and substitution {x′′ 7→ v1, y′′ 7→ v2}. Function rec( , , , ) applied to the
whole term returns the set {〈x′, y′, z′〉}, because the only conflicting receive is n?〈x′, y′, z′〉.
Thus, the corresponding transition is
n!〈v1, v2, v3〉 | [x, y, z] n?〈x, y, z〉 | [x′] n?〈x′, y′, z′〉 | [x′′, y′′] n?〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉
(y′,v2 ∨ z′,v3)∧ z′′=v3 , n ∅ 2 〈v1,v2,v3〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [x, y, z] n?〈x, y, z〉 | [x′] n?〈x′, y′, z′〉
Moreover, the receive activities can communicate with the environment; in this case
the conflict checks are performed by rule (s-parcom2). For example, the transition corre-
5This means that the last rule applied in the inference is (s-com). Of course, the last rule could be
also (s-parcom1); in this case, two or three conflict checks will be performed on subterms of the considered
service.
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sponding to the execution of n?〈x, y, z〉 is
n!〈v1, v2, v3〉 | [x, y, z] n?〈x, y, z〉 | [x′] n?〈x′, y′, z′〉 | [x′′, y′′] n?〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉
x,bn∧ y,bn∧ z,bn∧ (y′,y∨ z′,z)∧ z′′,z , n [〈x,y,z〉] 〈x,y,z〉
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
n!〈v1, v2, v3〉 | [x′] n?〈x′, y′, z′〉 | [x′′, y′′] n?〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉
Finally, as another example consider the following term:
n!〈v1, v2, v3〉 | [x, y, z] n?〈x, y, z〉 | [x′] n?〈x′, v2, v3〉
If we try to infer the transition corresponding to the communication between n!〈v1, v2, v3〉
and n?〈x, y, z〉, we have that the condition on the transition label is false, because function
rec( , , , ) returns 〈x′, v2, v3〉 and gval(〈x′, v2, v3〉) = ∅.
4.4.5 Concluding remarks
Symbolic semantics and symbolic bisimulation were first introduced in [105] by Hennessy
and Lin on value-passing process algebras. The symbolic approach has been then applied
to pi-calculus in [180] by Sangiorgi and in [36] by Boreale and De Nicola. Victor has
adopted a similar approach in [198] to efficiently characterise hyperequivalence for the
fusion calculus. A more recent work on a symbolic semantics for a fusion-based calculus
is [48] by Buscemi and Montanari. A revisited symbolic technique for pi-calculus has
been recently proposed in [33] by Bonchi and Montanari.
We believe that the alternative symbolic operational semantics defined in this section
can pave the way for the development of efficient model and equivalence checkers for
COWS. In fact, the model checking approach introduced in Section 4.2 does not support
a fully compositional verification methodology. It allows to analyse systems of services
‘as a whole’, but does not enable analysis of services in isolation (e.g. a provider service
without a proper client). The symbolic operational semantics should permit to overcome
this limitation that is somewhat related to the original semantics of COWS which, al-
though based on an LTS, follows a reduction style. Furthermore, the symbolic operational
semantics can be used to improve efficiency of checking the equivalences introduced in
Section 4.3. This, of course, requires defining alternative characterizations of the equiva-
lences on top of the symbolic transition system. We plan to pursue these lines of research
in the near future, and in particular to implement the operational semantics and equiva-
lence and model checkers on top of it.
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Chapter 5
On the expressiveness of COWS
In the previous two chapters, we showed that COWS can model different and typical
aspects of SOC, and presented some methods and tools to analyse COWS terms. In this
chapter, we want to investigate the expressiveness of COWS.
On the one hand, we provide some encodings of other formal languages for SOC: the
three orchestration languages Orc, SCC and ws-calculus, the process calculus Lpi, and the
modelling language SRML. Translations from higher level languages, besides showing
the descriptive power of COWS, pave the way for using the reasoning mechanisms and
verification techniques that are being made available for COWS (see Chapter 4 for an
account) to verify properties of applications designed with different languages.
On the other hand, we present two COWS variants: a timed extension of COWS,
called CWS, and a dialect of COWS for concurrent constraint programming, which
permits modelling the phases of dynamic service publication, discovery and negotiation
of SOC applications. In fact, since it is not known to what extent timed computation can
be reduced to untimed forms of computation [197], we show how timed activities can be
easily incorporated into COWS. Instead, since COWS definition abstracts from a few sets
of objects (e.g., the set of expressions that can occur within terms of the calculus), we
appropriately specialise these parameters of the language so that services can specify and
conclude Service Level Agreements by generating and composing constraints dynami-
cally. This way, we obtain a linguistic formalism capable of modelling all the phases of
the life cycle of SOC applications.
Structure of the chapter. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1
presents the encodings in COWS of Orc, SCC, ws-calculus, Lpi and SRML. Section 5.2
introduces CWS and the variant of COWS for concurrent constraint programming. Each
section reports a comparison with related work.
5.1 Encoding other formal languages for SOC
We present here the encodings in COWS of three orchestration languages: Orc, SCC
and ws-calculus. The first language is based on the functional paradigm and has already
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proved to be capable of expressing the most common workflow patterns; the second one
is a language for SOC centered on the explicit modelling of services’ interaction sessions
and their dynamic creation; the last one exploits message correlation and turned out to
be suitable to model in a quite direct way the semantics of whole WS-BPEL [138, 129].
We end the section with the encoding in COWS of Lpi, the variant of pi-calculus closest to
COWS, and the implementation in COWS of the modelling language SRML.
We prove that there is a formal correspondence, based on the operational semantics (in
the style of [158]), between Orc expressions and the COWS services resulting from their
encoding. Similar results could be also proved for the other encodings. However, here we
aim only at showing the descriptive power of COWS, without losing ourselves in detailed
and intricate proofs. We leave as a future work the task of developing a formal account of
its expressiveness.
5.1.1 Encoding Orc
Orc [153] is a recently proposed task orchestration language with applications in work-
flow, business process management, and web service orchestration. We will show that its
encoding in COWS enjoys a property of operational correspondence. This is an impor-
tant witness of COWS’s expressiveness because it is known that Orc can express the most
common workflow patterns identified in [196]. Orc syntax is:
(Expressions) f , g ::= 0 | S (w) | E(w) | f > x > g | f | g | g where x :∈ f
(Parameters) w ::= x | v
where S ranges over site names, E over expression names, x over variables, and v over
values. Each expression name E has a unique declaration of the form E(x) , f . Expres-
sions can be composed by means of sequential composition · > x > ·, symmetric parallel
composition · | ·, and asymmetric parallel composition · where x :∈ · starting from the
elementary expressions 0, that is treated as a site that is never called, S (w) (site call) and
E(w) (expression call). The variable x is bound in g for the expressions f > x > g and
g where x :∈ f . We use f v( f ) to denote the set of variables that are not bound (i.e. which
occur free) in f .
Evaluation of expressions may call a number of sites and returns a (possibly empty)
stream of values. So, in summary, an Orc expression can be either a site call, an expression
call or a composition of expressions according to one of the three basic orchestration
patterns.
Site call: a site call can have the form S (w), where the site name is known statically, and
w is the parameter of the call. If w is a variable, then it must be instantiated before
the call is made.
Expression call: an expression call has the form E(w) and executes the expression de-
fined by E(x) , f after having replaced x by w. Here w is passed by reference.
Note that expression definitions can be recursive.
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S (v)
!v′
↪→ 0 (SiteCall) E(x) , f (Def)
E(w)
τ
↪→ f · {x 7→ w}
f
l
↪→ f ′
(Sym1)
f | g l↪→ f ′ | g
g
l
↪→ g′
(Sym2)
f | g l↪→ f | g′
f
τ
↪→ f ′
(Seq1)
f > x > g
τ
↪→ f ′ > x > g
f
!v
↪→ f ′
(Seq2)
f > x > g
τ
↪→ ( f ′ > x > g) | g · {x 7→ v}
g
l
↪→ g′
(Asym1)
g where x :∈ f l↪→ g′ where x :∈ f
f
τ
↪→ f ′
(Asym2)
g where x :∈ f τ↪→ g where x :∈ f ′
f
!v
↪→ f ′
(Asym3)
g where x :∈ f τ↪→ g · {x 7→ v}
Table 5.1: Orc asynchronous operational semantics
Symmetric parallel composition: the composition f | g executes both f and g concur-
rently, assuming that there is no interaction between them. It publishes the inter-
leaving of the two streams of values published by f and g, in temporal order.
Sequential composition: the composition f > x > g executes f , and, for each value v
returned by f , it executes an instance of g with v assigned to x. It publishes the
interleaving (in temporal order) of the streams of values published by the different
instances of g.
Asymmetric parallel composition: the composition g where x :∈ f starts in parallel
both f and the parts of g that do not need x. When f publishes the first value,
let say v, it is killed and v is assigned to x. The composition publishes the stream
obtained from g (instantiated with v).
The asynchronous operational semantics of Orc is given by the labelled transition re-
lation
l
↪→ defined in Table 5.1, where label τ indicates an internal event while label !v
indicates the value v resulting from evaluating an expression. A site call can progress only
when the actual parameter is a value v (rule (SiteCall)); it elicits one response v′. While
site calls use a call-by-value mechanism, expression calls use a call-by-name mechanism
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〈〈0〉〉r = 0 〈〈S (w)〉〉r = S!〈w, r〉 〈〈E(w)〉〉r = [r′] (E!〈r, r′〉 | [z] r′?〈z〉. z!〈w〉)
〈〈 f > x > g〉〉r = [r f ] (〈〈 f 〉〉r f | ∗ [x] r f ?〈x〉. 〈〈g〉〉r) 〈〈 f | g〉〉r = 〈〈 f 〉〉r | 〈〈g〉〉r
〈〈g where x :∈ f 〉〉r = [r f , x] ( 〈〈g〉〉r | [k] ( 〈〈 f 〉〉r f | r f ?〈x〉.kill(k) ) )
Table 5.2: Orc encoding
(rule (Def)), namely the actual parameter replaces the formal one and then the correspond-
ing expression is evaluated. Symmetric parallel composition f | g consists of concurrent
evaluations of f and g (rules (Sym1) and (Sym2)). Sequential composition f > x > g ac-
tivates a concurrent copy of g with x replaced by v, for each value v returned by f (rules
(Seq1) and (Seq2)). Asymmetric parallel composition g where x :∈ f prunes threads se-
lectively. It starts in parallel both f and the part of g that does not need x (rules (Asym1)
and (Asym2)). The first value returned by f is assigned to x and the continuation of f and
all its descendants are then terminated (rule (Asym3)).
Notably, the presented operational semantics slightly simplifies that described in [153],
in a way that does not misrepresent the properties of the encoding. Indeed, in the original
semantics, a site call involves three steps: invocation of the site, response from the site,
and publication of the result. Here, instead, a site call is performed in one step, that
corresponds to the immediate publication of the result.
The encoding of Orc expressions in COWS exploits function 〈〈·〉〉r shown in Table 5.2.
The function is defined by induction on the syntax of expressions and is parameterized
by the endpoint r used to return the result of expressions evaluation. Thus, a site call is
rendered as an invoke activity that sends a pair made of the parameter of the invocation and
the endpoint for the reply along the endpoint S corresponding to site name S . Expression
call is rendered similarly, but we need two invoke activities: E!〈r, r′〉 activates a new
instance of the body of the declaration, while z!〈w〉 sends the value of the actual parameter
(when this value will be available) to the created instance, by means of a private endpoint
stored in z received from the encoding of the corresponding expression declaration along
the private endpoint r′ previously sent. Sequential composition is encoded as the parallel
composition of the two components sharing a delimited endpoint, where a new instance
of the component on the right is created every time that on the left returns a value along
the shared endpoint. Symmetric parallel composition is encoded as parallel composition,
where the values produced by the two components are sent along the same return endpoint.
Finally, asymmetric parallel composition is encoded in terms of parallel composition in
such a way that, whenever the encoding of f returns its first value, this is passed to the
encoding of g (since f and g share the variable x) and a kill activity is enabled. Due to
its eager semantics, the kill will terminate what remains of the term corresponding to the
encoding of f .
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Moreover, for each site S , we define the service:
∗ [x, y] S?〈x, y〉.y!〈Sx 〉 (5.1)
that receives along the endpoint S a value (stored in x) and an endpoint (stored in y) to be
used to send back the result, and returns the evaluation of Sx , an unspecified expression
corresponding to S and depending on x.
Similarly, for each expression declaration E(x) , f we define the service:
∗ [y, z] E?〈y, z〉.[r] (z!〈r〉 | [x] (r?〈x〉 | 〈〈 f 〉〉y) ) (5.2)
Here, the received value (stored in x) is processed by the encoding of the body of the
declaration, that is activated as soon as the expression is called.
Finally, the encoding of an Orc expression f , written [[ f ]]r, is the parallel composition
of 〈〈 f 〉〉r, of a service of the form (5.1) or (5.2) for each site or expression called in f , in
any of the expressions called in f , and so on recursively.
We can prove that there is a formal correspondence, based on the operational seman-
tics, between Orc expressions and the COWS services resulting from their encoding. To
simplify the proof, we found it convenient to extend the syntax of Orc expressions with
f · {x 7→ y}, that behaves as the expression obtained from f by replacing all free oc-
currences of x with y. Correspondingly, we add the following rule to those defining the
operational semantics:
f
l
↪→ f ′
(Sub)
f · {x 7→ y} l↪→ f ′ · {x 7→ y}
Next proposition, that can be easily proved by induction on the syntax of expressions,
states that there is an operational correspondence between the extended semantics and the
original one.
Proposition 5.1.1 If y < f v( f ), then f
l
↪→ f ′ iff f · {x 7→ y} l↪→ f ′ · {x 7→ y}.
Expression f · {x 7→ y} is encoded as the parallel composition of the encoding of f with
a receive activity r′?〈x〉, that initializes the shared variable x, and with an invoke activity
r′!〈y〉, that forwards the value of variable y (when it will be available) along the private
endpoint r′. Formally, it is defined as
〈〈 f · {x 7→ y}〉〉r = [r′] (r′!〈y〉 | [x] (r′?〈x〉 | 〈〈 f 〉〉r) )
The operational correspondence between Orc expressions and the COWS services
resulting from their encoding can be characterized by two propositions, which we call
completeness and soundness. The former states that all possible executions of an Orc
expression can be simulated by its encoding, while the latter states that the initial step
of a COWS term resulting from an encoding can be simulated by the corresponding Orc
189
CHAPTER 5 On the expressiveness of COWS
expression so that the continuation of the encoding can evolve in the encoding of the
expression continuation. By letting s
α
==⇒ s′ to mean that there exist two services, s1 and
s2, such that s1 is a reduct of s, s1
α−−→ s2 and s′ is a reduct of s2, the two properties can
be stated as follows.
Theorem 5.1.1 (Completeness) Given an Orc expression f and an endpoint r, f
l
↪→ f ′
implies [[ f ]]r ≡ 〈〈 f 〉〉r | s
α
==⇒ 〈〈 f ′〉〉r | s, where α = r  〈v〉 if l = !v, and α = n ∅ ` v¯ if
l = τ.
Proof (sketch). By induction on the length of the inference of f
l
↪→ f ′, with a case
analysis on the last rule used in the derivation. 2
Lemma 5.1.1 Given an Orc expression f and an endpoint r, [[ f ]]r
r 〈v〉−−−−−9.
Proof. By a straightforward induction on the definition of the encoding. 2
Theorem 5.1.2 (Soundness) Given an Orc expression f and an endpoint r, [[ f ]]r ≡
〈〈 f 〉〉r | s n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−−→ s′ implies that there exists an Orc expression f ′ such that f l↪→ f ′
and s′
α
==⇒ 〈〈 f ′〉〉r | s, where α = r 〈v〉 if l = !v, and α = n′ ∅ `′ v¯′ if l = τ.
Proof (sketch). By induction on the definition of the encoding 〈〈 f 〉〉r. 2
As usual, for the sake of readability, we have only outlined here the techniques used in
the proofs. We refer the interested reader to Appendix B.4 for a full account.
5.1.2 Encoding SCC
SCC (Service Centered Calculus [34]) is a formalism aiming to serve as a basis for pro-
gramming and composing services. SCC integrates complementary aspects borrowed
from well-known process calculi, such as pi-calculus (names handling primitives), Orc
(pipelining and pruning of activities), web-pi, cJoin, and Sagas (long running transactions
and compensations). A key feature of SCC is the session handling mechanism, that al-
lows for the definition of structured interaction protocols. A session permits bi-directional
communication between two parties (service- and client-side). Transparently for the pro-
grammers, sessions are opened by service invocations, which spawn fresh session parties
(locally to each partner). Moreover, sessions can be nested and values can be returned
outside sessions. Finally, SCC sessions can be closed by the involved parties, providing a
mechanism for process interruption and service cancellation and update.
The syntax of SCC, given in Table 5.3, is parameterized by a countable set of names,
ranged over by a, b, . . . , x, y, . . . . Basically, in SCC processes are defined as parallel
compositions of service definitions and service invocations. Service definitions take the
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P,Q,T ::= (processes)
0 (nil)
| a.P (concretion)
| (x)P (abstraction)
| return a.P (return value)
| a⇒ (x)P : (y)T (service definition)
| a{(x)P} ⇐h Q (service invocation)
| a .h P (session)
| P | Q (parallel composition)
| (νa)P (new name)
Table 5.3: SCC syntax
form a⇒ (x)P : (y)T , where a is the service name, x is a formal parameter, P is the actual
implementation of the service, and (y)T is the protocol of the termination handler service
that will be instantiated on the server-side in service invocation. Service invocations are
written as a{(x)P} ⇐h Q: each new value v produced by the client Q will trigger a new
invocation of service a; for each invocation, an instance of the process P, with x bound to
the actual invocation value v, implements the client-side protocol for interacting with the
new instance of a. Name h identifies the termination handler service on the client-side. A
service invocation causes activation of a new session: a pair of dual fresh names, r and
r˜, identifies the two sides of the session. A session side has the form r .h P and the first
time the protocol P invokes the termination handler service identified by h (i.e. that of the
other side), the session is closed. Notably, in order to program the session termination,
the calculus has a special name close, that is replaced by the name of the termination
handler instantiated on the other side at invocation time. Within a session, client and
server protocols can communicate whenever a concretion is available on one side and an
abstraction is ready on the other side, i.e. abstractions and concretions model input and
output, respectively. A value can be returned outside the current session (just one level
up) by means of the primitive return .
To illustrate an example of interaction protocol in SCC, consider the (simplified) ser-
vice definition succ⇒ (x) x + 1 that models a service that, received an integer, returns its
successor. A (simplified) client for this service can be written as succ { (x) (y) return y } ⇐
5. After the service invocation, we have that x is bound to the argument 5, the client waits
for a value from the server succ and the received value is substituted for y and hence re-
turned as the result of the service invocation. As a consequence of the interaction between
the client and the server succ, the following session is triggered:
(νr)(r . 5 + 1 | r˜ . (y) return y)
The value 6 is computed on the service-side and then received at the client side, that
reduces first to r˜ . return 6 and then to 6 | r˜ . 0. Values returned outside the session to the
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enclosing environment can be used to invoke other services. For instance, the following
client invokes the service succ and then prints the obtained result:
print {(z) 0} ⇐ (succ { (x) (y) return y } ⇐ 5)
To take into account unexpected events, the above client can be extended so to exploit a
suitable service fault that can handle printer failures. Thus, we have the following parallel
composition:
print{(z)0} ⇐fault (succ{(x)(y)return y} ⇐ 5) | fault ⇒ (code) ErrorHandling
where ErrorHandling is a service protocol able to manage printer errors according to
their identifier code. Here, we suppose that when invoked by the client, a service-side
session of the form r .fault P[fault/close] is created, where P is the printer protocol and
fault is substituted for close. In case of printer failure the protocol P should invoke the
service close (instantiated to fault), with an error code err as a parameter. As effect of this
invocation, the whole service-side session r is destroyed and the invocation will instantiate
an error recovery session that executes ErrorHandling[err/code].
Since COWS is a calculus with asynchronous communication while SCC relies on
synchronous communication, then for the sake of the presentation, we define the encoding
[[ ]]K
in,out,ret, from SCC to ‘synchronous COWS’ and exploit the auxiliary encoding 〈〈 〉〉,
from the synchronous version of COWS to the original one. The auxiliary encoding acts
as an homomorphism except for the communication activities:
〈〈u • u′!〈1, . . . n〉.s〉〉 = [r] (u • u′!〈1, . . . n, r〉 | r?〈〉.〈〈s〉〉)
〈〈p • o?〈w1, . . . ,wn〉.s〉〉 = [x] (p • o?〈w1, . . . ,wn, x〉.(x!〈〉 | 〈〈s〉〉) )
The encoding [[ ]]K
in,out,ret, shown in Table 5.4, is inspired by that from the close-
free fragment of SCC to pi-calculus [34]. The encoding is parametric on three endpoints
used to receive values from (in), send values to (out), and return values to the enclosing
session (ret). Moreover, it exploits an auxiliary function K, that maps SCC names used
to identify termination handler services (ranged over by h) to COWS killer labels (ranged
over by k).
We comment on salient points. Concretion and return actions are rendered as out-
puts on the endpoints out and ret respectively, while abstractions are rendered as inputs
on in. The three endpoints are set by the encoding of sessions that, to permit closing a
session, also introduces a delimitation for a killer label (associated to the session name
by updating the function K). To model bi-directional sessions we associate a pair of end-
points a1 and a2 to each session name a. Parallel composition and restriction operators are
mapped homomorphically. In the encoding of restriction, the extra condition a < dom(K)
avoids name conflicts between the encoded term and the function K, and can always be
satisfied by first α-converting the a in (νa)P. To model service definitions and invoca-
tions we exploit a distinguished endpoint scc; each service definition waits invocations
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(concretion) [[a.P]]K
in,out,ret = out!〈a〉.[[P]]Kin,out,ret
(abstraction) [[(x)P]]K
in,out,ret = [x] in?〈x〉.[[P]]Kin,out,ret
(return value) [[return a.P]]K
in,out,ret = ret!〈a〉.[[P]]Kin,out,ret
(session) [[a .h P]]Kin,out,ret = [k] [[P]]
K,{h7→k}
a1,a2,out
[[a˜ .h P]]Kin,out,ret = [k] [[P]]
K,{h7→k}
a2,a1,out
(new name) [[(νa)P]]K
in,out,ret = [a] [[P]]
K
in,out,ret if a < dom(K)
(parallel comp.) [[P | Q]]K
in,out,ret = [[P]]
K
in,out,ret | [[Q]]Kin,out,ret
(service definition)
[[a⇒ (x)P : (z)T ]]K
in,out,ret = ∗ [x1, x2, y1, y2, x] scc?〈a, x1, x2, y1, y2, x〉.
[k] ( [[P[y1/close]]]
K,{y1 7→k}
x2,x1,out
| ∗ [z] th?〈y2, z〉.[[T [y1/close]]]K,{y1 7→k}, ,out )
(service invocation)
[[a{(x)P} ⇐h Q]]Kin,out,ret =

[r] ( [[Q]]K
in,r,ret | ∗ [x] r?〈x〉.
[h′, i, o] scc!〈a, i, o, h, h′, x〉.
[k] [[P[h′/close]]]K,{h
′ 7→k}
i,o,out
)
if a < dom(K)
[r] ( [[Q]]K
in,r,ret | ∗ [x] r?〈x〉.
th!〈a, x〉.kill(K(a)) ) if a ∈ dom(K)
Table 5.4: SCC encoding
on this endpoint, and request messages are routed to the correct service by means of their
first field, that is the name of the invoked service and acts as a correlation value. Simi-
larly, we exploits a distinguished endpoint th to model termination handler services. A
service definition, when it is invoked (along scc), instantiates the service protocol and
the termination handler service, by using the received data. Name close, in the service
protocol and in the termination handler, is replaced by a killer label corresponding to
the client termination handler name. Finally, for service invocation we differentiates two
cases: service invocation and termination handler invocation. In both cases, outputs on
the fresh endpoint r where process Q produces the parameters for service invocation are
intercepted, and each value v triggers an invocation of the service a. In the former case
(a < dom(K)), the invoked endpoint is scc, and the transmitted data are as follows: the
service name a (for correlation purpose), two fresh endpoints i and o for bi-directional
session communication, two termination handler names h and h′ (the former is installed
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n ::= a :: C (nodes)
C ::= ∗s | m  s (components)
| 〈a, o, u¯〉 | C | C
m ::= ∅ | {p = u} | m ∪ m (correl. constraints)
s ::= (services)
0 (null)
| exit (exit)
| ass (w¯, ¯) (assign)
| inv (r, o, w¯) (invoke)
| rec (r, o, w¯) (receive)
| if () then {s} else {s} (switch)
| s; s (sequence)
| s | s (flow)
| ∑i∈I rec (ri, oi, w¯i) ; si (pick)
| A(w¯) (call)
Table 5.5: ws-calculus syntax
at client-side, while the latter will be installed at server-side), and the produced value v.
After the invocation, the client protocol P is instantiated. In case of invocation of a termi-
nation handler service (a ∈ dom(K)), the invoked endpoint is th, and after this invocation,
the corresponding session is closed by means of the kill activity.
5.1.3 Encoding ws-calculus
ws-calculus [130] is a process language that formalizes the semantics of an expressive
subset of WS-BPEL, with special concern for modeling the interactions among web ser-
vices, be them WS-BPEL processes or not, in a network context. The syntax of (an
untyped variant of) ws-calculus, given in Table 5.5, is parameterized with respect to the
following syntactic sets: properties (sorts of late bound constants storing some relevant
values within service instances, ranged over by p), values (basic values and addresses,
ranged over by u), partner links (variables storing addresses used to identify service part-
ners within an interaction), operation parameters (basic variables, partner links and prop-
erties, ranged over by w), and service identifiers (ranged over by A). Notationally, we will
use a to range over addresses and r to range over addresses and partner links.
ws-calculus permits to model the interactions among web service instances in a net-
work context. A network of services is a finite set of nodes. Nodes, written as a :: C,
are uniquely identified by an address a and host components C. Components C may be
service specifications, instances or requests. The behavioural specification of a service
s is written ∗s, while m  s′ represents a service instance that behaves according to s′
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(nodes) 〈〈a :: C〉〉 = 〈〈C〉〉a
(components) 〈〈∗s〉〉a = ∗ [ka,V(s)] 〈〈s〉〉a
〈〈{ p¯ = u¯}  s〉〉a = [ka,V(s)] 〈〈s · { p¯ 7→ u¯}〉〉a
〈〈〈a′, o, u¯〉〉〉a = {| a • o!〈a′, u¯〉 |}
(null) 〈〈0〉〉a = 0
(exit) 〈〈exit〉〉a = kill(ka)
(assign) 〈〈ass (w¯, ¯)〉〉a = [w¯ = ¯]
(invoke) 〈〈inv (r, o, w¯)〉〉a = r • o!〈a, w¯〉
(receive) 〈〈rec (r, o, w¯)〉〉a = a • o?〈r, w¯〉
(call/def) 〈〈A(w¯)〉〉a = [A] ( A!〈w¯〉 | [x¯] A?〈x¯〉.〈〈s〉〉a ) if A(x¯) de f= s
Table 5.6: ws-calculus encoding (an excerpt)
and whose properties evaluate according to the (possibly empty) set m of correlation con-
straints. A correlation constraint is a pair, written p = u, recording the value u assigned
to the property p. Properties are used to store values that are important to identify service
instances. A service request 〈a, o, u¯〉 represents an operation invocation that must still be
processed and contains the invoker address a, the operation name o and the data u¯ for
operation execution.
Services are structured activities built from basic activities, i.e. instance forced termi-
nation exit, assignment ass ( , ), service invocation inv ( , , ) and service request pro-
cessing rec ( , , ), by exploiting operators for conditional choice if ( ) then { } else { }
(switch), sequential composition ; (sequence), parallel composition | (flow), external
choice
∑
i∈I rec ( , , ) ; (pick) and service call A(w¯) (of course, we assume that every
service identifier A has a unique definition of the form A(x¯)
de f
= s).
The encoding from ws-calculus to COWS, denoted by 〈〈·〉〉, is defined inductively
on the syntax of ws-calculus and is shown in Table 5.6. We only show the relevant
cases; for example, the encodings of structural activities are quite standard and, hence,
omitted. The encoding of a service net is the parallel composition of the encodings of its
nodes. The encoding of a node is given in term of the encoding of the hosted components
parameterized by the address of the node. Both variables and properties occurring in
service components are encoded as COWS variables.
The auxiliary parameterized encoding 〈〈·〉〉a is defined inductively over the syntax of
services. The parameter a is used both as the partner name to which a given request must
be sent and as a reference for the killer label ka used to identify each service instance. Ser-
vice specifications are encoded as COWS persistent services, by exploiting the replication
operator. The fact that variables are global to service instances is rendered through the
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〈〈a〉〉S∪{a} = xa • ya 〈〈a〉〉S = pa • oa if a < S
〈〈0〉〉S = 0 〈〈a(b).P〉〉S = [〈〈b〉〉S ′] 〈〈a〉〉S ′?〈〈b〉〉S ′ .〈〈P〉〉S ′ S ′ = S ∪{b}
〈〈(νa)P〉〉S = [〈〈a〉〉S ] 〈〈P〉〉S 〈〈a¯b〉〉S = 〈〈a〉〉S !〈〈b〉〉S
〈〈P1 | P2〉〉S = 〈〈P1〉〉S | 〈〈P2〉〉S 〈〈!a(b).P〉〉S = ∗ 〈〈a(b).P〉〉S
Table 5.7: Lpi encoding
outermost delimitation [ka,V(s)] , where V(s) is the set of free variables and properties of
s. Partner links used to identify service partners within an interaction are translated by
exploiting the address of the hosting node. The effect of executing exit inside a service
instance hosted at a is achieved by forcing termination of the COWS term resulting from
the encoding the instance and identified by the label ka. Basic activity ass (w¯, ¯) is en-
coded by [w¯ = ¯], which is the term (3.3) introduced in Section 3.2.1.3. Finally, the case
of service call is handled along the lines of the encoding of the Orc site call (presented in
Section 5.1.1).
5.1.4 Encoding localised pi-calculus
Localised pi-calculus (Lpi [147]) is the variant of pi-calculus closest to COWS. In fact,
all Lpi constructs have a direct counterpart in COWS and is indeed possible to define
an encoding that enjoys operational correspondence. More precisely, the syntax of Lpi
processes is
P ::= 0 | a(b).P | a¯b | P | P | (νa)P | !a(b).P
with the constraint that in processes a(b).P and !a(b).P name b may not occur free in P
in input position. For simplicity sake, we define the encoding only for Lpi processes such
that their bound names are all distinct and different from the free ones (but it can be easily
extended to deal with all processes). The crux of the encoding is mapping each Lpi channel
name in a COWS endpoint, that is composed of variables if the channel name is bound by
an input prefix (because in Lpi the name is used as a placeholder and COWS distinguishes
between names and variables), and of names otherwise. The actual encoding function
〈〈·〉〉S , that is parameterized by a set of names S , is defined by induction on the syntax of
Lpi processes by the clauses in Table 5.7 (where the endpoint pa • oa is sometimes used
in place of the tuple 〈pa, oa〉). The encoding of process P is given by service 〈〈P〉〉S with
S = ∅; as the encoding proceeds, S is used to record the names that have been freed and
were initially bound by an input prefix.
5.1.5 Encoding SRML
SRML (Sensoria Reference Modelling Language, [90]) provides primitives for modelling
composite services and activities whose business logic involves the orchestration of inter-
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ONROADREPAIR
OR:
Orchestrator
GP:
GPS
OP
intOR
SLA
SM:
SensorMonitor
SO
GA:
Garage
intGA
OG
REPAIRSERVICE
GO:
GarageOrchestrator
GL
intGO
LA:
LocalAgenda
SLA
     CR:
    Customer CG
Figure 5.1: Activity module OnRoadRepair and service module RepairService
actions among more elementary components and the invocation of services provided by
external parties. SRML is inspired by SCA (Service Component Architecture, [17]) and is
independent of the languages and platforms that are currently being provided for web [6]
(or grid [93]) services.
To illustrate and discuss the use of SRML and its methodology, we consider the sce-
nario depicted in Figure 5.1, which is a simplified model of the automotive case study
presented in Section 2.4.1. The scenario involves an activity OnRoadRepair that takes
place in a software system (embedded in a vehicle) handling engine failures detected by
a sensor. When the activity is triggered, the system (1) determines the current location
of the car by using a GPS device, and (2) binds to a repair service selected among those
offered by nearby garages that can ensure best levels of assistance, including a tow truck
if necessary.
In SRML, modules are used for specifying (business) activities and services. There
are two kinds of modules. Activity modules specify applications developed according to
requirements provided by a specific business organisation. An example is the activity
OnRoadRepair that will have been developed by, or for, the car manufacturer. Service
modules are developed (by, or for, service providers) to be published in repositories in
ways that allow them to be discovered when a request for an external service is published
in the run-time environment. An example is the repair service that OnRoadRepair will
procure when the engine-failure sensor is activated.
A module is specified in terms of a number of entities and the way they are intercon-
nected. For example, the activity module OnRoadRepair shown in Figure 5.1 (left-hand
side) involves the following software entities: SM (the interface to the sensor that triggers
the activity), GP (the interface to the GPS system), and OR (the orchestrator that coordi-
nates the interactions with the external services and GP). These entities are interconnected
through wires, each of which defines an interaction protocol between two entities. Typi-
cally, wires deal with the heterogeneity of partners involved in the activity by performing
data (or, more generally, semantic) integration, which is useful when, for instance, a car
has to travel across different countries. OnRoadRepair relies on an external service for
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booking a garage and calling a tow-truck, the discovery of which will be triggered, on-the-
fly, according to the conditions detected by the sensor. This dependency is made explicit
through the requires interface GA.
As illustrated, every activity module declares interfaces of four possible kinds: (1) one
and only one serves-interface that binds the activity to the application that triggered its
execution (e.g., SM on the left-hand side of Figure 5.1), (2) a number of uses-interfaces
(possibly none) that bind to persistent components already present in the configuration
when the activity is launched (e.g., GP on the left-hand side of Figure 5.1), (3) a number
of component-interfaces (at least one) that bind to components that are created when the
activity is launched (e.g., OR on the left-hand side of Figure 5.1), (4) a number of requires-
interfaces (possibly none) that bind the activity to services that are procured externally
when certain conditions become true (e.g., GA on the left-hand side of Figure 5.1).
Service modules such as RepairService in Figure 5.1 (right-hand side) provide a ser-
vice to the external environment and can be dynamically discovered and invoked (instead
of being launched directly by users). They have one provides-interface — CR in the ex-
ample — instead of a serves-interface. Notice that the workflow of a module is defined
collectively by the components in its configuration and the wires that connect them, which
facilitates modular development and reuse driven by the structure of the business domain.
SRML also offers primitives for defining internal and external configuration policies.
The internal policies (indicated by clocks) define the initialisation and termination con-
ditions of each component and the conditions that trigger the discovery process of each
external service. For instance, intGA in Figure 5.1 is the condition that triggers the dis-
covery of GA; it is defined in terms of the events that can occur during the execution of
OnRoadRepair. The external policies (indicated by the rulers) express constraints for
Service Level Agreements (SLA).
The graphical notation used to specify the automotive case study has the advantage of
being intuitive and facilitating the identification of the relationships among the involved
entities. However, it abstracts from a number of details that need to be accounted for
when defining an implementation. For this reason, a detailed and ‘tractable’ textual no-
tation is also defined for SRML, the Backus-Naur Form syntax of which is defined in
Appendix C.1. In Appendix C.2, we present the specification of the automotive case
study using this textual notation.
Now, we outline how the elements that compose a SRML configuration can be defined
in terms of an orchestrated system in COWS. We illustrate our approach by means of the
above scenario.
To make the encoding modular, the SRML configuration modelling the automotive
case study is decomposed in a number of areas of concern, numbered one to six in Fig-
ure 5.2:
(1) Creation of an activity or service instance. Every encoding of a SRML module
is intended as a factory (1a) that handles the creation of different instances. Each
instance of a module has an associated instance handler (1b) that implements mes-
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Figure 5.2: Decomposition of OnRoadRepair into areas of concern
sage correlation and maps the interaction/parameter names of the interface to those
of the correct components of the module.
(2) Orchestration. The orchestration consists of the executable pattern of interactions
described by the set of components internal to the SRML module.
(3) Discovery of a service. To bind new service components to those in the instance that
triggered the discovery, we need what we call a discovery handler. From a module’s
perspective, the information for handling the process of discovery of each of its re-
quires interfaces includes (1) a specification of the required syntactic/behavioural
properties (i.e., the business protocol), (2) a specification of the SLA constraints
given by the external policies and (3) the condition that triggers the discovery
process (i.e., the trigger condition associated with a specific requires-interface in
SRML). The discovery handler of a module includes a requires handler for each
requires-interface of the module. A requires handler implements the mapping of
names and parameters of a specific requires-interface to those of the components of
the discovered module as established by the wires.
(4) Middleware. It consists of those functionalities that support the execution of SRML
configurations. Among other things, the middleware enables the discovery and
binding processes by relying on a broker — a discovery and reasoner entity that se-
lects the most suitable service that matches a given requires-interface among those
stored in a repository. The middleware also includes a matchmaking agent support-
ing the matching of functional descriptions and a constraint solver supporting the
negotiation of Quality of Service properties. This is where COWS offers a layer
of abstraction that is still above that of a dedicated middleware, thus allowing us
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to ‘parametrise’ the encoding and remain independent of specific technologies. For
instance, web service architectures currently provide only very limited brokerage
facilities via the technology UDDI [6].
(5) Environment. It consists of the activities and services published in some repository.
(6) Bottom layer. It consists of the set of persistent entities, which typically already
exist when a service instance is created and which may be shared among different
instances (e.g., GP of type GPS in OnRoadRepair).
According to this architecture, the COWS representation of a service module is
Module(1,2,3) | Middleware4 | Environment5 | BottomLayer6
where Module(1,2,3) is of the form:
Factory1a.(InstanceHandler1b | Orchestration2 | DiscoveryHandler3 )
The superscripts establish a correspondence between the terms and the parts of a SRML
configuration illustrated in Figure 5.2. One advantage of this architecture is that it permits
an incremental development of the different aspects of the encoding.
In Appendix C.3 we give a flavour of the implementation of SRML in COWS through
the automotive case study previously presented. A more complete account of the encoding
can be found in [30].
5.1.6 Concluding remarks
We have defined encodings from a few languages for SOC such as Orc, SCC, ws-
calculus, Lpi and SRML to COWS, and we have formalized the properties enjoyed by
the first encoding. This is an important evidence of COWS’s expressiveness, since such
languages address different aspects (at different levels of abstraction) of currently avail-
able SOC technologies.
For what concern the encoding of the modelling language SRML, we give a special
emphasis to the architecture of the encoding rather than a detailed account. In fact, we
consider this to be the main interest of our work in the sense that it reveals general as-
pects of what it means to encode (i.e. implement) a business modelling language over a
calculus of services. Indeed, our encoding is such that the structure of the COWS terms
that implement SRML modules reflects the architecture of the configuration management
process that is promoted through SRML. More precisely, we partition the encoding into
areas of concern that derive from the declarative semantics of SRML [91], which has the
advantage of permitting a modular and incremental development of the encoding. The
need to easily support message correlation, together with implementation of shared states
and forced termination of (parts of) services, makes COWS a very reasonable choice as
target language of the encoding with respect to the many other calculi for SOC proposed
in the literature (among which we want to mention [127, 104, 57, 35, 45, 199]).
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5.2 COWS’s variants
In this section, we present two variants of COWS. The first one extends COWS with timed
orchestration constructs; this way we obtain a language, that we call CWS, capable of
completely formalizing the semantics of WS-BPEL. The second one permits comfortably
modelling Quality of Service requirement specifications and Service Level Agreement
achievements, and the phases of dynamic service publication, discovery and negotiation.
This can be achieved by smoothly incorporating in COWS constraints and operations on
them.
5.2.1 Timed extensions of COWS
This extension is obtained by considering an analogous of WS-BPEL’s wait activity which
causes execution of the invoking service to be suspended until the time interval specified
as an argument has elapsed. For the sake of presentation, we postpone the introduction
of attribute until, that causes suspension of the invoking service until the absolute time
reaches the value specified as an argument.
5.2.1.1 Extending COWS with the ‘wait’ activity
We assume that the set of values now includes a set of positive numbers (ranged over by
δ, δ′, . . . ), used to represent time intervals. The syntax of COWS is extended as follows:
g ::= . . . |   .s
Basically, guards are extended with the wait activity   , that specifies the time interval,
whose value is given by evaluation of , the executing service has to wait for. Conse-
quently, the choice construct can now be guarded both by message reception and timeout
expiration, like WS-BPEL pick activity. We assume that evaluation of expressions and
execution of basic activities, except for   , are instantaneous (i.e. do not consume time
units) and time elapses between them.
The operational semantics of the extended language is defined in terms of the labelled
transition relation
αˆ−−→, where αˆ stands for α or δ (that models time elapsing), obtained
by adding the rules shown in Table 5.8 to those in Table 3.12. Let us briefly comment on
the new rules. Time can elapse while waiting on receive/invoke activities, rules (recelaps)
and (invelaps). When time elapses, but the timeout is still not expired, the argument of wait
activities  is updated (rule (waitelaps)). Time elapsing cannot make a choice within a
pick activity (rule (pick)), while the occurrence of a timeout can. Indeed, it is signalled by
label †, thus is a computation step, generated by rule (waittout) and used by rule (choice)
to discard the alternative branches. Time elapses synchronously for all services running
in parallel: this is modelled by rule (parsync) and by the remaining rules for empty activ-
ity (rule (nilelaps)), replication (rule (repelaps)), wait activity (rule (waiterr)), protection (rule
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0
δ−−→ 0 (nilelaps) ∗ s δ−−→ ∗ s (repelaps) n?w¯.s δ−−→ n?w¯.s (recelaps)
u!¯
δ−−→ u!¯ (invelaps)  0.s †−−→ s (waittout)
δ 6 [[]]
(waitelaps)  .s δ−−→  [[−δ]].s
[[]] , δ′
(waiterr)  .s δ−−→   .s
s
δ−−→ s′
(protelaps)
{|s|} δ−−→ {|s′|}
g1
δ−−→ g′1 g2
δ−−→ g′2
(pick)
g1 + g2
δ−−→ g′1 + g′2
s1
δ−−→ s′1 s2
δ−−→ s′2
(parsync)
s1 | s2 δ−−→ s′1 | s′2
s
δ−−→ s′
(scopeelaps)
[e] s
δ−−→ [e] s′
Table 5.8: Synchronous timed COWS operational semantics (additional rules)
(protelaps)) and delimitation (rule (scopeelaps)). In particular, rule (waiterr) enables time pass-
ing for the wait activity also when the expression  used as an argument does not return
a positive number; in this case the argument of the wait is left unchanged. Note that, in
agreement with its eager semantics, the kill activity does not allow time to pass. Compu-
tations can now also include transitions labelled by δ corresponding to time elapsing.
Since time elapses synchronously for all services in parallel, we can think of as all
services run on a same service engine and share the same clock. By making it explicit
the notion of service engine and of deployment of services on engines, it is possible to
describe more realistic scenarios. Therefore, we extend the language syntax with the
syntactic category of (service) engines defined as follows:
E ::= 0 | {s} | [n]E | E | E
Each engine {s} has its own clock (whose value does not matter and, hence, is not made
explicit), that is not synchronized with the clock of other parallel engines (namely, time
progresses asynchronously among different engines). Besides, (private) names can be
shared among engines, while variables and killer labels cannot. In the sequel, we will only
consider well-formed engine compositions, i.e. engine compositions where partners used
in endpoints of receive activities within different service engines are pairwise distinct. The
underlying rationale is that each service has its own partner names and that the service and
all its instances run within the same engine.
To define the semantics, we first extend the structural congruence of Section 3.2 with
the abelian monoid laws for engines parallel composition and with the following laws:
{s} ≡ {s′} if s ≡ s′ {0} ≡ 0 {[n] s} ≡ [n] {s} [n] 0 ≡ 0
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s
αˆ−−→ s′ αˆ ∈ {δ, †, n ∅ ` v¯}
(loc)
{s} −→ {s′}
E −→ E′
(res)
[n]E −→ [n]E′
E ≡ E′ E′ −→ F′ F′ ≡ F
(strE)
E −→ F
E −→ E′
(parasync)
E | F −→ E′ | F
s1
n v¯−−−−−→ s′1 s2
n w¯−−−−−−→ s′2 M(w¯, v¯)=σ fv(w¯)= x¯ noConf(s2, n, v¯, |σ |)
(comE)
{s1} | { [x¯] s2} −→ {s′1} | {s′2 · σ}
Table 5.9: Asynchronous timed COWS operational semantics (additional rules)
[n] [m]E ≡ [m] [n]E E | [n]F ≡ [n] (E | F) if n < fe(E)
The first law lifts to engines the structural congruence defined on services, the second
law transforms an engine with empty activities into an empty engine, while the third law
permits to extrude a private name outside an engine. The remaining laws are standard.
Secondly, we define a reduction relation −→ among engines through the rules shown
in Table 5.9. Rule (loc) models occurrence of a computation step within an engine, while
rule (res) deals with private names. Rule (strE) says that structurally congruent engines
have the same behaviour, while rule (parasync) says that time elapses asynchronously be-
tween different engines (indeed, F and, then, the clocks of its engines remain unchanged
after the transition). Rule (comE), where fv(w¯) are the free variables of w¯, enables in-
teraction between services executing within different engines. It combines the effects of
rules (delcom 2) and (com 2) in Table 3.12. Indeed, since the delimitations [x¯] for the input
variables are singled out, the communication effect can be immediately applied to the con-
tinuation s′2 of the service performing the receive. The last premise ensures that, in case
of multiple start activities, the message is routed to the correlated service instance rather
than triggering a new instantiation.
Notably, computations from a given parallel composition of engines are sequences of
(connected) reductions. Communication can take place intra-engine, by means of rule
(com 2), or inter-engine, by means of rule (comE). In both cases, since we are only consid-
ering well-formed compositions of engines, checks for receive conflicts are confined to
services running within a single engine, the one performing the receive, differently from
the language without explicit engines, where checks involve the whole composition of ser-
vices. Notice that, to communicate a private name between engines, first it is necessary to
exploit the structural congruence for extruding the name outside the sending engine and
to extend its scope to the receiving engine, then the communication can take place, by
applying rules (comE), (res) and (strE).
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5.2.1.2 Extending COWS with the ‘wait until’ activity
We introduce the attribute until that modifies the semantics of wait activity so that the
invoking service is suspended until the absolute time reaches the value resulting by the
evaluation of the argument of the wait until, denoted by U  . The set of values now
includes also a set of time values, ranged over by t, t′, . . . , that are used to explicitly
indicate the value of engines’ clock, now denoted by {s}t.
The operational semantics changes accordingly. In particular, the laws for structural
congruence over engines become as follows:
{s}t ≡ {s′}t if s ≡ s′ {[n] s}t ≡ [n] {s}t
The semantics of services is defined in terms of configurations of the form t  s, for
taking into account the absolute time t of the engine where the service s run, and of
labelled transitions between configurations t  s αˆ−−→ t′  s′. The rules in Tables 3.12
and 5.8 are then tailored for using configurations. For example, the rules for the receive
activity become as follows:
t  n?w¯.s n w¯−−−−−−→ t  s (rec) t  n?w¯.s δ−−→ t + δ  n?w¯.s (recelaps)
Additionally, we have the following rules for the wait until activity:
t + δ < [[]]
(waitUntil1)
t  U  .s δ−−→ t + δ  U  .s
[[ − t]] = δ
(waitUntil2)
t  U  .s δ−−→ [[]]   0.s
[[]] , t′
(waitUntilerr)
t  U  .s δ−−→ t + δ  U  .s
which permit time elapsing until the clock of the engine reaches the argument of U  .
Finally, the semantics of engines’ composition is tailored by replacing rules (loc) and
(comE) with the following ones:
t  s δ−−→ t + δ  s′
(locelaps)
{s}t −→ {s′}t+δ
t  s α−−→ t  s′ α ∈ {†, n ∅ ` v¯}
(locact)
{s}t −→ {s′}t
t1 s1 n v¯−−−−−→ t1 s′1 t2 s2
n w¯−−−−−−→ t2 s′2
M(w¯, v¯) = σ fv(w¯) = x¯ noConf(s2, n, v¯, |σ |)
(comE)
{s1}t1 | { [x¯] s2}t2 −→ {s′1}t1 | {s′2 · σ}t2
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Figure 5.3: Graphical representation of the Buyer/Seller/Shipper protocol
5.2.1.3 Examples
We end this section with some examples of application of the extended framework. The
first example provides a sort of clock service, while the last two are use-cases inspired by
[58, 59]. Moreover, in Section 5.2.2.3 timed activities are exploited to model a variant of
the automotive case study presented in Section 2.4.1.
A clock service. By using the timed activity, we can define a sort of clock service that
is set to send a message “tick” along m every 10 time units.
[n] ( n!〈〉 | ∗ n?〈〉 . 10 . ( m!〈“tick”〉 | n!〈〉 ) )
Notice that, however, because invoke activities are executed lazily (in fact, communication
in COWS is asynchronous), it is only guaranteed that at least (and not exactly) 10 time
units elapse between two consecutive emissions of message “tick”.
A Buyer/Seller/Shipper protocol. We illustrate a simple business protocol for purchas-
ing a fixed good. The protocol, graphically represented in Figure 5.3, involves a buyer,
a seller and a shipper. Firstly, Buyer asks Seller to offer a quote, then, after the Seller’s
reply, Buyer answers with either an acceptance or a rejection message (it sends the latter
when the quote is bigger than a certain amount). In case of acceptance, Seller sends a
confirmation to Buyer and asks Shipper to provide delivery details. Finally, Seller for-
wards the received delivery information to Buyer. Moreover, after Seller presents a quote,
if Buyer does not reply in 30 time units, then Seller will abort the transaction. In the end,
the whole system is
{Buyer} | {Seller} | {Shipper}
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Figure 5.4: Graphical representation of the Investment Bank interaction pattern
where
Buyer , [id] ( pS • oreqQuote!〈pB, id〉
| [xquote] pB • oquote?〈id, xquote〉 .
[k] ( if (xquote ≤ 1000)
then { pS • oaccept!〈id〉
| pB • ocon f irmation?〈id〉 .
[xdet] pB • odeliveryDet?〈id, xdet〉 }
else { pS • ore ject!〈id〉 }
| pB • oabort?〈id〉 .kill(k) ) )
Seller , ∗ [xB, xid] pS • oreqQuote?〈xB, xid〉 .
( xB • oquote!〈xid, vquote〉
| pS • oaccept?〈xid〉 .
( xB • ocon f irmation!〈xid〉
| pS H • oreqDelivDet!〈xid, pS 〉
| [xdet] pS • odeliveryDet?〈xid, xdet〉 .
xB • odeliveryDet!〈xid, xdet〉 )
+ pS • ore ject?〈xid〉
+  30 . xB • oabort!〈xid〉 )
Shipper , ∗ [xid, xS ] pS H • oreqDelivDet?〈xid, xS 〉 .
[xdet] [xdet = computeDelivDet(xS )] . xS • odeliveryDet!〈xid, xdet〉
Function computeDelivDet( ) computes the delivery details associated with a seller. No-
tably, if Buyer receives an abort message from Seller, then it immediately halts its other
activities, by means of the killing activity.
Investment Bank interaction pattern. We describe a typical interaction pattern in In-
vestment Bank and other businesses, graphically represented in Figure 5.4. We consider
two participants, A and B. A starts by requiring a quote to B, that answers with an initial
quote. Then, B enters a loop, sending a new quote every 5 time units until A accepts a
quote. Of course, in order to receive new quotes, also A cycles until it sends the quote
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acceptance message to B. Services A and B are modelled as follows:
A , pB • oreqQuote!〈pA, id〉
| [xquote] pA • oquote?〈id, xquote〉 .
[n] ( n!〈xquote〉
| ∗ [x] n?〈x〉 .
[xnew] ( rand() . pB • oaccept!〈id, x〉
+ pA • ore f resh?〈id, xnew〉 . n!〈xnew〉 ) )
B , ∗ [xA, xid] pB • oreqQuote?〈xA, xid〉 .
( xA • oquote!〈xid, vquote〉
| [n] ( n!〈vquote〉
| ∗ [x] n?〈x〉 .
[xquote] ( pB • oaccept?〈xid, xquote〉
+  5 . ( xA • ore f resh!〈xid, newQuote(x)〉
| n!〈newQuote(x)〉 ) ) ) )
Function newQuote( ), given the last quote sent from B to A, computes and returns a new
quote. Notably, in both services, the iterative behaviour is modelled by means of a private
endpoint (i.e. n) and the replication operator. At each iteration, A waits a randomly chosen
period of time, whose value is returned by function rand(), before replying to B. If this
time interval is longer than 5 time units, a receive on operation ore f resh triggers a new
iteration.
Now, consider the system A | B. If the participant A does not accept the current quote
in 5 time units, then a new quote is produced by the participant B, because its timeout
has certainly expired. Instead, if we consider the system {A} | {B}, the clock of B can be
slower than that of A, thus the production of a new quote is not ensured.
5.2.1.4 Concluding remarks
We have introduced CWS, an extension of COWS that permits modeling timed activ-
ities and is, hence, capable of completely formalizing the semantics of WS-BPEL. We
have first considered a language where all services are implicitly allocated on a same en-
gine. Then, we have presented an extension with explicit notions of service engine and of
deployment of services on engines.
For modelling time and timeouts, we have drawn again our inspiration from the rich
literature on timed process calculi (see, e.g., [71, 159] for a survey). Thus, in CWS,
basic actions are durationless, i.e. instantaneous, and the passing of time is modelled by
using explicit actions, like in TCCS [154]. Moreover, actions execution is lazy, i.e. can
be delayed arbitrary long in favour of passing of time, like in lTCCS [155]. Finally, since
many distributed systems offer only weak guarantees on the upper bound of inter-location
clock drift [18], passing of time is modelled synchronously for services deployed on a
same ‘service engine’, and asynchronously otherwise.
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As a further work, we want to develop type systems and behavioural equivalences
capable of dealing also with time related aspects. Pragmatically, they could provide a
means to express and guarantee time-based QoS properties of services (such as, e.g.,
time to reply to service requests), that should be published in service contracts. We plan
also to investigate an alternative operational semantics for CWS aiming at avoiding
infinite branching due to time elapsing of ‘non-maximal’ intervals of time. This way,
e.g., the term  10.s1 |  6.s1 should evolve only to  4.s1 |  0.s2, i.e. transitions to 10−6+δ.s1 |  δ.s2 with δ > 0 should be blocked.
5.2.2 Service publication, discovery and negotiation with COWS
In SOC, services can play essentially three different roles: the provider, the requestor and
the registry. Providers offer functionalities and publish machine-readable service descrip-
tions on registries to enable automated discover and invocation by requestors. In addition
to the function that the service performs, service descriptions should also include non-
functional properties, such as e.g., response time, availability, reliability, security, and
performance, that jointly represent the quality of the service (QoS). Some of these proper-
ties could depend on the current run-time configuration of the system (e.g. the maximum
allowed bandwidth might depend on the actual load of the server), thus a dynamic dis-
covery process is often needed to find a provider that meets the requestors’ requirements.
Moreover, since services are often developed and run by different organizations, a key
issue of the discovery process is to define a flexible negotiation mechanism that allows
two or more parties to reach a joint agreement about cost and quality of a service, prior to
service execution. This mechanism ranges from simple forms where a two-phase negoti-
ation is sufficient (one of the two parties exposes a contract template that the other party
can fill in with values in a given range) to more sophisticated forms where the parties
use complex strategies and interact repeatedly. For example, if the involved parties fail to
reach an agreement, their strategies can weaken the requirements and retry, or just give up
the negotiation.
The outcome of the negotiation phase is a Service Level Agreement (SLA), i.e. a
contract among the involved parties (service requestor and provider and, possibly, some
third parties) that sets out both type and bounds on various performance metrics of the
service to be provided, and the remedial actions to be performed if these are not met. For
example, an SLA among a Web hosting provider and its customers may specify the annual
cost of the service and the guaranteed bandwidth that will be provided, and the penalties
to be imposed if the service fails to fulfill the guaranteed bandwidth. After the agreement
has been achieved, trustworthy measurement services can possibly be used by each party
to dynamically monitor that the contract is respected by the other parties.
The expansion of web services has caused the development of several new languages
and technologies, among which we mention those for supporting the phases of discovery,
negotiation, agreement and monitoring, like e.g. WSLA [140, 119] and WS-Agreement
[8], that permit specifying and managing SLAs, WS-Negotiation [115], that permits im-
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plementing automated negotiation, and [189, 186], that exploit the ontology languages
DAML-S and OWL-S to enable semantic matching of service capabilities.
To provide formal foundations to current (web) services technologies, in Chapter 3 we
have introduced COWS. We demonstrate now that COWS can model all the phases of the
life cycle of service-oriented applications, such as publication, dynamic discovery, nego-
tiation, deployment and execution. We are not affirming that whoever programs service-
oriented applications should use COWS as the sole language. First of all, forcing to use
only one language would be unrealistic and in neat contrast with the ‘open-endedness’ of
the SOC paradigm. Moreover, COWS is a lower level modelling language rather than a
full-fledged programming language. We are instead putting forward that COWS can be
a common and convenient basis to enable analysis of service-oriented applications, e.g.
by means of translation from higher level languages. The possibility of analysing COWS
specifications by using the techniques and tools presented in Chapter 4 is certainly an
important added value of using COWS for modelling services.
Technically, we exploit the fact that COWS language definition abstracts from a few
sets of objects (e.g., the set of expressions that can occur within terms of the calculus)
and appropriately specialize these parameters of the language so that services can specify
and conclude SLAs. We follow the approach put forward in cc-pi [47], a language that
combines basic features of name-passing calculi with concurrent constraint programming
[184]. Specifically, we show that constraints and operations on them can be smoothly
incorporated in COWS, and propose a disciplined way to model multisets of constraints
and manipulate them through appropriate interaction protocols. This way, SLA require-
ments are expressed as constraints that can be dynamically generated and composed, and
that can be used by the involved parties both for service publication and discovery (on the
Web), and for the SLA negotiation process. Consistency of the set of constraints resulting
from negotiation means that the agreement has been reached.
5.2.2.1 Using COWS for concurrent constraint programming
We now tailor COWS for specifying Service Level Agreements. We take advantage of the
fact that its syntax and operational semantics are parametrically defined with respect to
the set of values, the syntax of expressions that operate on values and, therefore, the defi-
nition of the pattern-matching function. We show that, by specializing these parameters,
we can obtain a dialect that properly integrates the principle of ‘computing with partial
information’, or constraints, that is at the basis of the concurrent constraint programming
paradigm [184].
We first provide some insights into the constraint system used. In COWS, a constraint
is a relation among a specified set of variables which gives some information on the set of
possible values that these variables may assume. Such information is usually not complete
since a constraint may be satisfied by several assignments of values to the variables. For
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example, we can employ constraints such as
cost > 350 cost = bw · 0.05 z = 1
1 + |x − y|
In practice, we do not take a definite standing on which of the many kind of constraints to
use. From time to time, the appropriate kind of constraints to work with should be chosen
depending on what one intends to model.
Formally a constraint c is represented as a function c : (V → D) → {true, false},
where V is the set of constraint variables (that, as explained in the sequel, is included in
the set of COWS names), and D is the domain of interpretation of V , i.e. the domain of
values that the variables may assume. If we let η : V → D be an assignment of domain
elements to variables, then a constraint is a function that, given an assignment η, returns
a truth value indicating if the constraint is satisfied by η. For instance, the assignment
{cost 7→ 500} satisfies the first constraint, while {cost 7→ 500, bw 7→ 8000} does not
satisfy the second constraint, that is, instead, satisfied by {cost 7→ 400, bw 7→ 8000}. An
assignment that satisfies a constraint is called a solution.
The constraints we have presented are called crisp in the literature, because they can
only be satisfied or violated. In fact, we can also use more general constraints called soft
constraints [97, 28]. These constraints, given an assignment for the variables, return an
element of an arbitrary constraint semiring (c-semiring, [27]), namely a partially ordered
set of ‘preference’ values equipped with two suitable operations for combination (×) and
comparison (+) of (tuples of) values and constraints. Formally, a c-semiring is an alge-
braic structure 〈A,+,×, 0, 1〉 such that: A is a set and 0, 1 ∈ A; + is a binary operation on
A that is commutative, associative, idempotent, 0 is its unit element and 1 is its absorbing
element; × is a binary operation on A that is commutative, associative, distributes over +,
1 is its unit element and 0 is its absorbing element. Operation + induces a partial order
≤ on A defined by a ≤ b iff a + b = b, which means that a is more constrained than b.
The minimal element is thus 0 and the maximal 1. For example, crisp constraints can
be understood as soft constraints on the c-semiring 〈{true, false},∨,∧, false, true〉 of the
boolean values.
The COWS dialect we work with in the rest of the section specializes expressions to
also include constraints, ranged over by c, and constraint multisets, ranged over by C, and
to be formed by using the following operators.
• Consistency check: predicate isCons(C) takes a constraint multiset C and holds true
if C is consistent. Formally, isCons({c1, . . . , cn}) holds true if there exists an assign-
ment η such that c1η ∧ . . . ∧ cnη , false, i.e. if the combination of all constraints
has at least a solution1. The predicate isCons( ) is defined for crisp constraints.
However, we can generalize its definition to soft constraints by requiring that it is
satisfied if there exists an assignment η such that c1η × . . . × cnη , 0.
1We do not consider here the well-studied problem of solving a constraint system. Among the many tech-
niques exploited to this aim, we mention dynamic programming [156, 26] and branch and bound search [204].
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M(x, v) = {x 7→ v} M(v, v) = ∅ M(〈〉, 〈〉) = ∅ M(a1, b1) = σ1 M(a¯2, b¯2) = σ2
M((a1, a¯2), (b1, b¯2)) = σ1 unionmulti σ2
isCons(C unionmulti {c})
M(〈c, x〉,C) = {x 7→ C}
C ` c
M(〈c`, x〉,C) = {x 7→ C}
Table 5.10: (Extended) matching rules
• Entailment check: predicate C ` c takes a constraint multiset C and a constraint c
and holds true if c is entailed by C. Formally, {c1, . . . , cn} ` c holds true if for all
assignments η holds that c1η ∧ . . . ∧ cnη ≤B cη, where ≤B is the partial ordering
over booleans, defined by b1 ≤B b2 iff b1 ∨ b2 = b2. Also this predicate can be
generalized to soft constraints by requiring that {c1, . . . , cn} ` c holds true if there
exists an assignment η such that c1η × . . . × cnη ≤ cη.
• Retraction: operation C − c takes a constraint multiset C and a constraint c and
returns the multiset C\{c} if c ∈ C, otherwise returns C.
• Multiset union: binary operator unionmulti is the standard union operator between multisets.
Since constraints and constraint multisets are expressions, they need to be evaluated.
The (expression) evaluation function [[ ]] acts on constraints and constraint multisets as
the identity, except for constraints containing COWS variables, for which the function is
undefined. Therefore, evaluated constraints and constraint multisets are values that can
be communicated by means of synchronization of invoke and receive activities and can
replace variables by means of application of substitutions to terms.
To efficiently implement the primitives of the concurrent constraint programming
paradigm, we tailor the rules in Table 3.3 (Section 3.2.1) defining the pattern-matching
functionM( , ) to deal with constraints and operations on them, as shown in Table 5.10.
We assume that tuples can be arbitrarily nested and can be constructed using a concatena-
tion operator defined as 〈a1, . . . , an〉 : 〈b1, . . . , bm〉 = 〈a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm〉. To single out
an element of a tuple, we will write (a¯, c, b¯) to denote the tuple 〈a1, . . . , an, c, b1, . . . , bm〉,
where a¯ or b¯ might not be present. The original matching rules (reported in the upper
part of Table 5.10) are still valid and state that variables match any value (thus, e.g.,
M(x,C) = {x 7→ C}), two values match only if they are identical, and two tuples match
if they have the same number of fields and corresponding fields do match. The new rules
(shown in the lower part of the table) allow a two-field tuple to match a single value in
two specific cases: a tuple 〈c, x〉 and a multiset of constraints C do match if C unionmulti {c} is
consistent, while a tuple 〈c`, x〉 and a multiset of constraints C do match if c is entailed by
C; in both cases, the substitution {x 7→ C} is returned. Notably, by applying the operator
` to a constraint one can require an entailment check instead of a consistency check.
The concurrent constraint computing model is based on a shared store of constraints
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that provides partial information about possible values that variables can assume. In
COWS the store of constraints is represented by the following service:
storeC , [n] ( n!〈C〉 | ∗ [x] n?〈x〉. ( ps • oget!〈x〉 | [y] ps • oset?〈y〉. n!〈y〉 ) )
where ps is a distinguished partner, oget and oset are distinguished operations. Other ser-
vices can interact with the store service in mutual exclusion, by acquiring the lock (and,
at the same time, the stored value) with a receive along ps • oget and by releasing the lock
(providing the new stored value) with an invoke along ps • oset. Notably, local stores of
constraints can be simply modelled by restricting the scope of the partner name ps.
The store is composed in parallel with the other services, which can act on it by per-
forming operations for adding/removing constraints to/from the store (tell and retract, re-
spectively), and for checking entailment/consistency of a constraint by/with the store (ask
and check, respectively). These four operations can be rendered in COWS as follows:
〈〈tell c.s〉〉 = [n] ( n!〈c〉 | [y] n?〈y〉. [x] ps • oget?〈〈y, x〉〉. ({| ps • oset!〈x unionmulti {y}〉 |} | 〈〈s〉〉) )
〈〈ask c.s〉〉 = [n] ( n!〈c`〉 | [y] n?〈y〉. [x] ps • oget?〈〈y, x〉〉.({| ps • oset!〈x〉 |} | 〈〈s〉〉) )
〈〈check c.s〉〉 = [n] ( n!〈c〉 | [y] n?〈y〉. [x] ps • oget?〈〈y, x〉〉. ({| ps • oset!〈x〉 |} | 〈〈s〉〉) )
〈〈retract c.s〉〉 = [n] ( n!〈c〉 | [y] n?〈y〉. [x] ps • oget?〈x〉. ({| ps • oset!〈x − y〉 |} | 〈〈s〉〉) )
where n is fresh. Essentially, each operation is a term that first takes the store of constraints
(thus acquiring the lock so that other services cannot concurrently interact with the store)
and then returns the (possibly) modified store (thus releasing the lock). Since the invoke
activities n!〈c〉 and n!〈c`〉 can be performed only if [[c]] is defined, i.e. if c does not
contain COWS variables, the store can only contain evaluated constraints. Availability of
the store is guaranteed by the fact that, once the store and the lock have been acquired, the
activities reintroducing the store and releasing the lock are protected from the effect of kill
activities. This disciplined use of the store permits to preserve its consistency. Notably,
the matching rules in the lower part of Table 5.10 are essential for faithfully modelling the
semantics of the original operations.
While tell and ask are the classical concurrent constraint programming primitives, op-
erations check and retract are borrowed from [47]. In particular, operation retract is
debatable since its adoption prevents the store of constraints to be ‘monotonically’ re-
fined. In fact, in concurrent constraint programming a computation step does not change
the value of a variable, but may rule out certain values that were previously possible;
therefore, the set of possible values for the variable is contained in the set of possible val-
ues at any prior step. This monotonic evolution of the store during computations permits
to define the result of a computation as the least upper bound of all the stores occurring
along the computation and provides concurrent constraint languages with a simple deno-
tational semantics in which programs are identified to closure operators on the semi-lattice
of constraints [183]. Therefore, if one wants to exploit some of the properties of concur-
rent constraint programming that require monotonicity, he must consider the fragment of
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COWS without retract. On the other hand, in the context of dynamic service discovery
and negotiation, the use of operation retract enables modelling many frequent situations
where it is necessary to remove a constraint from the store for, e.g., weakening a request.
To avoid interference between communication and operations on the store, we do not
allow constraints in the store to contain variables, thus they cannot change due to appli-
cation of substitutions generated by communication. Indeed, suppose constraints in the
store may contain variables and consider the following example:
[x] ( store∅ | tell(x ≤ 5). (n!〈6〉 | n?〈x〉) )
After action tell has added the constraint x ≤ 5 to the store, communication along the
endpoint n can modify the constraint in 6 ≤ 5. This way, the communication can make
the store inconsistent. This means that the write-once variables of COWS are not suitable
for modelling constraint variables.
Therefore, as we stated before, we do not allow constraints in the store to contain
variables. Instead, they can use specific names, that we call constraint variables and, for
the sake of presentation, write as x, y, . . . (i.e. in the sans serif style). Indeed, names are
not affected by expression evaluation (i.e. [[x]] = x) and by substitution application (i.e.
x ·σ = x). Moreover, names can be delimited, thus allowing us to model local constraints.
In the sequel, we will use cv(t) to denote the set of constraint variables occurring in a
term t. Notice however that constraints occurring as arguments of operations may contain
variables so that we can specify constraints that will be dynamically determined. For
example, we can write tell (cost > xmin cost).s; of course, since [[cost > xmin cost]] is
undefined, this operation is blocked until variable xmin cost is substituted by a value.
5.2.2.2 Communication protocols for constraints generation
Besides ask, tell, retract and check, inter-service communication can be used to imple-
ment many protocols allowing two parties to generate new constraints. For instance, in
[47], service synchronization works like two global ask and tell constructs: as a result of
the synchronization between the output x¯〈y〉 and the input x〈y′〉 the new constraint y = y′
is added to the store. Therefore, synchronization allows local constraints (i.e. constraints
with restricted names) to interact, thus establishing an SLA between the two parties, and
(possibly) to become globally available. Differently, COWS does not allow communica-
tion to directly generate new constraints: e.g., an invoke p • o!〈x〉 and a receive p • o?〈y〉
cannot synchronize, becauseM(y, x) does not hold. In the rest of this section, we present
three example protocols that permit establishing new constraints. For the sake of readabil-
ity, in the protocols we will use the conditional choice construct if () then {s1} else {s2}
introduced in Section 3.2.1.3 (encoding (3.4)).
A simple protocol. To create constraints of the form x = y, where each of x and y is ini-
tially local to only one party, we can use the standard COWS communication mechanism
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together with operation tell. For example, the following term
storeC | p • o!〈x〉 | [z] p • o?〈z〉. tell (z = y). s (5.3)
for z fresh in s, adds to the store the constraint x = y, if it is consistent with C.
Indeed, the communication along endpoint p • o takes place before the consistency
check (performed by operation tell), and the term evolves into
storeC | tell (x = y). s
Now, if x = y is not consistent with the store, the receive and invoke activities along p • o
are definitively consumed and the execution of term s is blocked.
This protocol is simple and divergence-free, but it may introduce deadlocked states in
the terms. This fact has a relevant impact on the specification of protocols for negotiation,
particularly when there are more parties that provide (or require) the same service. For
example, consider the following term
storeC | p • o!〈x〉 | [z] p • o?〈z〉. tell (z = y). s | [z′] p • o?〈z′〉. tell (z′ = w). s′
where another receive activity is put in parallel with term (5.3). Now, if x = y is not consis-
tent with C, then the term can non-deterministically evolve in a stuck state by performing
the receive p • o?〈z〉, although x = w might be consistent with C.
A divergent protocol. To overtake the previous problems, the following more refined
protocol restores the communication activities if the constraints generated when commu-
nication takes place are not consistent with the current store. To simplify the encoding,
we assume that a single communication cannot produce both substitutions and new con-
straints. The extended communication activities can be rendered as follows:
〈〈p • o!¯〉〉 = [n] ( n!〈〉 | ∗ n?〈〉.[m] ( p • o!(m, ¯) | m?〈〉.n!〈〉 ) )
〈〈p • o?w¯.s〉〉 =

[x] p • o?(x, w¯).〈〈s〉〉 if cv(w¯) = ∅
s′ if w¯ = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉
unde f otherwise
s′ , [n] ( n!〈〉 | ∗ n?〈〉.[x, x1, . . . , xn] p • o?〈x, x1, . . . , xn〉.[y] ps • oget?〈y〉.
[r] ( {| if (isCons(y unionmulti {x1 = x1, . . . , xn = xn}) )
then { ps • oset!〈y unionmulti {x1 = x1, . . . , xn = xn}〉 | r!〈〉 }
else { ps • oset!〈y〉 | x!〈〉 | n!〈〉 } |}
| r?〈〉.〈〈s〉〉 ) )
for n, m and r fresh in ¯, w¯ and s. An invoke activity is encoded as a term that performs the
same invoke with, as an additional argument, a private endpoint m where, if communica-
tion fails, it waits for an acknowledgement that triggers the restart of the term. A receive
activity with a tuple, as an argument, without constraint variables is encoded as a term
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that performs the same receive with, as an additional argument, a dummy variable (i.e. x),
that stores the endpoint for the acknowledgement (that, however, is not sent in this case).
A receive activity with, as an argument, a tuple of constraint variables is encoded as a
term that performs a receive with a tuple of COWS variables which store the endpoint for
the acknowledgement and the received data (i.e. constraint variables or values). After the
receive, the term takes the current store of constraints and checks its consistency with the
constraints that would be generated by taking place of the communication. In the posi-
tive case, it updates the store with the new constraints and triggers the (encoding of the)
continuation term s by a signal along the endpoint r. Otherwise, it leaves unchanged the
store, sends an ack back to the corresponding invoking term, and restarts its execution.
As in the encodings of concurrent constraint programming primitives, in order to guaran-
tee the release of the lock on the shared store of constraints, the activities following the
acquisition of the lock are protected.
The encoded receives can be terms like s′, hence they cannot be used as guards of a
choice. Therefore, to implement a choice between encoded receives, they must be put in
parallel and synchronized by using a lock (as in [158]).
Communication can generate constraints expressing equalities between names (alike
fusions of [47]) or equalities between names and values. For example, the invoke p • o!〈x〉
and the receive p • o?〈y〉 can synchronize and add the constraint x = y to the store,
if consistency is preserved, otherwise the synchronization is forbidden. Similarly, the
receive above can synchronize with the invoke p • o!〈v〉 and generate the constraint y = v.
Let us now consider the following term
storeC | 〈〈p • o!〈x〉〉〉 | 〈〈p • o?〈y〉.s〉〉 | 〈〈p • o?〈w〉.s′〉〉
and assume that x = w is consistent with the store while x = y is not. In this case, by
performing the receive p • o?〈y〉 the term will come back to the initial state, while by
performing the receive p • o?〈w〉 it becomes storeCunionmulti{x=w} | 〈〈p • o?〈y〉.s〉〉 | 〈〈s′〉〉 where, for
simplicity sake, we omit the stuck terms produced by the encoding.
Of course, since the protocol can diverge (i.e. an invoke can synchronize infinitely of-
ten with the same receive without modifying the store), a fairness assumption is essential
to guarantee progress properties: if an invoke can synchronize with many receives and at
least one synchronization produces consistent constraints, then eventually this synchro-
nization will succeed.
A divergence-free protocol. To get rid of divergence, we could add the following
pattern-matching rule
| x¯ |=| x¯ |=| v¯ | isCons(C unionmulti {x¯ = v¯})
M((x¯ : x¯, y), (v¯,C)) = {x¯ 7→ v¯, y 7→ C}
(notice that, since the tuples (x¯ : x¯, y) and (v¯,C) have different length, the rule does not
interfere with the other ones) and encode communication activities as follows:
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〈〈p • o!¯〉〉 = [n] ( n!〈〉 | ∗ n?〈〉. [m] ( [x] ps • oget?〈x〉.
( p • o!〈(¯, x), m〉 | {| ps • oset!〈x〉 |} | m?〈〉. n!〈〉 ) ) )
〈〈p • o?w¯.s〉〉 =

[z, x] p • o?〈(w¯, z), x〉. 〈〈s〉〉 if cv(w¯) = ∅
s′ if w¯ = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉
unde f otherwise
s′ , [n] ( n!〈〉 | ∗ n?〈〉.[x1, . . . , xn, z, x] p • o?〈〈x1, . . . , xn, x1, . . . , xn, z〉, x〉.
[y] ps • oget?〈y〉.
[r] ( {| if (y == z)
then { ps • oset!〈y unionmulti {x1 = x1, . . . , xn = xn}〉 | r!〈〉 }
else { ps • oset!〈y〉 | x!〈〉 | n!〈〉 } |}
| r?〈〉. 〈〈s〉〉 ) )
for n, m and r fresh in ¯, w¯ and s. Essentially, the encoding of the invoke reads the store
and releases it, invoke and receive activities synchronize (i.e. the new constraints are
consistent with the store), the encoding of the receive reads the store and, if the value
is unchanged, adds the new constraints, otherwise it restarts the terms. The encoding is
divergence-free in the sense that whenever the terms are restarted the value of the store of
constraints differs from that in the previous execution, namely the terms cannot stutter on
the same store. Of course, more robust protocols (that, e.g., avoid also starvation) could
be defined. However, they should rely on synchronization among more than two entities
at the same time (as it is permitted, e.g., by the join input of the Join-calculus [94]), that
goes against our choice to reconcile expressiveness and implementability.
5.2.2.3 Examples
We show two examples that illustrate how our framework can be used to model both auto-
matic service discovery mechanisms and negotiation mechanisms with the aim of achiev-
ing service level agreements. The former is a specification of a web hosting scenario, that
is, in a simplified form, one of the typical SOC scenarios where SLA among organizations
are largely employed. The latter one integrates publication, discovery and negotiation to
the specification of the automotive case study presented in Section 2.4.1 and specified in
COWS in Section 3.4.1.
A Web hosting scenario. We consider a scenario, inspired by [47], that involves a client
C that needs a web hosting service, and some service providers P1, P2, . . . , that offer dif-
ferent Web hosting solutions, varying in cost and bandwidth. In order to be invoked by
clients, provider services need to be discovered. The dynamic service discovery mecha-
nism relies on a (single) registry R that, similarly to an UDDI registry, allows providers to
publish their service description, as a WSDL document, and clients to discover published
services by performing search queries. Suppose that providers obtain their bandwidth re-
sources from third parties T1, T2, . . . , and that each provider can cover only a delimited
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geographical area. The whole system results from the parallel composition of C, R, store∅
and all provider and third party services. In the following COWS specification of this sce-
nario, we implicitly rely on the first communication protocol presented in Section 5.2.2.2.
The client service C is defined as
C , pR • osearch!〈“web hosting”, pC, (zip = 10012)〉
| [x] pC • ocorr?〈x〉. [k] ∗ [xP] pC • oresp?〈xP〉.
( xP • oreq!〈pC〉 | [z] pC • ostartNeg?〈z〉.C neg )
The endpoint pR • osearch is used to perform a query on the registry and transmit the client’s
partner name pC. Besides the string identifying the kind of required service, a query
contains a constraint identifying the location of the client2. The registry will reply by
sending along pC • ocorr a private name used to send a stop signal to the registry, and along
pC • oresp all partner names corresponding to providers that satisfy the query. For each
of them, an instance of the client is created that starts a negotiation phase, implemented
by term C neg. We assume that once a negotiation succeeds, C neg forces termination of
all the other parallel instances (by performing kill(k)) and sends a signal to the registry to
stop the database querying (by performing {|pR • ostop!〈x〉|}). Client C issues one request
at a time; in case of concurrent queries, correlation can be exploited to relate a query and
its answers. The more general case of multiple clients can still be dealt with by using
correlation or by relying on the (very reasonable) assumption that clients’ partner names
are pairwise distinct.
A service provider is defined alike the following term P
P , pR • opub!〈“web hosting”, pP, ((zip > 10000) ∧ (zip 6 14905))〉
| ∗ [xC] pP • oreq?〈xC〉. [p] ( xC • ostartNeg!〈p〉 | pT • ostartNeg!〈p〉
| [xT] p • othird?〈xT〉.P neg )
The endpoint pR • opub is used for invoking the registry service and transmitting the de-
scription of the provided service. This description consists of a string identifying the kind
of provided service, the provider’s partner name pP, and a constraint that defines the area
covered by the provider3 which, of course, may differ from provider to provider. Notably,
zip is a global constraint variable. Each request sent by a client, say C, triggers a new
negotiation phase. Specifically, when a request arrives along the endpoint pP • oreq, the
provider creates a new instance that generates a new partner name p, that defines a private
endpoint used to receive from C and from the considered third party, say T. Indeed, the
provider instance sends p to C and T. After that, T replies with another private partner
name (stored in xT), that allows the instance of P to interact with the correct instance of
T, and the provider instance continues as P neg.
The registry service R is defined as
2A client position is expressed by a zip code. In the example, the client C is located at the Computer
Science Department of the New York University.
3A geographical area is defined by a set of United States Postal Service zip codes. In the example, the
provider P covers the whole State of New York.
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R , [n] ( ∗ [xtype, xP, xc] pR • opub?〈xtype, xP, xc〉. n!〈xtype, xP, xc〉
| ∗ [xtype, xC, x′c] pR • osearch?〈xtype, xC, x′c〉.
[id] ( xC • ocorr!〈id〉 | [ps] ( store∅ | tell x′c.R′ ) ) )
R′ , [k] ( ∗ [xP, xc] n?〈xtype, xP, xc〉.
(pR • opub!〈xtype, xP, xc〉 | check xc. xC • oresp!〈xP〉)
| pR • ostop?〈id〉.kill(k) )
For each publication request received along the endpoint pR • opub from a provider ser-
vice, the registry service emits a tuple containing the service description along the private
endpoint n. The parallel composition of these outputs represents the database of the reg-
istry service. When a client request is received along pR • osearch, R replies by sending
a new correlation identifier id, that will be used to correlate stop signals sent from the
client along pR • ostop, and initializes a new local store by adding the constraint within the
query message. Then, it cyclically reads a tuple (whose first field is the string specified
by the client) from the internal database, checks if the provider constraints are consistent
with the store and, in case of success, sends the provider’s partner name to the client.
Notably, reading a tuple in the database, in this case, consists of an input along n followed
by an output along pR • opub; this way we are guaranteed that, after being consumed,
the tuple is correctly added to the database. The termination of the loop is triggered by
the receiving of a signal along pR • ostop. It is worth noticing that database tuples are
non-deterministically chosen, thus the same provider name can be sent many times. This
could be avoided by refining the specification, e.g. by tagging each tuple with an identifier
(stored in an additional field), that permits reading the tuples in an orderly way.
Finally, the third party T which P relies on is defined as
T , ∗ [xP] pT • ostartNeg?〈xP〉. [p′] ( xP • othird!〈p′〉 | T neg )
Once the discovery phase terminates, the client, the selected provider and the corre-
sponding third party initiate the negotiation phase, in order to sign an SLA contract before
the execution of the service. Notably, the success of the negotiation also depends on the
resources provided by the third party.
Each party specifies its SLA requirements or guarantees: the client C imposes that 600
Euro is the maximum cost it is willing to pay for the service; the provider P indicates
the minimum annual cost of 350 Euro for the service and the cost per unit of bandwidth
cost = bw · 0.05; and the third party T fixes the maximum bandwidth that it can supply at
a rate of 10·000 Mbit/s. Thus, we have
C neg , [bw′, cost′] tell (cost′ 6 600).
( z • osync!〈bw′, cost′〉 | pC • osign?〈〉. ( z • oackC!〈〉 | C′ ) )
C′ , [x′, y] pC • o f ix?〈x′, y〉.
check ((x′= bw′) ∧ (y = cost′)).(kill(k) | {|pR • ostop!〈x〉|})
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P neg , [bw, cost] tell ( (cost > 350) ∧ (cost = bw · 0.05) ) .
p • osync?〈bw, cost〉.
(xT • osync!〈bw〉 | p • oackT ?〈〉. (xC • osign!〈〉 | p • oackC?〈〉.P′ ) )
P′ , pP • oreqMetrics!〈p〉 | [xbw] p • ometrics?〈xbw〉 .
( xC • o f ix!〈xbw, xbw · 0.05〉 | check ((xbw · 0.05 = cost) ∧ (xbw = bw)) )
T neg , [bw′′] tell (bw′′ 6 10·000). p′ • osync?〈bw′′〉. xP • oackT !〈〉
Each party starts by adding its local constraints (i.e. constraints with restricted constraint
variables) to the shared global store by performing an operation tell. Then, for sharing
the local constraints, all parties synchronize each other by invoking operation osync (that
each party provides). Finally, since all constraints are consistent, by communicating along
pC • osign and p • oackC , C and P sign the following contract:
(cost > 350) ∧ (cost = bw · 0.05) ∧ (cost′ 6 600) ∧ (bw′′ 6 10·000)
∧ (bw = bw′) ∧ (bw = bw′′) ∧ (cost = cost′)
Once the contract is signed, P invokes an internal service (along the endpoint pP •
oreqMetrics) to obtain a run-time measurement of the bandwidth effectively supplied to the
client. For simplicity sake, P’s subservice performing the measurement is not explicitly
represented. Then, P fixes the bandwidth, communicates it to client C (along the endpoint
pC • o f ix), and, by performing some operations check, the two parties validate the signed
contract with respect to the value fixed by the provider. Afterwards, during the execution,
the client service could use again operation check in a similar way to verify compliance
with the SLA defined at negotiation time, by exploiting run-time data provided by some
trustworthy measurement service. Finally, in case contract validation succeeds, C stops
all its other instances that are concurrently performing negotiation phases, by means of a
kill activity, and notifies the registry that it does not need further query results, by com-
municating along pR • ostop. Notably, COWS’s prioritized semantics guarantees that only
one instance of C signs a contract with the provider.
Automatic discovery and negotiation in the automotive case study. Initially, each on
road service (such as e.g. garages, tow trucks, . . . ) has to publish its service description
on a service registry. For example, assume that a garage service description consists
of: a string identifying the kind of provided service, the provider’s partner name, and a
constraint that defines the garage location. Now, by assuming that the registry provides
the operation opub by means of the partner name preg, a garage service can request the
publication of its description as follows:
preg • opub!〈“garage”, pgarage, gps = (4348.1143N, 1114.7206E) 〉
where gps is a constraint variable.
The service registry is similar to that presented in the previous example and can be
defined as
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[oDB] ( ∗ [xtype, xp, xc] preg • opub?〈xtype, xp, xc〉.preg • oDB!〈xtype, xp, xc〉 | Rsearch )
For each publication request received along the endpoint preg • opub from a provider ser-
vice, the registry service outputs a service description along the private endpoint preg • oDB.
The parallel composition of all these outputs represents the database of the registry. The
subservice Rsearch, serving the searching requests, is defined as
Rsearch , ∗ [xtype, xclient, xc, oaddToList, oaskList]
preg • osearch?〈xtype, xclient, xc〉. [ps] ( store∅ | tell xc.R′ | List )
R′ , [k] ( ∗ [xp, xconst] preg • oDB?〈xtype, xp, xconst〉.
( {|preg • opub!〈xtype, xp, xconst〉|} | check xconst. preg • oaddToList!〈xp〉 )
|  δ. ( kill(k) | {| [xlist] preg • oaskList?〈xlist〉. xclient • oresp!〈xlist〉 |} ) )
When a searching request is received along preg • osearch, the registry service initializes
a new local store (delimitation [ps] makes store∅ inaccessible outside of service Rsearch)
by adding the constraint within the query message. Then, it cyclically reads a description
(whose first field is the string specified by the client) from the internal database, checks
if the provider constraints are consistent with the store and, in case of success, adds the
provider’s partner name to a list (by exploiting an internal service List, that provides oper-
ations oaddToList and oaskList). After δ time units from the initialization of the local store4,
the loop is terminated by executing a kill activity and the current list of providers for ser-
vice type xtype is sent to the client. Notably, reading a description in the database, in this
case, consists of an input along preg • oDB followed by an output along preg • opub; this
way we are guaranteed that, after being consumed, the description is correctly added to
the database. It is worth noticing that service descriptions are non-deterministically re-
trieved, thus the same provider can occur in the returned list many times, similarly to the
registry service presented in the previous example. Moreover, since our notion of time
does not rely on the so-called ‘maximal progress assumption’5, i.e. communication does
not prevent execution of timed transitions, there is no guarantee that any service at all is
retrieved.
After the user’s car breaks down and Orchestrator is triggered, the service Discovery
of the in-vehicle platform will receive from Orchestrator a request containing the GPS
data of the car, that it stores in xloc, and a string identifying the kind of the required
services (see the specification in Section 3.4.1). By exploiting the latter information, it
will know that it has to search a garage, a tow truck and a rental car service. For example,
the component taking care of discovering a garage service can be
preg • osearch!〈“garage”, pcar, dist(xloc, gps) < 20 〉 | [xgarageList] pcar • oresp?〈xgarageList〉
where the constraint dist(xloc, gps) < 20 means that the required garages must be less
than 20 km far from the stranded car’s actual location.
4The timeout is modelled by means of the timed construct  δ.s introduced in Section 5.2.1.
5We refer to Section 5.2.1 for further details about the considered notion of time.
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Once the discovery phase terminates and Reasoner communicates the best garage ser-
vice to Orchestrator, the latter and the selected garage engage in a negotiation phase in
order to sign an SLA. First, Orchestrator invokes the operation oorderGar provided by the
selected garage (see OrderGarageAndTowTruck); then, it starts the negotiation by per-
forming an operation tell that adds Orchestrator’s local constraints (i.e. constraints with
restricted constraint variables) to the shared global store; finally, it synchronizes with the
garage service, by invoking osync, for sharing its local constraints with it.
[cost, duration]
tell ( (cost < 1500 ∧ duration < 48) ∨ (cost < 800 ∧ duration > 48) ).
( xgarage • osync!〈cost, duration〉
| pcar • ogarageOK?〈xgps, xgarageInfo〉. · · · + pcar • ogarageFail?〈〉. · · · )
In our example, the constraints state that for a repair in less than two days the driver is
disposed to spend up to 1500 Euros, otherwise he is ready to spend less than 800 Euros.
After the synchronization with Orchestrator, the selected garage service tries to im-
pose its first-rate constraint c = ((cost’ > 2000 ∧ 6 < duration’ < 24) ∨ (cost’ >
1500 ∧ duration’ > 24)) and, if it fails to reach an agreement within δ′ time units, weak-
ens the requirements and retries with the constraint c′ = ((cost’ > 1700 ∧ 6 < duration’ <
24) ∨ (cost’ > 1200 ∧ duration’ > 24)). Both constraints are specifically generated by
the garage service for the occurred engine failure, by exploiting the transmitted diagnostic
data. After δ′′ time units, if also the second attempt fails, it gives up the negotiation. This
negotiation task is modelled as follows:
[xcost, xduration, cost’, duration’]
pgarage • osync?〈xcost, xduration〉. tell (xcost = cost’ ∧ xduration = duration’).
( tell c. xcust • ogarageOK!〈garageGPS, garageInfo〉
+  δ′ . ( tell c′. xcust • ogarageOK!〈garageGPS, garageInfo〉
+  δ′′ . xcust • ogarageFail!〈〉 ) )
Notably, operations tell cannot be used as guards for the choice operator. Thus, a term
like tell c. s +  e. s′ should be considered as an abbreviation for
[p, q, o] ( check c. (p • o!〈〉 | q • o?〈〉. tell c. s) |  e. s′ + p • o?〈〉. q • o!〈〉 )
Intuitively, if the constraint c is consistent with the store, the timer can be stopped (i.e.
communication along p • o makes a choice and removes the wait activity); afterward, the
constraint can be added to the store, provided that other interactions that took place in the
meantime do not lead to inconsistency. Otherwise, if the timeout expires, the constraint
cannot be added to the store.
5.2.2.4 Other concurrent constraint programming constructs
In the previous sections, for the sake of presentation, only four operations have been de-
fined to interact with the store of constraints. We want now to show that variants of these
operations or other concurrent constraint programming constructs can be easily imple-
mented in COWS, to model some peculiar aspects of discovery and negotiation processes.
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Non-blocking operations. The operations tell c, check c and ask c are blocking oper-
ations, i.e. if the constraint c is not consistent with/entailed by the current store, the op-
erations, and their continuation, are suspended until the constraint is consistent/entailed.
Nevertheless, non-blocking variants of these operations can be defined. For example, by
adding the following pattern-matching rule
¬ isCons(C unionmulti {c})
M(〈c¬, x〉,C) = {x 7→ C}
the non-blocking operation tell c {s1}{s2} – that adds c to the store and continues as s1, if
c is consistent with the store, or otherwise continues as s2 – can be rendered as follows:
〈〈tell c {s1}{s2}〉〉 = [n] ( n!〈c, c¬〉
| [y1, y2] n?〈y1, y2〉.
[x] ( ps • oget?〈〈y1, x〉〉.({| ps • oset!〈x unionmulti {y1}〉 |} | 〈〈s1〉〉)
+ ps • oget?〈〈y2, x〉〉.({| ps • oset!〈x〉 |} | 〈〈s2〉〉) )
This operation can be used, for example, to model a party of a negotiation that, in case
its first-rate constraint is too strong to reach an agreement, weakens the requirements and
retries with another constraint. For example, the term
tell cstrong {sstrongSuccess}{ tell cweak {sweakSuccess}{squit} }
continues as sstrongSuccess (resp. sweakSuccess) if constraint cstrong (resp. cweak) is consistent
with the current store; if both attempts fail, it gives up the negotiation and continues as
squit.
Getting the (best) solutions. During the negotiation phase, one is usually interested
in satisfaction or violation of constraints. However, when the involved parties reach an
agreement, one could be interested to obtain (one of) the best solution of the resulting
multiset of constraints.
To achieve this aim, we introduce a function getSol(C) that takes a constraint multi-
set C and, if C is consistent, returns a solution. Formally, in case of crisp constraints,
getSol({c1, . . . , cn}) returns an assignment η such that c1η ∧ . . . ∧ cnη , false. Instead,
in case of soft constraints, it returns one of the optimal solutions, i.e. an assignment η
such that c1η × . . . × cnη , 0 and c1η′ × . . . × cnη′ ≤ c1η × . . . × cnη for any η′. Like for
consistency and entailment predicates, we do not consider here the problem of solving a
constraint multiset and refer the interested reader to the literature (see e.g. [156, 26, 204]).
We also add the following rule to those defining the pattern-matching function:
getSol(C) = η η |x¯ = v¯
M(〈x¯, x¯, y〉,C) = {x¯ 7→ v¯, y 7→ C}
Here, |x¯ is a projection function that, given an assignment η, returns the tuple of values
associated by η to the constraint variables x¯. Therefore, the construct getSol(x¯, x¯).s – that
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gets (one of) the best solution of the current store of constraints, assigns to x¯ the values
associated to x¯ and continues as s – can be rendered in COWS as follows:
〈〈getSol(x¯, x¯).s〉〉 = [y] ps • oget?〈x¯, x¯, y〉. ({| ps • oset!〈y〉 |} | 〈〈s〉〉)
Notably, if a variable within x¯ is replaced before the execution of getSol(x¯, x¯), the pattern-
matching rule above cannot be applied and, thus, the operation is stuck forever. However,
this unwanted behaviour can be easily prevented by properly delimiting the variables, as
in, e.g., the term [x¯] getSol(x¯, x¯).s.
We now illustrate the semantics of the operation getSol by means of some examples.
Suppose that the following crisp constraints are the result of a negotiation between a client
and a provider:
cclient = cost 6 600 cprovider = cost > 150
Then, any assignment that maps cost to a value between 150 and 600 is an effective
solution. Thus, in this case, execution of getSol(cost, x) has the effect of substituting x
with a value between 150 and 600. As another example, consider the soft constraints
c′client = b600/costc c′provider = bcost/150c
defined over the domain of interpretation [100..800] for the variable cost and returning
values within the c-semiring 〈[0..6],max,min, 0, 6〉. Constraints c′client and c′provider as-
sociate to each assignment for the variable cost an element of the c-semiring, which
represents a grade of preference. For example, from the client point of view, the as-
signment {cost 7→ 500} has grade of preference 1, while the assignment {cost 7→ 300}
has grade of preference 2, because (of course) the client prefers to save money. In-
stead, from the provider point of view, the greater the values of cost are the higher the
grade of preference is. Moreover, c′client states that values greater than 600 are not ac-
ceptable for the client, because the corresponding grade is 0; similarly, c′provider states
that values lesser than 150 are not acceptable for the provider. In this case, the oper-
ation getSol(cost, x) has the effect of substituting x with one of the best solutions of
the constraint system, i.e. an assignment that produces the maximal grade of prefer-
ence. For instance, the assignment {cost 7→ 300} is one of the best solutions, indeed
min(c′client · {cost 7→ 300}, c′provider · {cost 7→ 300}) = min(2, 2) = 2 and one can prove that
2 is the highest grade of preference for the combination of the two constraints.
Of course, more complex variants of the operation getSol could be implemented, in
order to get all the (best) solutions or all the solutions with a grade better than a certain
threshold.
5.2.2.5 Concluding remarks
By focussing on QoS requirement specifications and SLA achievements, we have demon-
strated that COWS is a suitable formalism for modelling publication, discovery, negoti-
ation, deployment and execution of service-oriented applications. Specifically, we have
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shown that constraints and operations on them can be smoothly incorporated in COWS,
and proposed a disciplined way to model multisets of constraints and manipulate them
through appropriate interaction protocols. The novelty of our proposal is that all the
above different key aspects of SOC are dealt with in an homogeneous and direct way
by using a single linguistic formalism that already provides a number of analytical tools
and techniques (see Chapter 4 and [172, 173]).
We end by touching upon more strictly related work. Most of the proposals in the
literature result from the extension of some well-known process calculus with constructs
to describe QoS requirements. This is, for example, the case of cc-pi [47], a calculus that
generalises the explicit name ‘fusions’ of the pi-F calculus [206] to ‘named constraints’,
namely constraints defined on enriched c-semiring structures. Rather than on fusions of
names, COWS relies on substitutions of variables with values and can thus express also
soft constraints by exploiting the simpler notion of c-semiring. Moreover, COWS permits
defining local stores of constraints while cc-pi processes necessarily share one global
store. A similar approach to SLAs negotiation is proposed in [10], although it is based
on fuzzy sets instead of constraints and relies on three different languages, one for client
requests, one for provider descriptions and one for contracts creation and revocation. SLA
compliance has been also the focus of KoS [72] and Kaos [73], two calculi designed for
modelling network aware applications with located services and mobility. In both cases,
QoS parameters are associated to connections and nodes of nets, and operations have a
QoS value; the operational semantics ensures that systems evolve according to SLAs. All
the mentioned proposals aim at specifying and concluding SLAs, while COWS permits
also modelling other service-oriented aspects, such as e.g. service publication, discovery
and orchestration, fault and compensation handling, service instances and interactions.
Integrations of the concurrent constraint paradigm with process calculi have also been
used to define foundational formalisms for computer music languages. This is the case of
the pi+-calculus [82], an extension of the (polyadic) pi-calculus with constraint agents that
can interact with a store of constraints by performing ‘tell’ and ‘ask’ actions. Differently
from COWS, the store of constraints is not a term of the calculus, indeed the operational
semantics of pi+-calculus is defined over configurations consisting of pairs of an agent and
a store, and local stores are not supported.
A different approach to QoS is adopted in [172], where a stochastic extension of
COWS is presented to enable quantitative reasoning about service behaviours. Specifi-
cally, COWS syntax and semantics are enriched along the lines of Markovian extensions
of process calculi [101], and then probabilistic verification is carried on by using the
PRISM probabilistic model checker.
There are also some other works that, differently from COWS, exploit static service
discovery mechanisms. For example, [14] introduces λreq, an extension of the λ-calculus
with primitive constructs for call-by-contract invocation. In particular, an automatic ma-
chinery, based on a type system and a model-checking technique, constructs a viable plan
for the execution of services belonging to a given orchestration. Non-functional aspects
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are also included and enforced by means of a runtime security monitor. In [139], user’s
requests and compositions of web services are statically modelled via constraints. Finally,
the calculi of contracts of [39] represent a more abstract approach for statically checking
compliance between the client requirements and the service functionalities. A contract
defines the possible flows of interactions of a service, but does not take into account non-
functional properties and, thus, cannot be used for specifying and negotiating SLAs.
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Chapter 6
Concluding remarks and future
work
This thesis attempts to provide a formal account of the SOC paradigm and related tech-
nologies. To sum up, the thesis contains three main contributions:
1. we have introduced COWS, a formalism for specifying and combining services,
while modelling their dynamic behaviour;
2. we have presented some methods and tools developed to analyse COWS terms: a
type system to check confidentiality properties, a bisimulation-based observational
semantics, a logical verification methodology to express and check functional prop-
erties, and a symbolic characterisation of the operational semantics;
3. we have discussed the descriptive power of COWS, by showing some encodings of
other formal languages and by presenting two COWS dialects that permit modelling
timed activities and dynamic service publication, discovery and negotiation.
We have exploited many examples and two large case studies, from automotive and
financial domains, to illustrate the COWS’s approach for specifying and analysing SOC
applications.
As a future work, we plan to continue our programme to lay rigorous methodologi-
cal foundations for specification and validation of SOC middlewares and applications by
pursuing the following promising lines of research:
Development of further analysis techniques. We intend to tailor the studies on session
and behavioural types developed for the pi-calculus (see e.g. [112, 207, 57, 3, 124,
121, 117, 122, 114]) to COWS. In fact, these type disciplines, in the case of services,
could permit to express and enforce many relevant policies for, e.g., regulating re-
sources usage, constraining the sequences of messages accepted by services, ensur-
ing service interoperability and compositionality, guaranteeing absence of deadlock
in service composition, checking that interaction obeys a given protocol.
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Moreover, we aim at identifying appropriate sets of sound and general equational
laws that can facilitate the task of analysing SOC systems through the semantic
theories introduced in Section 4.3. We also plan to develop efficient symbolic char-
acterisations of the labelled bisimilarities over the symbolic operational semantics
for COWS introduced in Section 4.4.
We are considering developing a formal account of COWS’s expressiveness, by
proving the goodness of the encodings proposed in this thesis and by studying the
expressive power of prioritized constructs and primitives for dealing with termina-
tion.
We plan also to formalize the relationships between COWS and UML4SOA [141],
the high-level formalism used for specifying the case studies presented in Chapter 2.
In particular, we intend to define a ‘compositional’ translation from UML4SOA to
COWS (see [12] for a preliminary work in this direction) and develop an automatic
translator using Java-based technologies. The output should be COWS specifica-
tions that can be accepted in input by the CMC model checker; this way, it should
be possible to easily check properties of graphical specifications of services by us-
ing COWS as an intermediate step.
Finally, we would like to apply our analysis techniques to verify properties of secu-
rity protocols for web service conversation, such as WS-SecureConversation [162]
and WS-Security [161].
Development of prototype implementations. Besides the foundational aspects, we be-
lieve that prototype implementations of COWS could be also important to assess
its practical usability and to minimize the gap between theory and practice. The
implementation of a language based on a process calculus typically consists of a
run-time system (a sort of abstract machine) implemented in a high level language
like Java, and of a compiler that, given a program written in the programming lan-
guage based on the calculus, produces code that uses the run-time system above.
Consider as an example the experimental language X-Klaim, based on the calculus
Klaim [74], designed for modelling network aware applications with located ser-
vices and mobility. Its implementation relies on Klava [20, 22], a Java package that
provides the run-time system for X-Klaim operations, and on a compiler, which
translates X-Klaim programs in Java programs that use Klava. We plan to follow
a similar approach, by also exploiting a generic Java framework called IMC (Im-
plementing Mobile Calculi, [19]) that provides recurrent mechanisms for network
applications and, hence, can be used as a kind of middleware for the implementa-
tion of different process calculi. In fact, in [21], IMC has been successfully used to
implement in Java the service-oriented calculus CaSPiS. Among other implemen-
tations of service-oriented calculi, we want to mention: JOLIE [157], an interpreter
written in Java for a programming language designed for web service orchestration
and based on SOCK [104]; JSCL (Java Signal Core Layer, [88, 89]), a coordination
middleware for services based on the event notification paradigm of Signal Calculus
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[87]; and PiDuce [64], a distributed run-time environment devised for experiment-
ing web services technologies that implements a variant of asynchronous pi-calculus
extended with native XML values, datatypes and patterns.
Moreover, we intend to implement the alternative symbolic operational semantics
defined in Section 4.4, by following the approach underlying CMC [192]. More
specifically, we aim at realizing an interpreter capable to derive all computations
originating from a COWS term in an automated way. Afterwards, building upon this
tool, we would implement a modular framework composed of translators from high-
level languages (e.g. WS-BPEL, UML4SOA, SRML) to COWS and of a model
checker that overcomes the compositionality limitations of the approach presented
in Section 4.2.
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Appendix A
CMC specification of the case studies
and their properties
We report here the ‘machine readable’ syntax of CMC and the complete specification
of the automotive and finance case studies, together with the SocL formulation of their
properties we have checked, written using such syntax.
A.1 Syntax accepted by CMC
The syntax accepted by CMC is presented in Table A.1. Killer labels (ranged over by k,
k’, . . . ) start with lower case letters, and can only be used as argument of kill activities;
variables (ranged over by X, Y, . . . ) start with capital letters; service identifiers (ranged
over by A, A’, . . . ) start with capital letters and each of them has a fixed non-negative arity;
names (ranged over by n, m,. . . ,p,p’,. . . ,o,o’, . . . ) start with lower case letters; values
(ranged over by v, v’, . . . ) are either integer numbers, booleans, or names; identifiers
(ranged over by u, u’, . . . ) are either variables or names. The arguments of a receive-
guarded choice must be receive activities. The expression operators + and = are defined
as follows: if both e1 and e2 are evaluated as integer numbers then the evaluation of
e1 + e2 returns the integer number corresponding to their sum, otherwise it returns the
name corresponding to their concatenation; if both e1 and e2 are evaluated as values then
the evaluation of e1 = e2 returns the boolean true if these values are the same value,
otherwise it returns the boolean false.
The let construct permits to re-use the same ‘service code’, thus allowing to de-
fine services in a modular style; let A(fparams) =s in s′ end behaves like s′, where
calls to A can occur. A service call A(aparams) occurring in the body s′ of a construct
let A(fparams) =s in s′ end behaves like the service obtained from s by replacing the
formal parameters fparams with the corresponding actual parameters aparams.
The syntax accepted by CMC for expressing SocL formulae slightly differs from that
presented in Section 4.2.1 mainly for what concern the notation to indicate correlation
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s ::= (services)
nil (empty activity)
| kill(k) (kill)
| u.u’! <args> (invoke)
| p.o? <params> . s (receive)
| s1 + . . . + sn (receive-guarded choice)
| s1 | s2 (parallel composition)
| { s } (protection)
| [n]] s (name delimitation)
| [k] s (kill delimitation)
| [X] s (variable delimitation)
| ∗ s (replication)
| A(aparams) (call)
| let A(fparams) =s in s′ end (let construct)
e ::= X | v | e1 + e2 | e1 = e2 (expressions)
args ::= e | args, args (invoke arguments)
params ::= X | v (receive parameters)
| params, params
fparams ::= X | n | k (formal parameters)
| fparams, fparams
aparams ::= X | v | k (actual parameters)
| aparams, aparams
Table A.1: CMC syntax
variables. In fact, given a variable var, its binding occurrence (i.e. var in SocL) is
written $var, while its free occurrences are written %var. Moreover, logical operators ∨
and ¬ are written or and not, respectively.
A.2 Automotive case study
The complete specification of the automotive case study written in the CMC syntax is
as follows. It is worth noticing that CMC requires that the abstraction rules to apply
to a specification be provided together with the specification itself. However, since in
the sequel we report a few number of analyses relying on different abstractions of the
automotive scenario, for the sake of presentation, we introduce each considered set of
abstraction rules together with the associated set of SocL formulae.
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let
SensorsMonitor(car) = car.engineFailure!<diagnosticData>
GpsSystem(car) = * car.reqLoc?<>. car.respLoc!<gpsPos>
Discovery(car) =
* [GPS] [TYPE]
car.findServ?<GPS,TYPE>.
[nonDet#][choice#]
(nonDet.choice!<> | nonDet.choice?<>. car.found!<list>
+ nonDet.choice?<>. car.notFound!<>)
Reasoner(car) =
[SERV_LIST]
car.choose?<SERV_LIST>. car.chosen!<garage1,towTruck2,rentalCar1>
CardCharge(car,end,undo,k) =
bank.charge!<car,ccNum,amount,car>
| { car.chargeFail?<car>.kill(k)
+ car.chargeOK?<car>.
(end.end!<>
| car.undo?<cc>. car.undo?<cc>.bank.revoke!<car>) }
FindServices(car,end,undo,LOC,LIST,k) =
car.reqLoc!<>
| car.respLoc?<LOC>.
(car.findServ!<LOC,servicesType>
| car.found?<LIST>. end.end!<>
+ car.notFound?<>.
(kill(k) | { car.undo!<cc> | car.undo!<cc> } ) )
ChooseAndOrder(car,CAR_DATA,undo,LOC,LIST) =
[GPS]
( car.choose!<LIST>
|
[GARAGE] [TOWTRUCK] [RENTALCAR]
car.chosen?<GARAGE,TOWTRUCK,RENTALCAR>.
( [GAR_INFO]
-- Garage ordering
( GARAGE.orderGar!<car,CAR_DATA>
|
car.garageFail?<>.
(car.undo!<cc>
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| [ass#][ign#] (ass.ign!<LOC> | ass.ign?<GPS>.nil)
)
+ car.garageOK?<GPS,GAR_INFO>.
( [TOW_INFO]
-- Tow Truck ordering
( TOWTRUCK.orderTow!<car,LOC,GPS>
|
car.towTruckFail?<>. car.undo!<gar>
+ car.towTruckOK?<TOW_INFO>.nil
)
| car.undo?<gar>.
(GARAGE.cancel!<car> | car.undo!<cc> | car.undo!<rc>)
)
)
|
[RC_INFO]
-- Rental Car ordering
( RENTALCAR.orderRC!<car,GPS>
|
car.rentalCarFail?<>. car.undo!<cc>
+ car.rentalCarOK?<RC_INFO>.
car.undo?<rc>. RENTALCAR.redirect!<car,LOC>
)
)
)
BankInterface(check,checkOK,checkFail) =
* [CUST] [CC] [AMOUNT] [ID]
bank.charge?<CUST,CC,AMOUNT,ID>.
( bank.check!<ID,CC,AMOUNT>
| bank.checkFail?<ID>. CUST.chargeFail!<ID>
+ bank.checkOK?<ID>.
[k] ( CUST.chargeOK!<ID> | bank.revoke?<ID>.kill(k) ) )
CreditRating(check,checkOK,checkFail) =
* [ID] [CC] [A]
bank.check?<ID,CC,A>.
[p#][o#] (p.o!<> | p.o?<>. bank.checkOK!<ID>
+ p.o?<>. bank.checkFail!<ID>)
Bank =
[check#] [checkOK#] [checkFail#]
( BankInterface(check,checkOK,checkFail)
| CreditRating(check,checkOK,checkFail) )
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Garage(garage) =
* [CUST] [SENSORS_DATA] [checkOK#] [checkFail#]
garage.orderGar?<CUST,SENSORS_DATA>.
( garage.checkOK!<> | garage.checkFail!<>
| garage.checkFail?<>. CUST.garageFail!<>
+ garage.checkOK?<>.
[k] ( CUST.garageOK!<garageGPS,garageInfo>
|
garage.cancel?<CUST>. kill(k) ) )
TowTruck(towTruck) =
* [CUST] [CAR_GPS] [GARAGE_GPS] [checkOK#] [checkFail#]
towTruck.orderTow?<CUST,CAR_GPS,GARAGE_GPS>.
( towTruck.checkOK!<> | towTruck.checkFail!<>
| towTruck.checkFail?<>. CUST.towTruckFail!<>
+ towTruck.checkOK?<>. CUST.towTruckOK!<towTruckInfo> )
RentalCar(rentalCar) =
* [CUST] [GPS] [checkOK#] [checkFail#]
rentalCar.orderRC?<CUST,GPS>.
( rentalCar.checkOK!<> | rentalCar.checkFail!<>
| rentalCar.checkFail?<>. CUST.rentalCarFail!<>
+ rentalCar.checkOK?<>.
[k] ( CUST.rentalCarOK!<rentalCarInfo>
| [NEW_GPS]
rentalCar.redirect?<CUST,NEW_GPS>. kill(k)
)
)
in
[car#]
( SensorsMonitor(car) | GpsSystem(car) | Discovery(car) | Reasoner(car)
|
-- Orchestrator
[CAR_DATA]
( car.lowOilFailure?<CAR_DATA>.nil
-- + ...other failures...
+ car.engineFailure?<CAR_DATA>.
[end#] [undo#] [LOC] [LIST]
( [k] ( CardCharge(car,end,undo,k)
|
FindServices(car,end,undo,LOC,LIST,k)
)
|
end.end?<>.
end.end?<>.
ChooseAndOrder(car,CAR_DATA,undo,LOC,LIST)
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))
)
|
Bank()
|
Garage(garage1) | Garage(garage2)
|
TowTruck(towTruck1) | TowTruck(towTruck2)
|
RentalCar(rentalCar1) | RentalCar(rentalCar2)
end
A.2.1 Verification of the abstract properties from Section 4.2.1
The abstraction rules used for this analysis are the following.
Abstractions {
Action $car.engineFailure -> request(road_assistance,$car)
Action $car.towTruckOK -> responseOk(road_assistance,$car)
Action $car.rentalCarOK -> responseOk(road_assistance,$car)
Action $car.chargeFail -> responseFail(road_assistance,$car)
Action $car.notFound -> responseFail(road_assistance,$car)
Action $car.garageFail -> responseFail(road_assistance,$car)
Action $car.rentalCarFail -> responseFail(road_assistance,$car)
Action $car.towTruckFail -> responseFail(road_assistance,$car)
State $car.engineFailure? -> accepting_request(road_assistance)
}
The SocL formulae written in the syntax of CMC are as follows.
1) -- Available service --
AG(accepting_request(road_assistance))
A[accepting_request(road_assistance)
U {request(road_assistance,$var)} true]
2) -- Parallel service --
AG [request(road_assistance,$var)]
E[true {not (responseOk(road_assistance,%var) or
responseFail(road_assistance,%var))}
U accepting_request(road_assistance)]
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3) --Sequential service --
AG [request(road_assistance,$var)]
A[not accepting_request(road_assistance) {true}
U {responseOk(road_assistance,%var) or
responseFail(road_assistance,%var)} true]
4) -- One-shot service --
AG [request(road_assistance,$var)]
AG not accepting_request(road_assistance)
AF{request(road_assistance,$var)}
AG not accepting_request(road_assistance)
5) -- Off-line service ---
AG [request(road_assistance,$var)]
AF {responseFail(road_assistance,%var)} true
6) -- Cancelable service --
AG [request(road_assistance,$var)]
A[accepting_cancel(road_assistance,%var) {true}
W {responseOk(road_assistance,%var) or
responseFail(road_assistance,%var)} true]
7) -- Revocable service --
EF {responseOk(road_assistance,$var)}
EF (accepting_undo(road_assistance,%var))
8) -- Responsive service --
AG [request(road_assistance,$var)]
AF {responseOk(road_assistance,%var) or
responseFail(road_assistance,%var)} true
9) -- Single-response service --
AG [request(road_assistance,$var)]
not EF {responseOk(road_assistance,%var) or
responseFail(road_assistance,%var)}
EF {responseOk(road_assistance,%var) or
responseFail(road_assistance,%var)} true
10) -- Multiple-response service --
AG [request(road_assistance,$var)]
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AF {responseOk(road_assistance,%var) or
responseFail(road_assistance,%var)}
AF {responseOk(road_assistance,%var) or
responseFail(road_assistance,%var)} true
11) -- No-response service --
AG [request(road_assistance,$var)]
not EF {responseOk(road_assistance,%var) or
responseFail(road_assistance,%var)} true
12) -- Reliable service --
AG [request(road_assistance,$var)]
AF {responseOk(road_assistance,%var)} true
A.2.2 Verification of some request-response properties
The abstraction rules used for this analysis are the following.
Abstractions {
Action $car.engineFailure -> request(road_assistance,$car)
Action $car.towTruckOK -> responseOk(road_assistance,$car,truckGarage)
Action $car.rentalCarOK -> responseOk(road_assistance,$car,rentalCar)
Action $car.chargeFail -> responseFail(road_assistance,$car,truckGarage)
Action $car.chargeFail -> responseFail(road_assistance,$car,rentalCar)
Action $car.notFound -> responseFail(road_assistance,$car,truckGarage)
Action $car.notFound -> responseFail(road_assistance,$car,rentalCar)
Action $car.garageFail -> responseFail(road_assistance,$car,truckGarage)
Action $car.rentalCarFail -> responseFail(road_assistance,$car,rentalCar)
Action $car.towTruckFail -> responseFail(road_assistance,$car,truckGarage)
State $car.engineFailure? -> accepting_request(road_assistance)
}
The SocL formulae written in the syntax of CMC are as follows.
-- Once requested, the service always provides at least one response
-- about the status of the car renting.
--
AG [request(road_assistance,$var)]
AF {responseOk(road_assistance,%var,rentalCar) or
responseFail(road_assistance,%var,rentalCar)} true
-- Once requested, the service always provides at least one response
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-- about the status of the garage/tow truck ordering.
--
AG [request(road_assistance,$var)]
AF {responseOk(road_assistance,%var,truckGarage) or
responseFail(road_assistance,%var,truckGarage)} true
-- A positive response is never followed by a negative one for the same
-- order.
--
AG [responseOk(road_assistance,$var,$order)]
not EF {responseFail(road_assistance,%var,%order)} true
-- A negative response is never followed by a positive one for the same
-- order.
--
AG [responseFail(road_assistance,$var,$order)]
not EF {responseOk(road_assistance,%var,%order)} true
A.2.3 Analysis of other services of the automotive case study
The abstraction rules used for this analysis are the following.
Abstractions {
Action $car.reqLoc -> request(gps,$car)
Action $car.respLoc -> responseOk(gps,$car)
State $car.reqLoc? -> accepting_request(gps)
Action bank.charge<*,*,*,$id> -> request(charge,$id)
Action *.chargeOK<$id> -> responseOk(charge,$id)
Action *.chargeFail<$id> -> responseFail(charge,$id)
Action bank.revoke<$id> -> undo(charge,$id)
State bank.charge? -> accepting_request(charge)
State bank.revoke?<$id> -> accepting_undo(charge,$id)
Action rentalCar1.orderRC<$car,*> -> request(rental_car1,$car)
Action $car.rentalCarOK! -> responseOk(rental_car1,$car)
Action $car.rentalCarFail! -> responseFail(rental_car1,$car)
State rentalCar1.orderRC? -> accepting_request(rental_car1)
}
The SocL formulae written in the syntax of CMC are as follows.
-- The service GpsSystem is always available.
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--
AG accepting_request(gps)
-- The service GpsSystem always replies with successful
-- responses, i.e. it is reliable.
--
AG [request(gps,$var)]
AF {responseOk(gps,$var)} true
-- The service Bank is always available.
--
AG accepting_request(charge)
-- The service Bank, after it has accepted a request,
-- always provides a single (either positive or negative) response.
--
AG [request(charge,$id)]
AF {responseOk(charge,%id) or responseFail(charge,%id)}
not EF {responseOk(charge,%id) or responseFail(charge,%id)} true
-- After a successful response to a credit card charge request, the bank
-- accepts undo requests for the successfully completed transaction, i.e.
-- Bank is a strong revocable service.
--
AG [responseOk(charge,$id)]
A[ accepting_undo(charge,%id) {true}
W {undo(charge,%id)} true]
-- The service RentalCar_1 is always available.
AG accepting_request(rental_car1)
-- The service RentalCar_1, once a request is accepted, provides
-- a single (either positive or negative) response.
--
AG [request(rental_car1,$customer)]
AF {responseOk(rental_car1,%customer) or
responseFail(rental_car1,%customer)}
not EF {responseOk(rental_car1,%customer) or
responseFail(rental_car1,%customer)} true
A.2.4 Verification of orchestration and compensation properties
The abstraction rules used for this analysis are the following.
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Abstractions {
Action $car.engineFailure -> request(road_assistance,$car)
Action $car.towTruckOK -> responseOk(road_assistance,$car,truckGarage)
Action $car.rentalCarOK -> responseOk(road_assistance,$car,rentalCar)
Action $car.chargeFail -> responseFail(road_assistance,$car,truckGarage)
Action $car.chargeFail -> responseFail(road_assistance,$car,rentalCar)
Action $car.notFound -> responseFail(road_assistance,$car,truckGarage)
Action $car.notFound -> responseFail(road_assistance,$car,rentalCar)
Action $car.garageFail -> responseFail(road_assistance,$car,truckGarage)
Action $car.rentalCarFail -> responseFail(road_assistance,$car,rentalCar)
Action $car.towTruckFail -> responseFail(road_assistance,$car,truckGarage)
Action bank.charge<*,*,*,$id> -> request(charge,$id)
Action *.chargeOK<$id> -> responseOk(charge,$id)
Action *.chargeFail<$id> -> responseFail(charge,$id)
Action bank.revoke<$id> -> undo(charge,$id)
Action $car.garageOk -> responseOk(garage,$car)
Action *.cancel<$car> -> undo(garage,$car)
Action $car.towTruckFail -> responseFail(towtruck,$car)
}
The SocL formulae written in the syntax of CMC are as follows.
-- After a successful credit card charge, the rental car will be
-- booked, or the garage and tow truck will be ordered, or the credit
-- chard charge will be revoked.
--
AG [responseOk(charge,$id)]
AF {responseOk(road_assistance,%id,rentalCar) or
responseOk(road_assistance,%id,truckGarage) or
undo(charge,%id)} true
-- It cannot happen that, after the driver’s credit card has been
-- charged and some service ordered, the credit card charge is revoked.
--
not EF {responseOk(charge,$id)}
EF {responseOk(road_assistance,%id,rentalCar) or
responseOk(road_assistance,%id,truckGarage)}
EF {undo(charge,%id)} true
-- It cannot happen that, after the credit card has been charged and
-- then revoked, some order succeeds.
--
not EF {responseOk(charge,$id)}
EF {undo(charge,%id)}
EF {responseOk(road_assistance,%id,rentalCar) or
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responseOk(road_assistance,%id,truckGarage)} true
-- After the garage has been booked, if the tow truck service is not
-- available then the garage is revoked.
--
AG [responseOk(garage,$var)]
AG [responseFail(towtruck,%var)]
AF {undo(garage,%var)} true
A.3 Finance case study
The complete specification of the finance case study written in the syntax of CMC is as
follows.
let
Portal(key,authentication,notAuthorized,authorized,createInst) =
* [USER] [PWD] [CUST] portal.login?<USER,PWD,CUST>.
(portal.authentication!<USER,PWD>
| portal.notAuthorized?<USER>. CUST.failedLogin!<key>
+
portal.authorized?<USER>.
[sessionID#] (CUST.logged!<key,sessionID>
| portal.creditRequest?<sessionID>.
portal.createInst!<sessionID>
+ portal.bankTransferRequest?<sessionID>. nil
-- + ...other services provided by the credit portal...
)
)
Authentication(authentication,notAuthorized,authorized) =
* [USER] [PWD] portal.authentication?<USER,PWD>.
[nonDet#] [choice#](nonDet.choice!<>
| nonDet.choice?<>. portal.notAuthorized!<USER>
+ nonDet.choice?<>. portal.authorized!<USER>
)
Customer(key,username,password,amount,amountRevised) =
[k] (portal.login!<username,password,customer>
| [ID] (customer.failedLogin?<key>.nil
+ customer.logged?<key,ID>.
( portal.creditRequest!<ID>
|
-- at any time the customer could require
-- the cancellation of the credit request processing
[exit#] (customer.exit!<> | customer.exit?<>.
262
({portal.cancel!<ID>} | kill(k)))
|
portal.getCreditRequest!<ID,customerData,amount,customer>
| portal.securities!<ID,securityValues>
| portal.balance!<ID,balance>
| customer.balanceNotValid?<ID>.
-- balance not valid (1st time)
(portal.balance!<ID,balanceRevised>
| customer.balanceNotValid?<ID>.
-- balance not valid (2nd time): terminates
kill(k)
)
|
[OFFER] [MOTIVATIONS]
( -- receives a negative response
customer.negativeResp?<ID,MOTIVATIONS>. kill(k)
+
-- receives an offer
customer.offer?<ID,OFFER,MOTIVATIONS>.
[nonDet#] [choice#](nonDet.choice!<>
| nonDet.choice?<>. (kill(k) | {portal.answer!<ID,yes>})
+ nonDet.choice?<>. (kill(k) | {portal.answer!<ID,no>})
)
+
-- updating required
customer.update?<ID,MOTIVATIONS>.
(portal.updAnswer!<ID,yes>
| portal.updAmount!<ID,yes>
| portal.newAmount!<ID,amountRevised>
| portal.updSecurities!<ID,no>
| [OFFER] [MOTIVATIONS]
(customer.negativeResp?<ID,MOTIVATIONS>. kill(k)
+
customer.offer?<ID,OFFER,MOTIVATIONS>.
[nonDet#] [choice#](nonDet.choice!<>
| nonDet.choice?<>. (kill(k)
| {portal.answer!<ID,yes>})
+ nonDet.choice?<>. (kill(k)
| {portal.answer!<ID,no>})
)
+
customer.update?<ID,MOTIVATIONS>. kill(k)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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InformationUpload(createInst,reqProcessing) =
* [ID] portal.createInst?<ID>.
[k] [fault#] [abort#]
(
[abortFault]
(
[CUST_DATA] [SEC_DATA] [FINAL_BALANCE] [AMOUNT] [CUST]
portal.getCreditRequest?<ID,CUST_DATA,AMOUNT,CUST>.
[par#] [end#]
( -- Activities 1)
portal.securities?<ID,SEC_DATA>. par.end!<>
|
-- Activities 2)
[repeat#] [loop#]
( repeat.loop!<>
| * repeat.loop?<>.
[BALANCE] portal.balance?<ID,BALANCE>.
-- invoke validation service
(validation.validateBalance!<ID,portal,BALANCE>
| portal.validateBalance?<ID,no>.
-- notify the customer that balances
-- are not valid and cycles
( CUST.balanceNotValid!<ID> | repeat.loop!<> )
+
portal.validateBalance?<ID,yes>. par.end!<BALANCE>
)
)
|
-- Activities 1) and 2) terminates successfully
par.end?<>. par.end?<FINAL_BALANCE>.
-- invokes RequestProcessing
(kill(k) | {portal.reqProcessing!<ID,CUST_DATA,
SEC_DATA,FINAL_BALANCE,AMOUNT,CUST>})
)
| portal.cancel?<ID>. (kill(abortFault) | {fault.abort!<>})
)
|
-- fault handler
fault.abort?<>. nil
)
InformationUpdate(reqProcessing,reqUpdate) =
* [ID] [CUST_DATA] [SEC_DATA] [BALANCE] [AMOUNT] [CUST] [MOTIVATIONS]
portal.reqUpdate?<ID,CUST_DATA,SEC_DATA,BALANCE,AMOUNT,CUST,MOTIVATIONS>.
[k] [fault#] [abort#]
(
[abortFault] [NEW_AMOUNT] [NEW_SEC_DATA] [assign#] [ment#] [par#] [end#]
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( -- notifies the customer of needing to update the data
customer.update!<ID,MOTIVATIONS>
| (portal.updAnswer?<ID,no>. kill(k)
+ portal.updAnswer?<ID,yes>.
( ( -- updates the amount
portal.updAmount?<ID,no>. (assign.ment!<AMOUNT>
| assign.ment?<NEW_AMOUNT>. par.end!<>)
+ portal.updAmount?<ID,yes>.
portal.newAmount?<ID,NEW_AMOUNT>. par.end!<>
)
|
( -- updates the securities
portal.updSecurities?<ID,no>. (assign.ment!<SEC_DATA>
| assign.ment?<NEW_SEC_DATA>. par.end!<>)
+ portal.updSecurities?<ID,yes>.
portal.newSecurities?<ID,NEW_SEC_DATA>. par.end!<>
)
|
-- Updating terminated
par.end?<>. par.end?<>.
-- invokes RequestProcessing
(kill(k) | {portal.reqProcessing!<ID,CUST_DATA,
NEW_SEC_DATA,BALANCE,NEW_AMOUNT,CUST>})
)
)
| portal.cancel?<ID>. (kill(abortFault) | {fault.abort!<>})
)
|
-- fault handler
fault.abort?<>. nil
)
RequestProcessing(reqProcessing,reqUpdate,contractProcessing) =
* [ID] [CUST_DATA] [SEC_DATA] [BALANCE] [AMOUNT] [CUST]
portal.reqProcessing?<ID,CUST_DATA,SEC_DATA,BALANCE,AMOUNT,CUST>.
[k] [fault#] [abort#] [undo#]
(
[abortFault]
(
-- adds request to employee task list
portal.addToETL!<ID,SEC_DATA,BALANCE,AMOUNT>
| portal.taskAddedToETL?<ID>.
(
-- installs the compensation handler
{portal.undo?<empTaskList>. portal.removeTaskETL!<ID>}
|
-- receives evaluation from an employee
[RATING] [ADDITIONAL_INFO] [DECISION]
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portal.empEvaluation?<ID,RATING,ADDITIONAL_INFO,DECISION>.
[cond#] [choice#] (
cond.choice!<DECISION>
|
-- 1) negative evaluation
cond.choice?<no>.
(kill(k) | {CUST.negativeResp!<ID,ADDITIONAL_INFO>})
+
-- 2) ask to update
cond.choice?<update>. (kill(k)
| {portal.reqUpdate!<ID,CUST_DATA, SEC_DATA,
BALANCE,AMOUNT,CUST,ADDITIONAL_INFO>})
+
-- 3) positive evaluation
cond.choice?<yes>.
( -- adds request to supervisor task list
portal.addToSTL!<ID,SEC_DATA,BALANCE,AMOUNT,ADDITIONAL_INFO>
| portal.taskAddedToSTL?<ID>.
( -- installs the compensation handler
{portal.undo?<supTaskList>. portal.removeTaskSTL!<ID>}
|
-- receives evaluation from a supervisor
[OFFER] [MOTIVATIONS] [SUP_DECISION]
portal.supEvaluation?<ID,OFFER,
MOTIVATIONS,
SUP_DECISION>.
[cond#] [choice#] (
cond.choice!<SUP_DECISION>
|
-- 1) negative evaluation
cond.choice?<no>.
(kill(k) | {CUST.negativeResp!<ID,MOTIVATIONS>})
+
-- 2) ask to update
cond.choice?<update>.
(kill(k) | {portal.reqUpdate!<ID,CUST_DATA,
SEC_DATA,BALANCE,AMOUNT,
CUST,MOTIVATIONS>})
+
-- 3) positive evaluation
cond.choice?<yes>.
( -- sends the unrated offer to the customer
CUST.offer!<ID,OFFER,MOTIVATIONS>
| -- receives customer’s answer
(portal.answer?<ID,yes>.
(kill(k)
| {portal.contractProcessing!<ID,
CUST_DATA, SEC_DATA, BALANCE,
AMOUNT, CUST, RATING,
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ADDITIONAL_INFO, OFFER,
MOTIVATIONS>}
)
+ portal.answer?<ID,no>. kill(k)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
|
-- receive cancellation from customer
portal.cancel?<ID>. (kill(abortFault) | {fault.abort!<>})
)
|
-- fault handler
fault.abort?<>.
-- compensateAll
(portal.undo!<empTaskList> | portal.undo!<supTaskList> )
)
ContractProcessing(contractProcessing)=
* [ID] [CUST_DATA] [SEC_DATA] [BALANCE] [AMOUNT]
[CUST] [RATING] [ADDITIONAL_INFO] [OFFER] [MOTIVATIONS]
portal.contractProcessing?<ID,CUST_DATA,SEC_DATA,BALANCE,
AMOUNT,CUST,RATING,ADDITIONAL_INFO,OFFER,MOTIVATIONS>.
-- ... contract processing ...
nil
ValidationService =
* [ID] [BANK][BALANCE]
validation.validateBalance?<ID,BANK,BALANCE>.
[nonDet#] [choice#](nonDet.choice!<>
| nonDet.choice?<>. BANK.validateBalance!<ID,yes>
+ nonDet.choice?<>. BANK.validateBalance!<ID,no> )
EmployeeTaskList =
* [ID] [SEC_DATA] [BALANCE] [AMOUNT]
portal.addToETL?<ID,SEC_DATA,BALANCE,AMOUNT>.
( portal.taskAddedToETL!<ID>
| [EMP] (portal.askTaskETL?<EMP>.
EMP.getTaskETL!<ID,SEC_DATA,BALANCE,AMOUNT>
+ portal.removeTaskETL?<ID>. nil
)
)
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Employee(employee) =
[repeat#] [loop#]
( repeat.loop!<>
| * repeat.loop?<>.
( portal.askTaskETL!<employee>
| [ID] [SEC_DATA] [BALANCE] [AMOUNT]
employee.getTaskETL?<ID,SEC_DATA,BALANCE,AMOUNT>.
-- ... evaluates the request ...
[nonDet#] [choice#](nonDet.choice!<>
| -- sends the evaluation
nonDet.choice?<>.
(portal.empEvaluation!<ID,rating,additionalInfo,yes>
| repeat.loop!<>)
+ nonDet.choice?<>.
(portal.empEvaluation!<ID,rating,additionalInfo,no>
| repeat.loop!<>)
+ nonDet.choice?<>.
(portal.empEvaluation!<ID,rating,additionalInfo,update>
| repeat.loop!<>)
)
)
)
SupervisorTaskList =
* [ID] [SEC_DATA] [BALANCE] [AMOUNT] [ADDITIONAL_INFO]
portal.addToSTL?<ID,SEC_DATA,BALANCE,AMOUNT,ADDITIONAL_INFO>.
(portal.taskAddedToSTL!<ID>
| [SUP] (portal.askTaskSTL?<SUP>. SUP.getTaskSTL!<ID,SEC_DATA,
BALANCE,AMOUNT,
ADDITIONAL_INFO>
+
portal.removeTaskSTL?<ID>. nil
)
)
Supervisor(supervisor) =
[repeat#] [loop#]
( repeat.loop!<>
| * repeat.loop?<>.
( portal.askTaskSTL!<supervisor>
| [ID] [SEC_DATA] [BALANCE] [AMOUNT] [INFO]
supervisor.getTaskSTL?<ID,SEC_DATA,BALANCE,AMOUNT,INFO>.
-- ... evaluates the request ...
[nonDet#] [choice#](nonDet.choice!<>
| -- sends the evaluation
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nonDet.choice?<>.
(portal.supEvaluation!<ID,offer,motivations,yes>
| repeat.loop!<>)
+ nonDet.choice?<>.
(portal.supEvaluation!<ID,offer,motivations,no>
| repeat.loop!<>)
+ nonDet.choice?<>.
(portal.supEvaluation!<ID,offer,motivations,update>
| repeat.loop!<>)
)
)
)
in
[key#]
( Customer(key,francesco,sensoria,15000,10000)
| [createInst#] [reqProcessing#] [reqUpdate#] [contractProcessing#]
( [authentication#] [notAuthorized#] [authorized#] (
Portal(key,authentication,notAuthorized,authorized,createInst)
| Authentication(authentication,notAuthorized,authorized) )
| InformationUpload(createInst,reqProcessing)
| InformationUpdate(reqProcessing,reqUpdate)
| RequestProcessing(reqProcessing,reqUpdate,contractProcessing)
| ContractProcessing(contractProcessing)
| EmployeeTaskList()
| SupervisorTaskList()
)
)
| ValidationService()
| Employee(employee)
| Supervisor(supervisor)
end
Abstraction rules
The abstraction rules used for our analysis are the following.
Abstractions {
Action creditRequest<$1> -> request(cr,$1)
Action balanceNotValid<$1> -> fail(cr,$1)
Action negativeResp<$1,*> -> fail(cr,$1)
Action offer<$1,*,*> -> response(cr,$1)
Action update<$1,*> -> fail(cr,$1)
Action cancel<$1> -> cancel(cr,$1)
Action supEvaluation<$1,*,*,yes> -> response(seval,$1)
Action supEvaluation<$1,*,*,no> -> fail(seval,$1)
Action empEvaluation<$1,*,*,yes> -> response(eeval,$1)
Action empEvaluation<$1,*,*,no> -> fail(eeval,$1)
Action validateBalance<$1,yes> -> response(beval,$1)
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Action validateBalance<$1,no> -> fail(beval,$1)
Action taskAddedToETL<$1> -> request(eval,$1)
Action taskAddedToSTL<$1> -> request(eval,$1)
Action removeTaskSTL<$1> -> cancel(eval,$1)
Action removeTaskETL<$1> -> cancel(eval,$1)
Action taskAddedToSTL<$1> -> request(tostl,$1)
Action reqUpdate<$1,*,*,*,*,*,*> -> request(upd,$1)
Action update<$1,*> -> response(upd,$1)
Action securities<$1,*> -> request(sec,$1)
Action balance!<$1,*> -> request(bal,$1)
Action reqProcessing<$1,*,*,*,*> -> request(rproc,$1)
State login -> accepting_request(login)
}
SocL properties
We report the SocL formulae expressing the properties that the case study is expected to
fulfill, written in the syntax of CMC.
(Availability) AG accepting_request(login)
(Responsiveness and correlation soundness)
AG [request(cr,$id)]
AF {response(cr,%id) or (fail(cr,%id) or cancel(cr,%id))} true
(Interruptibility) AG [request(cr,$id)] EF {cancel(cr,%id)} true
(i) AG [request(cr,$id)]
not E[true {not response(seval,%id)} U {response(cr,%id)} true]
(ii) AG [request(cr,$id)]
not E[true {not (fail(seval,%id) or fail(eeval,%id)
or fail(beval,%id))} U {fail(cr,%id)} true]
(iii) AG [request(eval,$id)] EF [cancel(cr,%id)]
AF {cancel(eval,%id)} true
(iv) AG [request(upd,$id)]
AF {cancel(cr,%id) or response(upd,%id)} true
(v) AG [request(cr,$id)]
not E[true {not request(sec,%id)
or request(bal,%id)} U {request(rproc,%id)}true]
(vi) AG [ request(cr,$id) ]
AF {not cancel(cr,%id) or response(cr,%id)} true
(vii) AG [request(cr,$id)]
AF {not cancel(cr,%id) or request(tostl,%id)}true
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Appendix B
Proofs of results in Chapters 4 and 5
We report in this chapter the proofs of major results stated in Chapters 4 and 5.
B.1 Proofs of results in Section 4.1
Lemma B.1.1 (Substitution Lemma, Lemma4.1.1) If Γ, {x : r} ` s  Γ′, {x : r′} ` s′
and σ = {x 7→ {v}r′′}, then Γ · σ ` s · σ  Γ′ · σ ` s′ · σ.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the inference used to derive the
typing judgement.
The base cases (t-nil) and (t-kill) are trivial to conclude. Let us consider the base case
(t-inv): by definition s = s′ = u1 • u2!〈{1(y¯1)}r1 , . . . , {n(y¯n)}rn〉 where u1 ∈ ri for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Hence, we also have that u1 ·σ ∈ ri ·σ for any ri and σ. We now distinguish
three cases:
1. y¯1 ∪ . . . ∪ y¯n = ∅. In this case, Γ′ = Γ and r′ = r; thus by using rule (t-inv), we can
conclude that Γ·σ ` u1 • u2!〈{1}r1 , . . . , {n}rn〉·σ  Γ′ ·σ ` u1 • u2!〈{1}r1 , . . . , {n}rn〉·
σ.
2. Let I
de f
= { j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : x ∈ y¯ j}. In this case, it must be r′ = ⋃i∈I ri ∪ r and
Γ′ = Γ + {z : r1}z,x,z∈y¯1 + . . . + {z : rn}z,x,z∈y¯n . Now, we can to conclude like in the
previous case.
3. x < y¯1 ∪ . . . ∪ y¯n. In this case r′ = r and, again, we can conclude like before.
Let us now consider the inductive case and reason by case analysis on the last rule used
to infer the judgement. We explicitly show the most significant cases, the remaining ones
are easier.
(t-rec): Let s = p • o?w¯.t and s′ = p • o?w¯.t′. Then, we can suppose that Γ′′, {x :
r′′} ` t  Γ′, {x : r′} ` t′ for some Γ′′ and r′′. We distinguish three cases:
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1. fv(w¯) = ∅. In this case Γ′′ = Γ and r′′ = r. By induction, we have Γ · σ `
t · σ  Γ′ · σ ` t′ · σ. Now, by using rule (t-rec), we can conclude that
Γ · σ ` p • o?w¯.(t · σ)  Γ′ · σ ` p • o?w¯.(t′ · σ).
2. x ∈ fv(w¯). In this case Γ′′ = Γ + {z : {p}}z,x,z∈fv(w¯) and r′′ = r ∪ {p} and by
induction, Γ · σ + {z : {p}}z,x,z∈fv(w¯) ` t · σ  Γ′ · σ ` t′ · σ. Hence by using
rule (t-rec), we can conclude the wanted Γ ·σ ` (p • o?w¯.t) ·σ  Γ′ ·σ ` (p •
o?w¯.t′) · σ.
3. fv(w¯) , ∅ and x < fv(w¯). In this case Γ′′ = Γ + {z : {p}}z∈fv(w¯) and r′′ = r, and
we can conclude like before.
(t-delvar): Let s = [z] t and s′ = [{z}r′′−{z}] t′ for some r′′. Since z ∈ bv(s), by type
environment definition, we have z , x. Then, we can suppose that Γ, {x : r}, {z :
∅} ` t  Γ′, {x : r′′′}, {z : r′′} ` t′ for some r′′′ such that z < (r′′′ ∪ reg(Γ′)). Thus,
by induction Γ ·σ, {z : ∅} ` t ·σ  Γ′ ·σ, {z : r′′ ·σ} ` t′ ·σ. Hence, by using rule
(t-delvar), we can conclude the wanted Γ ·σ ` [z] t ·σ  Γ′ ·σ ` [{z}r′′·σ−{z}] t′ ·σ.
(t-par): Let s = s1 | s2 and s′ = s′1 | s′2. Then, we can suppose that Γ, {x : r} `
s1  Γ1, {x : r′1} ` s′1 and Γ, {x : r} ` s2  Γ2, {x : r′2} ` s′2. By induction,
Γ ·σ ` s1 ·σ  Γ1 ·σ ` s′1 ·σ and Γ ·σ ` s2 ·σ  Γ2 ·σ ` s′2 ·σ. Hence by letting
Γ′ = Γ1 +Γ2 we can conclude the wanted Γ ·σ ` (s1 | s2) ·σ  Γ′ ·σ ` (s′1 | s′2) ·σ.
2
Theorem B.1.1 (Theorem 4.1.1) If Γ′1 ` s′1  Γ1 ` s1 and s1
α−−→ s2 then there exist
a raw service s′2 and two type environments Γ2 and Γ
′
2 such that Γ2 v Γ1, Γ′1 v Γ′2 and
Γ′2 ` s′2  Γ2 ` s2.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the inference of s1
α−−→ s2.
Base Step: We reason by case analysis on the axioms of the typed operational semantics.
(kill) By rule (t-kill), s1 = s′1 = kill(k) and Γ1 = Γ
′
1. Thus, since s2 = 0 and by rule (t-nil),
it is trivial to conclude, by letting Γ2 = Γ′2 = Γ
′
1.
(r-inv) By rule (t-inv), s1 = s1 = p • o!{}r. Thus, since s2 = 0 and by rule (t-nil), it is trivial
to conclude, by letting Γ2 = Γ′2 = Γ
′
1.
(rec) By hypothesis, s1 = p • o?w¯.s2 and Γ′1 ` p • o?w¯.s′2  Γ1 ` p • o?w¯.s2. By the
premise of rule (t-rec), we can conclude that Γ′2 ` s′2  Γ2 ` s2 with Γ′2 = Γ′1 + {x :
{p}}x∈fv(w¯) and Γ2 = Γ1.
Inductive Step: We reason by case analysis on the last applied inference rule of the typed
operational semantics.
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(r-com) By hypothesis, s1 = sl | sr, s′2 = s′l | s′r and there exist two raw services s′′l and
s′′r , and two type environments Γl and Γr, such that Γ1 = Γl + Γr and Γ′1 ` s′′l |
s′′r  Γl + Γr ` sl | sr. By the premises of rule (t-par), Γ′1 ` s′′l  Γl ` sl
and Γ′1 ` s′′r  Γr ` sr. By the premises of rule (r-com), sl
n w¯−−−−−−→ s′l and
sr
n {v}r−−−−−−−→ s′r, then, by induction, there exist two raw services s′′′l and s′′′r , and
four type environment Γ′l , Γ
′′
l , Γ
′
r and Γ
′′
r , such that Γ
′
1 v Γ′′l , Γ′1 v Γ′′r , Γ′′l ` s′′′l 
Γ′l ` s′l and Γ′′r ` s′′′r  Γ′r ` s′r. By the definition of the preorder v, Γ′1 v Γ′′l
implies that there exists Γ such that Γ′1 +Γ = Γ
′′
l , and, similarly, Γ
′
1 v Γ′′r implies that
there exists Γ′ such that Γ′1 + Γ
′ = Γ′′r . By repeated applications of Lemma 4.1.2,
we obtain Γ′′l + Γ
′ ` s′′′l  Γ′l + Γ′ ` s′l and Γ′′r + Γ ` s′′′r  Γ′r + Γ ` s′r. Since
Γ′′l + Γ
′ = Γ′1 + Γ + Γ
′ = Γ′′r + Γ, by applying rule (t-par), we can conclude.
(par 3) - (parcom) - (parkill) These cases are similar to the previous one; the latter case relies
on Lemma 4.1.3.
(choice) By hypothesis, s1 = g1 + g2 and there exist g′1 and g
′
2, and two type environments
Γ and Γ′, such that Γ1 = Γ+Γ′ and Γ′1 ` g′1 +g′2  Γ+Γ′ ` g1 +g2. By the premise
of rule (t-sum), Γ′1 ` g′1  Γ ` g1. By the premises of rule (choice), g1
α−−→ s2
and, by induction, we can conclude.
(prot) By hypothesis, s1 = {|s|} and there exists a raw service s′ such that Γ′1 ` {|s′|} 
Γ1 ` {|s|}. By the premise of rule (t-prot), Γ′1 ` s′  Γ1 ` s. By the premise of rule
(prot), s
α−−→ s′′ such that s2 = {|s′′|}. By induction, there exist s′′′, Γ and Γ′ such
that Γ′ ` s′′′  Γ ` s′′. Then, by rule (t-prot), we can conclude.
(r-delcom) By hypothesis, s1 = [{x}r] s and there exists a raw services s′′ such that Γ′1 `
[x] s′′  Γ1 ` [{x}r] s. By the premise of rule (t-delvar), we obtain Γ′1, {x : ∅} `
s′′  Γ1, {x : r} ` s (for simplicity, we assume x < r). By the premise of rule
(r-delcom), s
nσunionmulti{x 7→{v}r′ } ` v¯′−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′ with s2 = s′ · {x 7→ {v}r′}. Hence, by Lemma B.1.1,
Γ′1 · {x 7→ {v}r′} ` s′′ · {x 7→ {v}r′}  Γ1 · {x 7→ {v}r′} ` s · {x 7→ {v}r′}. Then, by
definition of functionM( , ) and rule (r-com), s ·{x 7→ {v}r′} nσ ` v¯
′−−−−−−−→ s′ ·{x 7→ {v}r′}
and, by induction, we can conclude.
(delkill 1) By hypothesis, s1 = [k] s and there exists a raw services s′′ such that Γ′1 `
[k] s′′  Γ1 ` [k] s. By the premise of rule (t-dellab), Γ′1 ` s′′  Γ1 ` s. By the
premises of rule (delkill), s
k−−→ s′ with s2 = [k] s′, then, by induction, there exist
s′′′, Γ and Γ′ such that Γ′ ` s′′′  Γ ` s′. Thus, by applying rule (t-dellab), we can
conclude.
(r-delkill 2) - (r-delkill 3) - (r-del) These cases are similar to the previous one.
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(r-delvar) By hypothesis, s1 = [{x}r] s and there exists a raw services s′′ such that Γ′1 `
[x] s′′  Γ1 ` [{x}r] s. By the premise of rule (t-delvar), we obtain Γ′1, {x : ∅} `
s′′  Γ1, {x : r} ` s (for simplicity, we assume x < r). By the premise of
rule (r-del), s
α−−→ s′ with s2 = [{x}r] s′. By induction, there exist s′′′, Γ and
Γ′ such that Γ′ ` s′′′  Γ ` s′ and Γ v Γ1, {x : r}. Thus, we can obtain
Γ′′, {x : ∅} ` s′′′  Γ′′′, {x : r} ` s′ for some Γ′′ and Γ′′′, and, by applying rule
(t-delvar), we can conclude.
(str) By straightforward induction and by relying on Lemma 4.1.4.
2
Theorem B.1.2 (Type Safety, Theorem 4.1.2) If s is a well-typed service then s ⇑ does
not hold.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. We prove, by rule induction, that if s ⇑ then s is not
well-typed. Looking at the rules in Table 4.4, we see that the only case to be considered
is when there exists r′ ∈ r¯ such that p < r′: in such a case, there is no way to infer a type
for p • o!{}r using (t-inv). The other cases follow by induction. Suppose, for example,
that [n] s ⇑ because s ⇑. By induction, s is not well-typed and therefore we cannot use
(t-delname), that is the only possible rule to infer that [n] s is well-typed. 2
B.2 Proofs of results in Section 4.3
B.2.1 µCOWSm
Theorem B.2.1 (Theorem 4.3.1) ∼m is a congruence for µCOWSm closed terms.
Proof. We shall prove that, given two µCOWSm closed terms s1 and s2, if s1 ∼m s2
then C[[s1]] ∼m C[[s2]] for every (possibly open) context C. The proof is by induction on
the structure of the context C. The base case, i.e. whenever C = [[ ]], is trivial. For the
inductive case, we have the following possibilities:
• C = n?w¯.D.
By induction, we may assume that D[[s1]] ∼m D[[s2]]. If C is a closed context,
then w¯ = v¯, i.e. w¯ only contains values, D is a closed context, and there exists a
bisimulation F such that D[[s1]]R∅D[[s2]] with R∅ ∈ F . By Lemma 4.3.1, we can
prove the thesis by showing that (F \R∅) ∪ R′∅ is a bisimulation up-to ≡, where
R′∅ = {(n?v¯.D[[s1]], n?v¯.D[[s2]])} ∪ R∅
Indeed, R′∅ is transition closed because R∅ is transition closed and
n?v¯.D[[s1]]
n v¯−−−−−→≡ D[[s1]]
n?v¯.D[[s2]]
n v¯−−−−−→≡ D[[s2]]
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From the hypothesis D[[s1]]R∅D[[s2]], since R∅ ⊆ R′∅, we have D[[s1]]R′∅D[[s2]].
Instead, if w¯ and D contain free variables x¯ at most, then the hypothesis D[[s1]] ∼m
D[[s2]] implies that for all v¯ such that | x¯ |=| v¯ | we have D′[[s1]] ∼m D′[[s2]] for
D′ = D · {x¯ 7→ v¯}. Indeed, since s1 and s2 are closed terms, s1 · {x¯ 7→ v¯} = s1 and
s2 · {x¯ 7→ v¯} = s2. This means that for all v¯ there exists a bisimulation F ′ such
that D′[[s1]]R′′∅D′[[s2]] with R′′∅ ∈ F ′. By Lemma 4.3.1, we can prove the thesis by
showing that (F ′\R′′∅ ) ∪ R′′′∅ is a bisimulation up-to ≡, where
R′′′∅ = {(n?w¯·{x¯ 7→ v¯}.D′[[s1]] , n?w¯·{x¯ 7→ v¯}.D′[[s2]])} ∪ R′′∅
The rest of the proof proceeds as before.
• C = G + g.
By induction, we may assume that G[[s1]] ∼m G[[s2]]. If G is a closed context,
then there exists a bisimulation F such that G[[s1]]R∅G[[s2]] with R∅ ∈ F . By
Lemma 4.3.1, we can prove the thesis by showing that (F \R∅)∪R′∅ is a bisimulation
up-to ≡, where
R′∅ = {(G[[s1]] + g,G[[s2]] + g)} ∪ R∅ ∪ Id
and Id is the identity relation. Indeed, if G[[s1]] + g
α−−→ s, due to the structure of
G and g, then α = n [x¯] v¯ and there are the following possibilities.
– g
n [x¯] v¯−−−−−−−−→ s. Thus, G[[s2]] + g n [x¯] v¯−−−−−−−−→ s and sR′∅ s, since s Id s and
Id ⊆ R′∅.
– G[[s1]]
n [x¯] v¯−−−−−−−−→ s. From the hypothesis G[[s1]]R∅G[[s2]], then we have two
possibilities:
∗ There exists s′ such that G[[s2]] n [x¯] v¯−−−−−−−−→ s′ and, for all v¯ such that
M(x¯, v¯) = σ, we have s · σR∅ s′ · σ. Then, G[[s2]] + g n [x¯] v¯−−−−−−−−→ s′.
Since R∅ ⊆ R′∅, we get s · σR′∅ s′ · σ.
∗ There exists s′ such that G[[s2]] ∅−−→ s′ and, for all v¯ such thatM(x¯, v¯) =
σ, we have s · σR∅ (s′ | n!(w¯ · σ)). Then, G[[s2]] + g ∅−−→ s′ and, since
R∅ ⊆ R′∅, we get s · σR′∅ (s′ | n!(w¯ · σ)).
If C is an open context, we can proceed similarly to the case C = n?w¯.D when C
contains free variables.
• C = g + G.
We can proceed as in the case C = G + g.
• C = [x]D.
If D is a closed context, then [x]D ≡ D and, by induction, we immediately con-
clude. Instead, if D contains the free variable x at most1, by induction and since
1The case where D contains more than one free variable can be dealt with in a similar way.
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s1 and s2 are closed terms, it holds that, for all v, Dv[[s1]] ∼m Dv[[s2]], where
Dv=D · {x 7→ v}. This means that, for all v, there exists a bisimulation F v such
that Dv[[s1]]Rv∅Dv[[s2]], with Rv∅ ∈ F v. Now, consider the following family of rela-
tions:
F = {R[x]N : N is a set of names} ∪
⋃
v F v
where R[x]N = {([x] s, [x] s′) : ∀v s · {x 7→ v} RvN s′ · {x 7→ v} , RvN ∈ F v , s and s′
satisfy (∗) }; property (∗) states that if s α−−→ where α = n  [y¯] w¯, with
x ∈ w¯, or α = σ unionmulti {x 7→ v}, then s′ α−−→, and vice versa; ⋃v F v = {RN :
N is a set of names , RvN ∈ F v , RN =
⋃
v RvN }. The proof proceeds by proving
that F is a bisimulation up-to ≡. Indeed, by letting s = D[[s1]] and s′ = D[[s2]], we
obtain the thesis. In fact, Dv[[s1]]Rv∅Dv[[s2]] for all v, and D[[s1]] and D[[s2]] satisfy
property (∗), because x does not occur free in s1 and s2 (since s1 and s2 are closed
terms).
Thus, let us consider a relation R[x]N ∈ F . If [x] s
α−−→ s′′, we proceed by case
analysis on α. The most interesting case is α = n[x, y¯] w¯. By rule (openrec), we get
that s
n [y¯] w¯−−−−−−−−→ s′′. From this, for all v, s · {x 7→ v} n [y¯] (w¯·{x 7→v})−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′′ · {x 7→ v}.
By definition of R[x]N , for all v, we get that s · {x 7→ v}RvN s′ · {x 7→ v}, where
RvN belongs to a bisimulation. Hence, we would have two possibilities: s′ · {x 7→
v} n [y¯] (w¯·{x 7→v})−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ or s′ · {x 7→ v} ∅−−→. In the former case, because of property (∗),
we get that s′ ·{x 7→ v} n [y¯] (w¯·{x 7→v})−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′′′ ·{x 7→ v} and, for all v¯′ s.t.M(y¯, v¯′) = σ,
s′′ · {x 7→ v} unionmulti σ RvN s′′′ · {x 7→ v} unionmulti σ, where s′′′ is such that s′
n [y¯] w¯−−−−−−−−→ s′′′. By
rule (openrec), we conclude that [x] s′
n [x,y¯] w¯−−−−−−−−−→ s′′′.
In the latter case, i.e. when α = ∅, we have two possibilities. In one case, s ∅−−→ s′′′
with s′′ ≡ [x] s′′′. Then, for all v, s·{x 7→ v} ∅−−→ s′′′ ·{x 7→ v}. By definition ofR[x]N ,
there exits s′′′′ such that s′ ·{x 7→ v} ∅−−→ s′′′′ ·{x 7→ v} and s′′′ ·{x 7→ v}RvN s′′′′ ·{x 7→
v}, for some RvN belonging to a bisimulation. Since the communication does not
involve x, we get that s′
∅−−→ s′′′′ and, hence, [x] s′ ∅−−→ [x] s′′′′. We conclude
by noticing that, by definition of R[x]N , it holds that [x] s′′′R[x]N [x] s′′′′. The other
possibility is that s
{x 7→v′}−−−−−−−→ s′′′ with s′′ = s′′′ · {x 7→ v′}. Then, for all v, s ∅−−→ s′′′ ·
{x 7→ v}. By definition ofR[x]N , there exits s′′′′ such that s′·{x 7→ v}
∅−−→ s′′′′·{x 7→ v}
and s′′′ · {x 7→ v}RvN s′′′′ · {x 7→ v}, for some RvN belonging to a bisimulation. By
property (∗), s′ {x 7→v
′}−−−−−−−→ s′′′′ and, hence, [x] s′ ∅−−→ s′′′′ · {x 7→ v′}. Finally, from
s′′′ · {x 7→ v}RvN s′′′′ · {x 7→ v}, by letting v = v′ and by definition of R[x]N , we get that
s′′′ · {x 7→ v′}R[x]N s′′′′ · {x 7→ v′}.
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• C = D | s.
By induction, we may assume that D[[s1]] ∼m D[[s2]]. If D is a closed context,
then there exists a bisimulation F such that D[[s1]]R∅D[[s2]] with R∅ ∈ F . By
Lemma 4.3.1, we can prove the thesis by showing that the family of relations
F ′ = { R′N ′ : RN ∈ F , N ⊆ N ′ }
R′N ′ = { ( [n¯] (s′ | s), [n¯] (s′′ | s) ) : s′RN s′′ , for some n¯ and s s.t. N ∩ re(s) = ∅ }
where re(s) is the set of the receiving endpoint used in s, is a bisimulation up-to ≡.
Notice that for each relation RN ∈ F there exists a family of relations R′N ′ ∈ F ′ for
N ⊆ N ′ such that RN ⊆ R′N ′ (in fact, s can be 0 and n¯ can be empty).
Let us consider a relation R′N ′ ∈ F ′. If [n¯] (s′ | s)
α−−→ s′′′, then the proof proceeds
by case analysis on α. We only take a look at the cases of bound invocation and
communication of private names.
– α = n [m¯] v¯
We have two possibilities:
∗ s n[m¯
′] v¯−−−−−−−−→ s3, m¯′ ⊆ m¯, s′′′ ≡ [n¯\m¯] (s′ | s3).
If n ∈ N ′ then we immediately conclude, because Definition 4.3.4 does
not impose any requirement in this case. Instead, if n < N ′ then [n¯] (s′′ |
s)
n[m¯] v¯−−−−−−−→ [n¯\m¯] (s′′ | s3). Since s′RN s′′, by definition of F ′ we get
that [n¯\m¯] (s′ | s3)R′N ′∪m¯ [n¯\m¯] (s′′ | s3).
∗ s′ n[m¯
′] v¯−−−−−−−−→ s3, m¯′ ⊆ m¯, s′′′ ≡ [n¯\m¯] (s3 | s).
If n ∈ N ′ then we immediately conclude. Otherwise, since s′RN s′′ for
RN belonging to the bisimulation F , we get that there exists s4 such
that s′′
n[m¯′] v¯−−−−−−−−→ s4 and s3 RN∪m¯′ s4. Thus, we have that [n¯] (s′′ |
s)
n[m¯] v¯−−−−−−−→ [n¯\m¯] (s4 | s). From this and by definition of F ′ we get
that [n¯\m¯] (s3 | s)RN ′∪m¯ [n¯\m¯] (s4 | s).
– α = ∅, s′ n [m¯] v¯−−−−−−−−→ s3, s ≡ [x¯] s4 n [x¯] w¯−−−−−−−−→ s5, | m¯ |=| x¯ |.
By rules (str), (delcom) and (com), we get that (s′ | s) ≡ [x¯] (s′ | s4), (s′ |
s4)
{x¯ 7→m¯}−−−−−−→ (s3 | s5),M(w¯, v¯) = {x¯ 7→ m¯}, and s′′′ ≡ [n¯, m¯] (s3 | s5 · {x¯ 7→ m¯}).
Since n is a receiving endpoint of s, then n < N . From this and since s′RN s′′
for RN belonging to the bisimulation F , we get that there exists s6 such that
s′′
n [m¯] v¯−−−−−−−−→ s6 and s3RN∪ m¯s6, where RN∪ m¯ ∈ F . Hence, [n¯] (s′′ | s) ∅−−→
[n¯, m¯] (s6 | s5 · {x¯ 7→ m¯}). Since s3RN∪ m¯s6, by definition of F ′, we conclude
that [n¯, m¯] (s3 | s5·{x¯ 7→ m¯})R′N ′∪ m¯[n¯, m¯] (s6 | s5·{x¯ 7→ m¯}). The generalisation
to the case | m¯ |<| x¯ |, where also some non-restricted values are communicated,
is trivial.
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By letting s′ = D[[s1]] and s′′ = D[[s2]], we obtain the thesis. We can generalise to
the case where C is an open context as in the previous cases.
• C = s | D.
We can proceed as in the case C = D | s.
• C = [n]D.
By letting s = 0 in the family of relations defined in the case C = D | s, we obtain
the thesis.
• C = ∗D.
By induction, we may assume that D[[s1]] ∼m D[[s2]]. If D is a closed context,
then there exists a bisimulation F such that D[[s1]]R∅D[[s2]] with R∅ ∈ F . By
Lemma 4.3.1, we can prove the thesis by showing that the family of relations
{ { ( ∗ s | s′′, ∗ s′ | s′′ ) : sRN s′ , for some s′′ } : RN ∈ F }
is a bisimulation up-to ≡. The proof proceeds similarly to that for the bisimulation
defined in the case D | s.
By letting s = D[[s1]], s′ = D[[s2]] and s′′ = 0, we obtain the thesis. We can
generalise to the case where C is an open context as in the previous cases. 2
Theorem B.2.2 (Soundness of ∼m w.r.t. 'm, Theorem 4.3.2) Given two µCOWSm
closed terms s1 and s2, if s1 ∼m s2 then s1 'm s2.
Proof. By Theorem B.2.1, we have that ∼m is context closed. Thus, we only need to
prove that ∼m is barb preserving and computation closed.
• Barb preservation. Suppose s1 ↓n. Then, by Definition 4.3.1, this means that
s1
n [n¯] v¯−−−−−−−−→ s′1, for some s′1, n¯ and v¯. Since ∼m=∼∅m, by Definition 4.3.4, we
get that s2
n [n¯] v¯−−−−−−−−→ s′2, for some s′2. Thus, by Definition 4.3.1, s2 ↓n.
• Computation closure. By hypothesis, there exists a labelled bisimulation F such
that s1R∅s2 with R∅ ∈ F . Thus, if s1 ∅−−→ s′1, by Definition 4.3.4, we get that
s2
∅−−→ s′2 and s′1R∅s′2. This means that s′1 ∼m s′2. 2
Theorem B.2.3 (Completeness of ∼m w.r.t. 'm, Theorem 4.3.3) Given two µCOWSm
closed terms s1 and s2, if s1 'm s2 then s1 ∼m s2.
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Proof. We define a family of relations F = { RN : N set of names } such that 'm is
included in R∅ and show that it is a labelled bisimulation. Let N be the set {n1, . . . , nm},
then s1RN s2 if there exist m1, . . . , mm fresh such that
[n1, . . . , nm] (s1 | m1!〈n1〉 | . . . | mm!〈nm〉) 'm [n1, . . . , nm] (s2 | m1!〈n1〉 | . . . | mm!〈nm〉)
Take s1RN s2 and a transition s1 α−−→ s′1; we then reason by case analysis on α. For the
sake of simplicity, we consider in detail the case where N = ∅, i.e. we assume s1 'm s2.
We have to consider three cases, one for each clause in Definition 4.3.4.
• α = ∅.
By computation closure of 'm, we have that s2 ∅−−→ s′2 and s′1 'm s′2. 'm⊆ R∅,
hence s′1R∅s′2, as required.
• α = n  [n¯] v¯.
We consider first the case where all sent values are not restricted names, i.e. α =
n  v¯. We let the context C = [[·]] | n?v¯. m!〈〉 | m?〈〉 for m fresh, and consider the
computation C[[s1]]
∅−−→ C′[[s′1]], where C′ = [[·]] | m!〈〉 | m?〈〉. By hypothesis,
C[[s2]]
∅−−→ s and C′[[s′1]] 'm s. Since m is fresh, this fact implies that s2
n v¯−−−−−→ s′2
and s ≡ C′[[s′2]], otherwise s would not be able to exhibit a barb ↓m (whereas C′[[s′1]]
can). Now, we consider the computation C′[[s′1]]
∅−−→ s′1. By hypothesis and the
fact that s′1 is not be able to exhibit the barb ↓m, C′[[s′2]]
∅−−→ s′2 and s′1 'm s′2. Since
by definition 'm⊆ R∅, then we get s′1R∅s′2, as required.
Now, we consider the more general case where α = n  [n¯] v¯, with n¯ = 〈n1, . . . , nm〉
and m , 0. For the sake of presentation, suppose that v¯ = (n¯, v¯′). Take the context
C = [[·]] | [x1, . . . , xm] n?(x1, . . . , xm, v¯′). (m!〈x1〉 | . . . | m!〈xm〉), for m fresh, and
consider the computation C[[s1]]
∅−−→ s3 with s3 = [n¯] (s′1 | m!〈n1〉 | . . . | m!〈nm〉).
By hypothesis, C[[s2]]
∅−−→ s4 and s3 'm s4. Since s3 ↓m, by barb preservation,
we get s4 ↓m. This fact implies that s2 has performed an invoke activity n!(v¯′′, v¯′)
matching n?(x1, . . . , xm, v¯′). If v¯′′ would contain some non-restricted names, e.g.
v′′′, then we could define a context D = [[·]] | m?〈v′′′〉. m′!〈〉, for m′ fresh, that can
tell s3 and s4 apart. Indeed, D[[s4]]
∅−−→ s5 with s5 ↓m′ , while for each s6 such
that D[[s3]]
∅−−→ s6, it holds that s6 6↓m′ , that would contradict s5 'm s6 (implied by
the hypothesis s3 'm s4). Thus, v¯′′ is a tuple of restricted names and, possibly by
exploiting α-conversion, we get that s2
n [n¯] v¯−−−−−−−−→ s′2 and s4 = [n¯] (s′2 | m!〈n1〉 | . . . |
m!〈nm〉). From s3 'm s4 and by definition of F , we conclude that s′1R n¯s′2.
• α = n  [x¯] w¯.
For the sake of presentation, suppose that w¯ = (x¯, v¯). We consider the context
C = [[·]] | n!(v¯′, v¯), for v¯′ fresh, and the computation C[[s1]] ∅−−→ s′1 · {x¯ 7→ v¯′}.
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By computation closure, C[[s2]]
∅−−→ s3 and s′1 · {x¯ 7→ v¯′} 'm s3. We have two
possibilities:
– s2
n [x¯] w¯−−−−−−−−→ s′2 and s3 = s′2 · {x¯ 7→ v¯′};
– s2
∅−−→ s′2 and s3 = s′2 | n!(v¯′, v¯).
In both cases the thesis follows from the fact that, by definition of F , 'm⊆ R∅.
Let us now consider the more general case N , ∅. Let N be the set {n1, . . . , nk} = n¯. As
before, we have three possibilities. We show here the most interesting case: s1
n [m¯] v¯−−−−−−−−→
s′1 with n < N , m¯ = 〈m1, . . . ,mr〉 and v¯ = (m¯, v¯′); the other cases can be dealt with
in a similar way. Given m1, . . . , mk fresh, since n < N , we get that [n¯] (s1 | m1!〈n1〉 |
. . . | mk!〈nk〉) n [m¯] v¯−−−−−−−−→ [n¯] (s′1 | m1!〈n1〉 | . . . | mk!〈nk〉). Now, consider the context
C = [[·]] | [x1, . . . , xr] n?(〈x1, . . . , xr〉, v¯′). (m′!〈x1〉 | . . . | m′!〈xr〉), for m′ fresh, and the
computation C[[[n¯] (s1 | m1!〈n1〉 | . . . | mk!〈nk〉)]] ∅−−→ s3 with s3 = [n¯, m¯] (s′1 | m1!〈n1〉 |
. . . | mk!〈nk〉 | m′!〈m1〉 | . . . | m′!〈mr〉). As we have done for the case N = ∅, we can prove
that C[[[n¯] (s2 | m1!〈n1〉 | . . . | mk!〈nk〉)]] ∅−−→ s4, [n¯] (s2 | m1!〈n1〉 | . . . | mk!〈nk〉) n [m¯] v¯−−−−−−−−→
[n¯] (s′2 | m1!〈n1〉 | . . . | mk!〈nk〉), s4 = [n¯, m¯] (s′2 | m1!〈n1〉 | . . . | mk!〈nk〉 | m′!〈m1〉 | . . . |
m′!〈mr〉), and s3 'm s4. From this and by definition of F , we conclude that s′1R n¯∪m¯s′2. 2
B.2.2 µCOWS
Lemma B.2.1 (Lemma 4.3.3) Let s1 and s2 be two µCOWS closed terms and R be a
relation belonging to a labelled bisimulation such that s1Rs2. Then, noConf(s1, n, v¯, `) =
noConf(s2, n, v¯, `) for any n, v¯ and `, with ` 6 | v¯ |.
Proof. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose that there exists n, v¯ and ` 6
| v¯ | such that noConf(s1, n, v¯, `) = false and noConf(s2, n, v¯, `) = true. By definition,
noConf(s1, n, v¯, `) = false implies that there exists a context C such that s1 = C[[n?w¯.s]]
and s1 can immediately perform the receive activity n?w¯ and |M(w¯, v¯) |< `. This means
that there exists s′1 such that s1
n [x¯] w¯−−−−−−−−→ s′1 for some x¯ ⊆ w¯. Since |M(w¯, v¯) |< ` 6 | v¯ |,
we have that | x¯ |,| w¯ |. Hence, since s1Rs2 for R belonging to a labelled bisimulation, there
exists s′2 such that s2
n [x¯] w¯−−−−−−−−→ s′2. From this, we get that s2 = D[[n?w¯.s]] for some context
D such that s2 can immediately perform the receive activity n?w¯. Thus, by definition of
predicate noConf( , , , ), we obtain noConf(s2, n, v¯, `) = false, that is a contradiction. Of
course, the case where noConf(s1, n, v¯, `) = true and noConf(s2, n, v¯, `) = false proceeds
as before. 2
Theorem B.2.4 (Theorem 4.3.4) ∼µ is a congruence for µCOWS closed terms.
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Proof. We shall prove that, given two µCOWS closed terms s1 and s2, if s1 ∼µ s2 then
C[[s1]] ∼µ C[[s2]] for every (possibly open) context C. The proof is by induction on the
structure of the context C and proceeds similarly to that of Theorem B.2.1. Here, we take
a look only at the most relevant case of the inductive step, i.e. the case C = D | s regarding
the parallel composition. By induction, we may assume that D[[s1]] ∼µ D[[s2]]. If D is a
closed context, then there exists a bisimulation F such that D[[s1]]R∅D[[s2]] with R∅ ∈ F .
By Lemma 4.3.2, we can prove the thesis by showing that the family of relations
F ′ = { R′N ′ : RN ∈ F , N ⊆ N ′ }
R′N ′ = { ( [n¯] (s′ | s), [n¯] (s′′ | s) ) : s′RN s′′ , for some n¯ and s s.t. N ∩ re(s) = ∅ }
where re(s) is the set of the receiving endpoint used in s, is a bisimulation up-to ≡. Let
us consider a relation R′N ′ ∈ F ′. If [n¯] (s′ | s)
α−−→ s′′′, then the proof proceeds by case
analysis on α. We consider here only a few relevant cases.
• α = n ∅ ` v¯, s α−−→ s′′′′ and s′′′ = [n¯] (s′ | s′′′′).
By rule (parcom), since s
n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−−→ s′′′′ and s′ | s n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−−→ s′ | s′′′′, we get that
noConf(s′, n, v¯, `) = true. Since s′RN s′′ for a relation RN belonging to the bisim-
ulation F , by Lemma B.2.1 we have that noConf(s′′, n, v¯, `) = true. Hence, by
rules (parcom) and (del2), [n¯] (s′′ | s) n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−−→ [n¯] (s′′ | s′′′′). By definition of F ′, we
conclude that [n¯] (s′ | s′′′′)R′N ′ [n¯] (s′′ | s′′′′).
• α = n ∅ | v¯ | v¯, s′ α−−→ s3 and s′′′ = [n¯] (s3 | s).
By rule (parcom), since s′
n ∅ |v¯| v¯−−−−−−→ s3 and s′ | s n ∅ |v¯| v¯−−−−−−→ s3 | s, we get that
noConf(s, n, v¯, `) = true. Since s′RN s′′ for a relation RN belonging to the bisimu-
lation F , we have two possibilities:
1. there exists s4 such that s′′
n ∅ |v¯| v¯−−−−−−→ s4 and s3RN s4. Since noConf(s, n, v¯, `) =
true and by rules (parcom) and (del2), [n¯] (s′′ | s) n ∅ |v¯| v¯−−−−−−→ [n¯] (s4 | s). By
definition of F ′, we conclude that [n¯] (s3 | s)R′N ′ [n¯] (s4 | s).
2. there exists s4 such that s′′
∅−−→ s4 and s3RN s4. By rules (par2) and (del2),
[n¯] (s′′ | s) ∅−−→ [n¯] (s4 | s). By definition of F ′, we conclude that [n¯] (s3 |
s)R′N ′ [n¯] (s4 | s).
• α = n ∅ ` v¯, ` ,| v¯ |, s′ α−−→ s3 and s′′′ = [n¯] (s3 | s).
Like the case 1 above.
By letting s′ = D[[s1]] and s′′ = D[[s2]], we obtain the thesis. We can generalise to the
case where C is an open context as shown in Theorem B.2.1. 2
Theorem B.2.5 (Soundness of ∼µ w.r.t. 'µ, Theorem 4.3.5) Given two µCOWS closed
terms s1 and s2, if s1 ∼µ s2 then s1 'µ s2.
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Proof. By Theorem B.2.4, we have that ∼µ is context closed. Thus, we only need to
prove that ∼µ is barb preserving and computation closed.
• Barb preservation. Suppose s1 ↓n. Then, by Definition 4.3.1, this means that
s1
n [n¯] v¯−−−−−−−−→ s′1, for some s′1, n¯ and v¯. Since ∼µ=∼∅µ, by Definition 4.3.8, we get that
s2
n [n¯] v¯−−−−−−−−→ s′2, for some s′2. Thus, by Definition 4.3.1, s2 ↓n.
• Computation closure. By hypothesis, there exists a labelled bisimulation F such
that s1R∅s2 with R∅ ∈ F . Thus, if s1 ∅−−→ s′1, by Definition 4.3.8, we get that
s2
∅−−→ s′2 and s′1R∅s′2, which means that s′1 ∼µ s′2. Similarly, if s1
n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−−→ s′1 then,
by Definition 4.3.8, we get that s2
α−−→ s′2 and s′1 ∼µ s′2, where either α = n ∅ ` v¯ or
(` =| v¯ | ∧ α = ∅). 2
Theorem B.2.6 (Completeness of ∼µ w.r.t. 'µ, Theorem 4.3.6) Given two µCOWS
closed terms s1 and s2, if s1 'µ s2 then s1 ∼µ s2.
Proof. We define a family of relations F = { RN : N set of names } such that 'µ is
included in R∅, and show that it is a labelled bisimulation. Let N be the set {n1, . . . , nm},
then s1RN s2 if there exist m1, . . . , mm fresh such that
[n1, . . . , nm] (s1 | m1!〈n1〉 | . . . | mm!〈nm〉) 'µ [n1, . . . , nm] (s2 | m1!〈n1〉 | . . . | mm!〈nm〉)
Take s1RN s2 and a transition s1 α−−→ s′1; we then reason by case analysis on α. For the
sake of simplicity, we consider here the case where N = ∅ (the general case can be dealt
with in a similar way, as shown in the proof of Theorem 4.3.3), i.e. we assume s1 'µ s2.
We have to consider the following possibilities.
• α = ∅.
By computation closure of 'µ, we have that s2 ∅−−→ s′2 and s′1 'µ s′2. 'µ⊆ R∅, hence
s′1R∅s′2, as required.
• α = n ∅ ` v¯ and ` ,| v¯ |.
By computation closure of 'µ, we have that s2 n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−−→ s′2 and s′1 'µ s′2. As before,
we obtain s′1R∅s′2.
• α = n ∅ | v¯ | v¯.
By computation closure of 'µ, we have two possibilities:
1. s2
n ∅ |¯v| v¯−−−−−−→ s′2 and s′1 'µ s′2; hence, s′1R∅s′2.
2. s2
∅−−→ s′2 and s′1 'µ s′2; hence, s′1R∅s′2.
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• α = n  [n¯] v¯.
We consider first the case where all sent values are not restricted names, i.e. α =
n  v¯. We let the context C = [[·]] | n?v¯. m!〈〉 | m?〈〉 for m fresh, and consider the
computation C[[s1]]
∅−−→ C′[[s′1]], where C′ = [[·]] | m!〈〉 | m?〈〉. By hypothesis,
C[[s2]]
∅−−→ s and C′[[s′1]] 'µ s. This fact implies that s2
n v¯−−−−−→ s′2 and s ≡ C′[[s′2]],
otherwise s would not be able to exhibit a barb ↓m (whereas C′[[s′1]] can). Now, we
consider the the computation C′[[s′1]]
∅−−→ s′1. By hypothesis and the fact that s′1 is
not be able to exhibit the barb ↓m, C′[[s′2]]
∅−−→ s′2 and s′1 'µ s′2. Since by definition
'µ⊆ R∅, then we get s′1R∅s′2, as required.
Now, we consider the more general case where α = n  [n¯] v¯, with n¯ = 〈n1, . . . , nm〉
and m , 0. For the sake of presentation, suppose that v¯ = (n¯, v¯′). Take the context
C = [[·]] | [x1, . . . , xm] n?(x1, . . . , xm, v¯′). (m!〈x1〉 | . . . | m!〈xm〉), for m fresh, and the
computation C[[s1]]
n ∅m v¯−−−−−−→ s3 with s3 = [n¯] (s′1 | m!〈n1〉 | . . . | m!〈nm〉). Since
| v¯ |> m, by hypothesis, C[[s2]] n ∅m v¯−−−−−−→ s4 and s3 'µ s4. Since s3 ↓m, by barb
preservation, we get s4 ↓m. This fact implies that s2 has performed an invoke activ-
ity n!(v¯′′, v¯′) matching n?(x1, . . . , xm, v¯′). If v¯′′ would contain some non-restricted
names, e.g. v′′′, then we could define a context D = [[·]] | m?〈v′′′〉. m′!〈〉, for m′
fresh, that can tell s3 and s4 apart. Indeed, D[[s4]]
∅−−→ s5 with s5 ↓m′ , while
for each s6 such that D[[s3]]
∅−−→ s6, it holds that s6 6↓m′!, that would contradict
s5 'µ s6 (implied by the hypothesis s3 'µ s4). Thus, v¯′′ is a tuple of restricted
names and, possibly by exploiting α-conversion, we get that s2
n [n¯] v¯−−−−−−−−→ s′2 and
s4 = [n] (s′2 | m!〈n1〉 | . . . | m!〈nm〉). From s3 'µ s4 and by definition of F , we
conclude that s′1R n¯s′2.
• α = n [x¯] w¯.
We have the following possibilities:
– α = n  〈〉.
We consider the context C = [[·]] | n!〈〉 and the computation C[[s1]] ∅−−→ s′1.
By hypothesis, C[[s2]]
∅−−→ s and s′1 'µ s. We have two possibilities:
1. s2
n 〈〉−−−−−−→ s′2 and s = s′2;
2. s2
∅−−→ s′2 and s = s′2 | n!〈〉;
In both cases the thesis follows from the fact that, by definition of F , 'µ⊆ R∅.
– α = n  [x¯] x¯.
We consider the context C = [[·]] | n!v¯ for some v¯ such that M(x¯, v¯) = σ,
noConf(s2, n, v¯, | x¯ |) = true and C[[s1]] n ∅ |v¯| v¯−−−−−−→ s′1 · σ. By hypothesis, we
have two possibilities:
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1. C[[s2]]
n ∅ |v¯| v¯−−−−−−→ s and s1 · σ 'µ s. There are two cases:
(a) s2
n [x¯] x¯−−−−−−−−→ s′2 and s = s′2 · σ;
(b) s2
n ∅ |v¯| v¯−−−−−−→ s′′2 . Since the length of the generated substitution is | v¯ |
(i.e. the argument of the executed receive is a tuple of only variables),
by rule (com), s2
n [x¯] x¯−−−−−−−−→ s′2 and, hence, we can proceed as in the
previous case.
2. C[[s2]]
∅−−→ s and s′1 'µ s. This means that s2
∅−−→ s′2 and s = s′2 | n!v¯.
In both cases the thesis follows from the fact that, by definition of F , 'µ⊆ R∅.
– α = n  [x¯] w¯ with | x¯ |,| w¯ |.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that w¯ = (x¯, v¯). We consider the
context C = [[·]] | n!(v¯′, v¯) with v¯′ such that for any receive activity n?w¯′ that
s1 and s2 can immediately perform, with w¯′ more or equal defined than w¯,
M(w¯′, (v¯′, v¯)) does not hold. Then, consider the transition C[[s1]] n ∅ |x¯| (v¯
′,v¯)−−−−−−−−−→
s′1 · {x¯ 7→ v¯′}. By hypothesis, C[[s2]]
n ∅ |x¯| (v¯′,v¯)−−−−−−−−−→ s and s′1 · {x¯ 7→ v¯′} 'µ s. We
have the following possibilities:
1. s2
n [y¯] w¯′−−−−−−−−→ s′2.
Since the substitution generated by the communication is | x¯ | long, we
have that | x¯ |=| y¯ | and, by possibly exploiting α-conversion, we get that
s2
n [x¯] w¯′′−−−−−−−−−→ s′2 with w¯′′ obtained from w¯′ by replacing y¯ with x¯. From
this, we have that w¯′′ is as defined as w¯. Moreover, by rule (com), we have
thatM(w¯′′, (v¯′, v¯)) holds. Hence, by the constraints on v¯′, we get w¯′′ = w¯.
Finally, s2
n [x¯] w¯−−−−−−−−→ s′2 and s = s′2 · {x¯ 7→ v¯′}.
2. s2
n ∅ |x¯| (v¯′,v¯)−−−−−−−−−→ s′2 and s = s′2 | n!(v¯′, v¯).
By rule (com) and by following the same reasoning used before, we can
state that s2
n [x¯] w¯−−−−−−−−→ s′′2 . Therefore, C[[s2]]
n ∅ |x¯| (v¯′,v¯)−−−−−−−−−→ s′′2 · {x¯ 7→ v¯′}
and s′1 · {x¯ 7→ v¯′} 'µ s′′2 · {x¯ 7→ v¯′}.
In both cases the thesis follows from the fact that, by definition of F , 'µ⊆ R∅.
2
B.2.3 COWS
Theorem B.2.7 (Theorem 4.3.7) ∼ is a congruence for COWS.
Proof. We shall prove that, given two COWS closed terms s1 and s2, if s1 ∼ s2 then
C[[s1]] ∼ C[[s2]] for every context C. The proof is by induction on the structure of the
context C. The base case, i.e. whenever C = [[·]], is trivial. For the inductive case, we take
a look at two cases:
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• C = [k]D.
IfD is a closed context, then [k]D ≡ D and, by induction, we immediately conclude.
Instead, if D contains the free killer label k at most2, by induction we may assume
that D[[s1]] ∼ D[[s2]]. This means that, there exists a bisimulation F such that
D[[s1]]R∅D[[s2]] for some R∅ ∈ F . Now, consider the following family of relations:
{ { ( [k] s, [k] s′ ) : sRN s′ , s and s′satisfy (∗) } ∪ RN : RN ∈ F }
where property (∗) states that if s k−−→ s′′ then s′ k−−→ s′′′ and s′′RN s′′′. The proof
proceed by proving that the above family of relations is a bisimulation up-to ≡.
Indeed, by letting s = D[[s1]] and s′ = D[[s2]], we obtain the thesis. In fact, since s1
and s2 are closed terms, D[[s1]] and D[[s2]] satisfy property (∗).
Thus, let us consider a relation R′N belonging to the above family. If [k] s
α−−→ s3,
we proceed by case analysis on α. The most interesting case is α = †, with s k−−→
s4 and s3 = [k] s4. By property (*), s′
k−−→ s5 and s4RN s5. From this, we get
that [k] s′
†−−→ [k] s5 and, by definition of R′N , we conclude [k] s4R′N [k] s5. The
remaining cases can be easily proved by exploiting the fact that sRN s′.
• C = {|D|}.
By induction, we may assume that D[[s1]] ∼ D[[s2]]. If C is a closed context, then
there exists a bisimulation F such that D[[s1]]R∅D[[s2]] for some R∅ ∈ F . Thus,
we can prove the thesis by showing that { { ({|s|}, {|s′|}) : sRN s′ } , RN ∈ F } is a
bisimulation up-to ≡. Instead, if D contains free variables, we must consider D[[s1]]
and D[[s2]] under all possible substitution for such variables. 2
B.3 Proofs of results in Section 4.4
Theorem B.3.1 (Theorem 4.4.1) Let uvar(α) = ∅ and α , n  [n] . s α−−→ s′ if and only
if, for any favourable condition Φ, Φ ` s  Φ
′ , α−−−−→ Φ′ ` s′ for some favourable condition
Φ′.
Proof. The proof of the “if” part proceeds by induction on the length of the inference
of s
α−−→ s′. For the base case, we reason by case analysis on the axioms of the original
operational semantics.
(kill) In this case, α = k, s = kill(k) and s′ = 0. By rule (s-kill), kill(k)
true , k−−−−−−→ 0.
Then, by rule (constServ), we get that Φ ` kill(k)  Φ
′ , k−−−−→ Φ′ ` 0, where Φ′ =
2The case where D contains more than one free killer label can be dealt with in a similar way, while the
case where D contains free variables can be dealt with as in Theoerm B.2.1.
285
B(Φ∧ true, 0, ∅) (since uvar(Φ) = ∅). By definition, B(Φ∧ true, 0, ∅) = B(Φ, 0, ∅)∧
B(true, 0, ∅). Since Φ is favourable, by Lemma 4.4.1, we have that E(B(Φ, 0, ∅)) ,
false. Since B(true, 0, ∅) = true , false, we can conclude that E(Φ′) , false.
(rec) In this case, α = n  w and s = n?w.s′. By rule (s-rec), n?w.s′ true , nw−−−−−−−−−→ s′.
Then, by rule (constServ), we get that Φ ` n?w.s′  Φ
′ , nw−−−−−−−−→ Φ′ ` s′, where Φ′ =
B(Φ ∧ true, 0, ∅). As before, we can conclude that E(Φ′) , false.
(inv) In this case, α = n  v, s = n! where [[]] = v, and s′ = 0. By rule (s-inv),
n!
true , n v−−−−−−−−−→ 0. Then, by rule (constServinv), we get that Φ ` n!  Φ
′ , n v−−−−−−−→ Φ′ `
0, where Φ′ = B(Φ ∧ true, 0, ∅). As before, we can conclude that E(Φ′) , false.
For the inductive step, we reason by case analysis on the last applied inference rule of the
original operational semantics.
(choice) In this case, s = g + g′. By the premise of the rule (choice), g
α−−→ s′. By
induction, Φ ` g  Φ
′ , α−−−−→ Φ′ ` s′ for any favourable Φ and some favourable Φ′.
By the premise of the rule (constServ), we get that g
Φ′′ , α−−−−−−→ s′ where Φ′′ is such
that Φ′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′′, s′, ∅). By rule (s-choice), g + g′ Φ
′′ , α−−−−−−→ s′. Finally, by rule
(constServ), we can conclude Φ ` g + g′ Φ
′ , α−−−−→Φ′ ` s′.
(delcom 2) In this case, s = [x] s1 and s′ = s2 · {x 7→ v}. By the premise of the rule (delcom 2),
s1
n {x 7→v} 1 v−−−−−−−−−→ s2. By induction, we get that Φ ` s1  Φ
′ , n {x 7→v} 1 v−−−−−−−−−−−→ Φ′ ` s2 for
any favourable Φ and some favourable Φ′. By the premise of rule (constServ), we
get that s1
Φ′′ , n {x 7→v} 1 v−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s2 and, by rule (delcom 2), [x] s1 Φ
′′ , n ∅ 1 v−−−−−−−−−→ s2 · {x 7→ v}.
Finally, by rule (constServ), we can conclude.
(delkill 1), (delkill 2), (delkill 3), (del 2), (str), (prot), (parkill), (par 3), (parcom 2) These cases
are similar to the previous one; the latter case relies on the fact that
noConf(s2, n, v, 1) = true implies that confRec(s2, n) = {vi}i∈I such that v , vi for
all i ∈ I.
(com 2) First, we consider the case α = n ∅ 0 v. By the premises of rule (com 2), s = (s1 |
s2), s′ = (s′1 | s′2), s1
n v−−−−−→ s′1 and s2
n v−−−−−→ s′2. By induction, we get that Φ1 `
s1
Φ′1 , n v−−−−−−−→Φ′1 ` s′1 and Φ2 ` s2 
Φ′2 , n v−−−−−−−→ Φ′2 ` s′2, for any favourable conditions
Φ1 and Φ2, and some favourable Φ′1 and Φ
′
2. By the premises of rules (constServ) and
(constServinv), we get that s1
Φ′′1 , n v−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 and s2
Φ′′2 , n v−−−−−−−−−→ s′2, where conditions
Φ′′1 and Φ
′′
2 are such that Φ
′
1 = B(Φ1 ∧ Φ′′1 , s′1, ∅) and Φ′2 = B(Φ2 ∧ Φ′′2 , s′2, ∅). By
rule (s-com), s1 | s2 Φ
′ , n ∅ 0 v−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s′2, where Φ′ = Φ′′1 ∧Φ′′2 ∧n = n∧v = v. Finally,
by rule (constServ), we can conclude that Φ ` s1 | s2  Φ
′′ , n ∅ 0 v−−−−−−−−→ Φ′′ ` s′1 | s′2, where
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Φ′′ = B(Φ ∧Φ′, s′1 | s′2, ∅). The case α = nσ 1 v proceeds as above, by also relying
on the fact that noConf(s1 | s2, n, v, 1) = true implies that confRec(s1 | s2, n) =
{vi}i∈I with v , vi for all i ∈ I.
Consider now the “only if” part of the theorem. By the premises of rules (constServ)
and (constServinv), we get that s
Φ′′ , α−−−−−−→ s′ where Φ′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′′, s′, ∅). By hypothesis
E(Φ′) , false, hence E(Φ′′) , false too. The proof proceeds by induction on the length
of the inference of s
Φ′′ , α−−−−−−→ s′. We omit the details because the proof proceeds as that of
the “if” part, but the steps are executed in the reverse order. For the base case, we reason
by case analysis on the axioms of the symbolic operational semantics. We take a look at
one base case:
(s-rec) In this case, Φ′′ = true, α = n  w and s = n?w.s′. Trivially, by rule (rec),
n?w.s′
nw−−−−−−→ s′.
For the inductive step, we reason by case analysis on the last applied inference rule of the
symbolic operational semantics. We take a look at two cases:
(s-choice) In this case, s = g + g′. By the premise of the rule (s-choice), g
Φ′′ , α−−−−−−→ s′.
By induction, we get that g
α−−→ s′. Finally, by rule (choice), we can conclude
g + g′
α−−→ s′.
(s-com) In this case, s = (s1 | s2), Φ′′ = (Φ1 ∧ Φ2 ∧ n = n ∧ v , confRec(s1 | s2, n)),
α = n {x 7→ v} 1 v and s′ = (s′1 | s′2). Since E(Φ′′) , false, we get that E(Φ1) , false,
E(Φ2) , false and confRec(s1 | s2, n) = {vi}i∈I such that v , vi for all i ∈ I. This
means that noConf(s1 | s2, n, v, 1) holds true. By induction and since E(Φ1) , false
and E(Φ2) , false, we have that s1 n x−−−−−→ s′1 and s2
n v−−−−−→ s′2. Thus, by rule
(com 2), we can conclude that s1 | s2 n {x 7→v} 1 v−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s′2. 2
B.4 Proofs of results in Section 5.1.1
Theorem B.4.1 (Completeness, Theorem 5.1.1) Given an Orc expression f and a com-
munication endpoint r, f
l
↪→ f ′ implies [[ f ]]r ≡ 〈〈 f 〉〉r | s
α
==⇒ 〈〈 f ′〉〉r | s, where α = r 〈v〉
if l = !v, and α = n ∅ ` v¯ if l = τ.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the inference of f
l
↪→ f ′.
Base Step: We reason by case analysis on the axioms of the operational semantics.
(SiteCall) In this case f = S (v), l =!v′ and f ′ = 0. By encoding definition, 〈〈S (v)〉〉r | s =
S!〈v, r〉 | s, where s = ∗ [x, y] S?〈x, y〉.y!〈v′〉. Thus, S!〈v, r〉 | s S ∅ 2 〈v,r〉−−−−−−−−→ r!〈v′〉 |
s
r 〈v′〉−−−−−−−→ 0 | s. Since 〈〈0〉〉r = 0, we can conclude.
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(Def) In this case f = E(w) with E(x) , g, l = τ and f ′ = g · {x 7→ w}. By encod-
ing definition, 〈〈E(w)〉〉r | s = [r′] (E!〈r, r′〉 | [z′] r′?〈z′〉.z′!〈w〉) | s, where s =
∗ [y, z] E?〈y, z〉.[r′′] (z!〈r′′〉 | [x] (r′′?〈x〉 | 〈〈g〉〉y) ). Thus, 〈〈E(w)〉〉r | s E ∅ 2 〈r,r
′〉−−−−−−−−−→
[r′] ([z′] r′?〈z′〉.z′!〈w〉 | [r′′] (r′!〈r′′〉 | [x] (r′′?〈x〉 | 〈〈g〉〉r) ) ) | s , s′. Then,
s′
r′ ∅ 1 〈r′′〉−−−−−−−−−→ [r′′] (r′′!〈w〉 | [x] (r′′?〈x〉 | 〈〈g〉〉r) ) | s , s′′. In case w = z′′, since
〈〈g · {x 7→ z′′}〉〉r ≡ [r′′] (r′′!〈z′′〉 | [x] (r′′?〈x〉 | 〈〈g〉〉r) ), we can directly conclude.
Instead, in case w = v′, we have s′′
r′′ ∅ 1 〈v′〉−−−−−−−−−→ 〈〈g〉〉r · {x 7→ v′} | s. Thus, since
〈〈g〉〉r · {x 7→ v′} ≡ 〈〈g · {x 7→ v′}〉〉r, we can conclude.
Inductive Step: We reason by case analysis on the last applied inference rule of the oper-
ational semantics.
(Sym1) In this case, f = f1 | f2, f ′ = f ′1 | f2. By the premise of the rule (Sym1),
f1
l
↪→ f ′1 . By encoding definition, 〈〈 f 〉〉r | s = 〈〈 f1〉〉r | 〈〈 f2〉〉r | s. By induction,
〈〈 f1〉〉r | s′ α==⇒ 〈〈 f ′1〉〉r | s′ where s ≡ s′ | s′′. By rules (par 3) or (parcom), we can
conclude.
(Sym2) Similar to the previous case.
(Seq1) In this case, f = f1 > x > f2, l = τ and f ′ = f ′1 > x > f2. By the premise
of the rule (Seq1), f1
τ
↪→ f ′1 . By encoding definition, 〈〈 f 〉〉r | s = [r′] (〈〈 f1〉〉r′ |
∗ [x] r′?〈x〉.〈〈 f2〉〉r) | s. By induction, 〈〈 f1〉〉r′ | s′ n ∅ ` v¯=====⇒ 〈〈 f ′1〉〉r′ | s′ where s ≡ s′ |
s′′. By rules (parcom) and (del 2), we can conclude that 〈〈 f 〉〉r | s n ∅ ` v¯=====⇒ 〈〈 f ′1 > x >
f2〉〉r | s.
(Seq2) In this case, f = f1 > x > f2, l =!v and f ′ = ( f ′1 > x > f2) | f2 · {x 7→ v}.
By the premise of the rule (Seq2), f1
!v
↪→ f ′1 . By encoding definition, 〈〈 f 〉〉r | s =
[r′] (〈〈 f1〉〉r′ | ∗ [x] r′?〈x〉.〈〈 f2〉〉r) | s. By induction, 〈〈 f1〉〉r′ | s′ r
′ 〈v〉
======⇒ 〈〈 f ′1〉〉r′ | s′
where s ≡ s′ | s′′. Thus, 〈〈 f 〉〉r | s r
′ ∅ 1 〈v〉
=======⇒ [r′] (〈〈 f ′1〉〉r′ | ∗ [x] r′?〈x〉.〈〈 f2〉〉r |
〈〈 f2 · {x 7→ v}〉〉r) | s ≡ 〈〈 f ′1 > x > f2〉〉r | 〈〈 f2 · {x 7→ v}〉〉r | s.
(Asym2) In this case, f = f1 where x :∈ f2, l = τ and f ′ = f1 where x :∈ f ′2 . By
the premise of the rule (Asym2), f2
τ
↪→ f ′2 . By encoding definition, 〈〈 f 〉〉r | s =
[r′, x] ( 〈〈 f1〉〉r | [k] ( 〈〈 f2〉〉r′ | r′?〈x〉.kill(k) ) ) | s. By induction, 〈〈 f2〉〉r′ | s′ n ∅ ` v¯=====⇒
〈〈 f ′2〉〉r′ | s′ where s ≡ s′ | s′′. Thus, by rule (del 2), we can conclude that 〈〈 f 〉〉r |
s
n ∅ ` v¯
=====⇒ [r′, x] (〈〈 f1〉〉r | [k] (〈〈 f ′2〉〉r′ | r′?〈x〉.kill(k))) | s ≡ 〈〈 f1 where x :∈ f ′2〉〉r | s.
(Asym1) Similar to the previous case.
(Asym3) In this case, f = f1 where x :∈ f2, l = τ and f ′ = f1 · {x 7→ v}. By the premise
of the rule (Asym3), f2
!v
↪→ f ′2 . By encoding definition, 〈〈 f 〉〉r | s = [r′, x] ( 〈〈 f1〉〉r |
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[k] (〈〈 f2〉〉r′ | r′?〈x〉.kill(k))) | s. By induction, 〈〈 f2〉〉r′ | s′ r
′ 〈v〉
======⇒ 〈〈 f ′2〉〉r′ | s′ where
s ≡ s′ | s′′. Then, by encoding definition and rule (del 2), s′′′ , [r′, x] ( 〈〈 f1〉〉r |
[k] (〈〈 f ′2〉〉r′ | r′?〈x〉.kill(k)) | r′!〈v〉) | s is a reduct of 〈〈 f 〉〉r | s. We can conclude that
s′′′
r′ ∅ 1 〈v〉−−−−−−−−→ [r′] ( 〈〈 f1 · {x 7→ v}〉〉r | [k] ( 〈〈 f ′2〉〉r′ | kill(k) ) ) | s
†−−→ [r′] ( 〈〈 f1 · {x 7→
v}〉〉r | [k] 0 ) | s ≡ 〈〈 f1 · {x 7→ v}〉〉r | s. 2
Theorem B.4.2 (Soundness, Theorem 5.1.2) Given an Orc expression f and a commu-
nication endpoint r, [[ f ]]r ≡ 〈〈 f 〉〉r | s
n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−−→ s′ implies that there exists an Orc ex-
pression f ′ such that f
l
↪→ f ′ and s′ α==⇒ 〈〈 f ′〉〉r | s, where α = r  〈v〉 if l = !v, and
α = n′ ∅ `′ v¯′) if l = τ.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the definition of the encoding 〈〈 f 〉〉r.
Base Step: We reason by case analysis on the non-inductive cases of the definition.
( f = 0) In this case 〈〈 f 〉〉r = 0 and s = 0. Since [[ f ]]r ≡ 0
α−−9, we can trivially conculde.
( f = S (w)) In this case 〈〈 f 〉〉r = S!〈w, r〉 and s = ∗ [x, y] S?〈x, y〉.y!〈v′〉. If w = z
then [[ f ]]r
α−−9, thus we can trivially conculde. If w = v then [[ f ]]r ≡ S!〈v, r〉 |
s
S ∅ 2 〈v,r〉−−−−−−−−→ r!〈v′〉 | s = s′. By rule (SiteCall) we have l =!v′ and f ′ = 0. Thus,
s′
r 〈v′〉−−−−−−−→ 0 | s. Since 〈〈0〉〉r = 0, we can conclude.
( f = E(w)) Assuming E(x) , g, we have 〈〈E(w)〉〉r = [r′] (E!〈r, r′〉 | [z] r′?〈z〉.z!〈w〉) and
s = ∗ [y′, z′] E?〈y′, z′〉.[r′′] (z′!〈r′′〉 | [x] (r′′?〈x〉 | 〈〈g〉〉y′) ). Then, [[ f ]]r
E ∅ 2 〈r,r′〉−−−−−−−−−→
[r′] ([z] r′?〈z〉.z!〈w〉) | [r′′] (r′!r′′ | [x] (r′′?〈x〉 | 〈〈g〉〉r) ) | s = s′. By rule (Def)
we have l = τ and f ′ = g · {x 7→ w}. Moreover, s′ r
′ ∅ 1 〈r′′〉−−−−−−−−−→ [r′′] (r′′!〈w〉 |
[x] (r′′?〈x〉 | 〈〈g〉〉r) ) | s , s′′. If w = y, we directly conclude, since s′′ = 〈〈g · {x 7→
y}〉〉r. If w = v, we can conclude by s′′ r
′′ ∅ 1 〈v〉−−−−−−−−→ 〈〈g · {x 7→ v}〉〉r.
Inductive Step: We reason by case analysis on the inductive cases of the definition.
( f = f1 | f2) In this case 〈〈 f 〉〉r = 〈〈 f1〉〉r | 〈〈 f2〉〉r. By encoding definition, the transition
n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−−→ cannot be produced by a synchronization between 〈〈 f1〉〉r and 〈〈 f2〉〉r. Then,
we have only the following cases:
• 〈〈 f1〉〉r | s n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−−→ s1.
By induction, f1
l
↪→ f ′1 and s1
α
==⇒ 〈〈 f ′1〉〉r | s. By rule (Sym1), f
l
↪→ f ′1 | f2 =
f ′. By rule (par 3) or (parcom), we can conclude that s′ ≡ s1 | 〈〈 f2〉〉r α==⇒ 〈〈 f ′1〉〉r |
s | 〈〈 f2〉〉r ≡ 〈〈 f ′〉〉r | s.
• 〈〈 f2〉〉r | s n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−−→ s2.
Similar to the previous case.
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( f = f1 > x > f2) In this case 〈〈 f 〉〉r = [r′] (〈〈 f1〉〉r′ | ∗ [x] r′?〈x〉.〈〈 f2〉〉r). Lemma 5.1.1
implies that the inference of the transition
n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−−→ derives from 〈〈 f1〉〉r′ | s n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−−→
s1. By induction, f1
l
↪→ f ′1 and s1
α
==⇒ 〈〈 f ′1〉〉r′ | s. We have two cases:
• l = τ.
By rule (Seq1), f
τ
↪→ f ′1 > x > f2. By rules (parcom) and (del 2), s′
n′ ∅ `′ v¯′
=======⇒
[r′] (〈〈 f ′1〉〉r′ | ∗ [x] r′?〈x〉.〈〈 f2〉〉r) | s ≡ 〈〈 f ′1 > x > f2〉〉r | s.
• l =!v.
By rule (Seq2), f
!v
↪→ ( f ′1 > x > f2) | f2 · {x 7→ v}. By rules (com 2) and (del 2),
s′
r′ ∅ 1 〈v〉
=======⇒ [r′] (〈〈 f ′1〉〉r′ | ∗ [x] r′?〈x〉.〈〈 f2〉〉r) | 〈〈 f2 · {x 7→ v}〉〉r | s ≡ 〈〈( f ′1 >
x > f2) | f2 · {x 7→ v}〉〉r | s.
( f = f1 where x :∈ f2) In this case 〈〈 f 〉〉r = [r′, x] ( 〈〈 f1〉〉r | [k] ( 〈〈 f2〉〉r′ | r′?〈x〉.kill(k) ) ).
By Lemma 5.1.1, we have two cases:
• 〈〈 f1〉〉r | s n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−−→ s1.
By induction, f1
l
↪→ f ′1 and s1
α
==⇒ 〈〈 f ′1〉〉r′ | s. By rule (Asym1), f
l
↪→
f ′1 where x :∈ f2. By rules (del 2) and (parcom), s′
α
==⇒ [r′, x] ( 〈〈 f ′1〉〉r |
[k] ( 〈〈 f2〉〉r′ | r′?〈x〉.kill(k) ) ) | s ≡ 〈〈 f ′1 where x :∈ f2〉〉r.
• 〈〈 f2〉〉r′ | s n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−−→ s2.
By induction, f2
l
↪→ f ′2 and s2
α
==⇒ 〈〈 f ′2〉〉r′ | s. We have two cases:
– α = n′ ∅ `′ v¯′.
Similar to the previous case.
– α = r′!〈v〉.
By rule (Asym3), f
τ
↪→ f1 · {x 7→ v}. By rules (com 2), (parcom) and (del 2),
s′
r′ ∅ 1 〈v〉
=======⇒ 〈〈 f1 · {x 7→ v}〉〉r | [k] ( 〈〈 f ′2 · {x 7→ v}〉〉r′ | kill(k) ) = s′′. Then,
by rules (kill), (parkill), (delkill 1) and (par 3), s′′
†−−→ 〈〈 f1 · {x 7→ v}〉〉r.
( f = g · {x 7→ y}) In this case 〈〈 f 〉〉r = [r′] (r′!〈y〉 | [x] (r′?〈x〉 | 〈〈g〉〉r) ). Since r′!〈y〉 α−−9,
we have 〈〈g〉〉r | s n ∅ ` v¯−−−−−−→ s′′. By induction, g l↪→ g′ and s′′ α==⇒ 〈〈g′〉〉r | s. By rules
(parcom) and (del 2), we can conclude that s′
α
==⇒ [r′] (r′!〈y〉 | [x] (r′?〈x〉 | 〈〈g′〉〉r) ) |
s ≡ 〈〈g′ · {x 7→ y}〉〉r | s. 2
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Appendix C
Encoding SRML into COWS
We report here the ‘machine readable’ syntax of SRML, the specification of the automo-
tive case study presented in Section 2.4.1 using this textual notation, and its encoding in
COWS.
C.1 SRML syntax
A Backus-Naur Form syntax of SRML is presented in Table C.1. The set of names is
ranged over by mod, pr, bp, lp, comp, br, req, wire, int, tr, param, type and lvar used
for a module, provides/serves-interface, business protocol, layer protocol, component,
business role, requires-interface, wire, interaction, transition, parameter, type and local
variable. The names of nodes in a SRML module, when we refer in general to either a
provides-interface, a requires-interface or a component, are ranged over by name.
The language of expressions, ranged over by e, is deliberately omitted; we assume
that expressions contain, at least, names and invocation of ask interactions, whose names
differ from those of the expression functions (i.e. an expression cannot contain an invo-
cation of the interaction ask sqrt(integer) : integer since sqrt is an expression function).
A particular kind of expressions are the conditions, ranged over by c, whose evaluation
is a boolean value. We will use lvar′ to denote the value that a state variable lvar has
after the corresponding transition. The language is also parameterized by an unspecified
set of Service Level Agreement constraints (ranged over by SLAc), and by an unspecified
set of service descriptions (ranged over by ServiceDesc) that represent the behavioural
specifications of abstract references (i.e., requires-interfaces in SRML).
The syntax of the module definition is given in the upper part of Table C.1. A mod-
ule M is defined by a number of components COMPS, one provides-interface/serves-
interface, a number of requires-interfaces REQS, one external policy SLAc, a number of
wires and specifications SPECS. COMPS represents a set of one or more components,
each defined by a name comp and a type br that refers to one BR element in the specifica-
tions SPECS, and equipped with a set of initial assignments and a termination condition.
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An external provides-interface is defined by a name pr and a type bp that refers to one BP
element in SPECS. A serves-interface is defined by a name pr and a type lp that refers to
one LP element in SPECS. REQS represents a set of one or more requires-interfaces, each
defined by a name req and a type bp that refers to one BP element in the specifications
SPECS. Each external interface is equipped with a trigger condition that launches the
discovery. SPECS is the set of specifications, which can be business roles (BR), business
protocol BP and layer protocol (LP) elements.
The syntax of the specifications referred to by a module definition is given in the
lower part of Table C.1. The business role BR is defined by one declaration of interac-
tions INTS and one orchestration description. INTS represents the interactions supported
by SRML. There are different types of interaction: asynchronous one-way rcv and snd,
asynchronous conversational r&s and s&r, and synchronous ask, rpl, tll, and prf.
The orchestration consists of an optional declaration of local variables LVARS and one
or more transitions TRANS. A transition has (1) an optional trigger TRIGS that is either
a condition, a receive event or a receive of a synchronous interaction (when a trigger is
not specified we consider the default condition to be true), (2) an optional guard that is a
condition (where true is the default condition),(3) optional effects (i.e., a number of as-
signments GASGS), and (4) an optional sends section represented by the term GSENDS
consisting in one or more send interaction events, sends of synchronous interactions, re-
turn events for rpl and prf interactions (denoted by int  [ e ]), and assignments to
output parameters. The interaction events and assignments in GSENDS may have a con-
dition, likewise assignments in GASGS.
C.2 SRML specification of the automotive case study
Table C.2 presents an excerpt of the specification of the module OnRoadRepair illustrated
in Figure 5.1. OnRoadRepair is defined by a number of component-/serves-/requires-
interfaces and their associated type (e.g., OR of type Orchestrator). The types are defined
below (see SPECIFICATIONS).
The internal policies init and term of OR define the initialisation and termination
conditions of the component. Initially, the local variable s has value INIT . The component
is compulsorily terminated when either the final state is reached (i.e. s = FINAL) or a fatal
error occurs (i.e. s = ERR). According to the internal policy trigger of GA the discovery
process is triggered by the condition s = READY .
The wires SO and OG connect pairs of nodes by defining a relationship between the
interactions and the parameters of the corresponding specifications. For simplicity, we
consider only the case of wires that define a straight one-to-one mapping.
Each specification is composed by a syntactical interface (INTERACTIONS). In SRML
interactions are asynchronous and can be one-way (i.e., receive rcv or send snd) or con-
versational (i.e., receive-and-send r&s, or send-and-receive s&r). A number of interaction
events is associated with each conversational interaction: an initiation event (denoted by
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(Module)
M ::= MODULE mod is
COMPONENTS COMPS
PRVORSRV
[ REQUIRES REQS ]
[ EXTERNAL POLICY SLAc ]
WIRES WIRES
SPECIFICATIONS SPECS
(Provides-Interface or Serves Interface)
PRVORSRV ::= PROVIDES pr : bp
| SERVES pr : lp
(Components)
COMPS ::= COMPS COMPS
| comp : br
[ init IASGS ]
[ term c ]
(Initial assignments)
IASGS ::= IASGS ∧ IASGS
| lvar = e
(Requires interfaces)
REQS ::= REQS REQS
| req : bp [ trigger c ]
(Event type)
ET ::= ֠ |  | X | 8 |  
(Wires)
WIRES ::= WIRES WIRES
| wire : name name
WLINES
(Wire lines)
WLINES ::= WLINES WLINES
| int ↔ int
[ : ET param↔ param, . . .
. . . ,ET param↔ param ]
(Specifications)
SPECS ::= SPECS SPECS
| BR | BP
(Business role)
BR ::= BUSINESS ROLE br is
INTERACTIONS INTS
ORCHESTRATION
[ local LVARS ]
TRANS
(Business Protocol)
BP ::= BUSINESS PROTOCOL bp is
INTERACTIONS INTS
BEHAVIOUR ServiceDesc
(Layer Protocol)
LP ::= LAYER PROTOCOL lp is
INTERACTIONS INTS
BEHAVIOUR Description
(Interactions)
INTS ::= INTS INTS
| rcv int [֠ PARAMS ]
| snd int [֠ PARAMS ]
| r&s int [֠ PARAMS
| [ PARAMS ] ]
| s&r int [֠ PARAMS
| [ PARAMS ] ]
| ask int(TYPES) : type
| rpl int(TYPES) : type
| tll int(TYPES)
| prf int(TYPES)
(Parameters)
PARAMS ::= PARAMS , PARAMS
| param : type
(Types)
TYPES ::= TYPES , TYPES
| type
(Local variables)
LVARS ::= LVARS , LVARS
| lvar : type
(Transitions)
TRANS ::= TRANS TRANS
| transition tr
[ triggeredBy TRIGS ]
[ guardedBy c ]
[ effects GASGS ]
[ sends GSENDS ]
(Trigger)
TRIGS ::= c | int ET
| int(param1, . . . , paramn)
(Guarded assignments)
GASGS ::= GASGS ∧ GASGS
| [ c ⊃ ] ASG
(Assignment)
ASG ::= lvar[ ′ ] = e
| int.param = e
(Guarded sends)
GSENDS ::= GSENDS ∧ GSENDS
| [ c ⊃ ] int [ ET ]
| [ c ⊃ ] int(e1, . . . en)
| [ c ⊃ ] int  [ e ]
| [ c ⊃ ] ASG
Table C.1: SRML syntax
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MODULE OnRoadRepair is
COMPONENTS OR : Orchestrator init s = INIT term s = FINAL ∨ s = ERR
SERVES SM : SensorMonitor
REQUIRES GA : Garage trigger s = READY
· · ·
EXTERNAL POLICY carUserSLAconstraints
WIRES SO : SM OR activation↔ init : ֠ sensorData↔ data
OG : OR GA bookGarage↔ acceptBooking : ֠ data↔ info,
 price↔ servicePrice
· · ·
SPECIFICATIONS
BUSINESS ROLE Orchestrator is
INTERACTIONS
rcv init ֠ data : carData
s&r bookGarage ֠ data : carData
 price : moneyVal
· · ·
ORCHESTRATION
local s : [INIT ,READY ,WAITING,GA PRICE, . . . ,FINAL,ERR],
data : carData, much : moneyVal, . . .
transition data receiving
triggeredBy init֠ 
guardedBy s = INIT
effects s′ = READY ∧ data′ = init.data
transition reqToGarage
guardedBy s = READY
effects s′ = WAITING
sends bookGarage.data = data ∧ bookGarage֠ 
transition respFromGarage
triggeredBy bookGarage 
guardedBy s = WAITING
effects s′ = GA PRICE ∧ much′ = bookGarage.price
· · ·
LAYER PROTOCOL SensorMonitor is
INTERACTIONS snd activation ֠ sensorData : carData
BEHAVIOUR SensorMonitorBehaviour
BUSINESS PROTOCOL Garage is
INTERACTIONS r&s acceptBooking ֠ in f o : carData
 servicePrice : moneyVal
BEHAVIOUR GarageBehaviour
Table C.2: The textual definition of the module OnRoadRepair
֠ ), a reply-event (denoted by  ), and so on. Interactions can involve a number of parame-
ters for each phase of the conversation (e.g.,֠ -parameters for the initiation,  -parameters
for the reply, etc.). One-way interactions have associated only one ֠ -event and one ֠ -
parameter.
Every instance of Orchestrator can engage in the interactions init and bookGarage.
The former is of type rcv and permits to receive data from the sensor monitor installed in
the car. The data are represented by the parameter data of type carData. The interaction
bookGarage is used for engaging with a garage service. This interaction is conversational
(of type s&r) and has one ֠ -parameter data and one  -parameter price through which
the price for repairing the car can be obtained. In the initial state, i.e. when s = INIT ,
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MODULE RepairService is
COMPONENTS GO : GarageOrchestrator init s = INIT term s = FINAL
PROVIDES CR : Customer
REQUIRES . . .
EXTERNAL POLICY garageSLAconstraints
WIRES CG : CR GO getRequest ↔ handleRequest : ֠ dataFromCar ↔ d,
 cost ↔ c
· · ·
SPECIFICATIONS
BUSINESS ROLE GarageOrchestrator is
INTERACTIONS
r&s handleRequest ֠ d : carData
 c : moneyVal
· · ·
ORCHESTRATION
local s : [INIT ,HANDLING, . . . ,FINAL], data : carData
transition reqResp
triggeredBy handleRequest֠ 
guardedBy s = INIT
effects s′ = HANDLING ∧ data′ = handleRequest.d
sends handleRequest.c = computePrice(data′) ∧ handleRequest 
· · ·
BUSINESS PROTOCOL Customer is
INTERACTIONS s&r getRequest ֠ dataFromCar : carData
 cost : moneyVal
BEHAVIOUR CustomerBehaviour
Table C.3: The textual definition of the module RepairService
an Orchestrator can perform only the transition data receiving, which is triggered by
the event init֠ and changes the internal state (as usual, we denote by s′ and data′ the
next value of the local state variables s and data). The transition reqToGarage has no
trigger and is executed as soon as the guard s = READY is true. The transition sends
the event bookGarage֠ and assigns the sensor data (stored in the local variable data) to
the parameter bookGarage.data. The event is sent to the (dynamically discovered) garage
service. Finally, by means of transition respFromGarage, the price required by the garage
service can be received and stored in the local variable much.
An excerpt of the specification of the module RepairService is shown in Table C.3.
It contains the component GO (of type GarageOrchestrator) connected to the provides-
interface CR (of type Customer) by the wire CG. The GarageOrchestrator provides the
interaction handleRequest of type r&s, which is made available through the provides-
interface to bind to customers upon selection (e.g. bookGarage). The interaction
handleRequest can be engaged by executing the transition reqResp. In this way, the data
of the customer’s car are received and processed to calculate the cost of the repair (through
computePrice(·)), after which the computed cost is sent back to the customer.
C.3 A flavour of the encoding
We outline here the encoding of SRML in COWS through the automotive case study
introduced above. A more complete account of the encoding can be found in the following
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technical report [30]. Firstly, we present the static aspects of the encoding, i.e. how a
SRML configuration is implemented in COWS, and then the dynamic ones, by showing a
feasible computation of the resulting COWS term.
Static aspects of the encoding. The COWS term representing all the entities involved in
the automotive case study, where 〈〈·〉〉 represents the encoding in COWS of the enclosed
term, is
〈〈MODULE OnRoadRepair is . . .〉〉 | 〈〈MODULE RepairService is . . .〉〉
| Middleware | Environment | BottomLayer
where Middleware is the term (Broker | Registry | ConstraintSolver |
MatchmakingAgent | . . . ), while Environment contains, at least, a COWS term represent-
ing the car’s sensor monitor that interacts with the module instance through the serves-
interface. The encoding of the bindings performed through uses-interfaces is in progress.
Hence, the term BottomLayer is left unspecified.
For example, a sensor monitor can be represented by the following COWS term:
[idsm] ( OnRoadRepair • create!〈sensorMonitor, idsm〉
| OnRoadRepair • activation!〈idsm,֠ , “gps = (4348.1143N, 1114.7206E),
fuelPr = 60psi, brakeBias = 70/30, . . . ”〉 )
This term directly invokes the service factory of the module OnRoadRepair without re-
sorting to a discovery mechanism (recall that OnRoadRepair is an activity module). The
operation create does not correspond to an interaction supported by the original SRML
module but to the factory of the COWS encoding of OnRoadRepair. It has the effect of
creating a new instance of the module and initialising it with the sensor monitor partner
name sensorMonitor and the fresh instance identifier idsm. In parallel, the sensor monitor
sends the collected data by invoking the COWS operation corresponding to the interaction
activation provided by the interface SM of OnRoadRepair.
A SRML module corresponds to a persistent COWS service that can be instantiated
by invoking the operation create with the partner name of the module (that coincides
with the name of the module, as e.g., RepairService). We assume that names of modules
are distinct; this is reasonable because, at the real implementation level, module partner
names can be thought of as URIs.
The encoding of RepairService is:
Broker • pub!〈RepairService, “Customer is . . . ”, garageSLAconstraints〉
| ∗ [xcust, xext id] RepairService • create?〈xcust, xext id〉.
[idintra] ( ProvidesInt | RequiresInt | Wires | Components )
With respect to the architecture of the encoding of a service module we have seen in Sec-
tion 5.1.5, we have that Factory corresponds to the replicated receive along the endpoint
RepairService • create, while InstanceHandler, Orchestration and DiscoveryHandler cor-
respond to ProvidesInt, Wires | Components and RequiresInt, respectively. The encoding
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of the module OnRoadRepair is similar, except for the absence of the publication activity
(i.e. the invoke along the endpoint Broker • pub) and the replacement of ProvidesInt with
the term ServesInt implementing the serves-interface SM.
To instantiate a module, a service has to provide its partner name (to allow the cre-
ated instance to reply) and a conversation identifier (stored in xext id) that will be used
for correlating inter-module communication to avoid interference among instances of the
same module. To guarantee absence of interference during intra-module communication
when a new module instance is created, a fresh conversation identifier idintra is gener-
ated. This identifier is necessary because communication among entities of an instance
(i.e. components, wires and interfaces) are performed along the same endpoints used by
other instances of the same module. The intra-module identifier differs from the external
identifier to prevent external entities from directly contacting internal entities. Such an
identifier is also used in the communication with Broker during the discovery phase.
The encoding of a wire is a persistent COWS service that catches a send event (by
means of a receive activity) from a connected entity, adapts the communication endpoint
and forwards the adapted event (by means of an invoke activity) to the other entity. For
example, the wire OG between OR and GA in OnRoadRepair is:
∗ [xdata] OGroleA • bookGarage?〈idi,֠ , xdata〉.GA • acceptBooking!〈idi,֠ , xdata〉
| ∗ [xservicePrice] OGroleB • acceptBooking?〈idi, , xservicePrice〉.
OR • bookGarage!〈idi, , xservicePrice〉
The term above uses two distinguished partner names to interact with the connected enti-
ties: the partner name OGroleA is used to catch messages coming from the left end of the
wire, while OGroleB is used for the right end (see the specification of OG in Table C.2).
An instance of a module can interact with instances of other service modules only after
the successful completion of the discovery phase. In particular, when a requires-interface
of the considered instance is triggered, it starts the discovery process by interacting with
Broker. Consider, for example, the requires-interface GA of OnRoadRepair. After its
activation, it sends a message with the business protocol Garage and the external policy
carUserSLAconstraints to Broker. Then, MatchmakingAgent and ConstraintSolver exe-
cute a matchmaking process between the pair (“Garage is . . . ”, carUserSLAconstraints)
and the pairs of business protocols and SLA constraints stored in Registry. If matching
succeeds, Broker sends back to GA a message with binding information.
The encoding of GA is as follows:
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GA • trigger?〈idi〉.
( Broker • disc!〈OnRoadRepair, idi, “Garage is . . . ”, carUserSLAconstraints〉
| [xp, xacceptBooking] OnRoadRepair •GA?〈idi, xp, xacceptBooking〉.
[idext] ( xp • create!〈OnRoadRepair, idext〉
| xp • bindingInfo!〈idext, acceptBookingResp〉
| ∗ [xinfo] GA • acceptBooking?〈idi,֠ , xinfo〉.
( xp • xacceptBooking!〈idext,֠ , xinfo〉
| [xservicePrice] OnRoadRepair • acceptBookingResp?〈idext, , xservicePrice〉.
OGroleB • acceptBooking!〈idi, , xservicePrice〉 )
| . . . ) )
where idi is the conversation identifier for the intra-module communication of the con-
sidered OnRoadRepair’s instance. The discovery process is triggered by a signal along
the endpoint GA • trigger, which is sent by the encoding of the component OR when the
instance state is set to READY by transition data receiving.
An instance of a service module can receive messages from the customer service that
has created it by means of a provides-interface. For example, the encoding of the provides-
interface CR of RepairService is
[xgetRequest] RepairService • bindingInfo?〈xext id, xgetRequest〉.
∗ [xdataFromCar] RepairService • getRequest?〈xext id,֠ , xdataFromCar〉.
( CGroleA • getRequest!〈idintra,֠ , xdataFromCar〉
| [xcost] CR • getRequest?〈idintra, , xcost〉. xcust • xgetRequest!〈xext id, , xcost〉 )
The encoding of a provides-interface is symmetric to that of a requires-interface, i.e. it
replaces the external identifier within an incoming message with the internal identifier.
Notice that, in case of conversational interactions, to allow a provides-interface to reply
to the corresponding requires-interface, the latter has to send to the former some binding
information (e.g., in case of GA, the operation name acceptBookingResp).
We do not show here the encoding of components (we refer the interested reader
to [30]). It suffices to know that a component is implemented by a COWS term that
performs invoke/receive activities corresponding to SRML interactions according to the
types of the interactions and the orchestration logic of the component. The term schedul-
ing execution of the different transitions has been implemented assuming a fair execution
of concurrent activities.
Dynamic aspects of the encoding. Suppose now that the COWS service implement-
ing RepairService has already been published in the Broker’s registry. This means
that it has already communicated to Broker its partner name, the business protocol
of its provides-interface, and its external policy, by performing the invoke activity
Broker • pub!〈RepairService, “Customer is . . . ”, garageSLAconstraints〉. Suppose also
that the sensor monitor has already contacted, and instantiated, the module OnRoadRepair
by invoking operation create, and that the created instance has performed transition
data receiving. A possible evolution of this scenario is described below.
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(1) OnRoadRepair triggers the process of discovery and binding.
1. Execution of transition data receiving of OnRoadRepair has set the state to
READY . Thus, the triggering condition of its requires-interface GA holds
true and, hence, the encoding of GA starts the discovery process. As-
sume that the broker, through MatchmakingAgent and ConstraintSolver,
selects the pair (“Customer is . . . ”, garageSLAconstraints) published
in the repository by RepairService as the best match for the pair
(“Garage is . . . ”, carUserSLAconstraints) sent by GA. Then, Broker returns the
message 〈idi,RepairService, getRequest〉 along the endpoint OnRoadRepair • GA.
Therefore, xp is replaced by the partner name RepairService, and xacceptBooking by
getRequest. This way, the encoding of GA evolves into the following term:
[idext] ( RepairService • create!〈OnRoadRepair, idext〉
| RepairService • bindingInfo!〈idext, acceptBookingResp〉
| ∗ [xinfo] GA • acceptBooking?〈idi,֠ , xinfo〉.
( RepairService • getRequest!〈idext,֠ , xinfo〉
| [xservicePrice]
OnRoadRepair • acceptBookingResp?〈idext, , xservicePrice〉.
OGroleB • acceptBooking!〈idi, , xservicePrice〉 )
| . . . )
2. The requires-interface GA invokes the factory of module RepairService by execut-
ing the invoke activity RepairService • create!〈OnRoadRepair, idext〉. Hence, the
following instance of RepairService is created:
[idintra] ( ProvidesInt | RequiresInt
| Wires | Components ) · {xcust 7→ OnRoadRepair, xext id 7→ idext}
GA also communicates the binding information to CR by invoking the operation
bindingInfo.
(2) OnRoadRepair initiates the conversation with RepairService.
1. The component OR of the OnRoadRepair’s instance executes transition
reqToGarage corresponding to the interaction bookGarage֠ . The block
sends of this transition corresponds to the COWS activity OGroleA •
bookGarage!〈idi,֠ , “gps = . . . ”〉. Notably, in the encoding of component OR we
take into account that it is connected to GA by means of the wire OG.
2. The wire OG catches the send event and adapts the endpoint of the activity of OR
(i.e., bookGarage֠ ) to the corresponding activity of the requires-interface GA. The
executed COWS activity is GA • acceptBooking!〈idi,֠ , “gps = . . . ”〉.
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3. The requires-interface GA catches the message and replaces the identifier idi in-
side the message with the external identifier idext. Then, it invokes operation
getRequest provided by the module RepairService, i.e. it performs the COWS ac-
tivity RepairService • getRequest!〈idext,֠ , “gps = . . . ”〉.
4. The message 〈idext,֠ , “gps = . . . ”〉 sent by GA is delivered to the instance of
RepairService created at step (1-ii) by means of the correlation identifier idext.
This instance can receive messages from the instance of OnRoadRepair through
the provides-interface CR, that replaces the external identifier in the incoming mes-
sages with the internal identifier. Thus, CGroleA • getRequest!〈idintra,֠ , “gps = . . . ”〉
is executed.
(3) RepairService processes the interaction and replies.
1. The encoding of the wire CG acts as that of OG, i.e. it just renames
the endpoints according to its specification. Then, it catches the message
〈idintra,֠ , “gps = . . . ”〉 sent over the endpoint CGroleA • getRequest and for-
wards it along GO • handleRequest. Hence, the performed activity is GO •
handleRequest!〈idintra,֠ , “gps = . . . ”〉. Notice that the component GO exploits
the partner name GO to receive messages from other entities.
2. The encoding of GO executes transition reqResp. This means that it per-
forms the activity GO • handleRequest?〈idintra,֠ , xd〉 and replies with CGroleB •
handleRequest!〈idintra, , “Eur 75”〉, where “Eur 75” is the value returned by
computePrice(“gps = . . . ”).
3. The wire CG catches the reply message, replaces the name of operation
handleRequest with getRequest and forwards the message to CR. The executed
activity is CR • getRequest!〈idintra, , “Eur 75”〉.
4. CR renames the operation getRequest in acceptBookingResp, replaces the inter-
nal identifier idintra with the external one idext, and sends the reply message to
the instance of module OnRoadRepair. The executed activity is OnRoadRepair •
acceptBookingResp!〈idext, , “Eur 75”〉. Notice that, if there were more than one
instance of OnRoadRepair, the identifier idext would guarantee that the mes-
sage is properly delivered to the (requires-interface of the) proper instance of
OnRoadRepair.
(4) OnRoadRepair receives and processes the reply.
1. GA catches the reply message, changes the operation name, replaces the identi-
fier and forwards the message to OG. Thus, the executed activity is OGroleB •
acceptBooking!〈idi, , “Eur 75”〉.
2. OG changes again the name of the operation and delivers the message to the com-
ponent OR. The executed activity is OR • bookGarage!〈idi, , “Eur 75”〉.
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3. Finally, the receiving event triggers transition respFromGarage of OR, thus OR’s
encoding executes OR • bookGarage?〈idi, , xprice〉.
It is worth noticing that, if during the above computation a fatal error occurs within
the component OR of the OnRoadRepair’s instance under consideration (i.e., its instance
state is set to ERR), the encoding of OR would execute a forced termination of the COWS
term implementing OR. This is done by means of a kill activity kill(k).
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